Reviews


This book is one of the latest works by British physicist, Paul Davies, who is already well known for his popular contributions to science magazines and radio broadcasts. He has authored a number of books, most popular of which seem to be *The Edge of Infinity* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1981) and *Other Worlds* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1980). As in all his popular writing, here Davies speaks to "the general reader, both atheist and believer, with no previous knowledge of science" (p. viii). He is also eager to enlighten philosophers and theologians on recent work in cosmology—"to expand the context in which the traditional religious issues are discussed" (p. viii).

Davies's main interests are the theory of relativity and quantum theory. Their discoveries, he says, "demanded a radical reformulation of the most fundamental aspects of reality" (p. vii). Davies believes such reformulation now offers hope for answering "what were formerly religious questions" (p. ix). Did God create the universe? Why is there a cosmos? What is life? What is mind? Soul? Time?

Davies avows he has tried to exclude his religious opinion. But, reminiscent of Jacob Bronowski—"This book is not less scientific because my manner is personal, and I make no apology for it" (*The Common Sense of Science* [Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1958], p. 13)—Davies too acknowledges his personal presentation. He admits he is "convinced there is more to the world than meets the eye" (p. ix).

The result is a fascinating primer on the newest questions and answers in physics. Davies explores the genesis of the universe—whether there was one, whether God was involved. He sketches the history of experiment and debate between Albert Einstein and Niels Bohr over the quantum theory. He asks whether holistic concepts such as mind must lay reduced to neurons, electrochemistry, and atoms; he poses the mind-brain model in terms of the software-hardware aspects of computers. Davies explains in refreshingly lucid, lay terms the particle/wave character of atomic structures. He gets a bit more technical in chapter eleven, "The Fundamental Structure of Matter," where he charts progress toward the physicist's holy grail, a unified field theory. And throughout—for instance, on parallel universes and free will ("Free Will and Determinism," chap. 10)—he peppers discussion with useful references, from Douglas Hofstadter to Arthur Koestler, Isaac Asimov to John Wheeler, Stephen Hawking to David Bohm, Freeman Dyson to Woody Allen.

Of all the essays, I found "What is Life? Holism vs. Reductionism" (chap. 5), "Mind and Soul" (chap. 6), "The Quantum Factor" (chap. 8), and "Time" (chap. 9) the most satisfying and stimulating. About life, Davies sees no need to deny an organism is a collection of atoms. "The mistake is to suppose that it is nothing but a collection atoms" (p. 62). Thus, "Life is a holistic phenomenon" (p. 63). About minds and souls, he comes right out and says, "The fact that a
concept is abstract rather than substantial does not render it somehow unreal or illusory" (p. 82). Davies compares quantum waves with crime waves: “not waves of any substance but waves of probability” (p. 108). And Davies does his best, against the odds, to explain for us eerie spacetime, during which he makes one of his more profound statements: “I maintain that the secret of mind will only be solved when we understand the secret of time” (p. 127).

In the final chapter, “The Physicist’s Conception of Nature” (chap. 17), we find a one-and-a-half page quote from Richard Feynman’s The Character of Physical Law (London: B.B.C. Publications, 1965, pp. 124-25), the heart of which seems to be Feynman’s question, “Which is nearer to God; if I may use a religious metaphor. Beauty and hope, or the fundamental laws?” (p. 225). Feynman’s answer: neither. But not long afterward Davies suggests something which theologians should think about—for the physicist, he says, “Good and evil apply only to mind, not matter” (p. 229).

After turning the last page, my response is that readers should be advised that this book is about physics, and may have little to do with God save through physics. It continues in the Davies tradition: without being dry or turgid, it elucidates for the amateur significant scientific theories. This is always an achievement. Yet, with such a provocative title as God and the New Physics it is unfortunate that Davies consistently misreads much theology. The scope of Davies’s vision is wonderfully wide, but not all the ground he surveys has the clarity that comes from proper theological depth-of-field.

Symptomatic of the whole is the chapter, “Miracles” (which Science Digest published in its November, 1983, issue), where Davies asks whether miracles exist and whether they are proof of God’s existence. By way of an answer, we are lead through a Socratic dialogue between “Skeptic” and “Believer.” The label of antagonists here is telling. Davies appears to see scientists as skeptical of any perceptions seen with the eyes of faith, seemingly unaware that “scientist” and “skeptic” need not be synonymous. Believers, in fact, can well be skeptical, and both scientist and skeptic are indeed believers in their ways (Davies writes oblivious of Thomas Kuhn, Michael Polanyi, and Paul Feyerabend). As Ian Barbour noted in his Issues in Science and Religion (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1966), “The choice is not between ‘faith’ and ‘no faith,’ but only ‘faith in what?’” (p. 222).

