Reviews


Apocalypse is a literary genre cultivated more assiduously now than at any time since the twelfth-century prophecies of Joachim of Flore. Having survived to disprove the Communist scenario for the future, Western art and science now offer more fearsome visions of their own, in most of which science and religion fuse or struggle in ways now barely imaginable. It is to this fusion, respectively, or this struggle, in three American apocalypses, that I here direct attention.

Robert J. Heilbroner (An Inquiry into the Human Prospect [New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1974]) does not intend his widely reviewed essay on the crisis in industrial civilization to be read as a religious tract. “At this late juncture,” he writes, “I have no intention of sounding a call for moral awakening or for social action on some unrealistic scale” (p. 137). And yet it is not passivity either that he calls for, in concluding his brief volume, but rather a kind of active resignation: “It is the example of Atlas, resolutely bearing his burden, that provides the strength we seek. If, within us, the spirit of Atlas falters, there perishes the determination to preserve humanity at all cost and any cost, forever. . . . We do not know with certainty that humanity will survive, but it is a comfort to know that there exist within us the elements of fortitude and will from which the image of Atlas springs” (p. 144). In a footnote, Heilbroner thanks Daniel Bell for drawing his attention to Bertrand Russell’s use of the example of Atlas years earlier in his essay “A Free Man’s Worship.” Russell concluded that famous statement in a manner that bears close comparison to Heilbroner: “Brief and powerless is man’s life; on him and all his race the slow, sure doom falls pitiless and dark. Blind to good and evil, reckless of destruction, omnipotent matter rolls on its relentless way; for man, condemned today to lose his dearest, tomorrow himself to pass through the gate of darkness, it remains only . . . to sustain alone, a weary but unyielding Atlas, the world that his own ideals have fashioned despite the trampling march of unconscious power” (Bertrand Russell, Why I Am Not a Christian, and Other Essays on Religion and Related Subjects [New York: Simon & Schuster, 1957], p. 116).

The mood of these concluding paragraphs is plainly shared, but there are further points of contact in the body of the two essays. Both men write in the
context of external, physical challenges to human life. For Heilbroner, these are overpopulation, nuclear war, and environmental deterioration. For Russell, less specifically and more inevitably, they are “the vast death of the solar system” and the inevitable burial of “the whole temple of man’s achievement . . . beneath the debris of a universe in ruins” (Russell, p. 107). Both men urge human brotherhood, Heilbroner that evil may be resisted more effectively, Russell that it may be endured more nobly. Both see the ground of brotherhood eroded by natural science. Both propose a new brotherhood, appropriate for the new era, but inspired by Greek rather than Jewish or Christian mythology.

Against these similarities, two differences between the essays are interrelated and instructive. First of all, Russell, unlike Heilbroner, plainly does intend something like a call to moral awakening. He intends to answer for an indefinite audience his own anxious question: “In such an alien and inhuman world [i.e., the spiritually alien world of nonteleological scientific explanation] can so powerless a creature as man preserve his aspirations untarnished?” (ibid.). Second, unlike Heilbroner, who stresses that “avoidable evil remains, as it always will, an enemy that can be defeated; and the fact that the collective destiny of man portends unavoidable travail is no reason, and cannot be tolerated as an excuse for doing nothing” (Heilbroner, p. 137), Russell avers that “only on the firm foundation of unyielding despair, can the soul’s habitation henceforth be safely built” (Russell, p. 107).

Heilbroner’s essay may ultimately be religious in quite the same sense that Russell’s is, but if so, Heilbroner’s recognition of it is blocked, perhaps by a habit—normal among intellectuals since the eighteenth century—of thinking of religion as a private matter. Russell speaks of the private tragedy of personal death, Heilbroner of such collective tragedies as famine and war. In facing the former, religion—at least the religion of a Bertrand Russell (or more recently of a Stewart Alsop; see his widely praised Stay of Execution)—has been admitted as a resource; in facing the latter, it has not. The same divorce of individual from collective destiny makes it comparatively easy for Russell’s free worshipper to build his soul-habitation in despair: He despairs bravely who despairs only for himself. However, resignation to the death of the species, an unimaginably remote prospect in 1901, is quite another matter. In this context, the noblest despair seems a crime of sloth and indifference against one’s own grandchildren. Imperceptibly, Heilbroner corrects toward hope.

