Reviews


Few people are able to do the type of interdisciplinary work that merits the serious attention and scholarly challenge as that presented by Erik H. Erikson. J. Eugene Wright’s book, Erikson: Identity and Religion, does justice to the high caliber of Erikson’s interdisciplinary work by accurately summarizing and clearly explicating Erikson’s concepts on developmental psychology. Faithful to Erikson’s positions, Wright shows that Erikson’s theories are not limited to views on personal growth alone, but include the influences of social environment, and society as a whole, as they impinge on the individual and as the individual in turn shapes the development of his or her social milieu. Because Erikson insists on the importance of society in personal psychological development, his work correlates with the disciplines of sociology, history, and religion, thus generating theories of a psycho-historical, psycho-social, and psycho-theological nature.

Wright considers identity and religion to be key concepts of Erikson’s works. This two-pronged foci is unfolded in the two parts of Wright’s book: “Erik H. Erikson: His Identity, Method, and Theory” and “Ethics and Religion.” Lest one find Wright to be a blind enthusiast of Erikson’s thought it soon becomes evident that Wright is not only aware of, but directly addresses Erikson’s critics within the text. Taking full cognizance of these various positions, Wright proceeds to offer his own interpretation of Erikson’s theories through a development of the two key concepts of identity and religion.

Wright honors Erikson’s own orientation of studying subjects in their social context by presenting Erikson’s methodology and theory in the context of Erikson’s own social background. Through an effective overview of Erikson’s family and professional background, Wright specifies the influences exerted on Erikson, the stepchild, and later Erikson, the clinician. As a stepchild Erikson worked out his own identity in terms of himself, his family, and society. Erikson’s personality and way of knowing, suggests Wright, is highly intuitive, typical of a left-handed way of knowing. Wright takes Jerome Bruner’s work, On Knowing: Essays for the Left Hand (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press, 1963), to be authoritative in describing the synthesizing type of personality which is prevalent in some left-handed people such as Erikson. Erikson’s synthesizing personality found expression in the two major themes of his writings.

Wright contends that the two themes found throughout Erikson’s writings are the pursuit of and the goal of wholeness. Within the first theme Wright situates the problem of identity as the center of Erikson’s concerns. He says that not only one’s personal identity but society’s identity today has become confused. This, says Erikson, is due to the problem of our rootless historical period. Besides, identity is multidimensional “for we deal with a process ‘located’ in the core of the individual and yet also in the core of his communal

[Zygon, vol. 20, no. 1 (March 1985).]
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culture, a process which establishes, in fact, the identity of those two identities” (Erikson, *Insight and Responsibility* [New York: W. W. Norton, 1964], p. 143).

The heart of Erikson’s theory is found in the eight stages of human development in the “womb of society.” These stages unfold gradually with corresponding crises, virtues, and social institutions accompanying each stage. A crisis arising from encounter with the environment ushers in each new stage of the life cycle. The successful resolution of each crisis leads in turn to a new strength which Erikson called virtue—meaning personality or psychic strength. Wright finds Erikson “providing a framework for an ultimate ethical vision and a foundation for a religious point of view” in his positioning of the virtues (p. 43).

Not only is Erikson concerned with the social influences on the growing individual but with religious influences as well. The first of these is found at the very early infant stage of trust with religion becoming the social institution of trust, according to Erikson. Part two of Wright’s book is entitled, “Ethics and Religion,” a title which highlights the author’s own interest in this study. This interest began during Wright’s student days when his philosophy of religion professor pointed out the “hints of transcendence” present in everyday life. This Wright considers “to be a vital foundation to my later studies of Erikson” (p. xv). Indeed Wright finds “hints of transcendence” at each stage of the life cycle. “Signals of transcendence” are underscored by the virtues and the social institutions which sustain the virtues. Some examples Wright cites as signals of the ultimate are: play which restores a sense of hope and trust, conscience meaning and commitment, fidelity, mutuality of encounters with significant others, generativity, creativity, and integrity. The schematic theme drawn up by Donald Capps and Paul W. Pruyser which correlates theological themes, psycho-social themes, and the human virtues is but one more example which Wright draws upon to strengthen his argument that Erikson was making a religious statement in his developmental schema.

