Reviews


Although Clark Wissler suggested as early as 1923 (in Man and Culture, New York: Thomas Y. Crowell) that there might be some innate physical basis for the universal features of culture, American anthropology was slow to follow suit. It was not until the advent of ethology in cultural anthropology and somewhat later that of cultural ecology, evolutionism, and psychological anthropology that a more balanced view of the interaction between biology and culture in human behavior began evolving. The present volume of essays attempts to integrate these disparate approaches into a consistent picture.

The basic assumption accepted as given by the authors is that most human behavior is neither merely learned nor totally genetically determined. All behavior is held to be mediated by neural structures, which in turn develop by a continuous adjustment of the individual to the environment. As a methodological tool, a global theory is proposed, described as biogenetic structuralism. It owes much to the midcentury structuralists, especially Claude Lévi-Strauss, as well as to earlier functionalist thinking. Applying this method, the authors set out to explore the evolution of the human capacity for ritual, to examine the ritual in other species, and to investigate the biopsychological functions of ritual relative to cognition and neurophysiological processes.

The principal authors have succeeded in joining the contributions in such a way as to produce a satisfying flow of ideas. With most of the essayists reporting on a considerable volume of individual research, much of the writing is extremely dense. Each of the presentations would actually merit a critique of its own. The present review can do no more than briefly sketch the principal ideas expressed.

Following the detailed introductory essay, W. John Smith ("Ritual and the Ethology of Communicating") traces interpersonal and religious ritual acts to displays and formalized rituals of nonhuman animals. These are seen as products of biological evolution, creating genetic predispositions. The resulting behaviors can then be elaborated by learned traditions. In the next essay ("Mammalian Ritual") Charles D. Laughlin, Jr. and John McManus concentrate on the evolution of human behavior. Due to enhanced corticalization Australopithecines may have assumed an intermediary position between their nonhuman predecessors and later Homo sapiens in that they were able to conceptualize a greater space of uncertainty than the former. The authors believe they have sufficient data supporting the inference that, even this early in human evolution, there was an ability for directing conceptualized rituals at resource availability, death of fellows, curing, and maintaining group cohesion. Barbara Lex ("The Neurobiology of Ritual Trance") painstakingly outlines the

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complex underlying processes generating trance behavior. Ritual (religious) trance, she holds, produces a readjustment of dysphasic biological and social rhythms by manipulating neurophysiological structures under controlled, that is, institutionalized conditions. How the evolution of neocortical functioning can be related to that of cultural institutions is the topic of Eugene G. d’Aquili and Charles D. Laughlin. They discuss the importance of rhythmicity in ritual and the embedding of it in a cognitive matrix, namely myth. They attempt to localize mythologizing in specific areas of the neocortex and link ritual to cerebral lateralization.

The subsequent four essays rely heavily on Jean Piaget’s epistemology and its concern with physical realities, as well as on neo-Piagetian approaches that take ritual into the social arena in describing the role of ritual during cultural and ecological change, that is, during times of stress. The Catholic mass is discussed by the Jesuit father G. Ronald Murphy as an example for the application of the proposed methodology. An extensive summary concludes the volume.

Seen overall, the authors certainly have succeeded in breaking new ground. Rough spots have to be expected in such a pioneering effort. We wonder, for example, whether it is appropriate once more to trot out the old fundamentalist conviction that those engaging in a behavior, such as a trance ritual, are unaware of its function. And when d’Aquili and Laughlin (p. 171) contend that “mythic materials may be social, or they may appear individually in dreams, daydreams, or fantasies,” we are back in the nineteenth century and Edward B. Tylor’s speculation about the origins of religion. If new avenues are to be explored, then why not also give some serious thought to observations of non-Western religious specialists, who are adamantly making a distinction between those neocortical and cognitive activities and what they designate as the experience of the alternate reality? What brain activity, what localization, might be involved there? In addition, some of the fields the authors have tapped into are moving ahead fast. This is certainly true of prehistory and brain research alike. Research on chemical activity of the brain may alter many now accepted views on what goes on in our most complex organ. On the practical side, miniaturized equipment is finding its way into observing trance behavior in the field (Ralph G. Locke, Duke University, “Report on a Field Investigation Conducted at Cassadaga, a Spiritualist Community in Florida,” manuscript, 1982). The ritual trance is being induced and studied under laboratory conditions (Felicitas D. Goodman, “Experimental Induction of Altered States of Consciousness,” Paper presented to the Eighty-fifth Annual Meeting of the Ohio Academy of Science, Miami University, Oxford, Ohio, April 1976; “Altered States of Consciousness: A New Classification,” Paper presented to the Seventy-sixth Annual Meeting of the American Anthropological Association, Houston, Texas, December 1977; “Body Posture and the Religious Altered State of Consciousness: An Experimental Investigation,” Journal of Humanistic Psychology [under consideration]). Recent Japanese research (Tadanubo Tsunoda, Nipponjin no No0 [The Japanese Brain], Tokyo: Taishukan, 1978, reported at the Seventy-eighth Annual Meeting of the American Anthropological Association, Cincinnati, Ohio, 1979) has thrown doubt on brain lateralization as a human biopsychological universal. The authors of the present volume may soon find themselves in a position of having to rewrite large portions of their work.

