Reviews


Over the centuries major figures in Western thought from Aristotle to E. O. Wilson have looked to the natural sciences for guidance in resolving questions of pressing moral and social concern. The impressive successes of the natural sciences in the twentieth century have done nothing to diminish their attractiveness for many ethicists. Yet for various reasons many other philosophers, social theorists, and policymakers have registered a profound reluctance to employ science in their attempts to answer normative questions. This dialectical tension is exemplified in two recent books: John H. Beckstrom’s *Darwinism Applied: Evolutionary Paths to Social Goals* and Roger D. Masters’s *Beyond Relativism: Science and Human Values.* This essay examines their respective positions regarding the relevance of science to ethics and, more specifically, to the question of whether the scientific examination of nature, and especially human nature, can provide ethical “objectivity,” that is, knowledge regarding right and wrong behavior and good and bad character traits. Both authors believe that science can provide a degree of reliable knowledge regarding universal human characteristics rooted in the evolutionary history of our species. Yet Beckstrom denies emphatically that this information can provide a “foundation” for ethics, whereas Masters affirms both its conceptual possibility and its broad social value.

**BECKSTROM: BIOLOGY SEEN AS INSTRUMENTAL**

Beckstrom’s *Darwinism Applied* intends to distinguish proper from improper applications of behavioral biology to human affairs. Improper use of this source over the course of the last one hundred fifty years or so, most infamously by laissez faire capitalists and then later by Nazis, has led many philosophers and moralists to reject emphatically any and all proposed applications of biology to human behavior. Beckstrom distinguishes these and others abuses of biology from its proper use. According to Beckstrom, biology is improperly used whenever it is employed to justify social goals or moral values, whether progressive or conservative in nature. He explicitly cites Roger Masters as an example of improper use of biology. In an earlier

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essay, Masters wrote, "Respect for individual and cultural differences follows necessarily from the discovery of the natural causes of variation in human behavior" (cited in Beckstrom, p. 107, n. 12, from Roger Masters, "Evolutionary Biology and Political Theory," American Political Science Review 195 [1990]:205). Masters believes that respect for differences is entailed in the fact that individuals may carry mutant genes that may someday prove to be a valuable adaptation which might spread throughout the gene pool. Beckstrom sharply distinguishes moral values from scientifically established "facts." In response to Masters, he would argue that one cannot infer the "value" of respect for genetic diversity from the "fact" of potential adaptation because the former is premised on a silent assumption that survival is a moral value—a belief not justified by biology alone.

According to Beckstrom, biology is properly used to provide information about the "ultimate" causes of human behavior (i.e., its genetic basis) and to inform us about the means we might employ in pursuit of the given ends of human actions (whatever these might happen to be). Beneath Beckstrom's recommendation lies two complementary assumptions: that organisms are best conceived of as mechanisms and that the knowledge of these mechanisms provided by behavioral biology is instrumental rather than metaphysical or metaethical.

Beckstrom has great hopes for the application of evolutionary theory to human affairs. Biology may not be able to provide an objective and indisputable "foundation" for ethics, but it can function in a broadly "Machiavellian" way, as revealing the best means (i.e., which "behavioral mechanisms" to trigger) to predetermined goals. "Large leaps forward in evolutionary learning in the last few decades," he writes, "have brought us to the beginning of an era where science may be able to offer social planners advice on how to reduce or even eliminate a large array of social problems" (p. 2). Beckstrom scrupulously avoids indicating what these goals ought to be or what ethical standards might be used in their identification. Once they have been chosen, however, evolutionary theory can step in to recommend courses of action and policies that will channel human behavior in the desired direction, e.g., away from street crime, or toward properly ordered national loyalty. Beckstrom does not think sociobiology is a social panacea, but he believes its relevance to many pressing social problems has been underestimated.

Why is it improper to attempt to employ science to justify moral values and social goals? Beckstrom advances several claims to support this prohibition. First and foremost, he argues that doing so violates the "Is-Ought gap" and commits the "naturalistic fallacy." Lodging what appears to be an argument from authority, Beckstrom follows the majority position of Anglo-American ethicists who hold that every effort to justify a social "ought" in terms of a factual "is" discovered by science (or any other sources, for that matter) makes the fatal mistake of assuming that because something is in some sense "natural" it is therefore ipso facto morally good. In making this claim, Beckstrom relies upon the authority of various philosophers, most notably David Hume and G. E. Moore, to establish the legitimacy of what amounts to a "sanitizing" principle—"No 'ought' from an 'is' "—that enables him to identify and then reject fallacious inferences from nature to ethics.

