A "scientific theology" remains for many an impossible concept. Theologians and scientists agree, from the standpoints of their separate disciplines, that the relationship of these two fields, science and theology, has been, and must remain, inherently so sharply distinguished that one ought not to hope for a scientific theology. The term has recently come into some increased use, but, some thinkers would assert, it can be at most a linguistic symbol for an inherently unrealizable aspiration.

Others would distinguish among a variety of directions in which religious thought might develop. In "Science and the Search for a Rational Religious Faith," Donald Szantho Harrington distinguishes between scientism and naturalism. He rejects scientism, which he defines as an approach that would "take the knowledge we have gained through science and from it develop a scientific religion, develop a world view and system of values derived from the knowledge of science, and let this scientific consensus be our religion." He maintains that scientism "has failed to produce any world view capable of moving and stirring the hearts of men deeply and transformingly, and has failed thus far to discover any ethical consensus capable of commanding men's lives and unifying their fragmented world." Naturalism, however, is a view that says "it is possible . . . for science and religion to function together in a complementary way, dealing not with separate realms
but with a common realm of experienced existence, each exercising its
properly different function and employing its necessarily different
methods and forms of language.” He calls for a new synthesis. “What
can emerge is a new faith, a new synthesis in harmony with modern
science but equally in touch with the great rivers of religion flowing
out of the past.”

Harrington’s distinction is instructive. If scientism is a view that is
restricted in scope to the scientific consensus, and if that consensus is
to be the only acceptable content for a religious view, then it is an
elitist cult which can have little compelling power for the rest of man-
kind. But the development of the new synthesis for which he calls
will require much constructive work. Theology, liturgy, pastoral work,
and other areas will need careful, sustained attention in this construc-
tive task. Some thinkers who are now engaged in this task would argue
that the development of a scientific theology must come first, and that
liturgical developments and implications for pastoral work would then
follow. I rather think that work in each area must go forward con-
currently if such a synthesis is to be successful. But my remarks here
are directed to the first area, the construction of a scientific theology.
This does not mean that I would argue that systematic theology is
the heart of a religious synthesis. It is not; worship is central, if any-
thing is. But systematic theology is an indispensable element in such
a synthesis.

At present, we do not have a consistently scientific theology. Despite
the assertions of a few religious thinkers who now point toward certain
formulations as suggestive of the foundations for such a theology, it
appears fair to assert that this major constructive task remains before
us. Since I assert that we do need a scientific theology, I thereby incur
a responsibility to contribute to that constructive task. At this point,
however, I wish to restrict my remarks primarily to the relationships
of that constructive task to my own areas of particular concern, which
are church history and historical theology. Thus, in these further re-
marks on the need for a scientific theology I shall restrict my attention
to the meaning of the term “scientific theology” and to the historical
basis for asserting that such a structure of religious thought is both
possible and desirable. I would add that such a structure is, in my
opinion, not only possible and desirable; it is imperative for the future
of religion in these decades of approach to the twenty-first century.

**Forms of Theology**

The forms in which theology appears range from a kerygmatic theol-
ogy to an apologetic theology, with many variations. A kerygmatic
theology is "the exposition or expository presentation of the Christian message." Such an interpretation would represent the general position of Karl Barth. Apologetic theology, or "answering theology," is, according to Tillich, a position which "answers the questions implied in the 'situation' in the power of the eternal message and with the means provided by the situation whose questions it answers." The difference between these two forms is instructive, as Reinhold Niebuhr shows when he compares these two men. "If Barth is the Tertullian of our day, abjuring ontological speculations for fear that they may obscure or blunt the kerygma of the Gospel, Tillich is the Origen of our period, seeking to relate the Gospel message to the disciplines of our culture and to the complete history of culture." The range of positions now includes even those who have written of the "death of God." Thus, the very manner in which one structures a theological position discloses an implicit world view and a human delineation of the possible existence and the probable nature of the divine.

There is a distinct sense in which one must take into account the claims of those who maintain, as did Barth, that it is impossible for men to speak of theology except as bearing witness to having received a revelation. In this and related views, it will be asserted that man's only possible stance vis-à-vis theology is that of the recipient of revelation.

I must reject this view epistemologically, at least at a certain level, because, in a sense like William Ellery Channing, I am led to assert that reason must judge, concerning an alleged revelation, that it is, indeed, a revelation; it must then judge whether this message is the exclusive revelation to which we should attend; and it must judge to what extent we should be guided by it. I must say that I am not only led, I am virtually obliged to assert this. My reasons can be stated briefly.

John Baillie emphasizes that, as in the Old Testament, in the New Testament revelation is not a body of information; it is "a self-disclosure of God." He presents a variety of other positions, but this element of a divine self-disclosure is central. However, it is allegedly present in many human events, such as those which the anthropologist Anthony F. C. Wallace has termed "revitalization movements." Since there are many such human events, man must use his reason in some way to distinguish among them. And since this is true, every alleged revelation must be viewed from a man-centered standpoint wherein such concepts as "knowledge" and "truth" become indispensable for a clear understanding of the content of the event. If the content of the event is in any way related to knowledge, we must, at some point, have
John C. Godbey

recourse to the concept of "connectibility." This concept means, as Richard von Mises has written, that a sentence is connectible "if it is compatible with a certain totality of statements which regulate the use of the words and word forms appearing in it." The totality of statements will include both regulatory statements and, as von Mises emphasizes, some correspondence between significant sentences and experienceable events. The events, moreover, must be experienceable in some form by other men if communication is to take place. Now, these restrictions are, I believe, applicable not only to scientific thought but also to religious thought. Hence, I am persuaded that we must assert an essentially man-centered orientation in formulating a system of religious thought.