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I approach this book as one who teaches liturgics in a professional setting, but for whom liturgics has never been reduced to text studies. What we now call ritual studies has long interested me: what is going on here? who is involved? what myths, metaphors, and paradigms are enacted in liturgy? what is the meaning of time? of space? of the materials? These are some of my questions.

Ritual can be interpreted through various lenses: phenomenology, sociology, anthropology, and political science have all been used. However, Ronald Grimes circumvents the search for an interpretive mechanism to focus on the data. Methodology supersedes models, and the genius of the book is in its breadth of approach rather than in the option for a single perceptual grid.

The book is in four parts: The Ritual Field, Ritual Processes, Theories of Ritual, and Ritual and Theater. The first two sections offer ways to understand ritual by focusing on the process and meanings. We are to pay attention to two tasks in understanding ritual: self-knowledge and recognition of our feelings (intersubjectivity) and suspension of self-interest to focus on actions and values not our own (analytical).

We enter ritual studies by questioning about the space, objects, time, sound and language, identity, and action involved in ritual. We may understand ritual under six modes of sensibility: ritualization, decorum, ceremony, liturgy, magic, and celebration. These modes are discussed according to frame of reference, mood, activity, and so on, with examples listed for each mode.

Grimes offers a "soft definition" for our consideration: ritualizing transpires as animated persons enact formative gestures in the face of receptivity during crucial times in founded places (p. 55). This soft definition lets us see ritual as not merely text but also action and event which has phasic quality ("transpires"—like breathing). By using the word "enact" we see that ritual is a marriage of the literal and the symbolic—rather like Augustine's definition of a sacrament. By speaking of "formative gestures" we avoid the hardness of forms and yet include processes of both formalization (liturgy) and de-formalization (street theater), both of which aim at transformation of everyday gestures. By speaking of "crucial times" we are enabled to include both once-in-a-life times and here-we-go-again times within ritual studies.

The second part of the book explores ritual processes. Masking is explored in its various meanings, sitting and eating are used as forms of comparison between Zen and Christian ritual, and Zen ritual is discussed under the six modes mentioned earlier.

Part Three is a discussion and critique of the theories of Gotthard Booth, Theodor Gaster, and Victor Turner; there is a helpful comparison chart of the differences between Gaster and Turner's theories on pp. 144-146. Part Four discusses ritual in terms of contemporary theater, specifically the experimental theater groups in Poland, Canada, and England. This section concludes the book with an interesting chapter on "parashamanism," attempting to understand those who seek in texts for new ways creatively to soar above culture for the purpose of offering new ways of healing through play and ritual.

The book is a wealth of information; the bibliography is not only extensive but cited throughout the book. All the homework has been done. Grimes has
provided a vocabulary for a new *Wissenschaft* or "science of religion," and the book will be well received by all who struggle to understand more about how ritual informs, shapes, and creates the conditions for life.

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William James receives ample attention in books on the history of psychology, but is almost totally ignored in recent books about personality theory. For example, in the textbook reputed to be the best selling college level introduction to personality, James is mentioned on only one page. Don Browning's goal in his new book is to show that, although neglected, William James indeed made many important contributions to our understanding of the nature of human nature. Browning summarizes and interprets material selected from the complete range of James's psychological and philosophical writings in order to demonstrate the broad scope of James's thought on basic issues in personality psychology. This is put into contemporary perspective by comparing and contrasting James's ideas with those of B. F. Skinner, Sigmund Freud, Erik Erikson, and humanistic psychologists such as Carl Rogers.

Browning's dominant theme is that the richness of James's views, the wide and inclusive range of his ideas, is helpful and even indispensable for our efforts to understand the human condition today. But James's ideas are not well known among psychologists, perhaps because graduate schools seem to emphasize technical training more than intellectual education. Browning argues that the present one-sided focus on small, empirical studies in psychological research needs to be balanced with explicit consideration of larger questions about human nature. James had assumed that philosophers and psychologists would stay in communication with each other, but this has not proved to be the case. A fresh look back at the way philosopher-psychologist James utilized three major methods in his work—introspection, experimentation, and comparison—may help us to bridge this gap.