The major misconception lies in Davies’s assumption that the events of nature and supernature are easily divisible and mutually exclusive: the supernatural events, in “breaking the rules” (p. 190) of nature, are optional. Only “believers” see them, the miracles. For the most part, we are asked to choose between God or the new physics, between divine action in “defiance of natural laws” (p. 208) or “ordinary scientific terms” (p. 32) in “the light of modern science” (p. 33). He calls miracles “the show-biz end of religion” and lumps them uneasily “beside the other alleged paranormal phenomenon,” such as UFOs, levitation, metal-bending, and ESP (pp. 197-98).

Such characterizations, bordering on caricature, are misleading. The nature of divine action and explanation according to natural law need never be contradictory. At one point Davies writes: “a lack of understanding does not imply a miracle, and future discoveries could supply a lot of missing details” (p. 70). True. Yet compare this with Augustine, writing around 420 A.D.: “we say, as a matter of course, that all miracles are contrary to nature. But they are not . . . since the will of the great Creator assuredly is the nature of every created thing. . . . A Miracle, therefore, does not occur contrary to nature, but
contrary to what is known of nature" (The City of God [New York: Pelican Classic, 1972], p. 980). Contrary to Davies, this view would see divine action as more an inherent, albeit subtle, aspect of nature's own order, nonetheless wonderful.

Davies naively paints Judeo-Christians in the colors of radical dualists, who worship a rather deistic God ("oil[ing] the cogs of the cosmic machine," p. 38), presiding over mundane reality. At best this reflects only a portion of Western theological tradition. Davies seems unfamiliar with much of what has been read and talked about in seminaries the past ten to twenty years. For instance, he appears unaware of process theology, itself derived from the new physics.

The upshot is that, when Davies does venture upon theology, he sets up cardboard soldiers, easily knocked off-balance. Although he seems well acquainted with Gilbert Ryle's work, with science and religion Davies himself is prone to what Ryle called "category mistakes." Davies is a master tour guide, absorbing us in the detailed physical operations of a museum, now and then offering to help us find the "Display of Creativity" we had heard was responsible for all the patronage. He never finds that exhibition room—but it was not what we had in mind anyway.

For Davies, "science offers a surer path to God than religion" (p. ix), and—never mind that this may be a semantic contradiction—this is shown strangely true by his approach. The irony is that Davies sounds much more imaginative, theologically sophisticated, and, indeed, religious in his discussion of science than he is wont to show by his knowledge of religion proper. Perhaps if he more fully expressed the implications of this for scientists like himself, it would have meant a more even, more penetrating book in all dimensions—those of God and the new physics.

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This volume in the Concilium series is divided into two sections: the first highlights some historical aspects of the relationship between cosmology and theology and the second some topics of current interest, including evolution, creationism, and the nature of religious and scientific language.

Essays in the historical section begin with a short overview by John Collins of the link established in the New Testament between human salvation and an understanding of the cosmos. Henry Chadwick then traces the development of the notion of freedom and necessity from classical authors into the early fathers, particularly Origen and Augustine. Both "share a determination to be faithful to the biblical stress on the creative will of God, but to mitigate any suggestion that there is some element of spontaneity and suddenness about God's purposive action" (p. 12). In the most interesting historical paper, Olaf Pederson studies the use of theology as an ancilla scientiarum from the early
fathers through the Middle Ages. Christian belief and doctrine were brought to bear upon the properties of the universe and opened a capacity to recognize an infinite cosmos (p. 14). What was not easy to resolve was the relationship of an omnipresent God to this new notion of space. Pederson outlines the debate through Isaac Newton and observes in conclusion that the old way of speaking of divine presence using scientific categories was finally perceived to be beyond rehabilitation (p. 20). Gunter Alter and Tshibangu Tshishiku close out the historical section by taking up the issues of evolution and eschatology. Alter notes the tradition of thought before Charles Darwin which could have opened up a less mechanistic understanding of evolution had it come to fruition. Tshishiku tries to integrate traditional teaching on eschatology with theological currents in modern process theology and the work of Pierre Teilhard de Chardin.

James Buchanan opens the topical section of the book by applying Paul Ricoeur's and David Tracy's categories of manifestation and proclamation to the topic of theology and cosmology. The manifestation tradition, he concludes, is better able to preserve a sense of the sacredness of the cosmos and human participation in it. The proclamation tradition, in contrast, tends in a more anthropocentric direction and to a restrictive concentration on the events of salvation history. A recovery of the manifestation tradition is essential to our own ecologically threatened age. Hermann Bruck distinguishes the theological tradition of an understanding of "creation out of nothing" from the scientific discussion of the big bang. A confusion of the two leads theology into the dead end of a stop-gap God. Mary Hesse challenges the effort to view either scientific or religious language from the standpoint of a correspondence of theory of truth. Neither religion nor science today can pretend to definitively describe reality. A different theory of truth is needed "which will be characterized by consensus and coherence rather than correspondence, by holism of meanings rather than atomism, by metaphor and symbol rather than literalism and univocity, by intrinsic judgments of value as well as of fact" (p. 54). Langdon Gilkey presents an excellent summary of the central issues in the creationism debate. He notes the mistake of treating creationism as a scientific position and in assuming that it represents the only religious approach to the question of evolution. The essay on Teilhard de Chardin by William Warthling is marked more by rhetorical flourish than substance and is the weakest in the book. Ursula King provides a helpful bibliographical survey of works on the relationship between Eastern thought and scientific cosmology and rightfully points out the superficiality of much of the recent work in this area. She suggests some possible lines of further research. In the conclusion, Tracy and Nicholas Lash summarize some of the volume's themes and connect the discussion of cosmology to the concerns of liberation and political theology.