Granted, then, that if we must assert an essentially man-centered orientation in religion, a fixed content of theology, stated as such without qualification, becomes impossible. From this standpoint one must qualify, in some form, the term "theology" with an adjective so that one can denote, in some minimal form, the methodology and content of the religious position one holds. In doing so, one inescapably comes into some relationship to another discipline, such as philosophy.

Tertullian, we know, argued, in "The Prescriptions against Heretics," against "hyphenated Christianity" with all the vigor at his talented command:

From philosophy come those fables and endless genealogies and fruitless questionings, those "words that creep like as doth a canker." To hold us back from such things, the Apostle testifies expressly in his letter to the Colossians that we should beware of philosophy. "Take heed lest any man circumvent you through philosophy or vain deceit, after the tradition of men," against the providence of the Holy Ghost. He had been at Athens where he had come to grips with the human wisdom which attacks and perverts truth, being itself divided up into its own swarm of heresies by the variety of its mutually antagonistic sects. What has Jerusalem to do with Athens, the Church with the Academy, the Christian with the heretic? Our principles come from the Porch of Solomon, who had himself taught that the Lord is to be sought in simplicity of heart. I have no use for a Stoic or a Platonic or a dialectic Christianity. After Jesus Christ we have no need of speculation, after the Gospel no need of research. When we come to believe, we have no desire to believe anything else; for we begin by believing that there is nothing else which we have to believe.

This famous passage, in which Tertullian objects to a Stoic, a Platonic, or a dialectic Christianity, has been variously rendered and variously interpreted. It is particularly important to be fair to Tertullian when we refer to such a passage, for he has been continually scorned and misinterpreted because of the passage in which he is said to have asserted that he believes a proposition because it is absurd.
But his basic stance in the passage above is clear. When he objected to a Stoic, a Platonic, or a dialectic Christianity, he gave memorable voice to an issue, not for his time alone, but for all succeeding centuries of Western theology.¹⁹

Over against Tertullian, we must maintain that some form of "hyphenated Christianity" is inevitable. The same would be true, in general features, of Hinduism, of Buddhism, or of Islam.²⁰ Within any of these major faiths, one must argue one's religious position on the basis of the clearest interpretation available.

The relationship of one's religious position to the discipline of theology may then, perhaps, be best understood in the words of Professor Kenneth Cauthen: "Any theologian who explicitly makes the abiding religious essence of the biblical documents the norm of his convictions is by formal definition a Christian theologian, regardless of the inadequacy of the material content of his outlook. Any religious thinker may be said to be a Christian theologian in the material sense to the extent to which his point of view actually reflects the themes of the biblical witness, regardless of whether or not he consciously represents himself as giving allegiance to the Bible as a criterion in the formal sense."²¹

I would direct your attention to the words "the material content of his outlook" in the first sentence, and to the words in the second sentence which assert that a religious thinker may be termed "a Christian theologian in the material sense to the extent to which his point of view actually reflects the themes of the biblical witness." Cauthen is clearly a Christian theologian in terms of the two criteria that he stated above, a formal criterion and a material criterion. It would appear that we can fruitfully approach the question of the nature of a scientific theology from an analogous standpoint. We can paraphrase Cauthen thus: Any theologian who explicitly makes the scientist's devotion to truth as revealed by the correlative methods of the sciences the norm of his religious convictions is by formal definition a scientific theologian, regardless of the inadequacy of the content of his convictions in a material sense when such content is compared with traditional religious belief. Any religious thinker may be said to be a scientific theologian in the material sense to the extent to which his point of view actually reflects the findings of the sciences, regardless of whether or not he consciously represents himself as giving allegiance to the scientific method as a criterion in the formal sense. From this perspective, the formal criterion of a scientific theology is that of a norm established by the conscious avowal of an obligation to adhere to the truth (or truths) as revealed by the correlative methods of the
sciences. The material criterion of a scientific theology is that of the extent to which his point of view actually reflects the findings of the sciences; the theologian himself need not consciously avow allegiance to the scientific method as a criterion in the formal sense.

It will be apparent from the above that very few men will be scientific theologians in a strict sense, such that both the above formal criterion and the above material criterion would characterize their points of view in an exclusive sense. This is to be expected. There is something rather forced and unconvincing about a man who claims that he has been religiously uninfluenced by other aspects of his culture. A man of Western culture who claims that he has been religiously uninfluenced by the Torah or by the Old and New Testaments reminds us of a man from Arabia who claims that he has not been significantly influenced by the Koran, or a man from India who claims to be indifferent to the Vedas, the Upanishads, and the Bhagavad Gita. The overwhelming likelihood is that a man will have been influenced by the religious heritage of his culture in ways that are not amenable to exhaustive analysis by the conscious intellect. A relationship of considered, decisive rejection of one's traditional religious heritage is, then, far more credible than an avowal of indifference. And even a relationship of considered rejection usually retains elements of (allegedly rejected) positive content that are, in time, apparent, whether or not they are readily acknowledged by the individual in question.

