Reviews


A decade or two back this title might have been God or Chance. The one-letter change indicates considerable reunderstanding both scientifically and theologically. Earlier, it seemed that we had to choose God or chance; D. J. Bartholomew joins both in the "splendid vision of God who conceived a world built on chance and from which he continues to fashion something of eternal value" (p. 143). A disjunction has become a conjunction. The universe is "designed in such a way that chance had a role to play" (p. 30). "Chance was God's idea and... he uses it to ensure the variety, resilience and freedom necessary to achieve his purposes" (p. 14).

William P. Alston, analyzing God's action in the world, concludes, "I am not convinced at this point that it makes sense to think of God's leaving certain details of the basic structure of the universe 'to chance'" ("God's Action in the World," in Evolution and Creation, ed. Ernan McMullin. University of Notre Dame Press, 1985, p. 219). Against Alston, showing how fundamental a shift in argument underlies the one-letter change, we can put Bartholomew's "central thesis that a world of chance is not merely consistent with a theistic view of nature but, almost, required by it" (p. 102). "Chance offers the potential Creator many advantages which it is difficult to envisage being obtained in any other way" (p. 97).

Bartholomew's argument merits careful attention because it is the only book length analysis by a professional statistician who is theologically articulate, as well as broadly informed in the natural and social sciences. He writes clearly, compactly, bravely, modestly—not shirking hard questions and freely admitting to tentative answers. He argues a seminal case at the same time that he asks questions in the earshot of those whom he hopes can answer them.

Statistical understandings of the world, whether in physics, biology, or the human sciences, have increasingly shown that chance is consistent with order. There is a "subtle and surprising complementarity of chance and determinism" (p. 66). Physics, as a paradigm science, was for centuries mechanistic and deterministic; that seemed to give perfect order but with too little room for human freedom. Biology over the last hundred years has posited randomness both at genetic and evolutionary levels; that seemed to prohibit divine design. Both sciences have now become statistical. These same statistical patterns also characterize the human sciences—the lengths of time, for instance, that computer programmers stay on their jobs. The data come everywhere with scatter and yet with patterns that fit regression lines and standard curves.

Some interpret these statistics as always and only a remedy for human ignorance. All actual events are determined in every particular but our human access is partial and veiled. To ascribe an event to chance is to report that one has failed so far to find the causes, and in ignorance of particulars we can still
generalize statistically. Einstein refused to believe that God plays dice with the world, and for many scientists determinism has been an article of faith, requisite for order and justified by the repeated causal chains that science has successfully traced. But others are not so sure. No doubt much of the scatter is due to unknown causes, but is all of it? Perhaps statistics reveals the way the world objectively is; statistical analysis is not a mask for ignorance but realistic description.

The lines between determinism and chance are not as clear as they once were. Some deterministic processes (the output of a random number generator in a computer, or mathematically chaotic systems) can be indiscernible from genuinely random ones. Random processes in particular events (a coin flipped) can quickly lead to high probabilities in the aggregate (fifty percent heads, fifty percent tails). Random processes at one level (scattered tiny droplets of paint) can assure regularity on another level (an evenly painted wall). Random sampling can assure reliable scientific results. Some ends can be certain while paths to that end are uncertain. We know with virtual certainty that Sam will die, although we do not know his path through the world prior to his death. We do not know when Sam will die, though we can predict death rates in Los Angeles. Chaos is regularly mixed with order.

Bartholomew invites us to reform our theology, consistently with statistics. The subtle mixture of order and chance that science finds can enrich the doctrine of God. Formerly, chance seemed unworthy of God’s omniscience and omnipotence; it was regarded as irrational and unloving. How would God intelligently care for a world God leaves to chance? If the world is by chance, it is not godly. If godly, it is not by chance. Bartholomew demurs: “The mere existence of chance processes in nature is not a sufficient ground for inferring the absence of purpose.” To the contrary, “only in a world with a sufficient degree of randomness is there enough flexibility to combine a broadly determined line of development with adequate room for the exercise of real freedom on the part of individuals” (p. 82). Chance does not contradict divine providence; rather, it illuminates it.