Cosmology and Theology contains some worthwhile selections, particularly the essays by Pederson and Hesse. It is marked by the unevenness of many other volumes in the Concilium series and by the inherent limits of five or six page papers on difficult and broad topics.

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Science is a touchstone of reality in our civilization and when excellent scholarship exposes fundamental sexist distortions in it, responsible persons must take account of these criticisms and the possibilities of alternative models. Discovering Reality is important because within one volume the reader is exposed to both a range of issues and an array of feminist scholarship that sharply disclose the sexist fabric in Western science and philosophy that obscures our grasp of reality. Eighteen authors, mainly women, show in sixteen articles that sexism is enmeshed in the conceptual development and practice of science, that women's experience is generally excluded, and that a feminist perspective deepens our understanding of both social and natural realities.

The impact of Discovering Reality is cumulative as the reader is led into sustained and rigorous pursuit of feminist perspectives on such problems as the influence of Aristotle's conclusion that woman "is an impotent male," the effect of patriarchal images of nature as a realm of competition, scarcity, and aggression, the consequences of male and female psychological development, and factors delaying our consideration of women's distinctive cognitive experience. Once this diversity and depth of treatment are traversed, the significance of a feminist critique and perspective becomes compelling. A brief review of main themes in these sixteen articles will indicate the challenge of this feminist inquiry.

The first three articles revolve around Aristotle. Lynda Lange argues that Aristotle's view of woman shapes the entire nature of his philosophy, seen here particularly in his development of formal and final causes. This argument is furthered by Elizabeth Spelman's demonstration that Aristotle's politics is grounded in his metaphysics, which includes his views on the rational inferiority of women. The confirmation of the major influence of Aristotle's sexist assumptions appears in Judith Hicks Stiehm's showing the actual operation of Aristotle's assumptions about women in a book on social status, participation, and government responsiveness that won an American Political Science Association award. Together these articles demonstrate that the feminist view of Aristotle is not a caricature but a serious view that discloses the pervasiveness of Aristotle's sexism not only in his thought but also in our inherited views and methodologies.

The next three articles extend the evidence that patriarchal concepts about women and nature bias our central scientific tradition, especially in Darwinism. Ruth Hubbard shows how Charles Darwin's concepts are colored by the social and political ideology of his own time leading to Darwin's seeing males as characteristically aggressive and females as passive. Michael Gross and Mary Beth Averill describe the way scarcity and competition dominate current evolutionary thought and the difference that feminine categories of plenitude and cooperation would make in scientific findings. Like Hubbard, Gross and Averill also see in this problem the value-laden character of scientific thought reflecting early industrial capitalism. The neglect of women's experience in evolutionary theory and social thought is also seen in the case of Charlotte [Zygon, vol. 20, no. 2 (June 1985).]
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Perkins Gilman, an early social scientist and feminist theorist. Gilman's work is widely dismissed because she was a feminist. Now it seems that her concern about women's special roles in mothering ought to be given more attention in understanding evolution and our ideal of the equality of the sexes. Beyond the patriarchal consciousness informing Western metaphysics and epistemology since Aristotle, eight of the articles focus on the problems of methodology in the present period. Louise Marcil-Lacoste addresses the question as to whether feminist perspectives are finally repetitive of male rationality or actually contributing new ones. Merrill B. Hintikka and Jaakko Hintikka go beyond the familiar critiques of our sexist language to showing subtle linguistic differences that raise basic theoretical issues about the nature of language itself. Janice Moulton examines the adversary method widely used in philosophy and shows both its mistaken value-free assumptions as well as its disadvantages in rational inquiry. Catherine Pyne Addelson looks at cognitive authority in science, particularly biology and sociology, and the need for criticizing and testing the social arrangements that affect its understanding. These social arrangements involve metaphysical commitments that go without scrutiny, nourish political views, and maintain irrationality. Evelyn Fox Keller uses the insights of psychoanalytic and objects relation theory to show that the scientific ideal of objectivity has a masculine presumption that is both harmful and questionable. Christine R. Grontkowski and Evelyn Keller further this claim with a presentation of the tendency to conceive knowledge as being like vision, a detached and masculine characteristic, as opposed to knowledge being like tactility, a more feminine characteristic. The examples of Plato, René Descartes, and Isaac Newton demonstrate this thesis. Naomi Scheman finds liberal ideology determining the widely held belief that the objects of psychology such as emotions and intentions are reducible to individual states. This unexamined ideology informs capitalist and patriarchal society and denies the truths of female experience when it is not undercut by the assumptions of individualism. The final article dealing with methodology is by Jane Flax who pursues the way philosophy has developed and defined problems reflecting the repression of early infantile experience. This repression is shown in the way Plato, Descartes, Thomas Hobbes, and Jean Jacques Rousseau understand key issues such as mind and nature, and family and state.