The concept of a scientific theology may, thus, be more clearly understood under Max Weber's rubric of an ideal type. Ideal types are developed to "formulate concepts that will present the evidence 'systematically and in greater unity than has ever existed in the actual course of development.'" Thus a scientific theology may only be exemplified in approximation in a concrete structure of religious thought.

Hence in my earlier article in Zygon, "Brief Remarks on the Need for a Scientific Theology," I delineated the nature of an ideal type. As a definition I suggested,

A scientific theology is a systematic statement concerning the nature and bases of human values that utilizes the findings and the correlative methods of the sciences. . . . A contemporary scientific theology would not have the same content as earlier systematic theologies, nor would it (at present) have the same comprehensive scope. Its content would be limited by the necessity of determining the connectibility of its substantive assertions with empirical referents. Its scope would expand as scientific exploration of the nature and bases of human values permitted the integration of the findings of the various scientific disciplines into a coherent, applicable structure. This scope can be, in exploration, understood to include the findings of a single science or group of sciences, which findings are, at present, only partially integrated with the findings of
other scientific disciplines. In a statement of the content of a scientific theology as such, however, the scope would be restricted to the inclusion of those connectible assertions concerning human values that cohere with the findings of other scientific disciplines.23

This ideal type would consist of a structure of thought derived from, or connectible with, the findings of the several sciences. A consistently scientific theology would be restricted in content to this scope. In almost every case, if not, indeed, in every case, a contemporary formulation of a scientific theology will be seen, upon analysis, to contain nonscientific or extrascientific elements. Elements of the philosophy of science will be present together with elements of a cultural religious heritage, such as the biblical heritage, the Koranic heritage, or the Vedic heritage.

These elements from a point of view in the philosophy of science and from a point of view in a religious heritage will introduce differential perspectives such that complete unanimity is not to be expected. We must recognize, on scientific grounds, that complete unanimity is not to be expected, and, on religious grounds, that it is not to be desired.

Some thinkers would argue, on scientific grounds, that unanimity is not even to be desired. This is so, they would argue, because discrete idea units can be called "idenes" which provide the variation required by natural selection. We need further examination of this view that one can also speak of natural selection in relationship to structures of thought. It is certainly true, however, on scientific grounds, that unanimity is not to be expected. In a recent article in Zygon, "The Scope and Limitations of Science," Professor H. Stanley Bennett defines science as "the study of nature and its properties."24 He then considers science in relationship to art, music, literature, religion, and philosophy, pointing out that the formulation of scientific generalizations is possible, within certain parameters, in each of these fields. He concludes, however, as follows:

So we see that, though the realm of science is expanding, it is not infinite, it is not all-encompassing, it is not catholic. We have no basis to hope through science, or through any other means, to gain complete understanding of man or of nature. These limits may be defined as much by the abstract properties of logical systems as by the shortcomings of the human brain, or the complexities of the subjects of study. Science is very powerful nevertheless, and, though tentative and uncertain, it is self-correcting, self-expanding, and self-improving. Through science, man seeks to group and relate phenomena of nature in consistent ways and, through this process, to gain a measure of understanding and a means of influence and control over nature. We have no better way.25

I agree strongly with this conclusion. "We have no better way."
It is precisely for this reason that I would argue that, even though unanimity is not to be expected, we must use the findings and the correlative methods of the sciences in theological construction. Despite the limited scope, at present, of the results of such a method, the strength of the resulting conclusions is valuable.

Complete unanimity is, moreover, not to be desired on religious grounds because of the absolutely indispensable nature of honesty in one’s religious witness. This point is clear and can be stated briefly. If you take the element of basic conviction away from a religious witness, the resulting structure of thought is worthless, and even harmful, from the standpoints both of the individual concerned and of anyone else. Complete unanimity is to be neither expected nor desired.

If we, then, acknowledge the continued presence of different points of view among various representatives of scientific theology, the question to be asked is that of the reason for choosing a formal criterion and a material criterion from within the perspective of the sciences. Certainly this is an unusual source from which to draw criteria, and the burden of proof at this point rests, indeed, upon those who would choose such a perspective. This burden of proof is inescapable. Characteristically, it will be met by men from the standpoints of those disciplines with which they are most closely acquainted. This means that the responses of men from a variety of disciplines must be correlated before a more comprehensive examination of the strength of this perspective can be made. Such an enterprise is a major theological challenge.

Our question is, “By what criteria does one identify a preferred structure of theology?” My response is to be made from the discipline of church history. We remember that, in A.D. 434, Vincent of Lérins opposed extreme forms of Augustinian thought by the principle that Catholic doctrine is “that which has been believed everywhere, always, and by all men.” This principle is a landmark in the history of theology, for it presented a formulation of the importance of tradition as a criterion of normative Catholic theology. The principle of sola Scriptura became central to the Reformation. Hence, Philip Melanchthon’s Loci Communes of 1521, the first Protestant dogmatics, correlated passages in Scripture. But a theological principle more akin to that of Vincent of Lérins appeared within Protestantism in the advocacy, by the Lutheran theologian George Calixtus, of a harmony among confessional groups on the basis of a distinction between fundamental doctrines, which must be believed if one is to attain salvation, and nonfundamental doctrines. (Calixtus was even prepared to argue for harmony of belief among the churches on some nonfundamental doctrines.) Yet, characteristically, his principle was displaced in the major
churches of the Reformation by confessional criteria which rejected
the distinction between fundamental and nonfundamental doctrines.
But confessional criteria need not remain rigid, particularly if the
theologian recognizes that coherence with man’s growing knowledge
about the world has relevance for theology. Thus, the nineteenth-cen-
tury Dutch Reformed theologian, John Henry Scholten, presented both
a formal criterion and a material criterion for the content of his the-
ology. His criteria were drawn from the Reformed confessions and
were stated in traditional Reformed language. The formal principle
was that Holy Scripture is “the only source and touchstone of Christian
truth”; the material principle was that God’s sovereignty and His free
grace form “the only ground of salvation.” But, under the influence
of monistic philosophy and a distinction between Reformed Church
principles and particular doctrines, Scholten rejected the double decree
of election in favor of the salvation of all men! Scholten’s colleague,
Cornelis Willem Opzoomer, went even further to pioneer in the direc-
tion of a new, empirical school of theology. We should note that “em-
pirical” meant, for Opzoomer, the inclusion of all aspects of human
experience, including religious feeling, which was to supplement the
findings of the natural sciences. Finally, we should note the rigorous
empiricism of Henry Nelson Wieman which has significantly influenced
the development of American theology in the twentieth century.