The second element of his argument focuses on the epistemological
status of moral and social claims. Rather than the kind of "objective" reference to truth or falsity that one finds in the natural sciences, ethics and social goals are "largely a matter of personal values and tastes" (p. 2). This implied positivism suggests that science alone is competent to establish "facts" and to differentiate them from mere "opinions." Science, of course, can explain the evolutionary origins of "values and tastes"—for example, incest avoidance and out-group biases—but it cannot justify them in an ethical sense. A very sharp distinction is thus posited between the realms of science and ethics, with science most definitely holding the epistemological "upper hand." Beckstrom aspires to convince his readers that behavioral biology is relevant to human affairs, but not in the simple and straightforward way that has been the target of trenchant criticism from philosophers like Philip Kitcher (see Vaulting Ambition: Sociobiology and the Quest for Human Nature [Cambridge: MIT Press, 1985]). His discussion of a series of specific issues attempts to show that sociobiology can inform ethics in a nonfallacious and nontrivial way.

The actual content of what in evolutionary theory Beckstrom finds relevant to human behavior can be criticized in its own right. Some of the examples he gives simply mirror common sense and are not significantly enhanced by sociobiology, e.g., the fact that one way to decrease the incidence of rape is to increase the severity (and the public perception) of the prescribed penalty paid for it (chap. 6), that one way to reduce street crime is to place more police officers on the street (chap. 7), and that one way to decrease the incidence of child abuse by emotionally immature parents is to encourage postponement of childbearing (chap. 8). Beckstrom would point out that evolutionary theory is important because it points to the fundamental reasons why these proposals will work, namely, that they take advantage of innate "mechanisms" resident in human nature, e.g., fear of retribution in the case of rape. Other proposals are less consonant with common sense and appear to be highly unworkable, e.g., his proposal that one way to reduce child abuse by stepparents would be to encourage single parents to marry one of their in-laws (who, because of the genetic link, would have a significant incentive to care for these children) (chap. 2). Still other proposals appear even less likely to succeed, e.g., solving collective conflicts by attempting "to get everyone on both sides of a potential conflict speaking the same language with the same accent." Indeed, he writes, "One universal language is no longer farfetched" (p. 94). Perhaps it is true that people are less likely to kill those whom they identify as close genetic kin, but "tricking" the "kin recognition mechanism" through lessons in Esperanto can hardly be the most effective means of attaining conflict resolution between contesting nations.

Whatever the status of the specific issues Beckstrom takes up, the most important claim of the book concerns the adamant prohibition of any attempt to draw upon science for justification of moral values and social goals. This is a claim that can stand independently of the specific applications developed in the book. Beckstrom's approach yields several advantages. First, it enables him to embrace the valid insights of sociobiology while sidestepping the early and repeated criticism that Wilson and others committed the above mentioned "naturalistic fallacy." Beckstrom is eager to demonstrate the legitimacy of sociobiology by showing that it can be used without abusing the "Is-Ought gap." Second, it undercuts attempts to give
special authority to ideologies employing spurious science or improperly applying valid science. The instrumentalist use of science offers no foothold for those who wish to legitimate unjust social policies or narrow moralism via ethical naturalism. Third, it displays a "realist" epistemological position that acknowledges the explanatory power of scientific methods. It thereby rejects the view, fashionable with deconstructionists, that science is only another form of mythology or superstitious religion. In response, critics might charge that this "value-free" science is also open to misuse by those who would employ information about the workings of human nature for purposes of manipulation and exploitation, but, according to Beckstrom, this knowledge also provides information that can be used to support resistance to external control, and it can therefore also be used to promote greater autonomy.