James used the method of introspection to its fullest advantage in his writings on the stream of consciousness and the consciousness of self (e.g., chapters 9 and 10 of *The Principles of Psychology* [New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1890]). Browning agrees with recent efforts to demonstrate that this represents a phenomenological dimension in James's thought, and he draws connections between James's description of the personal nature of consciousness and the later existential phenomenology of Jean-Paul Sartre, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, and Paul Ricoeur. In light of other methods used by James, however, his incipient phenomenology should be seen as a point of departure for a pluralistic vision of human nature that included functionalism, experimentalism, and comparative analyses. Browning provides a timely and convincing corrective to the recent overemphasis of phenomenological aspects of James's psychology.
and thus reinforces the central theme of the need for multiple methods in understanding human nature.

Social psychologists have recently begun to focus a great deal of attention on the self as a topic for research and theorizing. Most of this work is directly or indirectly derived from James's writings on self-esteem and the consciousness of self, such as his distinction between the spiritual or inner self and the social or outer self. Contemporary social psychology, however, seems to be dominated by a cognitive perspective that limits this renewed interest in the psychology of self to narrow boundaries, which unnecessarily impoverishes the field of inquiry. It is here that the importance of Browning's efforts to broaden our interpretation of James, and thus our understanding of psychology, becomes clearly apparent. For James went beyond phenomenological description of the self to explain its functional and adaptive role in the human effort to respond creatively to the challenges of the environment. James believed the development of the constituents of the empirical self was built upon human instinctive tendencies, such as the social self being rooted in an "innate propensity to get ourselves noticed" (Principles of Psychology, p. 293). To this important comparative or evolutionary perspective, James added an ethical viewpoint by arguing that development should lead to a valuing of the spiritual and social self above the comfort of the material self, essentially an argument against extreme individualism and narcissism.

Perhaps the most interesting chapter in Browning's book presents his interpretation of James's theory of human instinctuality. In contrast to both Freud's pessimistic dual-instinct theory and to the "sweetness-and-light" view of human nature held by humanistic psychologists, James accepted a pluralism of instincts that included both egoistic and sympathetic impulses. His view of socialization seems to be much closer to Erikson's positive theory (i.e., humans need culture in order to reach psychosocial maturity) than to Freud's bleak outlook on Civilization and Its Discontents (New York: Norton, 1961). Although James believed humans could use free will to be agents of historical improvement, he was well aware of the sacrifice and suffering entailed by "the moral equivalent of war." This is a much more satisfying conceptualization for many who are interested in religion and the social sciences than the unrealistically romanticized optimism of humanistic psychology. James also thought that instinctual inclinations could be shaped and organized through social experience into reliable habits that form the basis of a person's moral character; this provides an interesting alternative to Skinner's amoral, and rather empty, view of operant conditioning. Few people who cite James's famous line, "habit is the enormous fly-wheel of society," seem to realize that James included an evolutionary analysis of instincts and a phenomenological or introspective analysis of free will and choice in his conceptualization of the role of habit in human life. Once again, the virtue of Browning's presentation is its emphasis on the richness of James's vision of human nature.

In the final two chapters, Browning returns to the theme of his previous book, Generative Man (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1973): How can humans live a good life in the face of the seemingly endless problems in the modern world? A possible solution may be found in James's concept of "the strenuous life." To examine this concept, Browning draws from James's writings on philosophy, religion, and ethics in addition to the basic psychological works. The message here is that social scientists should become more modest about their confidence in their own narrow specializations and more open to contact with other fields. The strenuous life involves living by a hierarchy of
values, and James argued that religion brings forth higher ethical deeds with a spontaneous and durable power. His concept of a personal God functioning as an "ideal social self" provides an interesting account of human autonomy in ethical decision making. This positive view of the nature of religion in contributing to modern life is tempered by criticism of any mysticism that leads to inaction and detachment.

Overall, Browning has done an excellent job of presenting a coherent synthesis of James's diverse ideas on human personality and of contrasting this Jamesian perspective with several narrow or one-sided contemporary "cultures" of psychology. Browning's presentation suffers from some weaknesses in sociological and developmental concepts, which mainly reflect these weaknesses in James's original work. Perhaps a more systematic attempt to integrate the broad Jamesian vision of the strenuous life with Browning's previous interpretation of Erikson in *Generative Man* would be helpful in this regard. One curious omission is Browning's failure to discuss the relationship between the recent controversial writings on sociobiology and James's theory of human instinctuality. The very interesting presentation of James's instinct theory does, however, allow the reader to undertake this comparison for him or herself. In fact, the greatest strength of Browning's book may be his ability to convince the reader that James's vision offers a powerful perspective for our efforts to understand not just the current debate on sociobiology, but the enduring nature of human personality.