Sometimes Bartholomew even suggests that a pure chaos is impossible; any chaos will emit spurts of order. “Chaos and order are complementary; the presence of one seems to imply the other. . . . Whatever the nature of the most elemental happenings there will be, inevitably, a hierarchy of order and chaos in the resulting cosmos” (p. 95). If so, Bartholomew is not clear whether this coupling of chaos and order results from God’s action or is empirically or logically anterior even to God. If the latter, the statistical character of the universe might be a more ultimate given than God.

Bartholomew, a statistician, finds God the Statistician, with divine “purpose primarily expressed in the aggregate effects of large numbers of genuinely random events” (pp. 135, 138). God the Averager operates in the probable trends, letting the individuals rattle around in the statistics. “We therefore had to formulate a doctrine of providence which, while allowing that God is ultimately responsible for everything that happens, did not require his intimate involvement in all things” (p. 145). God does not notice the individual sparrow fall; God watches Dendroica populations!

Perhaps it will be more difficult to separate preordained probabilities and accidental contingencies than Bartholomew realizes. Social life among insects is confined to the order Hymenoptera with high probability. Is that a preset divine outcome? Or an accidental byproduct of some genetic setup (haplodiploidy)? Australia and New Guinea are inhabited by marsupial mammals; that,
presumably, is an accident of isolation by plate tectonics. On other continents, placental mammals have over evolutionary time outcompeted marsupials; that trend is God's will? Marsupials in isolation often evolve along lines parallel to placentals; that too is God's will? The resilience of mammals and their capacity to radiate is not an accident but a genius in the complex, neural, mammalian way of life. In any case, God's providence is systemic, not particular. God's design shows up in regression curves.

Bartholomew must be right that there is nothing ungodly, irrational, or disorderly about statistics. The originality of his book lies in its thorough examination of the way in which stochastic processes are foundational in the world and consistent with divine design. Bartholomew is also right that this at once permits God to ordain bigscale ends and to give human individuals freedom within the overarching trends. Providence is, to this extent, a statistical truth, true on average, though interrupted by human freedom. Bartholomew even suggests that the statistical character of the universe is primarily for the benefit of humans. "Our main theological contention will be that a degree of indeterminacy in nature is essential if human choices are not to be illusory" (p. 4).

A minor error: Karl Popper is said to be a determinist, agreeing with Einstein that "if only we were omniscient we would be able to trace the causal links backwards and find a satisfying explanation in deterministic terms. In principle, then, chance would have been banished from the universe" (Bartholomew, p. 67). Popper can be confusing, but Popper is really an indeterminist: "I am an indeterminist. . . . Einstein was mistaken in trying to hold fast to determinism" (Objective Knowledge, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972, p. 215).

A minor curiosity: Bartholomew is inconclusive whether he is determinist or indeterminist—at least outside human affairs. Chance and determinism are so subtly related that God can get all the needed chaos either deterministically or indeterministically; we cannot know which way, and it does not matter. "Our conclusion . . . was that we could never ultimately know whether what we observe is a pseudo-random process generated by deterministic means or whether there was no causal mechanism whatever. From a theological point of view there is little at stake as long as it is allowed that God's is the ultimate responsibility for chance being there. Its effect is the same whatever the mode of its generation." If pressed, he inclines to believe that "God generates the requisite degree of randomness . . . by deterministic means" (p. 102).

Continuing Bartholomew's main inquiry, I suggest several directions for the next stage of the debate Bartholomew has so seminally launched.

First: Is all that theists want to say about God's providence in human affairs a matter of objective probabilities? Does the statistical God also work personally, surprisingly, with novelty in the lives of individuals? In a revealing analogy, Bartholomew compares individual persons to solo pilots launched into this world where God operates through the averages. We are on our own in a world that is systemically dependable, though locally capricious, free in a challenging world. We can radio to headquarters for advice, but there is no providence that alters the weather or corrects mechanical faults (p. 139).

Does God tamper with the detail? As suggested by the solo pilot analogy, Bartholomew thinks objectively not, subjectively sometimes yes. Most of us are left to run these divinely ordained world probabilities, wending our way through our fortunes and misfortunes with radio advice from headquarters. God enters human minds on individual occasions, but God does not adjust the preset world probabilities.
Only the rare person, on whose behavior world fortunes turn, really gets special providence, and even this is subjective providence, not objective providence. Beyond the general, statistical pressures through which God keeps working toward creativity, morality in decisions, and peace-making, God can act "at the roots of human decision-making as individuals exercise their inherent capacity for freedom of action. If God is able to exercise influence at this level, he thereby influences the course of events in the world" (p. 141). "The normal mode of his action is in the realm of mind" (p. 143). This "top-down" and subjective approach Bartholomew prefers to the "bottom-up" and objective approach of W. G. Pollard, who tries to detect God bubbling up through submicroscopic indeterminacies (p. 141). "In particularly difficult circumstances" God might provide some "almost irresistible" communication that prevented, for example, "the pressing of the nuclear button" (p. 141, p. 139). Bartholomew's statistical God is thus the existentialist's personal God, who works inwardly but is otherwise absent from the world particulars.