I question the emphasis Wright assigns to religion in Erikson’s writings. I would see Erikson being primarily a psychologist who uses religion more by inference and illustration for his goal of wholeness than as a consciously directed study within the life cycle. Certainly the developmental works of James Fowler and Fritz Oser are more explicitly focused on religion. True, Erikson did explicate his religious and ethical concerns through works on religious figures like Martin Luther, Mahatma Gandhi, and at various points in his own writings, but at no place does Erikson attempt to take theological positions or try to posit a unique system of ethics. Erikson’s ethical base is the Golden Rule, a base akin to Old Testament ethics. However, Wright does note that Erikson’s Golden Rule ethics has “religious concepts,” again an example of religion by inference rather than a direct treatment of religion or ethics in a thorough fashion. Wright appears to recognize this “second place” position of religion to psychology in Erikson’s theory, for he states that Erikson treats religion more from a developmental stance than from the ambiguous stance as charged by his critics. Wright goes on, however, to argue that Erikson is sympathetic to religion for he writes about religious figures, uses religious terms, and makes statements about religion which indicate a “kind of nostalgia” for religion. Nostalgia is insufficient evidence for maintaining that Erikson’s work focuses on religion. It then seems somewhat of an exaggeration for Wright to state that for Erikson “religion is essential in the development of the life cycle and the race” (p. 181).
However, I must acknowledge the superb synthesizing Wright himself did in unifying all of the religious motifs within Erikson's writings. In so doing Wright illustrates quite remarkably the themes he found in Erikson's work, those of the pursuit and the goal of wholeness. Erikson does truly seek a new synthesis and wholeness in spite of the polarities in modern society which are alien to wholeness. Erikson's wholeness involves the entire life cycle of generations such that "societal, historical, religious, and cultural forces interact with the developing person" (p. 200).

*Erikson: Identity and Religion* would ably serve as a text which both summarizes and reviews Erikson's major arguments and his theory of the life cycle. Part 1 of the book clearly outlines the theory and methodology employed by Erikson while Part 2 introduces the ethical/religious dimensions of Erikson's work. One must be aware, however, that Part 2 gives a more central role to religion than Erikson himself explicitly assigns religion in his theories. Written clearly and in a readable, concise style, I would recommend this book for college classes of an interdisciplinary nature or for theologians taking their first dip into another discipline which relates to religion.

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Few would deny that Charles Hartshorne stands as the elder statesman of that young school of thought known as process philosophy or neo-classical metaphysics. For over half a century, Hartshorne has been among the most original formulaters and vigorous defenders of process thought, developing a theory of God, nature, and humanity involving such traditionally suspect conceptions as novelty, contingency, passivity, and feeling. Although he has spent much energy trying to dialogue with other schools of thought, Hartshorne's latest book constitutes his most sustained, cohesive attempt to define and defend his position by reaction to previous thinkers.

As the title suggests, this book is not an impartial history of ideas but a partisan attempt to indicate what value the great systems of the past have for treating current philosophical problems, reminiscent of similar critical histories by Bertrand Russell and G. W. F. Hegel. Hartshorne complains that many contemporary thinkers either made inadequate use of the rich history of philosophy or else treat past philosophical systems as relatively isolated from each other and as valuable today simply in proportion to their fame or influence. He recommends that we try to identify for each major philosophical problem what the spectrum of possible solutions would be and then turn to the history of philosophy to see how well each of those solutions has actually been presented and defended, whether by philosophical giants or obscure minor figures. This analytical spirit guides Hartshorne's use of the history of philoso-
phy, even though his book is chronological in structure, focusing on European thinkers from the ancient, medieval, modern, and contemporary periods.

Hartshorne's conclusions may be summarized briefly along with a few of the problems they raise under three key ideas. First, there is his doctrine of relational asymmetry. Hartshorne complains that most philosophers have either treated all relations in reality as external, as if the terms of those relations were mutually independent, or else treated all relations as internal, as if those terms were mutually dependent (pp. 151-69). He depicts the former extreme as long popular among philosophers in Britain, including William of Ockham, David Hume, Russell, G. E. Moore, Alfred J. Ayer, and the early Ludwig Wittgenstein (pp. 107, 136-42, 157-58, 257-61), and the latter extreme as held by such thinkers as Benedict de Spinoza, Hegel, F. H. Bradley, Josiah Royce, and Brand Blandshard (pp. 123-25, 155-59, 196-97, 205-8, 256, 260-61). Hartshorne defends the third option that between any two non-simultaneous terms, the earlier term is externally related to the later but the later is internally related to the earlier. Hence causes are independent of effects but not vice versa; likewise, in perception and memory, two basic sorts of causality and of prehension of the past in process metaphysics, objects are included in but independent of subjects and subjects include but are dependent on objects. It is through this asymmetrical view of relations that Hartshorne accounts for the directionality of time (p. 318) and for personal identity as involving not a static substance but a self-ordered accumulation of feelings (pp. 41-42, 54-55, 78-181, 337).

