PSYCHOLOGY AND HERMENEUTICS:
JUNG'S CONTRIBUTION

by Peter Homans

Theological studies are today, to employ one of theology's own more banal euphemisms, in a state of flux. While it may not be entirely correct to state that the high and grand theologies of neoorthodoxy have run their course, their influence is hardly as pervasive and compelling as it once was. In the face of their decline, a variety of minor emphases or approaches have appeared: death-of-God theology, religionless Christianity, theology of the secular, and, more recently, the theology of hope. Each has made the claim of freshness and renewal; yet each too, it seems, has already largely spent much of whatever energy it had.

Alongside these shifts still another motif, somewhat stronger for the present at least, has appeared. It takes curricular form in an emphasis upon "religious" rather than "theological" studies. I am referring to a fundamental shift from a methodological orientation dominated by dogmatic and systematic theological considerations to one which places primary emphasis upon hermeneutics, upon theory of interpretation. This motif appears in two different but related movements. The first is theological hermeneutics, which insists that dogmatic and systematic concerns are less central to the nature of theological work than are interpretive concerns. A dogmatic statement implies something more fundamental; it implies something about the nature of interpretation itself. But the term "hermeneutics" has also become current in a second sense, that of the phenomenology of religion. Here it refers to the task of extracting cosmological and ontological meaning from the phenomenological explication of religious forms.

Characteristic of the high, neo-Reformation theologies has been an ambiguous stance toward the human sciences generally, and toward the psychological sciences in particular. These theologies have shown some interest in particular aspects of psychology, most notably dynamic-therapeutic psychology. They have, however, been primarily concerned with establishing the limits of psychology and only secondarily have

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they attempted to make use of its constructive possibilities. The various movements replacing these theologies, especially the death-of-God theology, have been more generous in their attitude toward psychology, allowing it a more substantial place in their constructive theological work.

In the writings of theological hermeneutics—that is, the so-called new hermeneutic—no intrinsic connection can be found to exist between the activity of interpretation and psychological meaning. In fact, the dogmatic and systematic orientation was, in its own limited way, more open to psychology than is the new hermeneutic. On the other hand, the phenomenology of religion is at least implicitly open to certain types of psychological thinking, especially insofar as such thinking has already been incorporated into anthropological studies.

But neither of these approaches has given explicit attention to the place of psychology in the work of interpretation. In this paper I first explore the possibility of relating psychological meaning and psychological processes to hermeneutics. Second, I take the psychology of C. G. Jung as the basis for specific inquiry into this issue. Jung’s psychology is especially helpful in this regard for three reasons. First, his work began as an attempt to go beyond the methods and assumptions of Freudian psychology and behaviorism, the two psychologies which the neoorthodox theologies also address; second, Jung turned to Protestant theology itself for assistance in formulating the higher human processes which he felt Freud and experimental psychology had rejected; and third, Jung’s psychology moved beyond both theological orthodoxy and Freud’s psychology by developing a psychology of religious structures—that is, he was forced to develop what I call a psychological hermeneutic.

In this paper, then, there are two circles of emphasis. On the one hand, there is the wide circle of hermeneutics, understood in two senses, first, as it is used in theology, and second, as it is used in the phenomenology of religion. And there is a narrower circle of emphasis, consisting of psychological self-understanding, represented by Jung’s psychology. I wish to argue that psychological understanding does have some bearing upon hermeneutics. In order to do so, I must also “interpret” the relation between psychology and hermeneutics, if the circles are to move closer and finally to intersect at important points. So there is interpretation of different types of thought, as well as interpretation in the theological and religious sense.

Interpretation in this second sense accomplishes its task, that of drawing the two circles closer together, by the introduction of a third circle, the nature of the religious image, which will be the unifying factor in
the following discussion. The religious image is central to Jung's psychology and to the phenomenological study of religious structures, and it is also important to theological hermeneutics, although not nearly so central as in the first two cases. Jung's psychology is fundamentally dynamic and subjective, and the religious image has a dynamic function in the process of individuation. In the case of the phenomenology of religion, the religious image is endowed with a good deal more structural and objective significance, although dynamic considerations are also important. The religious image receives less discussion in theological hermeneutics. But when it is considered important, it is conceived of as disclosing to the believer aspects of the nature of God which lie beyond objective and subjective modes of comprehension. Here the religious image is closely related to the theological meaning of transcendence and faith.

The phenomenon of the religious image therefore makes it possible to explore psychological understanding in relation to these two different views of hermeneutics, while keeping in view the more orthodox theologies. This paper argues that Jung's psychology supports a movement away from dogmatic and systematic theology and toward hermeneutics; but it also argues that the deepest intentions of his psychology support the second use of hermeneutics rather than the first. In so arguing, it concludes that there is a psychological dimension to the religious image and to one's understanding of it. The religious image opens human consciousness not only to cosmological meaning but to psychological-developmental self-understanding as well. That is, this subjective dimension, which is generally unattended in theological hermeneutics, lies implicit in phenomenological approaches to religion. If this is the case, then it may be possible for psychology and hermeneutics eventually to enter into sustained conversation.