Flax's article concludes with programatic suggestions for a feminist epistemology and the last two articles develop more the constructive possibilities arising from a feminist critique. Nancy C. Hartsock explores the feminist standpoint as the ground for a historical materialism. This materialism would provide for a new political economy that significantly values and includes women's activity. Sandra Harding in her article discusses why the oppressive sex gender system could not become visible until now and how its recognition calls for a revolution in epistemology. The book ends having substantially set forth that we can no longer understand women and their world by adding new facts about them which take male experience as normative and that neither can we do our best rationally if we continue to define science and philosophy in sexist terms. Every article in the book is demanding and this account only touches the topics, not the depth and technical skill of each author as a thinker. The writers all share a common commitment to rationality that disciplines and guides their feminist interest. At bottom, the question to the reader is not whether he/she is a feminist but whether one is willing to reexamine our usual perspectives.
Unfortunately the complexity of the writing style may deter some. The articles were written for a scholarly feminist audience. Two major areas that would support the general thesis of the collection are missing. One is the impact of patriarchal thinking and the potentialities of a feminist critique on the role of religion in culture. The second one, which is closely related to religious institutions, is our ecological crisis that derives partly from the theme of “man’s” domination of nature.

The book is so rich in its presentation of ideas and issues that it is regretful that it has only a name index and does not include an index of subjects. After reading through it, one will want to return to it many times for further thought and reference.

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Rustum Roy, a journeyman scientist, technologist, and science policymaker, demurs initially at the prospect of delivering these Hibbert Lectures, seeing he is not a professional theologian. People who, like this reviewer, are professionals will find Roy’s humility incumbent upon themselves as they then watch this scientist-cum-lay-theologian venture boldly onto theologically forbidding frontiers, reproaching establishment theologians for their timidity as he goes. I do not mean to begrudge Roy’s theological modesty. Occasionally it is warranted. But the truth remains, he has explicitly joined forces with challengers like Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, Friedrich von Weizsäcker, Jacques Ellul, and Alister Hardy in pacing theologians at least, much more his religiously interested fellow scientists, with the consequence that the rest of us dare not relapse into anything less than what Roy calls for. We may aspire to something more, also something more daring, though not without satisfying his requirements as we try.

Roy, “born in India, simultaneously a thirty-third generation genetic Brahmin and a third generation Christian,” believes that “the whole world—East and West, North and South—finds itself in need of a reexamination and rearticulation of the fundamentals of new holistic, syncretic, religious formulation” (p. 184). Therefore, he dedicates himself “to the first step in that task, the attempt to redefine . . . the concept of :*:” (p. 184). That strange mark comes close to duplicating Roy’s, which on the pages of his book resembles a tiny fingerprint, “a truly random pattern of black dots on a white space as the symbol for the full meaning” (p. 60) of what conventionally is called “God,” a name which in religious practice has become much too small and cheapened for its referent.

Any redefinition of :*: says Roy, must be in terms acceptable to a wider community, including those reared in religious traditions . . . [especially those
many among them] who cannot connect their affirmations about 
*: with their everyday lives in everyday language," as well as "members of the scientific and engineering communities, many with the deepest sense of the mysteries of the universe" (p. 184). Moreover, any “authentic relation to the Beyond in the Midst” presupposes a wholeness of the human person demanding “not only that one’s knowledge of reality be constructed from the integration of the experiential with the religious and scientific viewpoints, but also that knowledge and action, being and doing, be continuously interwoven...” (p. 185).

Roy strikes a hard bargain, though the truth of the matter seems to me to require a still harder one, religiously and scientifically. Even so, Roy’s demands, both for a redefinition of :*: and for a human person whole enough to perceive such a :*: and to act befittingly, are already overwhelming enough to discourage any realistic hope of fulfillment. For Roy, however, these demands seem to be unremitting and the very condition of human survival—for salvation, one might have said in another idiom. True, Roy does seem to concede that what is now being expected of us theologically might not have been so fully divined until this present, advanced stage in a long evolutionary “experimenting with truth.” (The title of this book comes from Mahatma Gandhi.) Nevertheless, these by now highly evolved expectations, I gather, are not merely human improvisations but are rooted in reality itself, which in turn “radiates” :*: So it is :*: presumably, who is at the bottom of this whole evolutionary experiment, both wins and losses, survival as well as its opposite. Coming on such high authority, then, Roy’s latter-day theological and ethical demands, in view of their stringency, might prompt some conscientious soul, at least in a previous, less advanced age, to cry out, Who then can be saved? This is an even more serious issue if Roy had upped the ante still higher, as well he might.