The men whom we have considered represent quite differing criteria
by which one identifies a preferred structure of theology: tradition,
Scripture, confessional position, philosophical interpretation of a con-
fession, an empiricism of religious feeling, and radically empirical the-
ology. The contrasts among them are significant in that they indicate
a growing recognition, by theologians, that a theology must vitally
take into account and cohere with the growing knowledge of one’s time
if it is to command more than a nominal assent from those who seri-
ously inquire into the content of a religious faith.

CONTINUITIES OF THEOLOGICAL METHOD

Origen, Aquinas, Schleiermacher, and Tillich form major representa-
tive examples of the power of such a position in the history of Christian
theology. What they have accomplished, each in his own century, is
of great significance for us, for their accomplishments illustrate the
historical basis for asserting that a scientific structure of thought is both
possible and desirable. My remarks concerning each man’s thought
must be brief, for our concern is with a generalization concerning
continuities of theological method rather than with the varying con-
tents of their resulting structures of thought.
Many analyses, both historical and theological, have been written concerning the theological methodology and structural content of each man’s work. A generalization concerning their respective theological methods is, I know, open to the criticisms that may come from specialists in each man’s thought. These criticisms may disclose specificities which may, in a particular case, require that the application of the generalization be qualified before it can embrace certain aspects of a man’s thought. Therefore, although it is hazardous to advance a generalization, such a formulation remains a useful, even an indispensable tool of inquiry, for it can point to areas that require further study. It is from this standpoint, then, that I examine the theological methodologies of these four thinkers.

Origen (d. 254) has been called the first systematic theologian. He fully deserves this recognition because of the momentous contribution which his theological methodology made to the development of Christian thought.

There can be no question that Origen spoke from the standpoints of Scripture and the Rule of Faith. Even Reinhold Seeberg, who wrote that “Origen is more positive than Clement, but Clement is more Christian than Origen,” acknowledged that Origen was, in fundamental emphasis, an orthodox Christian. This fundamental emphasis is to be seen in the four sections of his work, Περὶ Αρχῶν [On first principles], in which he treats of God, the Word, Free Will, and the allegorical interpretation of Scripture. The basic role this emphasis played in his thought has been well pointed out by J. L. Neve, who wrote that “Origen’s dogmatic work . . . was the first attempt to present a comprehensive system of Christian doctrine by founding it on the Scripture and the Apostolic tradition, and then building it up with the philosophical knowledge of the age.”

Neve’s colleague, Otto Heick, has portrayed the secondary, yet crucial emphasis, that of Origen’s philosophical contribution to theological methodology: “No matter how impossible his system was as a whole, no matter how much we may reject his many errors and his synthesis of religion and philosophy in its practical details, nevertheless, Christianity does possess the inner impulse to establish itself, as a system, and to pour its contents into the mental forms which have been developed by the work of philosophy. In this sense Origen was a pioneer in the quest for theological method. Irenaeus’ refusal to recognize philosophy prevented him from making any contribution to the solution of the trinitarian problem, but the contribution of Origen and his successors was great.”

The element which Neve termed “the philosophic knowledge of the
age” is, indeed, crucial. Origen was speaking, in his day, to the questions and with the concepts of the representatives of the finest intellectual attainments of Alexandria: the advocates of Platonism. And this he could do easily; Platonism had become virtually a part of him. As Henry Chadwick says, Platonism was virtually a part of the air that he and his contemporaries breathed. Origen simply took for granted the Platonist’s conception of the world’s metaphysical structure. This was not all, however, as Chadwick makes clear: “So sensitive is he to the charge of adulterating Christianity with Platonism that his attitude to Plato and the great philosophers becomes prickly and even aggressively rude. He wanted to be a Christian, not a Platonist. Yet Platonism was inside him, malgré lui, absorbed into the very axioms and presuppositions of his thinking. Moreover, this penetration of his thought by Platonism is no merely external veneer of apologetic. Platonic ways of thinking about God and the soul are necessary to him if he is to give an intelligible account of his Christian beliefs.”

