THE IMPORTANCE OF THE THREE PHASES OF FREUD FOR THE UNDERSTANDING OF RELIGION

by Heije Faber

It is possible to describe the scientific method quite simply as the attempt to coordinate things and then to make out whether the correlation is correct. Every branch of science constructs hypotheses about possible connections between given facts and then investigates whether the hypotheses hold water. As a result it is possible to make gingerly a modest prognostication.

However, I must warn you. In a typical investigation the scholarly researcher tries to show a connection between two phenomena, each as clear as can be. Whenever possible he will create a laboratory situation so that he can be certain that he can isolate the phenomena with which he is working from disturbing elements.

What I intend to do is, in comparison, debatable. I want to try to coordinate two theories, and not even two theories from the same branch of scholarship but from two different sciences. Thus I put myself outside the usual patterns of scientific investigation. The possibility of putting my hypothesis to the test is also very limited. I have to trust that the theories which I have chosen to coordinate have, each in its own field, been sufficiently verified. Yet I know that on their home grounds there is anything but unanimity of opinion about them. So I ask you to join me on a somewhat adventurous journey, from which, however, I trust you will gain something. We shall have to work with daring generalizations, but perhaps they will let us have a glimpse of new perspectives here and there which we otherwise would miss.

But I must not leave you too long in uncertainty about what I am talking about. It concerns the coordination of two theories, one from the field of comparative religions and the other from the psychoanalytical branch of developmental psychology.

I will begin by introducing you to these two theories. The first...
is to be found in the work of K. A. H. Hidding, the Leiden historian of religion, and the second, in publications by the well-known American psychoanalyst Erik H. Erikson. Hidding argues that in the field of religion different types can be detected. What is important for me is his distinction between what he calls the religions of the image and another group which he characterizes as those of the word. This quickly brings to a psychologist's mind the relationship of a child to its mother and father as this is demonstrated in the work of Erikson. For in the relation to the mother something like the image plays a dominant role, and in that to the father, the word. Are there, we may ask, links between this first type of religion and the relation to the mother, and between the second type and the relation to the father?

Hidding's Two Kinds of Religion: Of the Image and of the Word

What, exactly, does Hidding have to say about both types? The religions of the image are the so-called naturalistic, polytheistic religions, which, as he says, are characterized "by the acceptance of the multiple unity of the mystery of the boundless Being of reality."1 God is the unity, the totality, which contains everything and is revealed in many images. The religions of the word are the religions in which God is worshipped as the one transcendent creator who through his word reveals himself to man. Examples of this type are Islam and the religion of the Old Testament. Christianity is also often called, at least in its Protestant forms, a religion of the word.

Hidding here makes a short formulation of what we can find indications of elsewhere in theology. Some scholars have spoken of religions in which participation is central, as against others which are distinguished by a personal conception of God and an I-thou relationship between God and man. We may also think of the contrast which is often made between the Israelite type of thought in the Bible and Greek thought, for example, as we know it in philosophical writings. The contrast between philosophical idealism and Christianity is probably also related to Hidding's thesis. And in recent theological discussion many writers have drawn the distinction between religion and faith, which undoubtedly runs parallel to Hidding's formulation. Statements by Bonhoeffer and Barth about this have become world famous and are to be rediscovered in different words in such writings as those of Harvey Cox and Gibson Winter. I would finally mention Arend van Leeuwen who, in his publication Christianity in World-History, makes a distinction between ontocratic and biblical thought.
We may well conclude that in the field of religion there can be indicated two types which not only throw light on the differences between various religions themselves but also are valid distinctions within the history of Christianity itself. The importance of Hidding's contribution is that his typology highlights the role of the image and the word. Hidding speaks of the ontological character of the naturalistic religions. "God," he says, "is identical with the hidden, inscrutable, inexhaustible Being of all that is." Throughout reality a holy order prevails, and man has to live in and act from this order. Man is himself a phenomenon in which the boundless power is revealed. In the phenomena which man observes around him sacred powers are at work, all of which are founded in the Being of the holy, cosmic order. Man must behave in an orderly way with these powers; religion is that orderly behavior—it is remaining within the sacred order. These powers are close to man in the images.