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The common aim of this collection of essays by R. M. Martin is to argue against the frequent objection to the use of logical methods in philosophy, that "such methods are appropriate only for the sciences and perhaps for the philosophy of science, but not for the more 'humane' parts of philosophy such as aesthetics, ethics, theology, and metaphysics" (p. 13). In contrast, the author holds that "logic is common to all these, being not only subject-matter neutral but closely interwoven with the very texture of language" (p. 13). Believing that "the best way to convince those who think it can't be done is to go ahead and do it" (p. 14), Martin wades in and takes the latest tools developed by contemporary logicians for theory construction and applies them to problems of theology, metaphysics, ethics, and aesthetics. He sees this common method as a way of "harmonizing metaphysics and theology [along with ethics and aesthetics] with the sciences" (p. 1). Thus these essays should be of peculiar interest to the readers of *Zygon*.

Since the author does make use of the latest tools of the logician, perhaps the book is not easy reading for the uninitiated. However, one should not be frightened by the use of contemporary symbolism; it certainly is worth the effort to familiarize oneself with it. I would recommend that a reader not
familiar with contemporary logic begin with Chapters 1 ("On Truth, Justification and Metaphysical Method"), 8 ("On Philosophic Ecumenism: A Dialogue"), 9 ("Some Musings on Hartshorne's Methodological Maxims"), and perhaps 19 ("The Strange Costume of Peirce's Hegelism: A Dialogue"). These essays are easy reading and will give the uninitiated a good introduction to what Martin is doing in these essays and a justification for the approach he takes throughout the book.

In a similar way, Chapter 17 ("Toward a Constructive Idealism") will also serve as a good introduction to the theological and metaphysical essays. The symbolization used in this essay is minimal and relatively easy to follow, and it will prepare the reader for the heavier and more detailed ones: chapters entitled "On God and Primordiality," "Some Thomistic Properties of Primordiality," "The Human Right to Good and Evil," "Fact, Feeling, Faith, and Form," "On the Logic of the Psyché in Plotinus," "A Plotinic Theory of Individuals," and "On the Eliminability of God's Consequent Nature." These essays taken together represent the most extensive attempt to date to treat metaphysics and natural theology using the new logical tools. In these essays Martin is concerned primarily with the theological and metaphysical theories of others: Alfred North Whitehead, Saint Thomas Aquinas, Jacques Maritain, and Plotinus. As a result one may be tempted to argue with Martin's interpretations of these philosophers, but to dwell on this would be to miss the value of these essays. Their value lies in their showing how such theories, whatever the differences in interpretation of the details, can be constructed using the new logical techniques.

In pointing to Martin's attempts to symbolize the theories of other philosophers in contemporary dress, I do not mean to suggest that his own views on metaphysical questions are held in the background. On the contrary, his nominalism, or conceptualism, comes through on almost every page; and it is ably expounded and defended, for example, in Chapters 12 ("On Intensions and Possible Worlds"), 13 ("On Virtual Class Designation and Intentionality"), and 20 ("On Meaning, Protomathematics, and the Philosophy of Nature"). Readers interested in value theory will find Chapters 14 ("On the Language of Music Theory") and 15 ("On World-making and Some Aesthetic Relations") particularly interesting, if not intriguing. Of course, the theological essays involve value theory likewise, for Martin believes that "God's knowledge . . . is primarily valutational; more particularly, it is of what is valued in the highest possible sense, of what is worthy of being loved in the highest sense, so much so that it ought in fact to be realized on earth as in heaven" (p. 21). And it is this belief that guides his theological construction. Chapters 14 and 15, however, are concerned with the aesthetic theory of music and painting. Since music is a performing art, Martin's own logic of events is utilized as a basis for an aesthetic theory of music. In contrast, Chapter 15 deals with painting where it is the art object with which the aesthetic theoretician is concerned. Here relations such as representing, expressing, and exemplifying are analyzed and systematized, using the new logical techniques.

What can be said for Martin's thesis on the applicability of these new logical techniques in metaphysics, natural theology, ethics, and aesthetics? The reviewer finds himself in strong agreement with Martin on this score. Metaphysics, natural theology, ethics, and aesthetics are highly conceptual disciplines. Some of the criteria, if not the primary criteria, of success in such disciplines should be precision, clarity, and systematization. It is precisely these
that the new logical techniques in syntax, semantics, and pragmatics have to offer the philosopher. Consequently, these techniques should be of even more fruitful advantage in these disciplines than in, say, the empirical sciences, albeit there also. A common method does make for attempts toward harmonization. One thing needed is a familiarity with the tools among philosophers. Much has been accomplished along these lines in the past twenty-five years. Yet more than familiarity is needed; they must be used. As Martin suggests over and over, this is hard work and it is here that Martin's work in these essays is so important. Even though his efforts in these essays to apply new logical techniques in various disciplines are largely exploratory, as he admits (p. xii), still he is pointing the way. He is, in effect, breaking new ground, ground that needs to be broken and ground that can be tilled fruitfully. He himself says, "... if the qualified reader should be displeased with the material here or find it wanting in this respect or that, the hope is that he will at least find it useful in his own attempts to do better" (pp. xii-xiii). Perhaps the highest compliment that can be given a philosopher is to say that his work can be built upon. Martin's work in these essays can be built upon.