We cannot now pause to inquire what form of Platonism he utilized, or into the degree of affinity with Platonic thought that may definitively be said to characterize his thought. My point is not that such concerns are not relevant, for indeed they are, in a larger framework. One might, for instance, hold with Father Jean Daniélou that Origen was very far from agreeing with the philosophers. Daniélou says: “There were certain problems which he shared in common with the philosophers of his time; we have noticed some of them in connection with the ideas of God, the world, demonology, the soul, and allegory. But within the framework of the common set of problems, Origen’s mind pursued a course diametrically opposed to the one taken by the pagan philosophers. They were alike in that they asked the same questions, but the answers they gave were fundamentally different.” This is a rather extreme position which some scholars would contest. But at least some philosophers found reason to be hostile toward him: “His manner struck Porphyry, who was directly and emotionally involved, as offensive and unpardonable, and he could only regard Origen as a crook who used Greek tools to rationalize a crude barbarian superstition, having apostatized from the faith in which he had been brought up. Porphyry’s accusation presupposes that no one could be as deeply hellenized as Origen without accepting the polytheistic belief with which, for him, Hellenic culture was indissolubly associated.”

My point is that Origen’s tremendous, lasting influence rests on his ability to speak to the intellectual concerns of the finest minds of his age. This is the importance of his De Principiis. To be sure, his Hexapla, his many volumes of biblical commentaries, and his acknowledged
skill in theological instruction and disputation all contributed to his enormous personal influence. But the epoch-making character of his *De Principiis* was of another order. In it, Christian theology was able to take seriously into account and cohere with the growing knowledge of his time. Thereby it commanded, not a nominal, but a powerful, convinced assent from those who seriously inquired into the content of this new religious faith.

Origen was, hence, for the Eastern church and for Platonism, what Thomas Aquinas was for the Western church and for Aristotelianism. For, in the first half of the thirteenth century the usefulness of Platonic categories of thought for the interpretation of faith had declined. The Dominican Aquinas's contemporary and friend, John of Fidanza, known as Bonaventura, presented, to be sure, one of the most attractive structures of Platonic Augustinianism, particularly in his doctrine of illumination of the human mind by the divine Reason, the uncreated Word. This concept of divine illumination was not a metaphor. As Sydney H. Mellone has pointed out, Bonaventura's position meant that "knowledge of any kind depends on divine illumination." Divine illumination meant, for such a Christianized Platonism, that a certitude of knowledge was possible. But, for Aquinas, such a certitude of knowledge was a surreptitious knowledge which, moreover, could not serve to describe with appropriate accuracy the structures of our known and human world. For Aquinas, the power of thought was to be seen more clearly in the newly translated works of Aristotle, which presented such a formidable body of knowledge that the church, sooner or later, must come to terms with or be vanquished by it.

Aristotelianism was becoming for the thirteenth century what Platonism had been for the third century: the best knowledge, the very science of that age. Thus the epoch-making achievement of Aquinas is not to be found in the *Summa Contra Gentiles* (valuable as it was as an apologetic for the Christian faith), a thirteenth-century analogue to Athanasius's great *Contra Gentes*. Nor is Aquinas's achievement to be seen primarily in his marvelous harmonization of Scripture and tradition, forming an answer to Abelard's famous question to the tradition, *Sic et Non*. It is, rather, to be seen in the means by which he achieved that harmonization. The integration he achieved depended upon, was made possible by, the more precise intellectual distinctions and the more inclusive and finely divided categories that Aristotelian philosophy now provided. For this, Platonism was, it must be said, no match. When Kenneth Scott Latourette said that "the great achievement of Thomas Aquinas was setting forth the relation of reason and faith in
such fashion that those to whom the Aristotelian philosophy was definitive could feel that they might consistently remain Christians.”45 He was, at the same time, both correct and misleading. The statement is, to be sure, correct; yet the point is that “those to whom the Aristotelian philosophy was definitive” were precisely the more inquiring minds of his time. These were the men of whom the church had most need. For as Origen spoke to, and for, and won the intellectual of his day, the Gnostic, so that such a man became proud to bear the name of Christ, so Aquinas spoke to, and for, and won the man for whom truth, wherever found, was indispensable. For such men, Siger of Brabant, and the doctrine of a double truth which he was at least accused of holding,46 represented an unwelcome alternative. In Aquinas’s powerful use of Aristotelian categories and distinctions each found, however, a way in which he might remain “both an intelligent modern and a serious Christian.”47

The synthesis Aquinas achieved soon came under heavy attack. His work has been called a “brief moment of intellectual concord.”48 It has been referred to as “a moment immediately before the impending storm whose coming could well be sensed by everyone.”49 One need only mention the name of John Duns Scotus to sense the impending storm. There are a great many considerations which I pass over here, for they are appropriate to studies of particular features of the philosophical context and content of Aquinas’s thought. Our concern here is not with particular features but with the place of Aquinas’s thought in a quite broad generalization. For Thomas must not be denied the credit due him for his achievement; it was far more lasting than the above words by Josef Pieper would imply. Through his work, Christian theology was again able to take seriously into account and cohere with the best knowledge of his time. Thereby it commanded a powerful assent from those who seriously inquired into the content of the faith.