**The Style of Neo-Reformation Theological Thought**

By way of initiating this exploration of hermeneutics and Jung's psychology, let us recapitulate the current theological situation in more detail, by annotating several of the more recognizable characteristics of Protestant theology. This is our starting point for our movement from a dogmatic-systematic approach to a hermeneutical and psychological approach. Neoorthodox theology addresses itself to two fundamental problems, those of methodology and anthropology, and in each case the problem of transcendence is central. Methodologically the problem is, How is one to think about God's transcendence? Anthropologically the problem is, What is the nature of self-transcendence? The answers
which this theology supplies with regard to psychology are clear: theological method transcends the methods of psychology, and the objective reality of which theology speaks transcends psychological processes.

This generalized stance toward psychology is expressive of a particular style, which I would characterize as a "style of the gaps," especially with regard to the problem of psychological self-understanding. Theology reads psychology in a manner which supports a split or dissociation between the developmental and existential dimensions of life. This splitting can be visualized as a gap between lower psychological processes and higher spiritual and religious aspects of the total life of the self.

For example, the early experiences of the self in family life are not considered to be of a theological order, but the self's relations to others at the level of society and history are considered central. There is a split or gap between the order of experiencing described by psychological constructs, often referred to as "merely subjective," and the objective reality to which theological understanding is directed. Put in the language of the demythologizing discussions, there is a split between the developmental process and myth, such that the structure of myth and the dynamics of personality are considered to be quite discontinuous. In each case transcendence is viewed as referring to a dimension of life which lies beyond psychological processes. While there is a strong emphasis upon a dialectic between transcendence and immanence in Protestant thought, the force of its work clearly emphasizes transcendence. Psychological processes are associated with the immanental side of life and are therefore neglected. Also associated with immanence is religious experience, at least the sort described by William James and his co-workers. Because of its focus upon transcendence, neoorthodox theology has been unable—perhaps it is more correct to say, unwilling—to assimilate religious experience into its understanding of faith and transcendence.

Since the decline of the neoorthodox systems, theological discussion has shifted over into a number of different, minor emphases, as already noted: death-of-God theology, religionless Christianity and theology of the secular. These movements have been accompanied by various individual inquiries into the vicissitudes of belief. The drift of all these discussions seems to be in the direction of rethinking the positive value of immanence and the resources of the human sciences. While these discussions provide no sense of unified approach or school, they can be viewed as a generalized effort to close the gaps—especially the gap between immanence and transcendence—so characteristic of a "high" the-
ological tradition. As might be expected, most of these attempts combine traditionalistic perspectives and idiosyncratic innovation.

Out of this pluralism in theological reformulation more unified efforts are emerging, such as the "new hermeneutics," in which the dogmatic-systematic task is not abandoned but is rather brought under the control of the problems of the nature of interpretation and of language. The activity of interpretation takes priority over dogmatic formulation and in fact makes such formulation possible. This approach is characterized by an intensive concern with the future, eschatology, and the ethical and political implications of hope. On the other hand, the phenomenology of religion, pursuing the problem of interpretation in a different way, presents us, quite interestingly I think, with what amounts to a reverse emphasis: primitive religions and the primordial are emphasized, rather than the futuric; beginnings are sought, rather than ends; in other words, nostalgia, rather than hope, seems to be the concern.

The new hermeneutic carries forward the high theological tradition in its conviction that psychology is too concerned with personal experience, with the hero or great man, or with human personality, to assist either in determining the objective meaning of the text. Nor can psychology clarify the subjective conditions which characterize the situation of the interpreter. The second approach is more open to psychology at the point of interpreting texts or religious structures, but, like theological hermeneutics, it, too, is loath to admit any substantive influence of a developmental sort upon even the subjectivity of the interpreter. Both approaches fail to integrate into their theories of interpretation concrete analysis of the contemporary forms of individual and personal experiencing. Psychology is one discipline given over to such analysis.

What contribution can or should Jung's psychology make to this situation? That psychology, we now begin to argue, forces an abandonment of the first view of hermeneutics, creating a transition to the second. Jung moves us from dogmatics to hermeneutics of the second kind. In so doing, however, his work also opens this second view to developmental and psychological-cultural considerations. Such considerations raise what I call the question of a psychological hermeneutic.

The movement of the argument can be clarified in still another way, by introducing the following distinction between two levels of analysis. There is, first, the level of methodological thinking, and here the movement is from dogmatics to hermeneutics, albeit of the second type, via Jung's psychology. Second, there is the level of the experiential or
psychological process itself, and here the movement is from doctrine to religious image. Jung’s psychology draws these two levels of analysis closer together, through his use of the triad of fantasy, image, and archetype.

The aim of our argument, then, is to arrive at the contribution which psychology can make to the activity of interpretation, for we cannot split psychological processes from the objects of interpretation; nor need we, for that matter, identify the two, as the theologian, be he of dogmatic or hermeneutic sort, fears. But we must not begin with the problem of the relation between interpretation and its object; we must begin with psychology. We begin with the problem of understanding Jung.

**Different Views of Jung’s Psychology**

How is one to read Jung’s psychology? Here we can learn much from the directions taken by criticism of Freud. Until recently Freud’s work has been understood either as a theory of personality—as a metapsychology, to use his own term—or else as a clinical theory at a low level of generalization. According to these two views, Freud’s work on fantasy and symbol, and on myth and culture, is always considered of secondary importance—it is one of the “applications” of his psychology. Only recently has this third or cultural emphasis been given serious attention, alongside the metapsychological and clinical, as a fundamental force of his psychology as a whole. Dogmatic-theological discussions of Freud have worked primarily with the metapsychological and clinical views in mind to the neglect of the cultural point of view.