One can formulate Hidding's intention thus: in these religions of the image man participates in the unity and power of the Being, which reveals itself in every possible way. The images are the ways in which sacred powers—which all originate in the one inexhaustible Being—appear to man and come close to him. By this formulation we get a clear view of the function of the image. The image is not first and foremost a portrayal—as such the image in these religions is generally not very successful—for it is only a representation. That is, it makes present, it makes the power exist.

The religions of the word have a different structure. In this type, God is not Being in which man participates but the transcendent Creator who creates, determines, rules, and commands. Hidding speaks of this God as Spirit. This brings to mind too the I-thou relationship, of which Buber speaks. Man here does not participate with God but stands in a subject-subject relationship which is characterized by obedience and trust. So there is no question of identity between God and man because man as phenomenon finds his foundation in the divine Being, as other phenomena do. In religions of the word God is the other, who stands both over against and above man. Man is creature, created by the word of God and spoken to again in that word. Hidding writes: "This God is clearly not primarily the Power of Being, but sacred Will, who asks his people to lead a holy life in obedience to his word. Here everything turns on faith and conviction and because of this a completely different, and to our feeling more personal, relationship is generated between the believers and their God, than when God is first and foremost power." It is clear from this what the role
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of the word is in this type of religion: it is the means by which the
great Other addresses himself to us men in order to make his will clear.

ERIKSON'S IDENTITY PATTERNS FROM MOTHER AND FATHER

Already a superficial comparison lets us see that analogous types are to
be depicted in the child’s relationship to both parents.

What has Erikson said about these relationships which can help us
here? In his *Identity and the Life-Cycle* he demonstrates that what a
child needs in order to become a grown-up human being is a maternal
relationship with a certain quality. This quality does not consist of a
certain amount of food or factual demonstrations of love, but rather
in a certain way of being present, in the way that a child is cuddled
and smiled at. Safety, warmth, order, security are the aspects which
determine the quality of the relationship. So here a unity, a participa-
tion, a knowledge of being embodied in the enveloping love of the
mother is fundamental.

In this connection Erikson does not speak about a particular role
for the image, which I shall deal with later. But now I shall indicate
only the analogy of type, which can be demonstrated. What is im-
portant is that Erikson draws a connection with religion. According to
Erikson the connection between religion and the maternal relationship
is trust. The child receives in the relationship to the mother a basic
trust, and religion does in essence the same. The function of religion
is, he says in *Identity and the Life-Cycle*, to restore a sense of trust.
In the last pages of his famous book *Young Man Luther*, he argues that
“the original faith which Luther tried to restore goes back to the
basic trust of early infancy.” Or, in other words: for Erikson, the
relation to the mother, participation, trust, and religion all belong
together. It seems clear to me that what Erikson says here is close to
what Hidding has said about naturalistic religions.

Where does the relationship to the father stand in Erikson’s ideas?
Erikson, like Freud, differentiates the development of the child in
its first years of life into three periods: the period in which the mother
is the dominating factor, technically called the oral phase; the second
in which the child through its own bodily functions develops a measure
of independence, the anal phase; and the third, in which the relation-
ship to the father becomes the all-important factor, the so-called Oedi-
pus or genital phase. Erikson stresses the growth toward one’s own
identity in these phases, and not, as Freud, the development of psycho-
sexual relations, although this aspect is by no means lacking in
Erikson’s work. The child, in particular the son, moves from partici-
pation to autonomy—naturally always in a childlike-primitive way—and from there into a period in which he looks further afield than the horizon of his family. He discovers the world and so the possibilities—still childlike-primitive—of his own place in it. He does not only want to be, he also wants to become something. Moreover, he discovers in his father a being that he can imitate but also one who can get in his way and cross his will. Or in other words: in this phase the child discovers in the father the other with whom he is in the world. And this other is at the outset primarily the person with power, whom one may imitate but who can also forbid. Erikson does not say all this explicitly, but I draw these conclusions from what he says about this phase. Of course the child has already known the other, his fellowman, in his life, in the mother, and in his sisters and brothers; but in this third phase a new dimension, as it were, opens in the relationship to another, which before was not so clear. Up to this moment he was together with others. The ground plan was, so to say, the participation; but now the other stands opposite and above him. An idea such as obedience now takes on an obvious function.