It would be misleading to suggest that Roy himself presses such soteriological questions. On the contrary, his critics might wish to ask him why the conditions of human survival should be made so unattainable—which, I agree, truth shows them to be—if that only reemphasizes how little significant survival there ever really is—which, alas, seems equally true. This is not the kind of questioning Roy welcomes. But that is not because he has satisfied the question with compelling answers. In fact, his critics might also claim he merely finds the question to be anachronistic and evolutionarily retarded, thus dismissing it by recourse to the chronic fallacy. It might even be charged that at the point of such hard soteriological questions Roy’s otherwise evenhanded rhetoric tends to wax shrill and arbitrary, the way an unsure preacher pounds the pulpit when substance runs thin. If so, that would not be in the reasonable spirit of the book as a whole.

Is it that Roy, if he does sidestep what for want of a better term I have had to call soteriological problems, is forced to do so by his excessive preoccupation with religion as knowing—that is, as our knowing? Understandably, such gnostic reductionism would be tempting in any effort to “fuse” religion with science as scientia. However, it must be said in Roy’s defense that his commitment is not only to science but at least as much to science-based technology and the implementation of science in public policy. Moreover, while cognitive or noetic metaphors for religion do predominate in the book and while those often are optical, suggesting the nonparticipant observer, the author takes elaborate pains to dispel any misimpression of intellectualism. The objective observation of the scientist and even the reflection of the religionist are both based in the prior, determinative knowing by participant experience. Fur-
thermore, even knowing in all its multifocal, multidirectional range—Roy's image of the zoom lens is useful—is not yet the whole it must be until it is enacted in doing and being. All that, Roy knows well.

Even with all those qualifications, however, is it not still myopic to confine religious knowing to our knowing, however holistically defined, even our knowing of an only mediately known :*:? Does that not still leave out another whole dimension of religious knowing, namely, what some classical theisms have referred to as our "being known?" But then the objection comes back, Yes, but no matter how well we may be known—say, by :*:—none of that is religiously relevant until we ourselves know at least that. It is we, after all, who must know whether and how we are known. Exactly. And does not that very objection reintroduce the soteriological question, how to know ourselves as we are known, by :*:, and still survive that? Even the vocabulary of our sciences has preserved something of that insight in the old Greek term dia-gnosis. How to see ourselves as we are "seen through"—and yet live?

In face of that sort of talk about :*:, as being a knower who knows us, who of all things knows us mortifyingly, Roy probably would want to issue stern warnings. For one thing, he would warn against excessive anthropomorphism—not that he disallows any and all construing of :*:, as personal, given the fact that we humans happen to be persons ourselves and thus need to employ that category upon any meaningful referent of our own religiousness. But I question whether Roy would countenance carrying theological personalism to the point where it is :*: Is knowing of us quite as much as our not knowing of :*:, which jeopardizes the creation's survival.

Really, Roy's more basic objection would be that such divine knowing as interposes a gap between knower and known, especially from the yon side, commits the virtually unforgivable sin, the untenable heresy, of construing :*:, as a separate reality. As his counter to this fallacy Roy argues a persuasive case for panentheism, although in doing so he mistakenly discounts some theological giants from the Christian past as having been antipanentheist whereas in fact they insisted upon an in-scendent (as much as a transcendent) Creator, for whom all of creation was but a myriad of masks and larvae—not unlike Roy's reality as radiation.

Related to Roy's protest against a separate reality is his objection to a God "contained within one human being, Jesus," or belonging "in a very special way to one tribe, the Jews" (p. 152). Roy's objection would be worth considering were it not that his alternatives—"Jesusism" or "the human idol heresy," on the one hand, and the Incarnation as merely a special diaphaneity, on the other—are much too limited. But what most limits Roy's capacity to cope with the separate reality is not his panentheist ontology, which by itself is credible enough, but his simply, arbitrarily assuming that the theos who is thus en the pan is self-evidently benign, like sweetness in berries, quite ignoring that the very closeness of :*: in, with, and under reality is precisely what exacerbates the wholly otherness, the critical separateness from all that is not holy. The separateness, in other words, need not be ontic. It is worse than that, it is a critical separateness. But in ignoring that, the whole soteriological question is simply begged and the field is too easily abandoned to religious wishfulness. To correct this requires more than caricaturing in either direction.

What is at issue, as I see it, is not just the problem of evil, a problem which Roy does address, only to dispatch it quickly. "In a single stroke," he asserts, "panentheism removes all the clutter by including good and evil under Reality,
through which :*: may be experienced or known (pp. 159-60). Well and good, evil is thus acknowledged to be quite as real as good is. True, by its association with :*: evil evidently loses some if its existential edge, its meaning as real evil, as the opposite of good. Furthermore, :*: is largely exonerated from whatever evil there still is since reality, whether good or evil, is not so much :*:’s doing—that would be too anthropomorphic—as it is the medium through which :*: is perceived.