**Masters: Biology Seen as Teleological**

One would be hard-pressed to find a position more opposed to Beckstrom's than that presented in Roger Masters's *Beyond Relativism*. Masters takes science to be an invaluable source for overcoming the intellectual underpinnings of contemporary moral relativism, or at least those forms of relativism which insist on severing the connection between the nature of human beings and the ethics which guide their lives. What Beckstrom wants to separate, Masters would unite: means and ends, science and values, the "is" and the "ought." Most importantly, and in diametrical opposition to Beckstrom, Masters claims that science can be used to establish the proper ends of human behavior. Masters's reasoning is direct and clear: human nature contains certain built-in goals which are the basis of ethics, and science can help us to understanding the nature of these goals. "Values," in other words, are not entirely the product of convention and local custom; on the contrary, many human values have been produced by the sustained operation of natural selection on human genotypes. Some of these "values" can be seen in "innate ideas," such as the innate "sense of justice" that Masters believes is common to all human beings (though with some variation in content across cultures).

*Beyond Relativism* is too complex to summarize and examine thoroughly in the brief amount of space allotted here. It should be noted that while Masters believes that ethics should be based on an appropriate understanding of human nature, he is no uncritical naturalistic thinker suggesting that the good life and right action are simply a matter of "conforming" to the natural moral order. He is intensely aware of the limitations and defects of modern science, and he insists that we recognize that not all human problems admit of technical solutions. Yet he does have an Aristotelian confidence that science can provide an understanding of "human nature" and "its proper ends or goals" (p. 8).

The central tactic of *Beyond Relativism* is negative. It uses contemporary human sciences (particularly cognitive neuroscience, behavioral ecology, and mathematical theories of chaos) to argue for the untenability of the foundational anthropological assumptions underlying the "fact-value gap," particularly the modern mechanistic notion of nature and the complementary Lockean "tabula rasa" view of the mind (see chap. 7). Masters believes
that modern "scientific value relativism" is based on two fundamental beliefs. First, following Locke it holds that the variability of norms across cultures disproves the existence of a universal human morality. Second, it assumes with the positivists that truth is attained by science and that values are merely idiosyncratic "preferences." Masters responds effectively to both claims. First, he argues that a proper philosophical understanding of nature, particularly that held by Aristotle rather than Bacon, acknowledges the variability of nature itself as well as of culture. This view of nature applied to human nature and morality generates universal values and virtues but not unvarying universal norms binding on all people everywhere. Genuine diversity and relativity need not lead to moral relativism, the belief that all values and norms are nothing but the biases of particular cultures. Masters holds that repugnance at overgeneralized and dogmatic moral absolutism certainly generates humility and tolerance, but it need not lead us to the extreme of moral relativism.

Second, Masters argues that behavioral biology discovers innate behavioral predispositions toward certain kinds of values (p. 129). To him, values are not simply arbitrary "preferences," à la Beckstrom. Rather, values are both grounded in our evolved natures as Homo sapiens and given varied expressions in different concrete cultural contexts. The fact that we have an inherent predisposition to engage in parental care, for example, is not belied by the fact that in conditions of resource unpredictability or scarcity, populations are known to engage in infanticide. Human nature is construed teleologically: moving toward desirable ends in ways suited to the varied circumstances of human lives.

Nature itself is characterized by diversity, argues Masters, and therefore human values must be understood as both rooted in nature and manifested in diverse ways according to particular circumstances. Abortion is a case in point. From an evolutionary standpoint, the practice of abortion can be said to be "according to nature" in cases where it promotes parental investment for other offspring, but it also can be said to "violate nature" when it contravenes parental care. How is nature a "foundation" for ethics here? According to Masters, nature provides guidance by indicating a ranking of preferences from more to less desirable alternatives for regulating birth. Artificial birth control is more desirable than abortion, abortion than infanticide, and so forth (p. 128). Methods used to control fertility are more or less desirable in relation to their positive or negative effects on the health of women and the costs imposed on them and others. Values and their ranking, for Masters, are not arbitrary "preferences."