Erikson points to certain fundamental aspects in the relationship to the father. In his book about Luther he says that the word and the face-to-face attitude are essential to it, in definite difference from the relation toward the mother, in which togetherness, the loving and caressing look are more essential.

You can see that here words are popping up which Hidding used when he was talking about the second type of religion. The God in this type of religion clearly bears the attributes of the father: He stands opposite and above man, he has a will, and in particular he addresses himself to man via the word. You will have perceived that “image” and “will” are not used here as representing the “stuff” of sensory processes but have a special meaning in the framework of the God-man relationship.

**ANALOGY BETWEEN PERSONAL AND RELIGIOUS HISTORY**

It is now possible to formulate my hypothesis more exactly. Perhaps I could better speak of a theme, which I try to carry as far as and wherever it will go. It runs as follows: Religious life reveals a dual structure which can be associated with the dual relationship of a child to its two parents.

Now we must put this hypothesis, this theme, to the test. However, before we do this we must pause a moment to consider how we should think about this association.
Does the relationship to mother or father continue as it is in later life? Is religion then a fragment of childish experience that is clung to? Perhaps then with some changes—for example, that there is no longer mention of a natural father but of a father-God—yet emotionally without radical change? If the growth toward adulthood may be described as a continuous process of breaking away from the parental figures, then religion represents a portion of nonadult life. We know that this is the way Freud and many of his disciples regard religion. The image of God originates from projections of man's infantile need, they say. In fact, Erikson maintains a different standpoint when he says that religion is one of the most important forms of culture, in which man gives and experiences basic trust. This basic trust does originate in the relation to the mother as as essential element of the identity—one can say of the spiritual health—of man. Religion does originate, then, in the years of childhood but is not an infantile remnant. Of course it can be this, but in fact it is a possible, and then in principle an acceptable, element in the adult life of man.

I wonder if, following Erikson's line, we cannot put it thus: that in the relation toward the mother something has to be started, or "released," as biologists say, which is necessary for the further life of man. We know that there are sensitive periods in the life of young animals in which, in relation to one of the parents, certain instincts are "released" (it is also known in sex relations, in which certain signals are necessary in order to release the right responses). Religion is then a form of basic trust, for which a certain relationship toward the mother is essential. In connection with this it is understandable that someone like Rümke in his booklet on the psychology of unbelief, in which he takes "primeval trust" as his starting point, should, with Minkowski, ask whether we ought not to postulate a religious instinct in the life of man. We should add here that this release does not take place in the same way in each type of religion. Basic trust follows effortlessly from a good relationship with the mother. It depends very largely on the cultural milieu whether and if at all this trust will be expressed in a religious way. In the relation to the father there is something more. The religions which can be coordinated with this relation are sometimes called historical religions in order to differentiate them from the naturalistic religions. It is also intended to show that here the relation to God was brought about via a historical person, and therefore that the word, which made the relationship, must have been spoken by a historical figure. The God-man relationship thus develops here not simply from the relation to the father, as the first type of religion
developed from the relation to the mother, but the father-child relation creates the possibility ("releases" it, as it were) of letting a prophet speak the word at a definite point in history.

In brief, my hypothesis is: The relation of the child to his parents determines his religious life in two ways. The good mother evokes a basic trust in the child, which forms the nucleus of the religions Hidding calls naturalistic religions, characterized by participation in Being and the use of images. The father creates in the child the possibility of experiencing an I-thou relationship based on reverence and respect, a relationship within which religions that are characterized by a similar I-thou relationship of man to God can develop and expand. (For this the appearance of one or more prophets is necessary.)

**Some Tests of the Analogy**

In putting the hypothesis to the test, we must consider further the relationship to the mother and the origins of basic trust. We have seen that participation and the use of images are two essential elements in the religious pattern which fit naturalistic religions.