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After Virtue, a Study in Moral Theory. By Alasdair MacIntyre. Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1981. 261 pages. $15.95. $7.95 (paper).

This is an important work in the present philosophical context and it has to be reckoned with for its many virtues as well as its shortcomings. Its basic contribution is to show the importance of history as constitutive in ethics, but I have reservations about the way Alasdair MacIntyre uses history. On the analysis of specific virtues it is superb, for its shows their reach into the culture of the time, so that to understand the virtue is almost to grasp the mental life of a period. This is achieved in part by invoking literature and the arts: Wolfgang Amadeus Mozart and Giotto, Jane Austin and Sophocles rub shoulders with Plato and Peter Abelard, Immanuel Kant and Ludwig Wittgenstein. This makes the reading highly enjoyable—the reader is almost afloat on a sea of culture. To this is added a lively specificity and a quick sense of analogy. MacIntyre is not content with saying, for example, that the pleasures of some psychological states are external goods, but conjures up "the closely successive and thereby blended sensations of Colchester oysters, cayenne pepper and Veuve Cliquot" (p. 184).

Since an essential part of MacIntyre's thesis is that human actions become intelligible only when they are seen as episodes in a narrative, what are the episodes underlying the narrative that is this book itself? MacIntyre provides an answer in his preface. He has been in revolt against "the conception of 'moral philosophy' as an independent and isolable area of inquiry" (p. vii). At the same time he was concerned with the basis for a moral rejection of Stalinism
and found it inadequate simply to add a liberal morality to a Marxian historicism. Indeed liberal individualism even more than Marxism becomes the object of his fundamental critique. The book is in effect an extended pilgrim's progress away from the sins and errors of modernity—the subversion of morality by a basic emotivism with its rampant individualism and a misdirected social science that continues the spurious rationalistic program of the Enlightenment. But unlike many of his contemporaries who begin a retreat from the present and end in medievalism (or else abandon the intellect itself) MacIntyre decides midway to recapture the proper sense of morality through a history of the virtues. This is a positive contribution of the book, and each historical step in the pilgrimage adds an element to the restoration. His conclusion, perhaps a bit narrower than the fuller outcome, is that "the crucial moral opposition is between liberal individualism in some version or other and the Aristotelian tradition in some version of other" (p. 241).

We have accordingly to consider, first, his critique of analytic ethics, liberal individualism, and the social science spawned by the Enlightenment; then the kind of history he invokes; and finally the adequacy of his thesis about the role and career of the virtues.

MacIntyre denies that moral concepts can be dealt with in isolation from an historical context and a specific state of culture. Since a relation to history and culture carries the specific values of the time into the concepts, he is in effect denying the value-free character of analysis. Indeed he is at his best in showing the cultural value content of abstract moral ideas and dilemmas. In a biting analogy (pp. 105-7) he compares the state of our abstract ethical concepts over which analytic moral philosophy struggles to the state of the Polynesian taboo which puzzled Captain Cook and on which his Polynesian informants were unable to enlighten him beyond that what was taboo was prohibited. Taboos came to seem arbitrary prohibitions, says MacIntyre, because the context which had rendered them intelligible had disintegrated. That was why, he says, Kamehameha II met with no resistance in abolishing the taboos, thereby creating "a moral vacuum in which the banalities of the New England Protestant missionaries were received all too quickly" (p. 106). But "with the blessings of analytic philosophy" taboo would have been analyzed as a nonnatural quality (by G. E. Moore), an intuitive idea (by W. D. Ross and H. A. Prichard), an emotional expression (by A. J. Ayer and C. L. Stevenson), an implied universalization (by R. M. Hare). MacIntyre asks: "Why should we think about our modern uses of good, right and obligatory in any different way from that in which we think about late eighteenth century Polynesian uses of taboo? And why should we not think of Nietzsche as the Kamehameha II of the European tradition" (p. 107)? Certainly MacIntyre makes the case for the historical-cultural character of moral concepts as constitutive—belonging in the main tent, not as an interesting side-show.