This method stands in sharp contrast to Beckstrom's relativism. Beckstrom holds that science itself can provide ethical justification for valuing neither the health of women nor the control of social costs. For Beckstrom, one might speculate, health is a biological value but not necessarily a moral value—unless the relevant agents so choose. We have evolved to pursue these values because they favor the reproductive interests of individuals, but knowledge of this inherent predisposition and its evolutionary origins does not yield substantive ethical justification for acting on this predisposition. Science cannot prove that abortion is ethically inferior to artificial birth control; it can show only that it may be preferred on medical, biological, or other scientific grounds.
As already indicated, Masters's book is too complex to examine comprehensively in a short essay. It is necessary at least to note that it covers a wide range of issues in an engaging and persuasive way. His teleological interpretation of the emotions is particularly interesting. Masters successfully debunks the epistemological ("blank slate"), historical (Hume himself did not rigidly separate "fact" and "value"), and ethical (moral claims need not be equated with absolute norms) assumptions that underlie a great deal of "scientific value relativism," the very view which Beckstrom advocates. Given the strength of Masters's assumption-debunking enterprise, it seems at the very least incumbent upon Beckstrom to make a stronger case for maintaining the "fact-value" dichotomy that he has done to this point in his writings. The most important upshot of Masters's book for Beckstrom's project is its demand for a more satisfying conceptual justification of the "fact-value" dichotomy than is supplied in Darwinism Applied.

Whatever Beckstrom's weaknesses, however, Masters's position cannot be preferred simply on the basis of a process of elimination. Beyond Relativism demonstrates masterfully that values are not reducible to either arbitrary individual "preferences" or purely conventional mores. While claiming that science can give "foundations" of moral values and that knowledge of human nature "points to the proper way a person should live" (p. 145), Masters does not sufficiently support these claims. Even if values are rooted in human nature, we still are left with the question of which values ought to be embraced and which ought to be spurned. Infanticide might be preferred by nature (our "inclusive fitness" or "reproductive interests") under certain circumstances, but being "according to nature" in these circumstances does not make it either ethically obligatory or even permissible. The same is true of adultery, lying, child abuse, theft, and a host of other vices. Masters holds that ethical standards should be taken from a "rational understanding of the highest perfection of human nature" (p. 150). This is certainly a more exalted and morally appealing vision than what is offered by Beckstrom's Machiavellian value-neutral instrumentalism. Even if science can provide interesting insights into inherited human tendencies, it still cannot determine for us which of these comprise the "perfection" of human nature—if, that is, by "perfection" we mean an inclusive perfection of moral character or something like Aristotelian arête rather than merely biological excellence. Biology alone, in other words, is not sufficient to tell us whether the life of the saint or the life of the knave is morally superior.

It should be noted that Masters never claims that biology alone is sufficient for moral guidance. On the contrary, he explicitly states that "moral obligations or values cannot be logically deduced from factual propositions but... factual or scientific propositions can and must inform the judgments about moral obligations" (p. 45; Masters's emphasis). Beckstrom could in principle agree with this general statement as long as it is restricted to meaning that ethics consults science because (1) "ought implies can" and science can inform us about the "can," and (2) ethics is about means as well as ends, and science can tell us about the means most effective for obtaining our given ends. Masters argues that science can also provide insight into moral values themselves. Science can indicate the natural origin of certain values, e.g., why natural selection would favor those who develop a "sense of
justice.” Beckstrom can accept this descriptive function of evolutionary theory but would insist that it does not supply justification for morally approving of these values.

This sharp contrast brings to the forefront the question of “ethical justification.” What is the status of ethical justification in Masters’s book? While he does not use this language, it seems that he understands it in terms of what might be called an “argument from consonance” (the phrase is not used by Masters). Values are not logically deduced from facts, but they can be judged to be more or less consonant with various “facts” about human behavior that are examined by science. Masters believes, for example, that the fact of genetic diversity and the potential future value of genetic mutations is more consonant with ethical virtues of toleration and respect for differences between people. The same virtues also are consonant with our increasing knowledge of the differences between people in neurotransmitter function, which in turn lead to differences of perception, emotion, and judgment (see p. 123). Masters coordinates the fact of diversity with the virtues of respect, humility, and prudence: “If differences in perception and judgment are natural and inevitable, no single individual can claim the truth and no single rule can apply in all cases without prudential modification and individual judgment” (p. 123; see also pp. 154-57).

Two potential criticisms might be leveled against this kind of argument. First, the “argument from consonance” is liable to the criticism that it is easily susceptible to alternative interpretations. A strict meritarian, for example, might argue that genetic diversity can also be described hierarchically, from inferior to superior genes or from inferior to superior genotypes. Going farther, a radical eugenicist might argue that a rigid social hierarchy, carefully planned eugenics, and an omnipresent Orwellian government is more “consonant” with genetic diversity than are egalitarianism and toleration. After all, why tolerate defective or even inferior genes when we have the power to do otherwise? It seems clear that the “argument from consonance” needs to be controlled by more extensively developed moral philosophy than Masters has yet provided.