Not without sympathy with the correction, one may still ask whether Russell, by consciously facing the religious question, does not more fully appropriate the content of the Atlas image. Heilbroner’s proposal that we, who have been sitting on top of the world, now imagine ourselves staggering beneath it may imply the “basic change of values and goals at individual, national, and world levels” called for by the Club of Rome (Donnella H. Meadows et al., The Limits of Growth [New York: New American Library, 1972], p. 198), but on the imaginative or rhetorical level the proposal plainly is better ordered to suffering fate than to shaping history. The point is not idly raised, for despite avowed intentions to the contrary, Heilbroner’s tone does intimate that this battle is already lost. The comfort he finds in the image of Atlas may then represent a personal, religious reconciliation to the death of the race even as Russell’s was a reconciliation to the death of the self. Atlas, the brother of Prometheus, was punished, one recalls, for his failure to control the exces-
The chaos of the university, however, is not the disease itself but only a symptom of it. The disease, for Thompson as for Heilbroner, lies at the scientific and technological heart of industrial civilization. Its cure will be the emergence of a new Pythagorean science replacing the old Archimedean one. Pythagorean science, though available to technology, will find equal expression in art and religion. Archimedes was Homo faber, Pythagoras Homo ludens. In the new Pythagorean synthesis, Homo ludens comes into his own. Thompson sees a “four-stage process: (1) crazies; (2) artists; (3) savants; and (4) pedants” (p. 132). Artists like C. S. Lewis and, more recently, Doris Lessing have already carried us into stage 2. Stage 3 is dawning in the work of savants like Paolo Soleri, C. F. von Weizsaecker, and others. The bulk of Passages about Earth is a kind of erudite travelogue, a visit to stage-3 hidden valleys where the new Atlas now gathers his strength.

Most of chapter 3, “The Individual as Institution,” deals with Paolo Soleri, an Italian architect whose Cosanti Foundation outside Phoenix proposes nothing less than the redesign of the city. Thompson groups Soleri with Ivan Illich, Marshall McLuhan, and Teilhard de Chardin as Catholic critics of Protestant industrial society. The strength in this critique is its “medieval” sense of order and austerity; its weakness, an ignorance of the inner life of the culture it wishes to change. Soleri is a European aristocrat: “a taut figure of hard line and flat plane; with his gray hair brushed over his forehead, his
aristocratic features gave him the air of a classical Roman senator. . . . [But] . . . Soleri is a Michelangelo, the expressor of a culture rather than the creator of one. . . . first things must come first. First comes the re-visioning of the universe in Christianity, then comes the Sistine Chapel or the B Minor Mass. One does not live in the Sistine Chapel or the B Minor Mass, one lives in Christianity” (pp. 36, 52).

Chapter 4, “The World State and H. G. Wells,” begins with Thompson’s report on W. Warren Wagar, an H. G. Wells scholar associated with the World Order Models Project. In his work Building the City of Man, Wagar sees what Soleri failed to see, namely, that art alone is not enough:

We shall not reach, nor can we sustain, an organic world civilization without the help of a new living religious faith.

But how does one “create” a new religion? Could a committee of venerable world religious leaders, or a team of sociologists of religion, or a battery of computers perform such a feat? [P. 59]

This, for Thompson, is the crucial question. Wagar, however, proposes shelving it until after the collapse of the present civilization. Recalling Well’s famous film The Shape of Things to Come, in which total war catapults the world into a new Dark Age but somehow spares a cadre of engineers and scientists, he writes:

I suggest quite seriously that one fragment of the world revolutionary movement should detach itself from the main body at a very early stage and direct its energies toward the building of an ark of civilization, a renewal colony well enough staffed and supplied to guide the survivors of a total war back to civilized life and forward to human unity. . . . Building such a colony and keeping its facilities and personnel up to date would involve an initial investment of, let us say, $200,000,000, and yearly expenditures of $40,000,000—the cost of a medium-sized state university. [P. 62]

Thompson has misgivings but makes Wagar’s proposal to physicist C. F. von Weizsaecker in Weizsaecker’s tower overlooking the Starnbergersee. In the most illuminating pages in the book, von Weizsaecker narrates how with Werner Heisenberg he once considered forming a club of atomic scientists, vowed to keeping the lethal lore out of government hands. Unfortunately, “they made a decision that he now sees was foolish and a clear mistake: . . . in order to be certain that there was indeed a danger to atomic science and that it all wasn’t a chimerical fantasy, they would have to do the research. . . . How Faustian it all appeared to me” (p. 70). At Max Planck’s urging, Heisenberg and von Weizsaecker remained in Nazi Germany through the war in hopes both of concealing the feasibility of atomic weapons from the regime and of reviving German science after Hitler’s defeat. Having thus built a renewal colony in the middle of a collapsing national culture, von Weizsaecker was skeptical of Wagar’s proposal for a secret colony: “If they have any superior science that constitutes a threat to nations, they will be killed. . . . Conflict or betrayal would be inevitable in a colony. . . . If individuals like Klaus Fuchs could always be found to give away national secrets, undoubtedly just as many could be found to give away the secrets of the Pythagorean Brotherhood” (pp. 71–72).