However, even if all that is true, evil by whatever name and in all its forms is still that which, real though it is, must be targeted for extinction and hence driven from reality. Witness how on page after page a truly prophetic Rustum Roy, as all of us must, wages not only moral but metaphysical war against such evil—that is, such reality—as volcanoes, cancer, nuclear holocaust, racism, sexism, religious obscurantism, theological bigotry, and, worst of all, hatred. Presumably, this fight to the death against a sector of reality called evil is somehow grounded in :*: But then the soteriological question, at least of the ancients, reenters, Who then can be saved? This is not the traditional problem of evil if by that is meant the problem of accounting for evil but rather the practical problem of how evil, whether explainable or not, is to be gotten rid of, that is, without destroying the very creatures whose biographies supply evil with its vectors.

It is eloquently clear that Rustum Roy has an answer to this question, an answer which he in his conspicuous compassion longs to share with the rest of us in the religious and scientific communities, both together. It is an answer which I for one commend as a notable advance. If his answer were not already as attractive as it is, it could not have evoked as interested a response as this review, inciting us to ask for more: for the answer, yes, but more critically and scientifically, for a sufficient ground of that answer—its (christological?) :*: av-atar. If that entails a crossing over, as I understand the Sanskrit might suggest, then the corresponding “experiment with truth,” through death to life, :*: leading the cruciform way, would be one for which these Hibbert Lectures for 1979 would still provide an exacting test and an incentive.

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In this volume, Edward Edinger, a noted Jungian psychiatrist, proposes that Carl Jung was an epochal man, “a man whose life inaugurates a new age in cultural history” (p. 12). This new age, Edinger feels, requires a new containing myth. Without such a myth (quoting William Butler Yeats) “the centre cannot hold; Mere anarchy is loosed upon the world.” Edinger cites Jung’s comments on a dream of Max Zeller that suggest we are in the very early stages of building a new religious vision that, in Jung’s view, will require some 600 years to form. The essential idea of the new vision, says Edinger, is that the underlying reason for human existence is the creation of consciousness.

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The myth of the creation of consciousness is closely linked to Jung’s concept of individuation; unconscious contents striving for consciousness have no pathway except through the individual ego-consciousness and thence, perhaps, into the world of collective consciousness. This produces movement in the individuation of the person as well as creating a greater degree of consciousness in the collective.

The process of increasing consciousness involves bearing the conflict of opposites in the vessel of the ego. Edinger cites two major cultural examples of persons carrying the conflict of opposites in consciousness: Jesus and Buddha.

The individual as bearer of increasing consciousness evokes for Edinger the image of the Holy Grail which carries the essence extracted in the alchemical coniunctio (union of opposites). The most controversial insight of Edinger is that “the new myth enlarges the God-image by introducing explicitly the additional feature of the unconsciousness of God,” as discussed in Jung’s Answer to Job, a book that Jung felt needed no later revision (Collected Works, vol. 11 [London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1958], pp. 355-470). In the myth of man as the creator of consciousness, each individual has a unique role to play, contributing a “permanent addition to the collective treasury of the archetypal psyche” (p. 23).

This statement is reminiscent of Hartshorn’s view of the “memory of God” as the final repository of human meaning. In support of such a view, Edinger cites scripture (I Cor. 15:51-53; Rev. 3:12), Egyptian pyramid texts, Jung’s autobiography, and the dream of a patient nearing death. This interplay of mythological material, sacred scripture, and clinical observation is an excellent example of the Jungian technique of amplification, the accumulation of parallel material from personal and archetypal sources.

To achieve authentic consciousness the ego must not only know but be known, an experience best encountered with the inner God-image, the archetypal Self in Jungian terminology. An additional aspect of consciousness is “knowing with,” the relationship principle, a function of Eros.

Edinger cites Jung (particularly from Aion, Collected Works, vol. 9, part 2 [London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1951]), about transformations in the God-image paralleling changes in human consciousness without our being able definitely to discern which may be the cause of the other. Jung’s citation of two striking dreams in his autobiographical Memories, Dreams, Reflections (New York: Pantheon, 1961) raises the possibility that, whereas we often consider that God is a projection of human consciousness, it may be the reverse—we may be projections of the transpersonal other. Edinger’s personal fantasy is that the universe is an omniscient mind, but it is asleep; as it awakens, its own desire for self-knowledge produces first worlds, then individual consciousness with which it may dialogue about itself: “Slowly, as this process unfolds, God begins to learn who He is” (p. 56). Jung is cited as saying “As far as we can discern, the sole purpose of human existence is to kindle a light in the darkness of mere being” (p. 16).

Edinger (p. 70) devotes a chapter to discussion of Jung’s Answer to Job: Considered psychologically, the Old Testament as a whole represents a vast individuation process unfolding in the collective psyche. Its pivotal crisis is Job and culmination is the mandala vision of Ezekiel. This vision is really a foundation-image of the Western psyche. How fundamental it is is indicated by the fact that Jung uses it as the basis for his most differentiated model of the Self (described in Aion).