A second key idea is the doctrine of divine dual transcendence. According to Hartshorne, between the writing of Plato's *Timaeus* and Alfred North Whitehead's *Process and Reality*, the dominant intellectual tradition of classical theism tended to treat God as embodying only the former side of such basic polar concepts as one/many, active/passive, necessary/contingent, infinite/finite, and independent/dependent, while treating the latter side of each such contrast as applying solely or more characteristically to the sub-divine. He holds, on the contrary, that because there is an eminent mode as well as inferior modes of both poles of such contrasts, both poles must be considered in different respects attributes of God and also in different respects attributes of the sub-divine (pp. 60, 207, 376). "God is exalted above other realities not as cause surpasses effect, or unity, plurality, or being, becoming; but rather as eminent cause surpasses ordinary causes, and eminent effect, ordinary effects; similarly, as eminent being and becoming surpass ordinary being and becoming, or eminent unity and plurality surpass ordinary unity and plurality" (pp. 314-15). Another way of expressing God's dual transcendence is to depict God as in some respects unsurpassable even by God's own future states. For instance, every new divine experience exceeds its predecessors and the feelings of all sub-divine individuals in knowledge, love, and creativity; but the fact that every divine experience has such superiority is part of the inherent status or abstract essence of God which could not conceivably be surpassed by any future individual, including God (pp. 100-1, 274).

Because he takes seriously the traditional view of our bearing the image of God, Hartshorne holds that all states of all sub-divine individuals involve inferior modes of feeling (hence his psychicalism), creativity (hence indeterminism), love, and so on. Furthermore, he shares Whitehead's view that only God has subjective immortality or a perpetual addition of novel experiences, while sub-divine individuals have only objective immortality or a perpetual remembering and treasuring by God's future experiences of the sequences of
feelings that have constituted their lives. This suggests to Hartshorne his central ethical doctrine of contributionism, that the ultimate moral standard and meaning of life lies in our need to create the most beautiful experiences possible in ourselves and in all sorts of individuals in order to contribute the most beauty possible to the feelings of God (pp. 30, 72-73, 87-88, 308, 326-27, 372).

Third, Hartshorne has a nominalistic, Popperian epistemology and a priori metaphysics/theology. Although many may share his view that metaphysics and natural theology deal in universal and necessary statements about existence, Hartshorne considers himself almost alone among metaphysicians in treating metaphysical claims as incapable of either proof or disproof by empirical means (pp. 106-7, 370, 376). That is, since the publication of The Logic of Perfection (LaSalle, Ill.: Open Court, 1962), Hartshorne has often expressed his acceptance of Karl Popper's criterion of demarcation between science and metaphysics in terms of empirical falsifiability. In the present work Hartshorne reaffirms his belief that while scientific claims are in principle capable of empirical refutation, no conceivable observations, even if (contrary to Popper) we include those of a conceivable superhuman observer, could settle metaphysical disputes between theism and atheism, determinism and indeterminism, or realism and idealism (Chapter 8 of Creative Synthesis and Philosophic Method [LaSalle, Ill.: Open Court, 1970] was first published in the Review of Metaphysics 12 (1958), pp. 35-47, and appears to be a throwback to his pre-Popperian days in its depiction of metaphysical claims as empirically verifiable); hence Hartshorne insists that all metaphysical or theological argument must be nonempirical and judged on one's ability to bring the proper definiteness and polar contrast to one's concepts (pp. 48, 49, 149-150, 313, 321, 372).

It is interesting to note that despite his enthusiasm for Popper's sharp distinction between science and metaphysics, Hartshorne complains that process philosophy's greatest weakness is that "there seems to be no recent or living physicist or philosopher of science whose views of time and space are clearly compatible with those that my view seems to require" (p. 376). It is hard to see why the lack of a scientific defender would bother a metaphysician with Popperian ties, who need not and even should not depend for his metaphysical beliefs and conceptual paradigms on a field of thought held to be governed by empirical falsifications.