Yet MacIntyre's revolt against analysis does not, we shall see, take him as far out of its charmed circle as the boldness of the revolt might have led us to expect. He is certainly not an analyst manqué, for he is thoroughly steeped in that tradition; he is rather a heretic analyst whose heresy remains bound by its cords. Who but an analyst would still say, as he does in his last chapter, that the grave moral disorder of today "arises from the prevailing cultural power of an idiom in which ill-assorted conceptual fragments from various parts of our past are deployed together in private and public debate..." (p. 238)? We are left wondering whether the analytic has taken over the historical rather than been properly embedded in it.
MacIntyre’s critique of liberalism is that it rests essentially on an atomic view of the individual whose arbitrary will or feeling becomes the ultimate source of morality. It is arbitrary because the individual stands back from any character or relation and simply reacts: “Everything may be criticized from whatever standpoint the self has adopted, including the self’s choice of a standpoint to adopt” (p. 30). MacIntyre makes a great deal of this phenomenon of the empty or emptying self and spots it in unsuspected philosophical locations—even in G. E. Moore. Where it takes place, no social relations or roles or undertaking are constitutive of the self; all are shed as moral ties and with this total shedding go all reasons for acceptance.

In ethics, MacIntyre identifies this position as emotivism, according to which the meaning of a moral judgment is an expression of emotion with regard to the act, object, or person contemplated. He extends the concept tremendously; it covers not only feeling but also will, and so any ultimate commitment. Nietzsche comes readily under the emotivist rubric because of the basic role he gives to will and the will to power. Sören Kierkegaard’s treatment of the aesthetic as contrasted with the ethical is swept into this individualist attitude, and so is Jean-Paul Sartre’s treatment of present decision as primary. Indeed, emotivism for MacIntyre becomes the essence of individualism and the hallmark of modernity in ethics, and all ethical theories are either identified as emotivism or assessed for their capacity (and their failure) to stem the emotivist tide.

Now such a critique of liberalism, charging an isolated self, is hardly novel. It is found in religious philosophies (Jacques Maritain in Catholicism and Reinhold Niebuhr in Protestantism), in materialist philosophies (Karl Marx), and in naturalist philosophies (John Dewey). Let us reflect for a moment on the variety of interpretations given to this atomic individual and the empty self. Maritain (to whom MacIntyre acknowledges a debt [p. 242]) sees this individualism as beginning in the Protestant heresy, growing into Liberalism and ending up in Communism, the ultimate heresy; individualism and totalitarianism are opposite sides of the same coin. Niebuhr regards this individualism as issuing in an arrogant secularism in which man believes he can pull himself up by his own bootstraps. Marx analyzes individualism as accompanying a growing capitalism, to be transformed into a socialist-cooperative self. Dewey (like MacIntyre) sees it as estrangement from the social and substitutes for this metaphysical self an ideal of individuality that can be achieved by social effort.

The precise interpretation of what has happened in the isolated or empty self and what is going on in the isolating or emptying is equally diverse. For Maritain a self is empty when it has cut its ties to God; we should think of the human being not as such an individual but as a person oriented directly to God; social relations come through this common orientation. Niebuhr turns this emptying into a process of transcendence; he looks favorably on the very feature of standing-back that MacIntyre finds to yield an empty self. Niebuhr in fact uses the notion of constant self-transcendence and its infinite movement to argue that we live in an atmosphere of infinity, which should engender a virtue of humility. Marx, in his analysis of the anarchistic individualism of Max Stirner, takes the completely empty self to be the reiterated me and mine, the reflection in extremis of the capitalist sense of property. For Dewey, remaining within the liberal tradition, the standing-off can be a normal part of consciousness which pauses in facing a problem to consider critically its existent
content—not to decide arbitrarily but to rehearse alternatives and their consequences.

These varied interpretations, different though they are, are all full-bodied, each set in the context of a rich underlying philosophy which gives substance to its selective focus on the phenomena. By contrast, MacIntyre’s critique of liberal individualism and its self phenomena turns out to be bare and abstract, more like a schema for possible interpretations. He is more intent, having found the enemy and labelled it emotivism, on attacking every trace, showing no mercy to the least turn that opens a door to it. Thus he criticizes Stoicism when it withdraws from the passions and desires to an inner control, Abelard when he turns inward to identify morality with the will, Kant when he unties the moral from human desire, claims for implanted individual or natural rights, and so on. On the whole, MacIntyre does not look to any positive elements in these conceptions, although he does at one point anchor the legalistic idea of duty to the social effort to bar general evils that hinder the pursuit of the good. For the most part competing theories are regarded as mistaken analyses. Given his view of the importance of the historical, we might have expected some consideration of the sociohistorical development of individualism in morality—perhaps in the fashion of a Max Weber or R. H. Tawney or Marx. But MacIntyre instead turns to a different history—the history of the virtues.