Is statistics plus inner guidance enough to spin the world history? Statistics is a quantified science; probabilities come with numbers. But narratives do not number well; stories have few bell curves in them. For a good story God the Narrator (beyond God the Statistician) may need critical control at turning points. It is not merely statistical averages that make history; it is critical surprises, anomalous turns, new beginnings. Narratives do not fit regression curves; regression curves (as every statistician knows) cannot be extrapolated very far through history. With the resources that Bartholomew provides, God can convert statistical curves into narratives only by inward persuasion in responsive human lives. Although Bartholomew sometimes notices how large historical outcomes can turn on thresholds at initiating events, he resists incorporating this into this doctrine of providence, because he dislikes finding God in the improbabilities.

No doubt God underlies the probabilities, but we may also suspect that God sometimes underlies the critical surprises. Take, for example, the story of Jesus. Bartholomew thinks that Jesus was at the risk of the chances, if he was human like the rest of us, and that means Mary might have suffered a miscarriage, or Jesus might have died an accidental death in the carpenter's shop. "Jesus was no less subject to the chances and changes of the world than we are" (p. 152). Bartholomew entertains the idea that God sent various messiahs, or tried various incarnations, with the hope that sooner or later one of them would succeed, and that was Jesus Christ (p. 153).

Perhaps. A perfectly plain reading of the Bible story is that God took risks in creation and in redemption. Not only could things go wrong, but they did go wrong, and the Biblical history is the result. Beyond this, however, Christians may sometimes want to detect God's hand objectively in the particulars, in the contingencies, as well as in the averages and probabilities. Especially at the Cross, and often at the crucial moments it foreshadows and illuminates, we can wonder whether Bartholomew's "view of the universe as a giant stochastic process" (p. 157) is adequate to its narrative, storied history.

Second: Bartholomew believes that statistical design can illuminate the divine providence over evolutionary history. A continuing creativity has been loaded into matter, and the evolution of life, mind, and persons was inevitable, despite the random vicissitudes of natural history. Bigscale divine design is superposed on randomness at genetic and local levels. "I have argued that in spite of the indeterminacy of the evolutionary path, the end-product is very likely to be some form of intelligent life capable of reflecting on its own nature
and influencing its own destiny. If this is so, we may infer that human life was what God intended and man remains his masterpiece" (p. 149).


Certainly there are biologists who hold otherwise, but mainstream biological theory in its present form is not prepared to give Bartholomew the statistical trends he needs for his averaged divine providence. On the scientific side, Bartholomew must persuade biologists that there are trends in the data scatter across the millennia of Earth's natural history that their theories are not catching. Only with such a revised evolutionary theory will it be possible to reconcile theology and biology via statistics.

Even if we could find naturalistic tendencies that load the dice, natural history (the rise of life, of dinosaurs, of mammals, of persons) might still look suspicious. There is nothing in the chemicals *per se* that makes highly probable this outcome (these same chemicals exist all over the universe regularly without such outcome), although these chemicals do always and everywhere have the possibility of life in them. We are not surprised when sodium (Na) and chlorine (Cl) form salt (NaCl); these atoms are "loaded" to do that, but when sodium enters into the formation of neural cells, it does so keyed by historical discoveries, by information that is nowhere present in the mere atoms themselves, although it can be coded into a string of them (known as DNA).

Nor is there any such probability in bigger systems as such. The loading for the origin of life, if there is any, has to be not simply at the generic systemic level, since these atoms exist in astronomical systems throughout the universe, but it has to be particular to the Earth system, perhaps a lucky system loaded to become a living ecosystem, with many (hopefully not all) other planetary systems elsewhere stillborn. Stochastic systems are independent of history in the sense that probabilities today do not depend on adventures long past. But historical achievements do get cumulatively, cybernetically, superposed on Earth's stochastic processes. The secret of life may lie in the former as much as the latter.