Second, the “argument from consonance” might be criticized for not really providing the kind of “foundation” of ethics capable of refuting relativism. It is true that “consonance” (a term which, again, Masters himself does not use) is much looser than Masters’s language of “foundation” (e.g., pp. 10, 127, 143). The language of “foundation” appeals to those who look to science as a way of addressing the problem of subjectivism—the belief that all values are purely subjective—and the allied problem of relativism—the claim that all values are nothing but the biases of particular cultures. One kind of naturalistic moral realism argues in this way: if nature, rather than culture alone or individual preferences alone, can be shown to be the “foundation” of moral values, then scientific understanding of nature plays a crucial role for ethics.

The critical point at issue here concerns the meaning of “foundation.” For his part, Beckstrom might allow nature to be a “foundation” in the sense that it is a cause, or at least a partial cause, of what in fact people value, e.g., health, sexual appeal, status, etc., but he would not acknowledge that nature can function as an ethical “foundation” in the sense of providing indisputable, nonrelative ethical principles. Masters himself, interestingly, does not believe that nature acts as a “foundation” in the
strong sense, either. Ethics "rests on" nature in the sense that general moral values and the virtues that lead to their attainment would not exist without natural human desires and ends. Yet, according to Masters, we cannot look to nature to supply us with an invariant and universal system of moral norms or a comprehensive moral code. Ethics includes general values and virtues but not absolute moral rules. These are objectively true values and virtues, so their importance for a world increasingly dominated by relativism should not be underestimated. Masters is much closer to Aristotle's view of ethics as pursuit of the "fitting" than he is to modern neo-Kantian ethics with its concern with a "supreme moral principle" (in the manner of, e.g., Alan Gewirth, *Reason and Morality* [Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1977]).

According to Masters, we come to understand this "consonance," and what are in fact the proper ends of human life, through "reasoned dialogue among reasonable people" (p. 152). The content of this kind of dialogue no doubt includes various beliefs about which aspects of our inherited behavioral repertoire ought to be approved of, acted upon, and promoted and which ought to be inhibited, sublimated, or closely monitored. We need to identify and clearly distinguish, as Hume put it, "the estimable qualities" and the "blamable" qualities of human beings (Hume, *An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals* [in *British Moralists 1650-1800*, ed. D. D. Raphael, 2 vols. (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 1969), vol. 2:60]). In this context, science can act as an informing source of ethical reflection but not as a sufficient moral guide.

Masters recognizes that value-claims are dependent on descriptive generalizations about human nature and that, while interpretations of these descriptive generalizations are influenced by cultural presuppositions, they are by no means reducible to the same. His position thus represents a moderate form of ethical "naturalism," that is, one that appreciates both the natural basis of moral values and the ways in which cultures influence their interpretation. It also can be characterized appropriately as a form of moral realism in that it claims that we can attain genuine knowledge of what is morally good and bad.

Critics might be dissatisfied with the very high level of generality with which Masters treats moral values. Indeed, to some he will appear to verge on normlessness. They might argue that he does not provide a systematically explicated theory of "ethical justification" because there are no norms to justify in the first place. Beckstrom's criticism, that Masters fails to distinguish ethical justification from natural origin, continues to stand.

For his part, Beckstrom correctly distinguishes the descriptive and explanatory functions of science from the normative function of ethics, but he improperly severs the latter from the former. If Masters fails to supply a fully developed account of ethical justification, Beckstrom repudiates the enterprise altogether and, what is worse, without the slightest argument. Masters would correctly claim that this is inadequate, given what is at stake in this issue.