A similar situation exists with regard to views of Jung’s psychology. Like Freud, Jung has been “read” in strikingly different ways. There are three general types of commentary on or understanding of Jung’s work. First of all, there has been some theological interest in Jung’s work. Different scholars have found, oriented as they were by their respective theological traditions, special value in Jung’s work. Each has sought some kind of psychological enrichment of his own theological thinking. All have emphasized Jung’s contribution to the psychology of doctrine, understood as a psychological exemplification of the Christian experience of faith. As such Jung’s thought has been seen as supplementary to a particular theological tradition, and the interpretive power of his psychology has therefore remained in the service of doctrinal statement. An important element of this view has been the theologian’s need to reject Freud’s view of religion while at the same time maintaining that a more generous psychological view of religion is
still scientifically possible. Jung's psychology provides both aspects and has thereby allowed these theologians to make use of psychology in doctrinal thinking while maintaining a clear separation between psychological science and theology.

This approach to Jung's work contains a double error: it says too much and too little. Our theologians rightly see the centrality of the archetype as an imaginative structure which organizes religious experience, and they recognize that the archetype has some relation to the processes of human development which psychology describes. But they do not, in their appropriation of Jung's thought, recognize the priority over even doctrine itself which he assigned to the appearance of the archetype and its interpretation. The interpretation of an archetype has the effect of releasing the self from the past—including the Christian past—and opening it to the not-so-Christian future. But in the minds of these theologians, the interpretation of religious structures simply has the purpose of clarifying the past and of transforming the present on the basis of the past. Yet Jung's psychology has a more subtle purpose. As we shall show, he interpreted doctrine—that is, he saw in doctrine more than doctrine sees in itself—rather than simply explicating it psychologically.

A second group of commentators in effect reverse this view of Jung. Their interest is in the therapeutic process, understood as a "way," a quest for fulfillment and wholeness, and they consider this process to be religious in form if not in content. However, Jung's characterization of the therapeutic process resembles mystical and conversion experience more than it does the paradigms of faith found in Protestant thought. Furthermore, this view greatly emphasizes the use of historical-universal religious structures to clarify subjective developmental processes. There is in it very little desire to understand as an objective reality the transcendence of God and of faith as a response to God's transcendence. Jung's portrayal of the individuation process is taken as a secularized religious experience.

These theological and psychological frameworks tend to split Jung's psychology into either a supportive subdiscipline for the clarification of Christian faith, on the one hand, or a secularized religious experience appearing in the form of a "high" view of the psychotherapeutic process, on the other. Both the theological and psychological views ignore the problem of interpretation. For this reason we ask: Is there a third view, in addition to the above two? To what extent is Jung's psychology a theory of interpretation which locates and clarifies religious structures, such that they open self-understanding to both cosmological and
ontological, as well as to developmental and psychological, meaning? In what sense does Jung’s psychology have a fundamentally hermeneutical intent?

The key to Jung’s psychology lies in his attempt to locate the archetypal dimensions of theological doctrine, religious myth, and the individuation process, and then to create interplay between these otherwise diverse and seemingly unrelated phenomena. The means for executing this task—to which he returned again and again—was the religious image.

THE CENTRALITY OF FANTASY AND ARCHETYPE IN JUNG’S PSYCHOLOGY

The meaning of Jung’s psychology lies as much in its style as in its content. His work is incredibly rich, often difficult and obscure, and his appeal lies largely in the fact that he is a “bridge” figure. Jung is constantly crossing over from problems, issues, and resources of one discipline to those of another. When we approach Jung with a particular question in mind, we find ourselves drawn into thinking about things we did not expect, perhaps even about things we did not wish to entertain. The difficulty with such a style is, of course, the question of whether there is a center, a focus, a fundamental emphasis which draws things together.

In asking what Jung can contribute to psychological self-understanding, I now propose that his work is fundamentally concerned with the psychological process of fantasy and with the interpretation of fantasy. However, as one instance of psychological activity, fantasy cannot be separated from other psychological processes, and in the case of Jung’s thought fantasy and archetype are closely related. Nor can fantasy be understood apart from the problem of subject and object. In Jung’s view, fantasy, like thought, has an object; it is intentional. It is the intentional character of fantasy which distinguishes Jung from Freud and which also allies Jung with students of religion concerned with myth.

How can we best enter the Jungian psychology, quickly and incisively, in order to demonstrate this point? Erik Erikson has given us, as is his habit, an Eriksonian analysis of the origins of psychoanalysis. He speaks of three dimensions which make up the total meaning of psychological discovery, each related closely to the others. The first is conceptual, the second is personal or developmental, and the third is a dimension of work techniques (or, in the older language, a dimension of vocation, or calling). So Erikson argues that Freud’s discovery of psychoanalysis really consisted in three discoveries—a discovery in terms
of the technique of doing therapy, a discovery in the conceptual formulation of that process, and a discovery in his own personal development. We refer to these three dimensions more simply as the interrelation of thought, person, and work in the process of psychological discovery, and we take them as means of interrogating Jung with regard to what is central in his psychology. Considerations of thought, person, and work intersect in Jung’s psychology around the nature of the phenomenon of fantasy.