MacIntyre’s critique of social science goes back to the Enlightenment program of studying man as one studies nature. That program rejected ancient teleology and substituted for moral purposes a reliance on the nature of man. MacIntyre has a long and detailed argument as to why the program had to fail. But much of this argument discusses the program’s over-simplifications, surreptitious value judgments, inadequate epistemology, and separation of fact and value. He has an interesting discussion of how a Weberian conception of bureaucratic expertise complemented the twentieth-century outcome of the program. But his case rests crucially—especially since the concepts of reason and rationality are not analyzed—on his critique of the current aim of social science. Here he focuses on the traditional hope that a social science will provide “a stock of law-like generalizations with strong predictive power” (p. 84), which he attempts to show cannot be furnished. This long critique seems to be the residue of his confrontation with Marxism as well as the Enlightenment tradition. Indeed he complains of a particular work of Marx’s that “he wishes to present the narrative of human social life as law-governed and predictable in a particular way” (p. 200). Now the crux of MacIntyre’s opposing case consists of arguments for a kind of systematic unpredictability, particularly the actual inability to predict inventions before they are invented or decisions before they are decided, as well as the occurrence of pure contingency. However, the upshot for social understanding presents less strength than the intensity of the critique. Social generalities will say “characteristically and for the most part...” rather than parade as strict laws. Further, much of the stability of life comes from “the threads of large-scale intention” and the social structure this supports (p. 98). But how, on MacIntyre’s view, could we predict that the long-range intentions will continue? Finally, when he speaks of vulnerability and fragility in social knowledge he does not seem to be saying anything very different from the contemporary philosophical picture of knowledge in general—physical as well as social—as only probable and always corrigible. In the end MacIntyre is not really rejecting social science, only a
particular interpretation of its claims and nature; he still allows it to furnish guides to analyze action, if not to ensure prediction. Surprisingly, he equates his position of generalization with Aristotle's: "He knew that the appropriate generalizations are ones which hold only epi to polu ('for the most part') and what he says about them agrees with what I asserted earlier about the generalizations of the modern social scientist" (p. 149). But Aristotle's view reflected his theory of the elements: the heavenly bodies as perfect exhibit strict universality, while what is below the moon—physical as well as social—does not, since it lacks perfection. The appropriate lesson from the Aristotelian comparison might rather be that instead of attacking a view of law in which the social is assimilated to the natural, one has to probe more deeply into assumptions and theories about the universe, time, contingency, and so on, to learn the types of determinate order—and novelty—to be found, and to what degree, in all phenomena.

What interpretation does MacIntyre offer of the history that is basic to understanding morality? His account is puzzling in many respects. He concentrates almost wholly on history as providing the meaning of an action and the selective element in interpretation, hence on history as story or narrative. There is a bare recognition that one narrative may be right and another not—an oblique admission of truth criteria (p. 198). Yet somehow in all this, history as happening gives way to history as told, to stories and story-telling, and even myth (p. 201). If this is a metaphorical way of underscoring the selective element in historical recounting, the variety of perspectives in which incidents may be viewed, it is enlightening. But narrative becomes a general category to cover human transactions. Conversations and actions become enacted narratives (p. 197). An action becomes intelligible only insofar as it is included in a story (pp. 195-96, 199). Personal identity is "just that identity presupposed by the unity of the character which the unity of a narrative requires. Without such unity there would not be subjects of whom stories could be told" (p. 203). The unity of an individual life lies in the unity of a narrative embodied in a single life (p. 203). In all this MacIntyre seems not far removed in philosophical spirit from the old positivist attempt to deal with linguistic statements rather than facts and events or from the way analytical philosophy limited inquiry to linguistic contexts, except that the temporal stretch is added. Just as the features of language often replaced properties of the world, so here features of narrative take over features of human life. "Unpredictability and teleology therefore coexist as part of our lives; like characters in a fictional narrative we do not know what will happen next, but none the less our lives have a certain form which projects itself toward our future. Thus the narratives which we live out have both an unpredictable and a partially teleological character" (p. 201). Surely it would be philosophically wiser to restore a partial teleology to human life by the simple (material) recognition that people have all sorts of purposes. We need no conceptual detour through narrative.

I am inclined to view this whole treatment of history as an analytic relapse, in which the notion of discourse over time becomes the essence of action and substitutes for the real world. MacIntyre's really fruitful hints about history come rather in his specific remarks about the kinds of conditions and human predicaments that have supported specific virtues.