A final twist to Hartshorne's position is his rejection of the quasi-Platonic realism of Whitehead (and Popper) on the status of abstract entities for a nominalism which views all the concepts employed in metaphysics as somehow abstracted from the concrete (pp. 269-70, 300, 355). While he may have good reasons for rejecting realism, Hartshorne has done little here to clarify the position he expressed on this important issue in Chapter Four of Creative Synthesis and Philosophic Method. It may seem intuitively plausible that the absolute is an abstract aspect of the relative or that an object of feeling is included in a subject, but Hartshorne would do well to explain more extensively how it is that eternity could be an abstract aspect of a transient event or how necessity could be included in a contingent event. In other words, what status do the materials of an a priori metaphysics possess before, during, or after their abstraction from the concrete?

On the whole, this book suffers somewhat from the unevenness that one might expect from so wide-ranging a work; for example, the treatment of Marxism is superficial compared to the lucid discussions of Aristotle and Hume on modality. Furthermore, the book is somewhat repetitive, though under-
standably so given the fact that its author feels that the same biases of ancient Greek philosophy have been manifested in the works of almost all subsequent thinkers until recently. Although 25 of the 30 chapters in this book appear here for the first time, there is a great deal of material in it which has been expressed in Hartshorne's earlier works; certainly, this book has not replaced *Creative Synthesis and Philosophic Method* as his most rich, original, and penetrating work.

Nevertheless, Hartshorne has explored some new territory here in stimulating fashion and more importantly has provided a systematic account of his relations to other schools of thought which he has so long tried to engage in debate. He has also announced two forthcoming books treating areas not covered at length in the present work, one a critical review of philosophy in the United States and the other a presentation of a metaphysically based ethics and aesthetics. If the present work and these forthcoming works fail to attract the serious attention that he has so long deserved from those in other schools of thought, it is difficult to imagine what could succeed.

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A primary concern for readers of *Zygon* is the relationship of religion to a scientific culture. Most often this relationship is sought through reflection on scientific theories and knowledge confirmed by the scientific community. On this approach Robert Short's little book would be judged a disappointment. Short instead looks for signs of the religious impulse in the imaginative and artistic productions of a scientific culture.

In this book he weaves a philosophical and theological interpretation of "The Religion of Outer Space" with cartoons and movie stills. In a sequence of science fiction films he traces a movement from atheistic humanism in *2001: A Space Odyssey* to the flowering of the meaning of the Christian Gospel in *E.T.* 2001 represents the dark brooding question of the meaning and purpose of life. For Short, the films *Close Encounters of the Third Kind, Superman, Star Wars,* and *E.T.* are attempts to move toward a stronger and more satisfying answer than that of 2001—that humans create their own meaning in the face of meaningfulness. The search for meaning in outer space and contact with extra-terrestrial beings represents a yearning to find meaning and purpose of a universal character.

In the popular appeal of these films, Short sees evidence that these space fantasies serve a religious function in helping people to examine the mundane problems of life on earth and find ultimate meaning for their lives. While salvation by super-aliens (*Close Encounters, Superman*) may be an alluring solution, the struggle with the duplicity of the human will in relation to the power of the "Force" (*Star Wars*) and the ache of universal love symbolized in *E.T.* more adequately represent the solution of traditional Christianity. Readers may find Short's particular Christian perspective somewhat offensive; nevertheless, this

[ *Zygon*, vol. 20, no. 1 (March 1985).]
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little book lifts up some basic questions in a light-hearted way and points to space fantasy and science fiction as sources for serious reflection on religion and science issues.

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In his book Faces of Science (Philadelphia: ISI Press, 1981) V. V. Nalimov states: "revolutionary changes in the development of science are very hard to express quantitatively. We no longer have an instrument with the help of which we can watch the development of an informational system. It is interesting to note that through history there have existed information systems which did not change in a revolutionary way, e.g., medieval theology; one of these which has been preserved up to now is the System of Yoga. It is inexplicable why nobody has so far studied the life of such systems as a contrast to the development of science" (pp. 21-22). In partial response to Nalimov I would have to suggest that, while no one has attempted such a historical contrast, the matter is rectified by examining such works as The Tao of Physics, The Dancing Wu Li Masters, Godel, Escher and Bach, and The Stone Monkey. Each of these synthesizes Eastern cosmological realities and quantum physics, while criticizing Western science predominantly for lack of vision.