Let us begin at the easiest level, the level of thought, and, since we are reading Jung as a psychologist, this means his theory of personality. There is general precedent in speaking of the structure and dynamics of personality.” With regard to structural considerations, then, the most important concepts are the ego and the persona. The ego is defined as an experienced inner sense of self-sameness and continuity. The persona is Jung’s term for the psychological meaning of the social other, the social or collective expectations which the ego senses and to which it agrees to conform. The concepts of ego and persona are in many ways similar to Freud’s concepts of ego and superego, and we may take them, at this point at least, to mean roughly the same thing. Jung, however, adduced a wider structural component of personality, which he called the self, which emerged, at least initially, as a result of certain dynamic changes in the relation between ego and persona.

The most comprehensive dynamic consideration in Jung’s psychology is the process of individuation. While this process is difficult to define in summary fashion, it refers primarily to changes in the relation between ego and persona. This process in turn presupposes the appearance and integration of the collective unconscious, which Jung considered to be the wider ground for the personal unconscious so central to Freud. The self, as a wider context for the ego and the persona, requires, for its development, integration of the collective unconscious. It is the collective unconscious, when taken into account, which permits an enlarging of the narrow sense of self characterized only by the ego and its matching of social expectations in the form of the persona. However, this collective dimension is accessible to the ego only through images, which Jung called archetypes. Archetypes mediate between the universal character of religious structures and the personal character of fantasy. They contain, therefore, a dimension of collective fantasy. Because the archetype does contain fantasy elements, and because its integration into the ego is central to the individuation process, we can conclude that fantasy is central to Jung’s conceptual formulation of the structure and dynamics of human personality.

But the significance of fantasy for the process of individuation is best
found in the therapeutic process itself—that is, in what we are calling Jung's work, as well as in his thought. Jung considered his rejection of Freud's psychology to be as necessary at the point of therapeutic technique as it was at the point of theory. While Freud retained a three-fold structure of personality (id, ego, and superego), Jung adduced the notion of the self as a wider structure that, in effect, contained both ego and superego, both ego and persona. What Jung considered to be characteristic of his therapy, however, was what he called the "breakdown of the persona"—a psychological crisis consisting of the failure of the ego and the persona together to continue to obscure the collective depths of psychic life, a crisis which resulted in the eruption into conscious experiencing of the archetypal images.11 The distinctively Jungian moment in psychotherapy is the breakdown of the persona and the subsequent appearance—with what can unfortunately only be regarded as suspicious regularity—of archetypal images. Jung tells us that what distinguishes his therapy from Freud's is the final disposition of fantasy. The merely personal fantasies of the personal unconscious, fantasies which the superego opposes, weaken, but do not overthrow, the superego. But for Jung there is another level of imaginative activity continuous with the first, consisting of historical and cosmological images, embodying an archetypal dimension. So the appearance of fantasy is the crucial feature in Jung's therapy, and the disposition of fantasy is crucial to his theory of what is normative in the psychological functioning of the person.

What of the place of fantasy in that more elusive aspect of psychological discovery, Jung's personal experience?212 Since the Jungian theory of personality and of therapy is a critical transformation of Freud's theory and therapy, it is interesting to note that Jung underwent a personal crisis which coincided with these changes in his theory and therapy, and that the crisis occurred in his personal relation to Freud. After the "break" in 1912 Jung reports in his autobiography that a sense of inner uncertainty settled over him, and he entitles the chapter which describes this uncertainty "Confrontation with the Unconscious"—as if, so to speak, the separation from Freud had a personal as well as professional and theoretical meaning.213 Jung's break with Freud was in any case followed by an increased sensitivity on Jung's part to collective, archetypal images, and he considers this phase of his life crucial to what later became most unique and distinctive in his work. Interestingly enough, one of the important events leading to the break was an argument over the meaning of a dream, one of Jung's dreams. Jung outwardly accepted, but secretly rejected, Freud's inter-
pretation of the dream. And Freud, eager, as he put it . . . to protect his authority, was willing to be put at ease.¹⁴

It seems clear that in Jung’s thought (i.e., in his theory of personality), in his work (i.e., as a psychotherapist), and in his personal, inner life, what I have called the psychological activity of fantasy occupies a central position. Jung’s psychology is intimately concerned with the therapeutic disposition of fantasy.

This concern, which I prefer to call the problem of the interpretation of fantasy, is not, however, the end point or goal of Jung’s psychology but rather the starting point. It was the point of departure for all that is original in his investigations. Jung inherited the problem of the interpretation of fantasy from Freud, whose solution was to reduce fantasy to the reality principle.¹⁵ Jung objected to this and attempted to expand the meaning of the phenomenon of fantasy into that of the archetype. This forced him out of the framework of classic psychoanalysis. It also forced him into an attitude of inquiry with regard to spiritual questions, and he turned to theology for assistance. He was again disappointed.¹⁶ Although theology does address itself to an objective reality which lies beyond the lower developmental processes which Freud had documented, it does so by severing itself from the psychological realm entirely. However, Jung was loath to create any such final splitting between admittedly lower, psychological processes and higher, spiritual processes. He was forced, in other words, to reject both psychoanalysis and theology. This double rejection required, anthropologically, that he create the concept of archetype and, methodologically, that he create a theory of interpretation appropriate to archetypal structures. Let us explore Jung’s objection to Freud in more detail. This objection forced Jung to create a higher psychological view of theology. That psychological view is precisely his contribution to hermeneutics.