From Aquinas to Schleiermacher one moves forward in time five hundred years, for one died in 1274 while the other died in 1834. One cannot but be mindful of Duns Scotus, Occam, Luther, Calvin, and a host of other figures in the “cloud of witnesses”50 whose lives intervened between the lives of these two men. Yet Schleiermacher belongs with this select group of theological giants whom we consider here. He not only decisively influenced the development of theological method; he influenced it in a way that gave a model of systematic thinking. Not only the structure, but even the content of his systematic theology was derived from the nature of the Christian experience of “absolute dependence.”51 This has been concisely stated by Heick, who wrote of Schleiermacher’s
method: "The formal principle and the material principle of his theology merge into one, for religious consciousness is both the means by which truth is apprehended and the very content of the truth."52

Schleiermacher's example thus demonstrates the possibility of deriving both a formal criterion and a material criterion for theology from a single source. The clarity of his methodology appears at this point. Many studies have pointed out, however, that one must distinguish between his intention and the ambiguous result of his chosen method. He surely believed that, from generation to generation, the presence of God-consciousness within the individual Christian and the Christian community would continue to support his avowed emphasis on Jesus of Nazareth as the decisive, the final norm of the content of theology. It was not his intention to imply, by the principles of his *The Christian Faith*, any possible transcendence of Christianity. He intended to be true both to the human experience of sin and redemption and to the finality of the revelation of God in Jesus Christ. It has been argued that the actual result of his method was to emphasize a position in which man might not be able to speak clearly of the God revealed in Jesus. The actual result has been construed as implying that man's experience of redemption is real, to be sure, but that man can, nevertheless, only speak about man. Man could not, then, clearly, in a consistent way, speak of God.

Thus, the content of his theology was decidedly anthropocentric.53 Because the content was so markedly influenced by his method, one is led, perhaps, by Schleiermacher's work to think of Ludwig Feuerbach's exposition of a homocentric theology in *The Essence of Christianity*. But to link Schleiermacher too closely with Feuerbach is to do an injustice to Schleiermacher. The earlier, vehement attacks on his views by Emil Brunner and others have been followed recently by careful, appreciative studies of his work which recognize the fundamental importance of his contribution to theological method and structure. In a period when one of the most acute needs in disciplined theological inquiry was to take seriously into account what it means to be human, Schleiermacher met that need in an enduring way.

Paul Tillich more clearly exemplified both the importance of a systematic theological method and a decisive basis for insisting on the integrity of the Christian character of the content of his theology. His "method of correlation" was intended to explain "the contents of the Christian faith through existential questions and theological answers in mutual interdependence."54 Our concern here is not with an analysis of his methodology or with a comparison of his *Systematic Theology*
with other positions. Rather, our concern is with the place of Tillich's thought within a quite broad generalization.

Tillich emphasized both the human experiences of estrangement, meaninglessness, anxiety, and sin, and the integrity of the revelation of God in Jesus Christ as the decisive, indeed, the final disclosure of the New Being. Thus it is clear that his repeated, careful attention to the results of philosophical and scientific thought is only one side of his basic intention. But this attention to philosophical and scientific problems enabled him, in an almost unrivaled manner, to command the response of the more inquiring minds of our time.

The importance of his achievement appears now to be difficult to assess. Although it is held by some that his thought was, so to speak, out of date even before his death, it is far more likely that the instructive, impelling achievement which his Systematic Theology represents will but grow in the years to come. Surely Mircea Eliade's words are to the point: "As is well known, Teilhard de Chardin's tremendous success is due in great part to his religious valorization of matter and life. Tillich's theological meditations on the same subject denote not only a structural similarity between the two great minds, but also how correctly they anticipated the central problematic of the new generation of believers and nonbelievers. And, exactly as in the case of Teilhard de Chardin, it is probable that Tillich's influence will prove to be more powerful and stimulating after his death."

The generalization to which these brief examinations of Tillich, Schleiermacher, Aquinas, and Origen point is our chief concern here. In the case of each of these acknowledged giants in the history of Christian thought, we find a clear admission that theology must wrestle with the best human knowledge available in the historical epoch in which a man writes. This admission may be explicit or only implicit; it is clearly present in each case. It is present, moreover, not only for an apologetic purpose; it arises, in addition, from a deep concern that theology should manifest the inescapable accountability to the question of truth. It arises, we can say, paraphrasing Henry Nelson Wieman, out of a concern for the wrestle of theology with truth. Indeed, Wieman is significant at precisely this point, for his inquiries were marked by this concern at an early stage, and they have continued to pursue it in decisive relationship to the sciences.

**Scientific Structure of Religious Thought**

This double concern is clearly evident in our four major thinkers, and in it we discern the historical basis for asserting that a scientific struc-
ture of religious thought is both possible and desirable. For, in a way that not even Tillich fully recognized, the challenge of the sciences to theology is both a dangerous threat and a remarkable opportunity.

The best analogue to Platonism in the third century or to Aristotelianism in the thirteenth century is the enormously expanding achievement of the sciences. The sciences are accumulating and expanding the results of their inquiries with such power that the life of mankind will be decisively influenced, in one way or another, by this growing body of knowledge, which has, in our day, no genuine intellectual rival.

It is important, at this point, to distinguish sharply this growing quest for and cumulative expansion of knowledge, as the enterprise of the sciences, from the almost omnipresent influence of the manifold technological applications of science which we experience daily. A pervasive tendency to confuse the two leads many today to decry the effects of technology on so many aspects of human life and, by confusing the two, to decry the scientific quest as such. Yet the two enterprises can be, and should be, sharply distinguished, in the name of honesty to both science and theology. For science is, in the words of Robert Bruce Lindsay, “a method for the description, creation and understanding of human experience.”

Unlike technology, science is essentially a contemplative, reflective inquiry, a quest for knowledge.