Here are some important points for the test:

1. In the relation to the mother the participation is originally the dominating element. In the beginning the child knows no differentiation between itself and the mother. They are one; there has even been talk of an "oceanic feeling."

2. Already early in the life of the child we can see the first signs of the breaking-away process. The child starts on the road to adulthood, which stretches over a number of phases from babyhood to the end of adolescence.

3. The basic trust originates and maintains itself as a certainty in this breaking-away process and can depend on "security," even when far from the mother. The famous tests with Harlow's young monkeys have shown what lies behind the origins of basic trust. The monkeys sit in a cage with several mother substitutes. There occurs a breaking-away process, which takes place between two poles. The monkeys want to explore their surroundings and so have to let go of the mother, but whenever they become frightened, they hurry back to the mother and cling tightly to her: in participation with the mother's body they rediscover certainty, trust. The older they get, the greater becomes the area in which they dare separate themselves from the mother and risk being in dangerous territory. Their basic trust becomes less dependent on the mother's nearness. Basic trust therefore is founded on participation; monkeys which grow up without mother warmth do not achieve this trust. One can say that basic trust is the ability to stand alone, if
needed, in the world, on the basis of participation, now in internalized images.

4. With Erikson we can describe religion as the totality of forms in which man experiences participation and thus once again finds trust reinforced. Hidding chooses to point out the image, as it especially becomes visible in myths, rites, etc. The image makes the divine power present and so binds man to God in a living unity.

5. The function of the image, then, is actually that of an intermediate object, as Winnicott has described it. Winnicott has demonstrated that there are so-called intermediate objects in the life of a young child. When a child becomes uncertain, the feeling of having contact with or being able to fall back on the mother is missing; then he loses courage and trust. Winnicott has noticed that children own objects, generally pieces of cloth or toy animals such as bears, which they especially like to have with them when they go to bed and therefore have to stay alone, or which they like to touch when in some way under stress. We all know children who put their fingers in their mouths and at the same time stroke a bit of material. They clearly become calmer by doing this. Such intermediate objects are mother substitutes. By touching and stroking them—they are often made of a stuff that reminds children of the mother’s breast—children make contact, they participate, as it were, once again with the mother and again obtain courage, trust. The mother is present in the intermediate object; she is represented by it. It is obvious that in this sense the image too is an intermediate object. I have already indicated that the portrayal character is secondary; what is primary is that the image makes the godhead present.

6. Because of this a certain aspect of religious life is illuminated. It is generally neglected—Hidding does not treat it either—yet it is of considerable importance. This aspect is that in the field of religious life there is a possibility of development. In the breaking-away process of the earliest childhood years, which we have seen is an essential element in man’s growth to adulthood, the intermediate objects help the child to let go of the mother as a tangible figure and at the same time maintain a disposition of trust, which is no longer beamed onto the mother but on wider aspects of reality. At the beginning the mother represents, as it were, the world or that which is real to the child; she is that world and reality. Via the intermediate objects the child, free from the mother, can feel just the same in connection with reality as in connection with his mother, that is, with trust. He and reality are connected, are one. Man is contained and borne up by reality. He is alone, yet at the same time secure.

So too we see in the history of religions a parallel cultural growth
toward a victory over the images, toward an imageless participation and trust. Or in other words, there is a tendency to evolve in religion from primitiveness to spirituality. A clear example of this is to be found in Hinduism. Radhakrishnan writes in his *The Hindu View of Life*:

The Divine reveals itself to men within the framework of their intimate prejudices. Each religious genius spells out the mystery of God according to his own endowment, personal, racial, and historical. ... It is sometimes urged that the descriptions of God conflict with one another. It only shows, that our notions are not true. To say, that our ideas of God are not true, is not to deny the reality of God, to which our ideas refer. Refined definitions of God as moral personality and holy love may contradict cruder ones, which look upon him as a primitive despot, a sort of sultan in the sky, but they all intend the same reality.  