On the theological side, if God is in the averages, built into the probabilities and absent from the detail (although present for guidance in the minds of persons), what do we say of God's action during the twenty billion years before the arrival of humans? The nonhuman fauna and flora are left to divinely preset averages. "The great stochastic process of nature and history was heading for a pre-determined end without his needing to bother" (p. 165). This is true even yet in most of the Universe and in areas of Earth where things
proceed unaffected by human decisions. This can seem a welcome autonomy. But also we have a do-nothing God for twenty billion years and across most of the twenty billion light years of space.

Bartholomew concedes that God might tamper with the particulars. "I see no reason to deny the possibility that, at least on rare occasions, God may take decisive action to direct the course of nature or history" (p. 143). But this is an anomaly in his general theory. Bartholomew likes to find God in the probabilities, not the improbabilities. On the whole, God is now absent from the world particulars; these by design are left to chance.

Is all that most theists want to say about the divine creativity in natural history a matter of stochastic process? A difference between probabilistic systems and historical ones, again, is that big outcomes can turn on little events. Even supposing certain prolife trends, I doubt whether one can always produce the more out of the less that has characterized evolutionary history simply by letting the system run through its preset probabilities. Bartholomew notices that some systems are especially sensitive to narrow thresholds at initiation points (whether a fire starts when a spark falls in a forest). Where systems "depend critically on the random behavior in the early stages of the process" (p. 78), significant differences in outcome do hinge on genuine chance. Big-scale results do not average out regardless of initiating particulars. Perhaps we need to suppose some "point inspiration" at critical junctures, mutation points. Historical emergence may be something more than stochastic process.

Third: Bartholomew dislikes what he calls the "significance test approach to theism" (p. 37). Assuming either God or chance, a frequent line of argument finds that the chances that world order should be as it is are so outrageously slim that divine design is the only reasonable conclusion. With Bartholomew's God of chance, we expect to find natural tendencies loading the dice. The probabilities are not negligible; to the contrary, they are high. Some preference sieve over the randomness catches the upstrokes. Although Bartholomew thinks that statistical tests for God once the universe is operating (for example, at the origin of life) are ill-advised, he admits that at the initial set-up of the universe (the big bang) the evidence is impressive (evidence often discussed in terms of the anthropic principle) and the capacity to assign probabilities fails. "Something is going on" (p. 63). Just what this something is needs an analysis that Bartholomew is unable to give, and it may be that here at the foundation of the world, with its interplay of contingency and necessity, we will find God as much in the improbabilities as in the probabilities. Bartholomew may press for a conjunction (God and statistically averaged chance) that, taken by itself, misses the truth as much as did the classical disjunction, God or chance.

Fourth: When we find natural and social processes that convert possibilities into expectable probabilities, that take the chances out of the bigscale trends, Bartholomew thinks we detect providence. What will he say to those who think that with the discovery of secular probabilities, natural or social, there is no need for further explanation? I share with him the conviction that it does not constitute a finished explanation of a thing to discover that it is natural. Nor that it is social. Nor that it is probable. One can still puzzle why nature, society, and probabilities are this way. But a large part of this conviction lies in how the natural series regularly breaks records of previous attainment and power. A large part lies in how social processes take on particular historical form and yield narratives of judgment and redemption. Statistical trends are impressive, and, in their own way, godly. They may be necessary. Perhaps too they are less than sufficient as evidence for divine providence.
In sum, this is one of the more challenging books to appear in recent years. If it receives the critical discussion it deserves, the relations between science and theology will be enriched for a long time to come.

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"And on the seventh day God ended his work." On the eighth day, God finally had the luxury of keeping her mouth shut. Cosmos-building is hard work after all; and its details have been entrusted to the evolutionary process. Since we humans have been neocortically appointed to carry the torch of cosmogenesis, the issue we must constantly address as moral agents of the noosphere is whether we carry that torch appropriately.

Adams addresses these questions implicitly, but never lectures. He has better things to do in this book, which is largely about the interplay between the physical and social sciences. Determinism, decision, and morality are, however, such lasting themes in philosophy, that no book of this nature can avoid them entirely. The Eighth Day particularly cannot avoid them, since it treats the emergence of social structures in a way that many might regard as deterministic. Although the ineluctability of energy flows dominates Adams's exposition of the evolutionary process, room is always left for "decision" in determining its particularities.