The outcome of Job is inconclusive, the God-image later becoming split into good and bad opposites, Christ and Satan. The incomplete incarnation of God
in Christ (because the dark side is split off in Satan) leads to a continuing incarnation.

In the concluding chapter, Edinger explores "The Transformation of God," citing the inhibited sacrifice of Isaac as also having been the occasion (psychologically) for a transformation of the God-image. The suffering inherent in participating in the transformation of a divine image is reflected in the Greek myths of Tantalus and Sysyphus as well as in the alchemical images associated with production of the Philosopher's Stone. The more modern version, says Edinger, is for mankind to willingly carry part of the burden of the God-image becoming conscious. This is a tremendous burden and responsibility. Only if enough individuals are willing to face such a task can the continuing incarnation of the God-image take place without the danger of the dark side of that image destroying mankind.

Edinger's book is thoroughly Jungian and represents a responsible effort to carry forward some of the most enigmatic and pregnant of Jung's ideas on religion in the modern world. The author squarely faces the challenge that Jungian thought offers to established religious traditions. It would have been possible to proclaim the same challenge with a different nuance, as for example, by giving more weight to developments within the living Christian myth, as evidenced by the proclamation of the assumption of Mary, an event that greatly interested Jung, or by emphasizing the emergence of the mandala form of Self-imagery, a form establishing order amid chaos. Perhaps the most basic concern is that Edinger may at times obscure a pervasive emphasis of Jung's—the God-image may not be reflective of the metaphysical reality of God.

These small critical comments aside, Edinger has produced the most challenging restatement yet seen of Jung's on-going concern with the image of God in its interaction with the individual psyche and with human history. The new frontier of religious understanding is within the human psyche. No one can responsibly explore that frontier without reference to Jung's vision and to Edinger's elaboration of it.

The volume, like all in the Inner City series, is well edited, readable, and affordable. I recommend the book highly for anyone interested in Jung's view of religion.

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In 1899, Karl Kraus began the publication in Vienna of a review journal of the arts and society, called Die Fackel. As the articles in the journal became increasingly satirical and as Die Fackel's reputation as a satirical journal became well established, it became possible for Kraus to satirize a speech or article published elsewhere merely by reprinting those texts, word for word without comment, in his journal. Kraus believed this kind of reproduction to be the highest form of satire, which is to say the most truthful and the most revealing. There can be

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no doubt that were Kraus still alive he would be sorely tempted by *The Naked Public Square*. After all, a text which contains such passages as: "Patriotism is a species of piety" (p. 74) or "If tax exemption is in fact tax expenditure, does this not assume that everything belongs to the government?" (p. 160) or one which refers to John Rawls's book as "*A Theology of Justice*" (p. 252), invites this sort of treatment. In fact, it is sometimes difficult to take *The Naked Public Square* seriously, but to dismiss it would be a mistake for in spite of itself the book manages to raise important questions and address itself to little understood, but significant, phenomena.

As is indicated by the subtitle, this book is concerned with the relation between religion and politics in liberal societies; specifically it is concerned with the rise of the American "new religious right." Richard Neuhaus, himself a conservative Lutheran theologian, is sympathetic to many of the goals of organizations on the religious right, such as the Moral Majority, although critical of their methods and their dogmatism. However, he avoids direct discussion of the specific issues raised by the religious right, so as to direct his attention exclusively to the general question of the function of religion in democratic societies.

Neuhaus's position on this issue is that religion is uniquely suited to providing a justification for democratic government without which such governments cannot survive. His argument is not original with him, but is rather one version of the simplified Burkean argument that has become so popular amongst conservatives today. It is in a sense a domestic version of Jeane Kirkpatrick's argument in support of foreign authoritarian governments. His argument in short might read something like this: Despite the fact that it might be possible to ground a moral theory in abstract, formal considerations, for the vast majority of Americans, morality is directly grounded in religious traditions. Not only do these Americans naively accept this traditional morality, but they also believe that laws and governments are legitimate only insofar as they conform to that morality. Thus religious tradition plays a dual role in political life: It legitimates governments which are guided and informed by religious tradition and it shows governments which are not so guided and informed to be illegitimate.

"Secularism," for Neuhaus, is the doctrine that religion and government must be kept separate, not only in detail, but also in spirit. Thus, secularism holds that it is wrong to allow governments to be guided or informed by religious traditions or arguments and that public debate concerning social policy should be stripped of all religious discourse, thus rendering "the public square" naked. As such, the delegitimation of government is a necessary consequence of a policy of secularism. Of course, as long as this policy is merely the intention of secularists and as long as government does not intrude into the private lives of the citizenry, this consequence remains an abstract possibility. However, as is now the case, when laws which do interfere with the private lives of citizens are formulated according to this secular doctrine, then delegitimation will become a reality.

Neuhaus believes that this has come about, that we are now in the midst of a legitimation crisis brought about by an aggressive secularism. This is alarming to Neuhaus because he thinks that illegitimate democratic governments cannot survive. Moreover, because such governments cannot depend on consent but ultimately only on force to secure obedience, they are "preludes to totalitarianism" (p. 82).