What is MacIntyre's picture of authentic morality as against the spurious morality of contemporary individualism? The picture may be built up from his account of the virtues. In the heroic age these express a morality firmly wedded to the social structure. Virtues are excellences in carrying out the roles
assigned to free men. The social nature of morality is manifest; there is no stepping-out to provide a detached judgment by a nonparticipant self, although Homer himself "puts in question, as his characters do not . . . what it is to win and what it is to lose" (p. 120).

The account of the virtues at Athens brings out plots that take shape with conflict. Plato questions the meaning of ethical ideas because the previous form of life has given way and rival standards have emerged. MacIntyre see conflicts particularly presented by Sophocles: in the Philoctetes there are opposing concepts of what is honorable, and in the Antigone the demands of the polis are pitted against those of the family. Sophocles offers no moral resolution. In contrast, Plato presents a transcending ideal supported by a psychology and a set of virtues. For Aristotle, "conflict is simply the result either of flaws of character in individuals or of unintelligent political arrangements" (p. 147). MacIntyre appears to share the Sophoclean view and Homer's insight that tragic conflict is the essential human condition, but he takes the rational core of morality to lie in Aristotle's conception of virtue grounded in a common pursuit of the good life in an organized community. This political or social relation is constitutive: a human self is a social self in such relations with others. Aristotle was able to expound such an ethics of virtue on a grand scale because he had his base in the polis. In spite of some narrowness in the virtues and a basic ahistoricity in Aristotle's outlook, MacIntyre accepts his core conception. That is why the opposition to emotivism is phrased in the title of a middle chapter as "Nietzsche or Aristotle?" and soon becomes, in effect, Aristotle or nothing.

Historicity is added in the medieval world. The new idea is of human life as a quest: "To move toward the good is to move in time and that movement may itself involve new understandings of what it is to move toward the good" (p. 164). Whatever the specific medieval historical picture, it is a picture of human life as historical; the virtues are seen as qualities that enable man to overcome evils on the historical journey. This chapter exhibits particularly the ambivalence of MacIntyre's own outlook. On the one hand he presents the growth of a rounded conception of morality in history; on the other he is intent on seeing that same history as a decline that advances emotivist individualism. The treatment of Abelard here, noted earlier, shows this double aspect. Abelard retreats from the contingency and accident of the world to the inner will. He is thus shunning the tasks that others undertake: "the twelfth century is a time when institutions have to be created" (p. 159). If MacIntyre had carried even this bare recognition of actual historical circumstance into his analysis of the present world, how different his picture of our own moral state might have become. Must we wait for the twenty-first century or later to have a moral historian understand that in the vast changes of the present century new institutions have to be created?

MacIntyre's treatment of virtue in the modern world is largely concerned with its distortions, first in the focusing of moral issues as egoism versus altruism and then—in recent philosophy—in attempts to build morality on the idea of justice. While his discussion of different virtues is rich, there is little or no attempt to appreciate the conditions and problems that prompt other modes of theoretical formulation in ethics. For the most part, as we noted earlier, they are treated as simply mistaken views.

In place of the empty self of individualism, MacIntyre eventually provides the social self whose unity lies in its historical tradition and social relations. The good life for man, with seeming paradox, is identified as "the life spent in
seeking for the good life for man" (p. 204), and the virtues are the qualities necessary for this search. MacIntyre recognizes the constant presence of conflict and the continual effort to deal with it. As for our present situation, his view is one of utter gloom. He concludes that the new dark ages are already upon us, and hope lies in sustaining the tradition of the virtues.

What, in the end, is the likely impact of this book on the present state of ethical theory? It is salutary in two different respects: MacIntyre calls ethical theory back to the sociohistorical character of morality and he focuses on the long neglected area of the virtues. In both respects the account may also lead astray for the job proposed needs greater historical depth. Also the partisanship for the idea of virtue as the essence of morality neglects the network of complex relations among virtue, obligation, and the good, and the lessons of their long history of jockeying for supremacy. The book almost systematically misappreciates perspectives it does not share and so makes little move toward a really systematic theory.

MacIntyre also has short-changed us on post-Millian moral philosophies. There is only a nod to Marxism, no specific appraisal of its specific theory of moral change. Also, in his revolt against analytic ethics there is no evaluation of its possibly positive side. But most surprising is the omission of nineteenth- and twentieth-century efforts to come to grips with the moral impact of the Darwinian revolution. For example, Dewey is not even mentioned. Yet so many of MacIntyre’s conclusions—the sociohistorical character of the self, the questing nature of the good, the place of conflict, a reckoning with individualism, even the nature of virtue in relation to the common good—were critically worked over and reworked by Dewey more than half a century ago in an attempt to shape a contemporary theory of ethics.

In spite of the shortcomings we have discussed, the book marks a significant step towards bringing moral philosophy back into a relation with human history and the problems of the quality of human life.

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