**Jung’s Criticism of Freud’s Psychology**

During the phases of their development, Jung’s critical amendments to the psychoanalytic psychology appeared more radical and thoroughgoing than they in fact are. As already noted, recent discussions of Freud have shown that his psychology was far more oriented toward problems of myth and symbol, and toward a moral psychology of culture, than the earlier interpreters of Freud recognized. For this reason there may be less difference between Freud and Jung than the writings of each suggest. Nevertheless, Jung’s objections to Freud remain finally substantive and are as well defined as they are thoroughgoing.
In a very general sense Jung felt that Freud had absolutized the oedipal myth, rather than having placed it in a wider context characterized by historical, collective, and universal features. Jung was convinced that the oedipal situation was a "first mythology," opening out into other mythologies to which the self must relate itself in the process of individuation. In structural terms, for example, Freud spoke of the superego as the only form of social transcendence available to the ego. To insist that the superego was the final structure of limitation and possibility for the self unnecessarily limited growth to the forms of family life. Jung used the term "self" to designate a wide psychological structure which included additional objective referents beyond the acquisition of parental norms. Freud's phylogenetic view of the oedipal situation and his recognition of a collective unconscious mitigate only somewhat this criticism, for he also insisted that the individual and cultural superego are continuous.

With regard to the dynamics of the self, Jung also spoke of regression, but he assigned to this process therapeutic as well as pathological significance. Characteristic of the regressive moment is the appearance of fantasy, and the interpretation of fantasy moves the developmental processes—individuation—forward. Again, Jung's dynamic revision of Freud's psychology considers transference to be first of all an active process involving change not only for the patient but also for the therapist. Jung considered Freud's notions of insight and working through to be excessively rational and constricting, and introduced the term "active imagination" to describe the process whereby the ego at once participates in archetypal forms and at the same time differentiates itself from them.

With regard to methodology Jung adopted the phrase "phenomenological standpoint" to define the approach taken by the analytical psychologist toward the material requiring interpretation, whether it was the patient's productions or universal mythic structures. The phenomenological standpoint is the methodological parallel to the therapeutic work of active imagination, permitting the differentiation of the interpreting ego from the contents of the collective unconscious.

There is no exact Freudian equivalent for these terms. Freud's vocabulary at this point remains clinical, restricted to describing the physician's attitude in such terms as "free-floating attention," what Theodore Reik has called "listening with the third ear." However, this omission should not be allowed to exaggerate the differences between Freud and Jung, for Freud too "listened" to mythic structures in his religious writings. And these writings are much richer than his apparent adoption of a clinical model of interpretation suggests.
The major difference between these two psychologies, however, lies in the view of fantasy and its disposition, that is, its interpretation. In each case we must say that Jung expanded or dignified fantasy to include mythic structures. The phenomenological standpoint is addressed to both developmental and religious forms, such that both are accorded objective validity—neither can be reduced to the other. Freud's therapy presupposed two levels of psychic life: first, a surface reality characterized by clarity of self-awareness, self-control, and continuity between ego and perceptual environment; and, second, a deeper level of psychological functioning, the dominant characteristic of which is fantasy. The force of his psychology lies in an attempt to relate the second interpretively to the first, the reduction of fantasy to reality. Jung extended the formal aspect of this approach to mythic or archetypal forms and asserted that individuation was a double movement of the self between the appearance of archetypes and their subsequent interpretation. Jung therefore both affirmed and then criticized Freud's psychology. In attempting to go "beyond" Freud he found himself face to face with the question of religious experience and theological thought—and, from our own point of view, with the task of interpreting theological doctrine itself and, in particular, the doctrine of transcendence.

From Dogmatics to Psychology: The Collapse of Distance

The psychological activity of fantasy is central to Jung's psychology. At the center of his thought is a double movement characterized first by the appearance of fantasy elements and archetype and second by the activity of interpretation. Given this wider understanding of the nature of fantasy, such that it leads out into religious images or archetypes, this second movement is the point at which Jung attempted to formulate the meaning of transcendence. However, because this concept was so fraught with theological rather than psychological meaning, and because Jung found his work located "between" classic Freudian theory and theological statement, it is best to adopt a middle term, that of distance, one midway between insight or understanding in the psychological sense and the theological notion of self-transcendence. Thus psychological insight may be understood as a form of distance from one's situation. In like fashion the theological view of self-transcendence implies the capacity to distance oneself from oneself in order to permit a deeper relation to oneself.

We can understand Jung's thought at this point through the notion of distance. The appearance of fantasy and archetype can be characterized as the collapse of distance, and the interpretation of the religious image, as the gaining or winning of distance. Methodologically
one gains distance from the past through the interpretation of historical-universal religious structures, and experientially the self gains distance from itself through the differentiation of the ego from the contents of the collective unconscious. In both cases continuity between developmental and cosmological, religious structures is absolutely necessary. While Jung does not make explicit use of the notion of distance, it is, we argue, implicit in his thought. Therefore this is an "interpretation" of Jung the validity of which depends on how well it clarifies Jung's work in relation to Freud's thought to theology, and to religion.

Jung took a distinctly psychological approach to theology. Like the early psychologists of religion, he spoke of such typical problems as conversion, mysticism, worship, and ritual. But unlike the psychologists of religion, Jung was far more interested in the psychological meaning of Christian doctrine—he approached it interpretively. Doctrinal thought was founded psychologically upon what he called the rational attitude, a characterization of modern, Western man closely associated with the extraverted attitude type and with a rather rigid relation between ego and persona. This kind of psychological organization prevents integration of the darker or "shadow" side of the self. Concern with the darker aspects of self-understanding led Jung ethically to the problem of evil, theologically to the doctrinal meaning of the demonic, and religiously to the image of Satan.