Thompson departs from Starnberg more convinced than ever that no secret colony can succeed. Wells, however, had made a second suggestion, that
of an "open conspiracy" to save civilization. Perhaps such a conspiracy had
begun in the famous "Club of Rome." After a brief visit to one of the club's
computer experts, Dennis Meadows, who confides: "If there isn't that much
time left for civilization, I don't see the point of wasting what's left running
around spending your life in airports. I'm leaving MIT and going to teach at
Dartmouth and live on a farm" (p. 74), Thompson sets off for Rome and an
interview with the club's director, industrialist Aurelio Peccei.

Like Soleri, Peccei is an Italian aristocrat repelled by the vulgarity of
America but compelled by its energy. Despite his own phenomenal success in
multinational corporations, Peccei looks neither to business nor to govern-
ment for a way out of the "civilizational malaise" but rather, with Soleri, to art.
Thompson objects "that most modern novelists or gallery painters suffered
from the same myopia as the businessman" and leaves unsatisfied (p. 79).

On balance, Thompson finds Peccei and the Club of Rome a useful object
lesson in the functioning of elites, nothing more. Elitism in democracies
serves a purpose, but "we greatly oversimplify society if we think that there is
one homogeneous group called the best that is waiting to be sifted from the
mass. There are many elites, and they have been coming into conflict with one
another throughout history" (p. 81). If American politics is as fit as any for the
future, this is not due to any direct ability to effect the required changes but
rather to its stance vis-à-vis those competing elites which can bring about
change. The change required is transpolitical, not a revolution but a cultural
"re-vision"—a seeing anew, before which the present normative secularism is
revealed as only "a temporary and very necessary process to give new energies
to the sacred and to release it from the prison of the old forms" (p. 82).

In chapter 6, "Of Physics and Tantric Yoga," Thompson visits Werner
Heisenberg in Munich and then returns to the Research Foundation for
Eastern Wisdom and Western Science in Starnberg. Heisenberg,

when he was a young musician, . . . had felt that the great era of European music had
reached its consummation and that the mind of Europe could be better raised to new
heights in physics. His intuition had always been good, and now he intuitively felt that
our culture was reaching its limit. The ecological limit on the growth of civilization, he
maintained, only expressed the outward sign of the limits to growth of the human spirit
in the material dimensions it had been exploring since the Renaissance. [P. 90]

For Thompson, such reflections are the refutation of C. P. Snow: "If there are
'two cultures,' they are not . . . science and the humanities, but Archimedean
and Pythagorean forms of knowledge. On the Archimedean side we have all
the technological attempts, whether agricultural, industrial, or military, to
alter and control nature; on the Pythagorean side we have all the cosmological
thinkers for whom art, religion, and science are different idioms in a single
language of contemplation" (p. 91). The bulk of chapter 5 is Thompson's
highly personal summary of von Weizsaecker on the singleness of that lan-
guage: briefly, after Schelling, that "Nature is spirit which does not have the
appearance of spirit." Gopi Krishna, von Weizsaecker's Indian colleague, is, it
turns out, "interested not so much in remythologizing science with yoga as in
demythologizing yoga with science. He looks to a new "lofty class" of scientists
with elevated kundaliniis to take over the leadership of the world in the wake
of a nuclear war. Lesser men may be corrupted by power, but Gopi Krishna
feels confident that there can be no problems with men whose brains have
been illuminated by kundalini” (p. 117). Gopi Krishna is no princeling guru in slippers and saffron robe but a self-made, working-class sage: “an old logger from the Northwest with a love for books or a wizened and storied fisherman from Maine” (p. 86). It appears that in the Starnberg collaboration the theoretical statement of mystical experience falls to von Weizsaecker, its implementation in social practice to Gopi Krishna. Thompson is intrigued by the former but alarmed by the latter. Gopi Krishna foresees a kind of Western caste system with a scientific rather than an economic elite. Thompson feels that the wartime experience of von Weizsaecker himself convincingly argues the weakness of any purely scientific elite in the twilight of a civilization. Once again, he finds himself pushed to the portals of religion:

There is one advantage that a religion has over science as an elite system. In religion the top and the bottom of society can think the same thought, though not in the same way. A peasant crucifix alongside a road and the Isenheim altarpiece by Gruenewald are much closer together than a peasant counting sheep and a scientist doing quantum electrodynamics. When science approaches the point at which mankind can participate in it, it passes over into mythology, and there converges with religion and art. [P. 117]

The program of Gopi Krishna, the Kashmiri householder, is, paradoxically, to transform the techniques of folk meditation which he inherited into postgraduate education for a scientific elite. This, in Thompson’s opinion, is not to exploit the power of meditation to save civilization but only to squander it.