In this way all images are put in a scale of relativity by him. All religions are a ladder to the moon. This means that they will eventually be conquered in the imageless participation in the mystery of unity, which is unutterable.

This brings to mind two modern Western philosophers who, each in his own way, represent this development toward imagelessness. The theologian Paul Tillich talks, in the last pages of his book *The Courage to Be*, of the God above God. And Karl Jaspers takes as his central idea in his *Philosophical Belief* "the all-enveloping," that he neither can nor will fill with images.

It is also possible to take Zen Buddhism as an attempt to bring man to an imageless experience of the mystery via the absurd.

That is as far as we can go with the testing of the first half of my hypothesis. Now let us look closer at the second half.

Is there anything more to be said about the second type of religion, that of the word, and the father-child relationship? My hypothesis is that the relation with the father makes a relationship of man to another possible in an I-thou kinship, and that, based on these premises, a historical religion such as Islam or Judaism is made possible via the historical figure of a prophet. Christianity too—as we have seen—is sometimes called a religion of the word.

To begin with, we can observe that, if we put the ideas of Hidding and Erikson next to each other, there are definite analogies to be drawn. Hidding shows that the relation of God to man in the religions belonging to the second type is characterized by the fact that God is above man and lays His will on him, which He reveals to him via His word, and that obedience and faithfulness are expected from man.
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Hidding speaks of a personal relationship; perhaps we may also call it an I-thou relation.

Erikson has written most about the role of the father in relationship to the son in his *Young Man Luther*. In the so-called Oedipus phase, the father is clearly the one who stands above the child with great authority; he is will that must be obeyed. Later in puberty it seems, moreover, that his word to the son has for the son an essential meaning. Erikson also speaks of a possible comradeship between father and son, a word which indicates that here a new element, that of the more personal, I-thou relationship has entered the parent-child relation.

The analogies between both forms seem unmistakable to me. But we can go further. When we read the Old Testament we see how deeply the father-son form has determined the life of the Jewish people. God is the Father-King, who, through the word spoken to Moses and the prophets, leads the people, who must obediently follow these leaders. He has difficulty in accommodating himself to the idea of a representative king being chosen by the people, a king who will lead the people in His name, and He is continuously mindful of a possible usurpation of power by the king, by which the people would no longer continue in obedience to Him.

In the Old Testament this matter of obedience again comes to a head because the people are unfaithful and worship other gods—or, somewhat more precisely said, because people worship images. The Jewish and Islamic religions are imageless. God's power is a power which stands above man and to which man must be obedient. In an image, divine being is close by and man tries to participate in it. In the ban on images, the Oedipus situation is, as it were, tangibly present. In the worship of images, man tries to participate in the maternal being—the Old Testament speaks of "whoring after," and that is for the Father-God an abomination.

It can be said that the patriarchal family pattern is the model for the Jewish form of religion. Indeed, it must be said that in such a family pattern an exclusive religious form has to fit. The relationship to the father releases a relationship pattern in which God, too, can only be experienced in a very definite manner. The preaching of the prophets and the behavior of Moses therefore fall into this pattern and thus engender this sort of religion.

In Erikson's book about Luther, this point is central. The image of God, or rather the way in which Luther experiences God, is determined by the image of his own father—that is, by the way he had experienced his father. What I am saying here may sound implausible to some of
you, but in fact we take it into account in every aspect of our daily life. The first experience of a father figure still has its effect in later experiences with other father figures. We all know that students react toward their professors in a way based on experiences that they have had earlier at home with the authority of a father figure. Indeed, our choice of a marriage partner is, as can be observed again and again, determined by reactions toward our parents. So it is not surprising that Erikson is able to indicate the same with Luther's image of God. And it is similarly not surprising that, due to the replacement of the paternal forms in our pattern of society, the image of God in modern theology is being changed. Robinson in his *Honest to God* has already made this obvious.

Testing my hypothesis against the reality of religious life shows us that we can rediscover the patriarchal form of the Jewish family, with all that this embraces, in the field of the I-thou relationship in the Jewish form of religion, and that a shift in this form, such as that which we are experiencing at this moment, can be demonstrated in shifts in the nature of the image of God.