The perspective of the new physics challenges both traditional cosmological values and the language in which those values were spoken. The ancient world vision of hierarchical, metaphysical completeness is being overshadowed by the construct of an immanent, metaphysical incompleteness. This ought to persuade philosophers to redefine the traditional philosophical concepts which have underscored the biblical and moral vision of the ideal person. Given the paradox that our more accurate technological instrumentation, while precise in its measurements, is exposing the realm of uncertainty as its only true measured result, it would appear that the human goals of completeness, perfection, and specificity are contradicted by the implicit probability of incompleteness, imperfection, and unspecificity in the universe around us. For these reasons, a philosophy of nature as reflected through religious truth is not existent today. Philosophers of religion do not dare to presuppose the depth and extent of knowledge so unsure. The ancients boldly imagined a completed universe, but today's scientist is daring to imagine and recreate this vast new frontier far from complete. In a word, the world views offered in the name of belief and belief systems that appealed to the test of time and the security of truth are today disconnected from the "real cause(s)" of what the universe is about.

In a time of rather conservative backtracking to secure foundations of human nature through religion, philosophy, and the arts, The Cosmic Code by physicist Heinz R. Pagels offers to the popular reader of scientific innovation a series of philosophical reflections on the dilemma of diversity versus stability in

[Zygon, vol. 20, no. 1 (March 1985).] © 1985 by the Joint Publication Board of Zygon. ISSN 0044-5614
the field of quantum physics. Pagels unfolds the incomplete universe of change and changeability and explains what quantum physics knows the real causes to be.

This book offers an alternative philosophy of science that is neither a restatement of the classical dualism of matter and spirit nor a methodical characterization of the world of the new physics. Rather his book describes the world as "the invisible organization of energy." Pagels accomplishes his purpose through a metaphysical journey into the world of "underreality" by working both the personal propensities of the great physicists of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, as well as the metaphysical qualities of the world of quarks, leptons, gluons, fields, and particles. Statements by Pagels such as "Einstein's character and upbringing encouraged a profound sense of trust in the universe and in life. That trust and confidence it brings is the foundation of the autonomous mind living at the boundary of human knowledge" (p. 20) suggest a sensitive humanistic and artistic appreciation of the psychology of the dedicated physicist. At the same time, the complex world of quantum nature is simply explained by articulating the relative distinctions among such quantum terms as leptons and hadrons. Pagels attempts to create a visual image of quantum concepts without the absolute use of mathematical themes and formulae. Examples of visual analogies and metaphors abound, and the reader imagines a world within worlds demanding the attention of any artist, philosopher, or religious metaphysician who wishes to ground his or her work in the nature of things.

As Pagels journeys into the natural world he states, "We could imagine a second mattress made of a different kind of spring, maybe a heavier one, that is superimposed on the first lattice, and this mattress would represent a quark field. Its vibrations correspond to quark particles. So far, in each field there is a different mattress of springs pervading all of space, and the vibrations of a specific spring correspond to a particle at that point" (pp. 270-71). By the same token, criticism of Pagels's metaphors and analogies may be easy to make from a scientific perspective, first, because the picturability of quantum reality qua things-in-themselves is debatable, and, second, because the operational quality of quarks, electrons and the like is, according to some, the only aspect of quanta capable of being pictured and is therefore subject only to mathematical laws of probability.

However, Pagels does indeed suggest the overriding philosophical controversy in the discussion of quantum reality, namely, the controversial paradoxes of that reality suggested by "identity and difference," "being and nothingness," "certainty and randomness." This aspect of the book is the most engaging for the nonscientist. The imagery created by the world of quantum physics among physicists themselves and the conclusions they draw from the "invisible organization of energy" opens up a world of creative possibility and new definitions of quantum ideas such as transformation and discretion. If life imitates nature, then it would appear that the language of quantum reality may be metaphorically extrapolated and applied to religion and the sciences, the arts and philosophy, theories of music, and so on, to engender a new possibility of transcending the physical to the realm of the imaginative. Of course, the law of entropy enters even here, for one cannot simply transpose the paradoxical riddles of nature to the living world of human beings unless one understands the complexity of such adaptations and the limitation of an exercise such as this. This is where The Cosmic Code is an enigma in itself. It is not clear what end
Pagels is intending. Is it to explain quantum reality simply? If it is, the book does not succeed as the laws of quantum reality are not simple but complex. If the purpose is to enlighten the layman by using common speech and visual images to bring complexity into visual form, the book succeeds. The effect is most praiseworthy and, as a complement to Werner Heisenberg's *Physics and Philosophy*, I recommend it to those in the humanities interested in the new physics because of its metaphorical approach. I would also add that a supplementary review of Stephen Hawking's efforts toward a unified field theory would have added a final touch to a comprehensive treatment of the processes of quantum reality, although not to the visual imagery Pagels creates.