The cumulative knowledge growing from the quest of the scientist is, then, the decisive challenge which theology must meet if it is to receive a respectful hearing and, even more, a deepening response of conviction from those men and women in our day whose intelligent, informed minds qualify them to be compared with the men to whom Origen spoke. As, centuries later, Schleiermacher wrote a set of speeches on religion “to its cultured despisers,” so contemporary theologians have the responsibility of speaking to the contemporary cultured despisers of theology.

The critical feature is the mode in which such contemporary theologians must speak. A number of modes are, of course, possible. Certain features or stances tend to recur in history (with appropriate modifications, of course). For instance, Clement of Alexandria, Origen’s predecessor and teacher, effectively portrayed to the cultured intelligentsia of Alexandria the position that, if they wished to be true Gnostics, true knowers or men of wisdom, they should become Christians, to learn from the master teacher, Christ. Yet Origen’s systematic presentation, *On First Principles*, followed and was more enduringly effective and
instructive. The youthful Schleiermacher's speeches on religion to its cultured despisers presented to the intelligentsia of Berlin the position that, if they wished to be true romantics, true men of deeply sensed human feeling, they should acknowledge religion, for it was not foreign to, but a part of, the complete life of man. Yet Schleiermacher's systematic presentation, *The Christian Faith*, followed and was more enduringly effective and instructive. And in our own time we face an analogous need.

In an age when the ancient moorings are loosed, when personal integration and cultural coherence are both threatened, religion again is despised. But the scorn is often merely the other side of a deep, urgent, unmet need. When theology, as it has been customarily presented, fails to accord with that which men know to be more reliably grounded, they must and will follow the more reliable source of guidance. They may do so slowly, hesitantly, even erratically; yet if the human species is, indeed, a viable branch of the growing tree of life, that species will rest its confidence and hopes for the future on that which it may more reliably trust to disclose to it the nature of and requirements for continued life. The human species may, however, not be viable. It may ignore the sources of its existence and continued life; it may move progressively toward its own destruction. We can only trust that it will not move toward destruction. We must work to make the species viable. In this task, theology has a vital role to play.

If, then, a deeply rooted human disposition, which derives from our genetic and cultural endowments, moves men to trust growing and more reliable guides to knowledge and life, a challenge has been presented which must be taken up by the theologians. For a hyphen is inevitable; theology should be and must be some specific kind of theology. The need in our day is for a scientific theology which meets and accords with this best, tested knowledge of our time. There is, indeed, a historical basis for asserting that such a structure of religious thought is both possible and desirable. Others have responded to analogous challenges in earlier centuries. Yet there are reasons to suspect that the contemporary challenge presents a more dangerous threat and a more remarkable opportunity than any challenge hitherto.

A scientific theology is not only possible and desirable; it is imperative for the future of religion in these decades of approach to the twenty-first century.

Nearly a century ago, a lonely prophet, Francis Ellingwood Abbot, sought to move religious thinkers to pursue this constructive direction. Abbot argued for the use of the scientific method in religion to develop
a "Scientific Theism." He described the scientific method thus: "This method consists essentially in three distinct steps: (1) observation and experiment, (2) hypothesis, (3) verification by fresh observation and experiment."\textsuperscript{60} Decades before the work of Douglas Clyde Macintosh and Henry Nelson Wieman,\textsuperscript{61} he argued that this method could be used in the construction of religious thought. And, be it noted, Abbot was concerned to speak to the emphases of both Origen and Schleiermacher:

If I have rightly divined the inner character, spirit, and tendency of this philosophy fated to be, it will not only "satisfy the heart in the new order of things,"\textsuperscript{62} but also (condition antecedent to this heart-satisfaction) satisfy the head as well. For the head has been too long sacrificed to the heart in religion; and the result to-day is the satisfaction of neither. Scientific Theism is more than a philosophy; it is a religion, it is a gospel, it is the Faith of the Future, founded on knowledge rather than on blind belief,—a faith in which head and heart will be no more arrayed against each other in irreconcilable feud, as the world beholds them now, but will kneel in worship side by side at the same altar, dedicated, not to the "Unknown God," still less to the "Unknowable God," but to the KNOWN GOD whose revealing prophet is SCIENCE.\textsuperscript{63}

Abbot's words fell on deaf ears.\textsuperscript{64} The idea remains, however, and appears to be an idea whose time for fulfillment has come. The development of a reliable system of religious thought, related to the sciences, has begun again in our day and continues. I have been concerned with showing the historical basis for the development of such a position. But demonstrations of the historical basis for such a position are but prolegomena, which must be followed by the intrinsic construction of the position for which one argues. This task must command the attention and efforts of many men if it is to be successfully achieved. And it must be achieved. For there is a real basis to "the growing fears that the widening chasm in twentieth-century culture between values and knowledge, or good and truth, or religion and science, is disruptive if not lethal for human destiny."\textsuperscript{65} This chasm can be bridged by constructive religious thought. It is for this reason that I have presented some further remarks on the need for a scientific theology.