Now, however, we must not be too one-sided, and to complete the picture of what has been said about the father-son relationship, something else must be added. In the relation to the father we have stressed his differences, the distance he maintains, the aspects of transcendence. This cannot be retracted, but I must also say that at the same time the father belongs to the family, that he, together with the mother and children, forms a whole. As he is experienced, the father always also has a motherly side to him; that is, as children we want and are able to feel with him, to participate in his being, or at least in some certain aspects of the paternal being. Indeed, there are moments when we want to bridge the distance that always exists. To put it more concretely, we create certain forms in the family in which we—still keeping the awareness of his difference—include him in the unity of the family: at table, in discussions, and in games. It is therefore possible in certain forms to be together with father as with mother. This means that in the relationship to the father there is a certain *tension*, which does not exist toward the mother. He is too high for us, stands too far above us, to make it possible to feel so at home and at one as we do with the mother; yet there are moments in which, as it were, we are allowed for a short while to forget this. Then he comes close to us. Then we feel secure with him too.

If we consider the Jewish religion more closely, we can observe analogous phenomena. Despite the obvious notion of transcendence
that is characteristic of Old Testament and Jewish piety, we also come across remarkable traces of the experience of God's nearness: God is present in the Law, in the Mazuza, in the Temple, although he is nowhere to be seen there and this closeness in no way reduces his transcendence. In the forms of "association with God" the pious man experienced God's nearness; indeed, he participated in a certain way in him, was one with him and at home with him.

This means here, too, that in the relationship to God there is a certain tension. God is near; yet he cannot and may not be identified with the Law or the Temple. Jeremiah warns the Jews that they cannot rely on owning the Temple in the city. It is, in fact, the tension which we too can trace throughout the history of Christianity. In the Reformation it was involved in the rediscovery of this transcendent God as opposed to the stress made on the possession of God in Roman Catholic forms.

The theology of Karl Barth was also a fight against the participation of God in idealistic and pietistic branches of twentieth-century theology. And, in the contrast made by Bonhoeffer between religion and faith or by Cox and Winter between the suburban religiousness in America and the call to a biblical approach to the problems of the city, we find the same theme.

Religion (as something different from faith) belongs to the relationship to God, insofar as forms in which we can experience his presence and can participate in his reality unavoidably arise in this relationship, but they have the danger that, as Kierkegaard said, they may veil our sight of the transcendence of God (the otherness), of the "qualitative distance."

I believe that I have at least made my hypothesis plausible in this exposition on the lines that can be drawn between the two types of religion and the two phases of development in a child. I hope that you have discovered some new perspectives in the religious material I have used.

**Some Further Analogy**

I can imagine that those of you who with some interest have followed this attempt to draw some lines from psychoanalysis to theology will now ask yourselves: does the second phase, the so-called anal phase, illuminate religion, and if so, how?

And I want to remind you that at the beginning I said that perhaps at the end of our journey we might be able to make a small, modest prediction. So I ask your attention now for two subjects: for the
First of all, then, the second phase and its possible value for the religious life. After I had made a closer study of its meaning, to my own astonishment, I realized how important this phase is, too, from a religious point of view. Earlier in this paper we saw that the value of the different phases is that they "release" a pattern which for the later life of man is of essential importance. The relationship to the mother sets the child on the way to basic trust, and that to the father, on the way to an I-thou relationship. Which pattern is involved in the anal phase? Erikson characterizes this phase with the word "autonomy." The child begins to develop a certain independence. In his elaboration of this idea, however, Erikson shows that many more aspects are present in the new pattern. He points out the toilet training, self-control, and self-respect, the fear of shame; he mentions a sense of law and order and the danger of a compulsive conscience. Those of us who accept these aspects will also realize that here we are dealing with practically complete patterns of culture, indeed that this pattern, as Erikson says, reveals many characteristics of our pattern of culture.