The mystical and the mystic, philosophy and the philosopher, poetry and the poet are no longer two separate entities, although they are distinct. In the world of quantum physics they become interacting fields of operable experience. The way things are becomes a matter of perception and reality, twin daughters of the field of *persona* and *cosmos*. A new cosmo-paradigmatic model of the universe is emerging and *The Cosmic Code* may be a place to begin to comprehend the diversity and transcendent imagery this model offers.

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Iain Paul introduces *Science, Theology and Einstein* with four sections addressed to Christians who doubt the validity of scientific statements. He challenges them to take another look at their assumptions about science's method, its need for certainty, its claims to truth, and its relationship to faith, so that obstacles to dialogue between science and theology may be eliminated. Raising the question, Why think scientifically? (p. 13), he attempts to answer it with an extensive compilation of Einstein's published epistemological statements.

Beginning in the fifth section ("Albert Einstein, the Skilled Guide"), Paul often reiterates Einstein's perception that his work was continuous with and supported by that of his precursors, that intuitive and logical unification took precedence over formal epistemology and empirical corroboration, and that research was a discovery of the intrinsic rationality of the universe. Adapting Einstein's view that science is a free, creative search for truth about nature, Paul identifies several heuristic elements involving intuition and faith at the heart of practicing either scientific or religious method. He strongly contrasts his heuristic view of science with those of Karl Popper and Thomas Kuhn, who as he sees it either constrain science logically to a prescribed method or disjoin science from previous research through a "scientific revolution." He also makes a careful distinction between scientific research and its technological applications. On the basis of this distinction he critiques Rudolf Bultmann's program of demythologizing, which inappropriately generalized scientific/technological method into a pervasive world view which in turn dominated the interpretation of both theological method and content. Through these exam-

[Zygon, vol. 20, no. 1 (March 1985).]
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ples Paul shows that actual scientific research resides at a lower level of abstraction than Einstein's epistemology, and that even this epistemology is less abstract than philosophy of science.

In my opinion, Paul rightly argues that much of the Christian community needs to increase its understanding of the scientific community, and he has contributed to dialogue in this direction by describing the activities and attitudes of Einstein and others. On the other hand, one might ask whether his discussion stimulates dialogue from the direction of theology to science, that is, would his theological arguments influence scientific research or epistemological reflection? To be sure Paul suggests that his answer to the question, Why think scientifically? raises the complementary question, Why think theologically? (p. 131), but he postpones a response to it until another essay. Most of all, though, what the book does not say scientifically, seriously undermines what it does attempt theologically.

Paul fails to mention two problems within the scientific context: first, the epistemological problem which arises through Einstein's arguments with Niels Bohr and Werner Heisenberg over possible interpretations of quantum indeterminacy, for example, the oft-cited statement, "God is not playing dice" (p. 54); and, second, the questionable role of the cosmological constant in general relativity theory. Paul also seems unaware that the majority of contemporary physicists do not support the kind of realism which Einstein maintained, holding instead an instrumentalist/positivist view of scientific theory. He says nothing about the recent challenge to realism contained in Bell's theorem. Finally, Paul refers to the fact that Einstein recorded his epistemological reflections "well over forty years ago" (p. 22). Rejecting Popper's and Kuhn's philosophies of science, he leaves unexplored the methodology of scientific research programs developed by Imre Lakatos, which to me seems more compatible with Einstein's epistemological point of view as Paul presents it. In sum, Paul focuses on Einstein, admittedly the most influential scientist of the twentieth century, without presenting sufficient arguments why Einstein's epistemological statements warrant similarly high regard.

Paul cautions against an ad hoc adaptation of Einstein's epistemology in formulating an analogy between scientific and theological enterprises. Nevertheless he believes that Einstein's realism, his search for invariant laws of nature, his intuition about those laws, his faith in their unity, and his dependence on significant predecessors correlate positively and form an analogy with the view of Christianity which Paul presupposes. Both his overdependence on Einstein's epistemology and his failure to clarify his own presuppositions suggest the conclusion that Paul has fallen unconsciously into the kind of picking and choosing he wants to avoid. He comments that "Only as Christians allow their presuppositions and desires to be creatively questioned by the objective Reality of God can they hope to transcend idiosyncratic interpretations and incoherent rationalizations" (p. 130). Yet he does not develop the radical possibilities inherent in such a statement. Still one hopes with Paul that in the (near) future scientist Christians will integrate their quest for scientific and theological truth(s) in a free, intuitive conceptualization beyond the limits of a "two-worlds" approach.

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