In conclusion, it can be observed that if ethics is based on human flourishing and if science can provide relevant insights into human flourishing, then Masters is correct, *pace* Beckstrom, to argue that science must be of more than purely instrumental relevance to ethics. Every ethical
position makes assumptions about the nature of human behavior, and these assumptions are in principle subject to empirical confirmation or disconfirmation. Science reveals some of the “ends” toward which humans normally move under certain circumstances, as Masters effectively argues. Science alone, however, cannot provide the moral criteria by which we are enabled to distinguish which of these ends we ought to pursue from those that we ought not to pursue. Science, for example, might be able to tell us the medical advantages of abstinence over abortion as a method of birth control, but it is simply not equipped to offer an ethical justification of a hierarchy of moral goods. Science, in other words, can determine the natural ends of human action, but philosophy, and especially ethics, bears the burden of discerning the morally proper ends of human action. What is needed for this task, as Masters notes, is the cardinal virtue of prudence.

The uses to which we put scientific studies inevitably are shaped by other, nonscientific factors, which are not themselves justified on scientific grounds alone. Both Beckstrom and Masters might agree that ethical justification is always context-dependent and “theory-laden” and that therefore it cannot be a matter of simply “deducing” moral obligations from natural facts. Rejecting this simplistic naturalism and striving for a more accurate account of the relevance of science for ethics, both of the projects examined here underscore the need for us to develop a richer and more complex employment of science within ethics than either simplistic natural law deductivism or Machiavellian instrumentalism allows. It remains to be seen whether these authors can fulfill this need in their future writings.

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In his book Eliade’s Vision for a New Humanism, David Cave treats Eliade’s “hope for a new humanity”—the “visionary impulse” forming the “most encompassing and persistent” motive behind the work of the great and controversial Romanian writer of novels, short stories, plays, and scholarly works (p. 3). Cave aims to establish this new humanism as the central paradigm through which the totality of Eliade’s oeuvre can be meaningfully interpreted and made relevant in the contemporary world by encouraging “a broad assimilation of religio-cultural experiences from across space and time” (p. 22) to produce culturally literate and spiritually sensitive individuals in society.

In a “largely sympathetic and descriptive” (pp. 12-13) manner, Cave develops Eliade’s view of the new humanism in seven chapters. Following the introduction, which includes a biographical sketch of Eliade, Cave turns to Eliade’s methodology, the crux of which is a “creative hermeneutics” that demands intellectual rigor and openness in the course of diligent encounter with “the spiritual-cultural values of other religio-cultural traditions.” The new humanism thus “implies a continual modification of
the hermeneute’s self-understanding and mode of being in the world” (p. 181). It taps the essentially religious nature of human beings (Homines religiosi) by nurturing symbolic modes of consciousness that open people to the sacred and ground them within particular historical, cultural, political, and social contexts (p. 54).

Cave devotes two chapters to “the nature of the human condition,” noting that a “powerful motivation behind Eliade’s enormous productivity” is to foster the renaissance of a mythopoetic mindset (p. 71). Mythic consciousness is a basic human “instrument of knowledge” capable of both making the world meaningful by breaking the deadlock of unilinear historical thinking (p. 66) and eliminating social fragmentation and individual alienation by fostering “existential encounters with the other cultural universes of meaning” (pp. 71–72).

While Cave marshalls an impressive review of key elements of Eliade’s life and thought, it is difficult to decide whose spiritual vision of a new humanism is more prominently set forth in the book—Cave’s or Eliade’s. For, as Cave himself acknowledges, “Eliade never elaborated on the particular implications and expressions of the new humanism. So there are no definitive goals that he had in mind to which we can point” (p. 103). Having said this, Cave intrepidly spends the next quarter of his book extrapolating upon the subject about which Eliade was mum. Why?

Cave apparently took to heart the challenge suggested in an article (“A New Humanism”) in which Eliade noted that “the history of religions is destined to play an important role in contemporary life” and is likely to make a “contribution of prime importance” to the formation of “a new humanism, on a world-wide scale” (The Quest [1969]: 3). Thus, in light of his own mission to foster a new humanism, Cave distills several new “archetypes” (irreducible, primary units of meaning) to bolster those that had become Eliade’s trademark, such as symbol, myth, and Homo religiosus. In the final chapters, Cave explores goals and challenges of the new humanism by developing the concepts of “authenticity,” “freedom,” “culture,” “creativity,” “initiation,” and “science,” which serve to invigorate the horizontal dimension of Eliade’s thought and set human beings squarely into history, society, politics, and self-awareness. The result is a rewarding application of Eliade’s work to an existential social agenda that “encourage[s] humans to . . . create for the good of their own personhood and of the larger cultural world” (p. 194).

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