Jung's concern with the ethics of the irrational allies him with such religious existentialists as Berdyaev and Marcel. But it allies him even more intimately with Protestant theological existentialism. Jung's criticism of the extraverted attitude type, related as it is to the functions of sensation and thinking, resembles theological existentialism's criticism of the false objectivity of the subject-object dichotomy. But his psychological-interpretive approach to theology itself distinguishes his work from this type of theology. From the methodological point of view of this genre of theology, myth is the objective pole and the cultural situation is the subjective pole. The theologian's task lies in demonstrating the relevance of his myth for the cultural situation, which is nonmythic in character. For example, Reinhold Niebuhr's distinction between primitive and permanent myth allocates to such disciplines as psychology and anthropology the task of interpreting primitive myth. But permanent myth, by which he means biblical myth, transcends primitive myth; therefore theological interpretation transcends psychological interpretation. Bultmann's demythologization program and Tillich's correlation of kerygma and situation exhibit a similar style. The theolo-
gian therefore moves from the givenness or priority of myth as a structure transcending natural and rational modes of knowing to the cultural situation.

Jung responded to this methodological style in two important ways. First, because he in effect had expanded Freud's psychological point of view, he was able to maintain a psychological approach to permanent myth without, however, being vulnerable to the criticism of reductionism. Consequently, he concluded that there was a psychological-archetypal structure not only to the highest forms of myth—that is, those of the Old and New Testaments—but also to doctrinal statement itself. The doctrine of the Trinity became extremely important in this phase of Jung's work; he found it closely related to the problem of evil and the image of Satan. Jung conceptualized this higher psychology of the darker, unconscious side of life in terms of the shadow archetype. He concluded that the doctrine of the Trinity was excessively rational, that it was expressive of neglect of the darker, shadow side of life. However, it must be emphasized that Jung was also arguing for the mediating power and function of religious images, for what should be called an "archetypal a priori" in any doctrinal formulation of transcendence and faith.

Because this type of a priori is generally neglected in doctrinal thinking, Jung's psychology takes as its object not only religious experience but doctrinal statement as well. He seeks images which underlie doctrinal statement, for it is these images which make doctrine attractive to the believer. Gaston Bachelard, in referring to his own work of a psychoanalysis of objective or scientific knowledge, also described it as an indirect and secondary psychoanalysis which seeks "the subjective value under the objective evidence, the reverie beneath the experiment." Transposing Bachelard's apt phrase, we say that Jung's psychology seeks the "reverie beneath the doctrine," and the particular reverie beneath the particular doctrine of transcendence. Analytical psychology is not, therefore, a different discipline which can be used to supplement theological statement, it is not an ancilla fidei; nor is it simply a secularized religious experience, transposed into the psychotherapeutic experience, as many Jungian commentators have suggested. Jung's psychology is an interpretation of doctrine, of the psychological, archetypal substructure of theological thinking. The immanent opposite to the doctrine of God's transcendence is the image of Satan, and this image in turn opens up the feminine, or anima, side of the divine life. Jung's psychology is an attempt to educe from doctrinal, dogmatic material such latent images.
Is this approach as reductive as it seems? Let us return to the phenomenon of distance. Jung argued that the doctrine of God's transcendence was closely related to a rational, extraverted psychological attitude. Transcendence in the Protestant tradition creates excessive distance between human consciousness and divine reality, whenever rational thinking is the only form of thinking permitted. Such distance is "false distance," and is collapsed by the emergence of latent archetypal structures. At this point Jung's work is a thoroughgoing criticism of the "high" theological tradition in the West, particularly its Protestant forms. Here Jung does in fact move from dogmatic theology to developmental processes. He collapses the transcendent, objective, divine reality into subjective, psychological processes.

At this point Jung's approach seems clearly reductive, for he forces doctrinal thinking to pass through its own archetypal infrastructure. Jung "humiliates" the dogmatic mode of thought by taking doctrine as his object of interpretation, reducing it to subjective psychological processes. But there is a second movement in Jung's work, one directed toward a recovery of transcendence, toward, in our terms, a recovery of distance. Jung's first movement seeks the religious image beneath the doctrine in order to make possible a second movement, one in which such images acquire the status of religious structures, which therefore in turn require interpretation. The psychological interpretation of dogma, and especially of the Protestant version of transcendence, is therefore only the first step of a twofold contribution. The second is a movement from psychological analysis to hermeneutics.

**From Psychology to Hermeneutics: The Recovery of Distance**

Jung opens dogmatic thinking to its own implicit, psychological meanings. In so adducing an archetypal infrastructure to doctrine, Jung takes the first step toward a psychology of religion. This first step is in some sense already interpretive, in that its view of dogmatics differs from dogmatics' view of itself. However, a second step assigns meaning to the archetypal infrastructure, rather than simply speaking in behalf of its phenomenal reality. At this point Jung's psychology openly becomes what we will call a psychological hermeneutic of religious images. We should keep in mind the very important fact that Jung's psychological work is methodologically situated midway between classic psychoanalysis and Protestant theology.