The Eighth Day is perhaps Adams's most ambitious work, for it attempts to bring socioeconomic evolution into "textbook" synthesis within the framework of physical and biological sciences. This is not sociobiology, by a long shot. Adams talks very little about "genes." When he does, it is not in the reductivist posture sociobiologists are (rightly or wrongly) accused of assuming. This book is in fact an excellent complement to sociobiology, for it inverts the gene-behavior matrix in such a way that life, and its productions, are linked with physical laws.

There are no textbooks on the subject. Adams has done a respectable job in delivering one, and few in the scientific community are better equipped for taking on such a project. His own specialties of anthropology and social theory give this book its considerable empirical flavor. Kinetics and thermodynamics provide its theoretical underpinnings, but the theory is always accountable to the empirical fact. On that basis alone this book is recommended reading for anyone looking to tie our activities as a species to the large-scale flow of nature.

The treatment of thermodynamics is qualitative. There are no equations, and kinetics is never explicitly mentioned by name. This is probably for the best: in discussing the physical sciences, Adams deals in broad brush-strokes whose impact might be diminished by tangential philosophizing about reductionism and the relationship between thermodynamics and kinetics. These are
complementary sciences for all evolutionary processes, and Adams doesn't need to retell the story. Thermodynamics tells us what is possible, and kinetics tells us how the possible is achieved. When Adams gets down to his own fields (economics, anthropology, sociology), he pulls in a wonderful richness of historical detail to the canvas of thermodynamics and kinetics. It's a winning combination.

Adams begins with basics, in language readers not conversant with the physical sciences can understand and that furthermore allows connections of social evolution with the broad evolutionary themes of innovation and natural selection. Social change has "triggering" mechanisms such as technological innovation and capital investment that release thermodynamic flows. This is the stuff of natural selection in the human realm. What is selected in nature are informed patterns of thermodynamic flow and the mechanisms that trigger those patterns. Adams does a sturdy job of articulating these connections. He might have done more, however.

Part of the power and spaciousness of the thermodynamic paradigm for social and humanistic concerns is in providing a physical basis for an indeterminacy that requires decisions (or triggers) to complete the causal framework in which societies develop. To work, triggers require instabilities. Those in turn require thermodynamic regimes that are remote from equilibrium. Societies are such structures, and Adams might have made his case more lucidly had he discussed bifurcations in non-equilibrium systems. An integrative work such as this requires some first-order approximations and theoretical omissions. Since The Eighth Day is one of the few books that seriously tries to connect socio-economic evolution with physical principles, it can be excused some of these.

The only kind of errors on which I'm competent to comment involve the thermodynamic infrastructure. The thermodynamics are presented loosely, and a few phrases will grind an ear or two—especially the remark that "thermodynamic equilibrium is a state of total entropy, the state of absolute zero" (p. 19). It's not so. There is no such beast as "total entropy." Even if there were, it would have to find a warmer climate than absolute zero: entropy decreases with decreasing temperature.

Such infelicities flaw the book, but not seriously. The reader should focus on its abundant substantive connections between the physical and social sciences. Adams is a true bridge-builder; and in an academic world of disciplinary chauvinism that seems hell-bent on chopping the world into tiny bits, we need all the bridges we can get. The corpus of his work has been of that nature. Energy and Structure (Austin: Texas University Press, 1985) engaged Piagetian themes of development with energy flows. Paradoxical Harvest (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982) is a slim masterpiece showing how Britain's capital investments triggered the development of the West. This is all extremely important reading for those who want to make the world a "whole" place and who want better to understand our roles in structuring it along sane and humane paths.

The layout is as follows. Chapter 1 presents the theme of the book succinctly: energy flows govern what we do and establish our options in the socioeconomic realm. Chapters 2 and 3 lay out the thermodynamic turf in which these options can be exercised. There are some minor problems involving "entropy" and "order" here, but they don't detract much from the exposition of the theme: Adams leads the reader carefully from chemical equilibrium to dissipative structures to the role of the latter in societies.
Chapter 4 moves the discussion to contemporary issues in self-organization theory, and does it well. Few contemporary thinkers on the subject are omitted in the references provided.