Although totalitarianism would be the result of the continuation of the trend toward secularization, according to Neuhaus, this trend has provoked a
counter movement, the new religious right, which, if successful, might re-establish democracy on its only possible stable, legitimating foundation, the Judeo-Christian tradition. It should be pointed out that nowhere does Neuhaus explain how one might so re-establish legitimate government. Must we put prayer in schools, elect ministers, outlaw abortion, praise God, renounce liberalism? Neuhaus’s inability to articulate a practical political program might be an indication that there is a problem with his analysis. However, the outline of the argument is clear; given that the choice facing us is one between totalitarianism and a government grounded in religious tradition, even the most convinced secularist, in order to avoid the totalitarian alternative, must support at least the general goal of the reintroduction of religious tradition into government.

Although Neuhaus clearly believes that his argument is related to Burke’s, it is significantly different. Although Burke’s opposition to the rationalism of the French Revolution resembles Neuhaus’s opposition to the secularism of contemporary America and Burke’s belief that the revolution would end in terror is similar to Neuhaus’s belief that secularism will lead to totalitarianism, Burke bases his belief on a view of tradition which Neuhaus does not share.

Burke views tradition as a complex, slowly evolving set of beliefs, behavior patterns, and institutions, which embody the wisdom of humanity. Traditional patterns of behavior and thought do not just seem to be legitimate, but according to Burke, they most likely are legitimate. As a result, Burke is suspicious of any social change that does not come about in an evolutionary fashion. In particular he is suspicious of changes that are imposed on traditional societies by individuals claiming to base their action on abstract reasoning. Such change, insofar as it runs counter to tradition, will probably be mistaken, but moreover such claims, Burke thought, often disguise baser, more self-interested motives. However, despite the fact that Burke opposed this kind of change, he did not believe that it would always appear to be illegitimate. In fact the seeming legitimacy in the eyes of the poor of radical change was one reason that underlay Burke’s doubts about democracy.

Clearly, Neuhaus’s view of the relation between tradition and legitimacy is not Burkean. More importantly, Neuhaus’s notion of tradition, in itself, is not Burkean either. While for Burke religion is only part of the traditional life of a society, for Neuhaus it exhausts tradition. Whereas for Burke tradition is complex and often contradictory, for Neuhaus it is simply “the” Judeo-Christian tradition. Because Burke understood traditions to be complex, he was sensitive to their complex evolving interactions. Neuhaus, on the other hand, unwittingly isolates religion from the rest of society and presents it as static and uniform. Finally, although Burke views tradition in social as well as psychological terms, for Neuhaus, and for the secularist he criticizes, religion is simply a belief in a set of “meaning bestowing” ultimate assumptions. In Neuhaus’s hands tradition becomes merely a one dimensional, abstract, irrational, and ultimately unjustifiable religious belief.

It is upon this lifeless, one-dimensional view of tradition that Neuhaus rests his argument. Given this notion of tradition his argument may follow. However, not only is that notion false, but it would also blind us to the true nature of both modern society and the legitimation crisis that Neuhaus correctly thinks it faces.

Neuhaus’s identification of tradition with religious tradition has allowed him to argue that a nontraditional secularism, by itself, is causing the legitimation
crisis. However, clearly secularism is part of our tradition and not as Neuhaus holds (despite his denials) simply the result of a conspiracy. Not only is secularism part of our tradition, but it has played a significant role in legitimating the American government. That the government is losing its legitimacy is not, therefore, simply the fault of secularism, but rather it is the result of a variety of factors of which, oddly enough, even Neuhaus is clearly aware. These factors include such things as doubts concerning U.S. foreign policy brought about by the Vietnam War, the collapse of the belief in inevitable scientific and technical progress brought about by the numerous technical crises weathered in the last decade (oil, environmental, energy, and so on), and the repolitization of questions of economic distribution and the consequent politization of private life. These phenomena may have a common root, as Jürgen Habermas argued in his book *Legitimation Crisis* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1973), but it is implausible to think that this root is secularism.

It is unfortunate that Neuhaus does not investigate the roots of this problem more deeply, for the legitimation crisis is real and dangerous. Moreover, it is not very well understood. Although, for example Habermas’s book is far superior to Neuhaus’s on this score, Habermas does not assign any legitimating role to religious tradition at all. However, religion does play such a role and is still a vital force in this area, as the rise of the new religious right demonstrates. But only a less ideological, more scientific examination of the political role of religious tradition can give us the knowledge to solve the current legitimation crisis. Neuhaus’s ideologically grounded solution, a simple return to religious values, is based on a misdiagnosis of the complexity problem and would ultimately make matters worse, if only by delaying a real solution. Burke has already warned us that policies based on abstract reasoning are likely to bring about evil, although unintended, results. I suspect that policies based on Neuhaus’s argument with its abstract conception of tradition would do the same.

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