This second movement can be described at the points of method and the developmental process. In the case of method, Jung requires a
movement from dogmatics, through the psychological criticism of dogmatic modes of thought, to the activity of interpretation. We have characterized the first movement as the collapse of distance, that is, of a false sense of distance closely related to the rational, psychological attitude and to its theological counterpart, a heightened sense of God's transcendence. The interpretation of the archetypal dimension of doctrine, the second movement, can therefore be characterized as the reverse, as the recovery or winning of distance. Such interpretation is related to developmental processes, for interpretation frees the ego from the effects of unconscious archetypal influence, by changing the relation of the ego to these contents. This freeing results in a new, more integrated relation between ego and collective unconscious, which is, of course, the essence of the individuation process. Interpretation therefore makes possible the process of individuation, and individuation requires interpretation.

By way of summary we note three fundamental principles which Jung's work requires of any view of hermeneutics. First, hermeneutics must be open to the possibility of a plurality of master myths, objectively and structurally. The interpreter may wish to emphasize the ascendancy of a single myth over others, its inherent capacity to transcend others, but this conclusion can be drawn only after the full range of myths has been recognized and then worked through. Second, hermeneutics must admit to a plurality of mythic structures subjectively as well. It must recognize that there are also mythologies of development and socialization. The interpreter may wish to designate these subjective structures as "lower" or more "immanent," but they still must be included in the total work of interpretation. Third, whatever correlations hermeneutics may wish to create—be they between the objective and the subjective, between kerygma and situation, between myth and modernity—must be made in the context of these two levels of myth.

Jung's work will, however, always be found largely incomplete and unsatisfying to those who are concerned with the full range of problems involved in a theory of interpretation of religious forms. His contribution is primarily at the point of dynamics and socialization. Only secondarily does he assist in structural and methodological considerations. Yet this dynamic emphasis is important, not only as one dimension of a religious anthropology but also because it makes possible fruitful interplay between structural and methodological considerations. This advantage is easily illustrated by drawing upon the work of Eliade and Ricoeur. Jung makes a permanent psychological contribution to Eliade's structural emphasis and to Ricoeur's methodological
interests. Depth psychology makes possible a full return to the type of hermeneutics of which Ricoeur speaks, on the basis of a phenomenology of religion as Eliade has demonstrated it, without sacrificing—as they both tend to do—developmental considerations.

For years Eliade has been impatient with Freud's genetic reductionism of religion, an objection similar to Jung's. However, Eliade has never closed the study of the history of religions to depth psychology, and he has even tentatively defined his own approach as a "metapsychology," the study of man "not only inasmuch as he is a historic being, but also as a living symbol," through the use of "a more spiritual technique applicable mainly to elucidating the theoretical content of the symbols and archetypes." For Eliade the image alone reveals, the symbol is an autonomous mode of knowledge which possesses and evinces intrinsic cognitive value. Because of his predominantly dynamic emphasis, Jung often gives the impression of reducing the meaning of religious structures to a projection of internal, personal processes. However, Jung refused to identify his approach exclusively either with experimental science or with idealistic metaphysics and the theologies associated with it. What he called the phenomenological standpoint was an attempt to remain open to the structural status assigned to symbol, myth, and archetype by such writers as Eliade.

According to Eliade's distinction between historical and structural approaches to the phenomenon of religion, structure refers to the images which embody a unity of wholeness which man in his historical life and thought lacks. Because he lacks such unity and wholeness, man knows the difference between this possibility and his own actual condition, and the being for which he yearns is expressed to him through the medium of its mythic forms. Therefore, religious structures are "out there," existing neither as psychological projections nor as the hypostatized reality of dogmatic theological statement. The dynamic component of Eliade's phenomenology is nostalgia, the desire to participate in mythic structures and through them in unfallen being: "to be always, effortlessly, at the heart of the world." Eliade's view is matched by Jung's psychological notion of the teleological significance of regression.

Paul Ricoeur employs the sort of phenomenological approach to religion developed by Eliade, but Ricoeur does so by moving through depth psychology. He therefore incorporates what we have called a psychological hermeneutic in order to arrive at the goal of his work, the concrete reflection upon symbols.

In his discussions of hermeneutics Ricoeur identifies three types of relation between consciousness and religious symbols. This typology
must be considered whenever one wishes to develop ways of thinking about religious symbols. There is first of all the original condition of primitive naïveté, of the immediacy of the symbol, a direct and immediate connection between the religious consciousness and symbols. This religious attitude is not, of course, available to modern man, who continually prefers to seek out the causes, function, and origins of myth, ritual, and belief. Modern man prefers awareness of myth as myth, the logos of the mythos. In so preferring, he dissolves myth into explanation and speaks of truth without belief. This second relation between consciousness and symbols Ricoeur calls “truth at a distance.” It calls for an interrogation of myth and symbol at the level of comparison rather than commitment; it runs from one symbol to another without regard for the existence and subjectivity of the interpreter.

The third attitude which can be taken toward symbols Ricoeur calls a second immediacy or second naïveté, a postcritical equivalent to a precritical hierophany, a return to the powerful immediacy of symbols— but all of this on the basis of distance, on the basis of demythologization.

This passage from truth at a distance to a second immediacy embodies a psychological step of fundamental importance. Ricoeur believes that Freud’s psychology is primarily a hermeneutic, and it is Freud’s hermeneutical style which fascinates Ricoeur. He uses Freud’s psychology to move from phenomenology to hermeneutics. Phenomenology, used here in two senses, refers philosophically to the method of pure description and to a phenomenological approach to religious structures. Ricoeur likens the cogito of phenomenological description to Freud’s description of the surface quality of the ego’s relation to reality. Ricoeur describes this relation as the pretension of consciousness to rule the senses. At this point Ricoeur and Freud, each in his own way, support Jung’s objection to the rational extraverted attitude which, we have argued, so readily articulates with the Protestant sense of transcendence.