**NOTES**

2. Ibid., p. 99.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid., p. 106.
10. "Revelation rests on the authority of reason, because to this faculty it submits its evidences of truth, and nothing but the approving sentence of reason binds us to receive and obey it... Reason must prescribe the tests or standards to which a professed revelation from God should be referred; and among these none are more important than that moral law which belongs to the very essence and is the deepest conviction of the rational nature. Revelation, then, rests on reason, and in opposing it would act for its own destruction" (William Ellery Channing, "Christianity a Rational Religion," in *The Works of William E. Channing, D.D., with an Introduction* [Boston: American Unitarian Association, 1875], pp. 236–37. Cf. Robert Leet Patterson, *The Philosophy of William Ellery Channing* [New York: Bookman Associates, 1952], chap. 6).
18. This passage has been repeatedly misunderstood. As Otto Heick has pointed out, Tertullian is not responsible for the phrase "Credo quia absurdum est." What he did write was this: "And the Son of God died; it is by all means to be believed, because it is absurd. And He was buried, and rose again; the fact is certain, because it is impossible" (Tertullian, "On the Flesh of Christ," ibid., p. 525 [''Prorsus credibile est quia inemptum est... certum est quia impossible est"]). See also: "Dr. Moffatt has pointed out the curious affinity between Tertullian's famous paradox mentioned in De Carne Christi, 5, and a passage in Aristotle's 'Rhetoric,' 23, 22. Tertullian deliberately exaggerates in order to call attention to the truth he wishes to emphasis" (C. De Lisle Shortt, *The Influence of Philosophy on the Mind of Tertullian* [London: 212
John C. Godbey


19. In his useful book, The Influence of Philosophy on the Mind of Tertullian, Shortt has demonstrated at length how powerfully Tertullian was influenced by the philosophies he disparaged and how deeply he was indebted to them. Valentinus Morel, however, has argued that Tertullian depended more on unchanging oral tradition than on Scripture as such, to which, of course, any influence from philosophy would be inferior. Professor Morel places tradition above Scripture: “Tertullianus gaat door als een roemrijk verdediger van de overlevering. Hij is het ook in feite. Geen schrijver uit de Oudheid heeft met meer onverbiddelijke logica en met meer grootscheid van beschouwingen aangetoond dat de mondelijke overlevering boven de H. Schrift staat en dat zij, wat den geloofsregel betreft, onveranderlijk is naar haar beteekenis. Van dit beginsel is hij nooit afgeweken, ook niet nadat hij montanist was geworden” (Valentinus Morel, De Ontwikkeling van de Christelijke Overlevering Volgens Tertullianus [Brussels: De Kinkhoren, 1946], p. 195. I have added the italics).

Such a one-sided view should be corrected by more balanced interpretations, such as that of Richard Baepler, who acknowledges that “Jerusalem has always needed Athens.” He continues: “It is inexact to conclude from some of Tertullian’s statements that he believes scripture to be incomplete and requiring an oral tradition superior to it in order to understand it. . . . The modern distinction or opposition between scripture and tradition is unknown to Tertullian; there is mutual coherence, rather in the uniting apostolic content. This is one leading idea in On the Prescription against Heretics” (Richard Paul Baepler, “The Biblical Interpretation of Tertullian” [Ph.D. diss., University of Chicago, 1964], pp. 17, 140–41).

20. Isma’il R. al Fāruqī has emphasized that because for Islamic modernism the empirical methods of science and revelation “both pertain to the same reality, they are, in final analysis, subject to the same laws of intelligibility and, hence, equally critical and rational” (Isma’il R. al Fāruqī, “Science and Traditional Values in Islamic Society,” Zygon 2 [1967]:239).


25. Ibid., p. 358.


34. Ibid., 1:114.


36. Ibid., p. 122.


38. Chadwick, p. 105.

39. In opposition to the interpretation of E. Gilson, Van der Laan emphasizes the importance of the studies of F. Van Steenberghen, who insisted on the importance of Aristotelianism in Bonaventura’s thought: “In dit opzicht zijn de onderzoekingen van Van Steenberghen van grote betekenis. Hij komt tot een bepaalde conceptie van Bonaventura’s denken, dat hij typeert als eklektisch en neoplatoniserend aristotelisme ten dienste van de augustijnse theologie. . . . Bovendien is dit aristotelisme in de illuminatieleer neoplatoniserend” (Hendrikus Van der Laan, De Wijsgerige Grondslag van Bonaventura’s Theologie [Amsterdam: Buitjen & Schipperheijn, 1968], pp. 135-36).


42. “At first he [Saint Thomas] even paid tribute to the Platonic-Augustinian theory of illumination only to reverse himself completely later on when the full force of Aristotelian principles drove his logical mind in another direction” (Hans Meyer, The Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas [Saint Louis: B. Herder Book Co., 1944], p. 30).

43. McNeill describes the coming of Aristotelian thought: “In the twelfth century, Ibn Rushd (Averroes) and Maimonides had revivified Aristotle’s philosophy. The doctors of Islam, who cherished their own well-tried patterns of thought and honored other sources of authority, paid no attention; but in the Latin West, where men were only beginning to explore the subtleties and complexities of intellectual life, the
logical method and systematic reasonableness of Aristotelian philosophy had all the force of fresh revelation. Aristotle offered a world-view that rivaled the traditional Christian (for the Latin West, basically Augustinian) outlook; a pagan philosophy, to be sure, yet one so impressive, so fascinating, and so appealing to the powers of reason that it could not casually be neglected" (William H. McNeill, The Rise of the West: A History of the Human Community [Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963], p. 550).


49. Ibid., pp. 119-20.


52. Heick (n. 28 above), 2:180.

53. Heick calls Schleiermacher's theology "a religious psychology" (ibid.).

54. Tillich, Systematic Theology (n. 7 above), 1:60.


58. Ibid., p. 197.


61. Kenneth Cauthen, n. 47 above.

62. Abbot is quoting Ralph Waldo Emerson.