Chapter 5 begins the center of Adams's work, which is the study of culture in relationship to physical dynamics. Chapters 6 and 7 explore the human use and structuring of energy flows and the manner in which this coevolutionary process brings the thermodynamic concept of power into the socioeconomic sphere. With the human subsumption of energy flows necessarily come hierarchies for their utilization. Hierarchy theory flows naturally from Adams's work, in a top-down way. Social structures are not "built up"; rather, they differentiate under energy flows. Always in sociobiology we are presented with a picture of big things (phenotypes, value systems, religions) being built from little things (molecules, genes) through a combination of serendipity and natural selection. Adams inverts that picture: history and biology are both accountable to thermodynamic flows. This book is therefore a welcomed complement to sociobiological insights.

Beginning with Chapter 8, Adams gets down to specifics about how the energetics of natural selection translate into the empirical realities of socioeconomic evolution. Civilization is a "trigger" for releasing thermodynamic flows, and the innovations of civilization are selected accordingly. The "trigger" concept is a kinetic one, tying what we do as a species to what is thermodynamically favorable. That theme is developed in the remainder of the book, with many historical examples.

This is a carefully done piece of work, and loaded with empirical data. Adams takes little for granted of his readership, except for a healthy interest in the way the world works and the way in which we participate in that working. Appendices are provided as necessary. For a pleasing change, they are done at the conclusions of the chapters themselves so that one doesn't have to flip pages to connect the themes.

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Der Dialog zwischen Theologie und Naturwissenschaft. Ein bibliographischer Bericht.
(The Dialogue Between Theology and Natural Science: A Bibliographical Report).
Forschungen und Berichte der Evangelischen Studiengemeinschaft.
xii + 523 pages. DM 69.00.

The topic of science-and-religion does not fit into ordinary bibliographical classifications. Bibliographies in this field are rare but useful. The German one reviewed here was produced by persons related to the Forschungsstätte der Evangelischen Studiengemeinschaft (FEST), a research institute of the German Protestant churches. The bibliography covers over one thousand books on the relationship between theology and science that have been published since 1945, especially German books from the period 1965 through 1985.

[Zygon, vol. 24, no. 1 (March 1989).]
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Brief, informative summaries are given for each book. Thus, the bibliography gives an overview of developments in this field during the past four decades.

The entries are organized systematically into sections on physics, information science, biology, medicine, psychoanalysis, anthropology, futurology, ecology (mostly ecological ethics), theory of natural science, complete worldviews, and a section with materials for educational (and similar) purposes. The systematic part is preceded by a very comprehensive section that includes books on the history of the dialogue and programmatic contributions by German Catholics and Protestants as well as a selection of contributions in Dutch, French and English. Some titles of journals and names of organizations are also incorporated. Zygon is worth half a page. Zygon's program, for example, is sketched thus: The dominant tendency is to point to a close and positive relation between natural science and religion, or theology, and to present a holistic and evolutionary representation of God and nature. Dualism is often rejected, as is the model of a conflict between science and Christian faith, and the model of absence of a relation (p. 154, reviewer's translation).

Each section has an introduction that sets forth the major issues, sketches very briefly the development of the discussion, and gives a selection of major titles. These introductions can be helpful for educational purposes.

The book is especially valuable as an introduction to the German discussions. The contrast with the American and English discussions is described by Sigurd Daecke in his introduction to the English section. The continental European discussion tends more towards dualism, separation, and methodology. There is a strong bias against natural theology, monism, and pantheism. The English and American approach is, with exceptions of course, characterized by the theme of the relatedness, or even unity, of God and nature.

The bibliography is a rich and balanced one, which will be a very useful resource for teachers preparing course material on the dialogue between theology and science. It would have been even more useful if it had indices by institution, journal, and subject, in addition to an index by personal names. A separate list of relevant journals would have made access to journal articles—which are not included—somewhat easier.

The bibliography will be less useful for scholars engaged in research on the relation between theology and science. Most of the books included give only second-hand knowledge of the relevant fields involved in the dialogue, such as philosophy of science, philosophy of religion, the individual sciences, and the different theological approaches. Because new contributions to the dialogue should be based on sound knowledge of the fields involved, and reading previous contributions to the dialogue is insufficient for gaining this knowledge, the bibliography can serve only to identify the important issues and the progress that has been made in resolving them, and to identify starting points for further study and discussion.