It is the thinking subject, the cogito, and not the object, the religious symbol, which must undergo deeper exploration, in order that it can become open to the meaning of symbols. Interpretation, Ricoeur argues, must pass through desire. The cogito must be “humiliated” it must “pass through” the experience of narcissism. Ricoeur therefore adduces psychoanalytic psychology as an antiphенomenology, the purpose of which is to conduct an archaeology of the subject, in preparation for philosophical reflection on symbols.

Narcissism is usually considered to be a metapsychological construct,
referring to the quantitative distribution of libido among ego, id, and objective reality. However, Freud also gave it mythic exemplification in the oedipal narrative, which Ricoeur refers to as the fantasm. It is the interpretation of this subjective, mythic structure that opens the way to hermeneutics proper, to reflection on objective structures.

Consequently Ricoeur is prepared to ask several questions, all turning on the nature of the fantasm and each quite recognizable in the light of Eliade's view of symbols and Jung's view of fantasy become archetype: "Is there, in the affective dynamism of religious belief, the wherewithal to rise above its own archaism?" Is the fantasm "only a vestige of a traumatic memory," or is it "a symbol, capable of providing the first stratum of meaning to an imaginative presentation of origins, more and more detached from its function of infantile and quasi-neurotic repetition, and more and more suited to an investigation of the fundamental meanings of human destiny?"

Ricoeur's work is therefore an interpretation of Freud, a critical expanding of Freud's approach. As such, it too has a double movement, first educing fantasy and then interpreting it. In this regard Ricoeur's approach to the hermeneutical implications of Freud's work is similar to Jung's. Both see in Freud's work a first mythology that opens understanding to other mythologies. Ricoeur and Jung could agree that the cogito is possessed of an archetypal infrastructure and that a psychological hermeneutic must be employed in order that thought can be released for a return to mythic structures—not, however, for the purpose of demythologizing or for preaching, but for the purpose of thinking about symbols. This thinking creates new moral possibilities, as well as new possibilities for thought. Clearly for Jung, ethics, understood as the fruit of individuation, was the more important. Becoming takes precedence over thinking in his psychology.

THE SYMBOL GIVES RISE TO BECOMING

Ricoeur has been fascinated by the formula, "the symbol gives rise to thought." By this he means that once the cogito is freed from its own archaism, once the archaeology of the subject has been carried out, thought is capable of listening to symbols; it can be shaped by them. For Ricoeur the deepest levels of thought are engaged by symbols. However, we must not overlook the fact that Ricoeur, in developing his view of hermeneutics, has drawn substantively on Freud, and that Freud's psychology is essentially developmental. This is acknowledged, for example, in Ricoeur's proposal of an "epigenesis of the religious sentiment." Therefore his adaptation of Freud's hermeneutical style
implicitly authorizes a second formula, "the symbol gives rise to becoming." Our own argument regarding the fundamental thrust of Jung's psychology explicitly insists upon such a formulation. As we have noted, his psychological hermeneutic opens the deeper strands of the subject to its own concealments, in order that the ego can return to the objective religious structures. This means that the objective cannot be separated from the subjective or developmental. Once the strategy of adducing psychological hermeneutical considerations has been adopted, it becomes necessary to recognize that the activity of interpretation bears a reciprocal relation to the subject's personal history as well. Therefore, the symbol also gives rise to becoming, to individuation, to the metamorphosis of personality.

I have tried to show the inherent propriety of bringing together certain psychological and hermeneutical considerations, by way of Jung's work. The point of departure for that work was the separateness of developmental and existential factors in human life, so characteristic of the separateness advocated by theological and psychological approaches to self-understanding. Jung's work transforms the opposites of developmental and existential into a second polarity, that of objective religious symbols and the archaic structure of the interpreter's own subjective being. For this reason a recent discussion, although not addressed to psychological questions, nevertheless summarizes well for us the import of Jung's psychology for hermeneutics: "Reflection proceeding from religious symbolism has the merit of correlating the interpreter as he seeks to discover his being with a level of historical expression commensurate with this intention. The interpreter as he moves from symbolism to rationality will find that he must make another movement, back into the shadows of his ego and history, for he discovers that his being is mirrored in the reality of life and history and simultaneously created by him in the moment of comprehension." It is that other movement, back into the shadows of the ego and its history, which Jung's psychology sought to document, and which constitutes that contribution to hermeneutics which we call psychological.

NOTES


3. The works of R. Otto, Van der Lecuw, Wach, and Eliade are often cited in this regard.


13. Ibid., p. 170.


16. Consider, for example, the following well-known remark by Jung: "The Mystery of the Virgin Birth, or the homoiousia of the Son with the Father, or the Trinity which is nevertheless not a triad . . . have stiffened into mere objects of belief" ("The Archetypes and the Collective Unconscious," The Archetypes and the Collective Unconscious, Bollingen Series 20 [New York: Pantheon Books, 1959], p. 8).

17. See "Fundamental Questions of Psychotherapy."


26. In addition to the writings on religion already mentioned, see also Jung, “Answer to Job,” in *Psychology and Religion: West and East*.


29. Ibid., p. 35.


33. *De l'interprétation*, pp. 410–16.


35. Ibid.