I think that we shall best understand the acquisition of the new pattern of life that is released in this phase if we take as our point of departure the fact that the child, in its toilet training—which now begins—gets to know the possibility of performing by himself and by so doing of winning some self-awareness. He makes something, he creates something through his own effort, and he is praised for it and can be pleased with himself about it, indeed, even proud. In this new pattern, which slowly but surely distinguishes itself as an exclusive pattern, a number of elements are consequently of importance.

In the first place, I want to point to the awareness of status. The child gets a status in the eyes of the mother through that which he performs and can therefore point to. The idea of status has become more and more important in our Western world. I believe that it has roots in this pattern. And we shall, I think, understand it better if we put it within the framework of this pattern. It has something to do with "performances" and with the mother or mother substitute. Status means being aware that one stands on one's own legs, that one is independent. But in the light of this pattern, it also means that one can only do this if one knows one is accepted, and the acceptance must be based on one's performances, achievements. In fact, then, the problem of status is a religious problem because in it is hidden man's religious meaning of the second phase, and for a glance into the future development of religion in the light of my hypothesis.
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need to know himself to be borne up and made secure, to belong somewhere, knowledge that supports his tottering self-esteem. One can say that in the problem of status the great religious problem of our modern industrial society becomes visible.

Then, as a second point, I think of the psychic problems of certain psychosomatic patients, in particular the heart-infarct patient. In a Dutch publication written by a medical research team about the heart-infarct patient, we clearly see that his psychic problems are of this pattern. He is the man who is compulsively active and is afraid of being passive, although deep within him he would like to be. Or, more concretely, he is the man who has to deliver the goods, who cannot back out, yet who can only go on if he can feel the supporting and protecting background of the "mother" (or mother substitute). The heart infarct happens when for one reason or another his self-evident support falls away and he suddenly finds himself alone in the tension. As long as he has to and is able to maintain the tension, there is generally no trouble, but the infarct happens as soon as the tension is relaxed, however slightly. The patient is the person who has not found the correct balance between being active and passive—or, in other words, between autonomy and participation. It is generally so that the mother in her upbringing of the child—to begin with the toilet training—teaches him to become aware that he is a big boy only when he performs and when he thus can show that he is a big boy. We get, then, a sort of primitive "superego" forming, which we often encounter in psychosomatic patients. We can thus see the same problems coming up which are to be found with the status seeker.

Here too we are concerned with the central religious problem of our modern Western civilization, that of the breakdown of autonomy and loss of security. In another way this pattern illuminates some important religious phenomena when we think of the figures of the Pharisee and the Puritan. What strikes us in both these figures is the connection of delivering the goods and cleanliness. Apparently both have kept the second phase of their upbringing dominant in their existence.

The Pharisee shows all the elements that Erikson reports in his studies of the anal phase: status obtained by performance, repelling of dirty impulses, but also continual doubt about whether he has done well.

And the Puritan, too, fits in this pattern: the studies of Weber and Tawney sketch for us a type of person who is characterized by his need to produce achievements for status, his need for order and punctuality, his need for independence (autonomy); by a sometimes permanent
doubt of his own worth and ability; and by the accentuation of the typical anal traits of purity and holding onto money. It must be said that it is clearly the influence of a certain pattern of upbringing, one that lays great stress on the second phase in the development of the child, that becomes visible here in the fields of religious life. From the point of view of the psychology of religion, therefore, the pattern of this phase has, next to the other two phases, a very considerable importance.

We cannot pause long by the many important aspects of this phase in human development. We shall only note that in the life of the religious man his relationship toward money and technical things can also play a radical role. James A. Knight wrote an extremely enlightening book about the first aspect in *For the Love of Money,* and with respect to technology one can make mention of all sorts of views expressed by European philosophers and theologians such as Heidegger, Klages, and Tillich.

**Analogy and Prophecy**

I hope I have been able to make my hypothesis acceptable to you; without doubt it demands a yet more precise testing than I have given it. Now in a few words I want to attempt to fulfill my promise made at the beginning of this paper, that I would risk a modest prognostication based on this inquiry.