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Beyond Mechanism: The Universe in Recent Physics and Catholic Thought. Edited by David Schindler. Lanham, Maryland: University Press of America, 1986. x + 156 pages. $24.00, $11.50 (paper).

This is a collection of essays by David Bohm and six other distinguished scholars centered around Bohm's theory of the implicate order and its significance for theology, here largely Catholic theology. David Bohm is a theoretical physicist whose accomplishments in standard theory are very impressive, but he is much more famous for his non-standard version of quantum theory and his invention of the implicate order. Around 1950 (shortly before Sen. Joseph McCarthy's Unamerican Activities Committee in a particularly witless persecution drove him from the United States), Bohm had become dissatisfied with the conventional, or Copenhagen, interpretation of quantum mechanics and had developed his quantum potential model. This replaced the randomly chosen trajectories of Copenhagenism with determinate ones (although no observer, subject to the laws of physics, could predict which trajectory would be chosen).

Somewhat before the quantum potential theory, Bohm had invented a practical form of the test proposed by Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen. When these tests were performed they showed, with the aid of Bell's theorem, that the assumption of locality-causes cannot propagate faster than light—was uncertain. The idea that the universe might be in instantaneous communication in all its parts but in subtle ways has, with some other arguments, led Bohm to propose the implicate order. At present, it is more a philosophical than physical idea, but he thinks of it as the basic physical nature of the universe. To explain it, Bohm uses the analogy of a hologram, which is a sort of photograph taken by special optical arrangements. The hologram, with other optical arrangements, can form a three-dimensional image of the object used to produce the hologram. The relevant property is that any piece of the hologram will serve to produce the whole image (although the quality of the image falls as the piece is reduced in size). This registration of the whole in each of the parts is what Bohm has in mind, but he is thinking of something much more abstract and multi-dimensional than a hologram. He likes the idea that perhaps the implicate order is the intermediary between the commonsensical world and the transcendent order of God. (For an authoritative discussion of the implicate order see the articles by Bohm in Zygon 20 [June 1985], pp. 111-33.)

The theologians contributing essays are John B. Cobb of Claremont, Frederick J. Crosson and David L. Schindler of Notre Dame, John H. Wright, S.J., of the Jesuit School of Theology at Berkeley, William J. Hill of Catholic University, and Kenneth L. Schmitz of the University of Toronto. These essays tend to be short expressions of the authors' theological views with some compliments for and a few criticisms of Bohm attached. They are, however, serious people and the essays are all interesting, perhaps especially to a non-Catholic to whom their approach is relatively unfamiliar.

In general, they welcome Bohm's idea, which is rather natural, for Bohm is a holist—the whole is present everywhere—and theologians of the monotheistic persuasion have an affinity for holism. Schindler sees Bohm's ideas as in accord with the idea of immanence. Cobb likes Bohm's realism, for Cobb thinks positivism undermines belief in God. Crosson is the most skeptical commentator and asks for an example as distinguished from an analog of the implicate order.

[Zygon, vol. 24, no. 1 (March 1989).]
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order. ("Consciousness," Bohm replies.) Wright finds the implicate order compatible with his own evolutionary theology. Hill finds several attractive aspects to Bohm's ideas but cites a caution from Frederick Ferré: "Theologians must not only find ways of incorporating current scientific explanations in their wider conceptual schemes but must also have a way of distancing themselves from the theories and models of science at any given time." ("Science, Religion, and Experience," in *Experience, Reason, and God*, ed. Eugene T. Long, Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America, 1980, p. 107.) In the last contribution by a theologian, Schmitz gives a theological view of time which I found exceptionally stimulating; it was so different from the physicists' approach, and the physicists have such trouble with time that it seems possible a new viewpoint is needed.

Bohm is a graceful, sensitive, and very intelligent writer, and the chapter in which he responds to the six theologians was, to me, the most impressive in the book.

What you will not find in the book is anything on the scientific status of Bohm's ideas. It is roughly this. There is no experimental evidence in significant disagreement with any of them; however, the experimental predictions that flow from them do not differ from those coming from conventional theory. Hundreds of physicists find his ideas very interesting, but they constitute a cult (to which I belong), not a branch of physics. It would be of enormous interest if an experiment could be found which would distinguish Bohm's theories from standard theory.

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