We have seen that the form of the three phases of early development in childhood can be retraced in religious life. In the life of a child the development after these first three phases continues: via latency man reaches puberty and after that adulthood. But neither does religious life stand still. Hidding says this of it: besides the two forms, the image and the word, there is a third type, a religion in which the person is the means of revelation. Hidding is convinced that Christianity with its concern with Jesus Christ is this religion. However, he remarks that Christianity has not yet realized its true self, that it actually has its history yet before it. It has been, as it were, until now too much a religion of the word. Recently we have heard remarkable expressions about the development of Christianity, which I am disposed to bring into connection with these ideas of Hidding. I am thinking of remarks such as: we are approaching the period of man's coming of age, we are moving toward a horizontalizing of religion, the road to God runs through fellowmen. Names such as Robinson, Bonhoeffer, Van Buren, Hamilton, Dorothee Sölle rise to one's lips.
In a publication called *Belief and Unbelief in an Industrial Age*, which appeared recently in Holland, I have tried to explain that in the twentieth century we have entered a period in which paternalism has faded and that therefore the father figures, which until this period have led man's life, have also faded. From a psychological point of view this means that socially man now stands on the threshold of his independence, his coming of age. He is leaving the bondage of the old paternal father figures and has to show how adult he is.

From a religious point of view this means that also the form in which we have lived here in the Western church is blurring and that the relationship to God which fits in this form is fading too. Until now we have experienced God in the form of the third phase, as the caring, authoritative, but also exemplary father. The feelings which we had for our own fathers were transferred to God, within a framework of this type. Now that this form is blurring, a certain image of God is also fading. But is this what we see happening in present-day theology?

Bonhoeffer and the many who have followed in his footsteps, such as Robinson, Van Buren, Hamilton, and Sölle, the clearest of the "God is dead" theologians, are actually all saying: the old images of God, which once called up definite feelings, do not do so any more. They are lifeless, dead. We have not lost the awareness of God, if we may use this word, but we cannot yet express this awareness clearly in words. What we can say about it is this, that it concerns our relationship to the world and to our fellowmen, which we are experiencing in a new way. Christ, who is still for us the one in whom we recognize what God means to us, we no longer experience as the Son of God come down from heaven, but as a comrade, a companion on our pilgrimage through life, who shows us in his words, his example, and his cross that God wants to build a world from love, without external power, a love which will redeem the world's suffering, violence, and death. We are, as it were, bound to the powers of this world, but in actual company with Christ we become free.

There is growing, as it were, a new religious "courage" in Western society, which struggles toward clarity but which cannot yet clearly formulate its deepest ideas.

In the wording given here, Hidding with his vision of Christianity and the theologians mentioned above approach each other. From a religious point of view, the importance is a new climate, which theologically points to a new Christology. If I should attempt to bring this development into line with the division into phases of the psychology
of development such as we find in the school of Freud, then we could refer, as I have already indicated, to a disintegration of the structure of the third Oedipal phase, partly brought about by our social development, with its continuation into the forms of puberty, and through this an entry into a new structure, that of adulthood. I have shown, in the above-mentioned book on belief and unbelief, that in our Western society we are concerned with a sort of puberty crisis. We can say the same for our ecclesiastical and religious positions. The crisis in the ecclesiastical structures, as we see, for example, so obviously in the Roman Catholic church, and the crisis in the field of religion and theology, such as that which a few remarkable words about the fading of religion in the letters of Bonhoeffer from the Berlin jail set in motion (or perhaps we could better say, brought into the open), stand in living connection (and this is my hypothesis) with this psychological and social development.

So I do risk attempting a prediction, namely this: the disintegration of the old religious and ecclesiastical patterns will continue; we shall have to deal with a new type of religious life and with it a new theology, by which in Christendom the concern with Christ will be made central; and we shall be called on to believe in the foolishness of God, as He is revealed in his powerlessness, as against the wisdom, the power of the world.

NOTES

1. This idea is expressed especially in K. A. H. Hidding, *De Evolutie van het godsdienstig Bewustzijn* [The evolution of the religious conscience] (Utrecht: Aulaboeken, 1965).
2. Ibid., p. 61.