Thompson’s last stop but one is Findhorn, a trailer camp in Scotland where mysticism and science join, as at Starnberg, but with fewer ominous overtones of elitism. Quotations from Findhorn’s theoretician David Spangler have a decidedly more occult ring to them than those from von Weizsaecker. The community is, in general, less concerned with the hidden powers of the individual subject—kundalini still coiled at the base of the spine, etc.—than with the hidden powers of the planet. Its vision is as much a geography as a psychology of salvation. Findhorn, however, has attracted members of widely varying ethnic, educational, and economic backgrounds; and it is this, more than any other single factor, which persuades Thompson of its validity: “At Findhorn . . . I found the balance between American politics and Eastern mysticism. And looking at the spiritually unbalanced politics of older Americans and the politically unbalanced mysticism of the younger ones, I knew that was as important as anything I had found around the world” (p. 181).

The word guru has unfortunate connotations, and perhaps Thompson would not apply it to himself. However, its base meaning is teacher, and, in the last analysis, his labors are perhaps those of a concerned and disturbed teacher. He walks out of the university for the student’s sake and concludes the account of his journey with a note on his new school:

Just as the traditional liberal arts colleges offers “the Great Books” as the foundation for a person’s professional training and development, so Lindisfarne offers the great spiritual disciplines for the transformation of consciousness as the foundation for a person’s existence in the new planetary culture. Directly concerned with the interface between esoteric and exoteric forms of thought, Lindisfarne offers seminars in science and the humanities by scholars who are rooted in daily meditational practice. [P. 190]

As with an invitation, Passages about Earth ends with Lindisfarne’s mailing address.
It is instructive to read Thompson's study in the light of a millennial hypothesis advanced in 1967 by molecular biologist Gunther Stent. Stent's hypothesis, apparently unknown to Thompson, appeared in 1969 as *The Coming of the Golden Age: A View of the End of Progress.* Like Thompson, Stent begins his reflection with the experience of campus turmoil in the late sixties. Though not at first disposed to take the "beat" and "hippie" movements seriously, Stent gradually began to connect them, improbably enough, with developments in his own science. The two halves of his essay are entitled "The Rise and Fall of Molecular Genetics" and "The Rise and Fall of Faustian Man," and the author sees them as crucially interrelated.

There remain, as Stent sees it, only three areas in which romantic (sic) discovery in biology is still possible. The first is cellular differentiation in the embryo; the second, the origin of life; and the third, the nervous system and human brain. The first two areas, it may confidently be assumed, will eventually yield to human intelligence. As for the third, "as far as consciousness is concerned, it is possible that the quest for its physical nature is bringing us to the limits of human understanding, in that the brain may not be capable, in the last analysis, of providing an explanation of itself" (p. 74). The relevance of this limit to the counterculture lies in the probability that long before the limit of man's understanding of his own brain is reached, his mastery of "what might be called electrophysical eupsychics" will be fully achieved and men will be able to live like gods "remote from grief, as long as their pleasure centers are properly wired" (p. 73).

Eupsychics being the *Leitmotif* of the sixties counterculture, Stent sees the hippie as a cultural mutant destined for selection in the coming intellectual environment. The sort of personality, in other words, which was selected for scientific advance will not be selected for scientific stasis. Faustian man has seen his day:

The will to power will not have vanished entirely, but the distribution of its intensity among individuals will have been drastically altered. At one end of this distribution will be a minority of the people whose work will keep intact the technology that sustains the multitude at a high standard of living. In the middle of the distribution will be found a type, largely unemployed, from whom the distinction between the real and the illusory will still be meaningful and whose prototype is the beatnik. He will retain an interest in the world and seek satisfaction from sensual pleasures. At the other end of the spectrum will be a type largely unemployable, for whom the boundary of the real and the imagined will have been largely dissolved, at least to the extent compatible with his physical survival. His prototype is the hippie. [P. 138]

Stent's Atlas neither shrugs nor staggers, then, but lightly bears the burdens of his myriad eupsychic Atlanteans.

The question as between Thompson and Stent is: Who includes whom? Stent would doubtless maintain that the new Pythagorean synthesis, the new program for religious education, which Thompson promises, is a mental environment now being institutionalized for the unemployed and the unemployable of the future, the coming beat and hippie masses. As for the real work and the real thought of society, they will continue to be performed by Stent's Faustians (Thompson's Archimeleans). "Always have been, always will be," one hears him conclude.

To this, we may imagine Thompson replying that Stent's end of progress is in fact its greatest new departure since Pythagoras's discovery of scientific
abstraction itself. Abandoning the distinction between mind and matter is not so much abandoning the distinction between reality and illusion as recognizing the former distinction as itself illusory in a more nearly perfectly understood reality, a recognition not produced or required by the underclass but rather by the scientific elite itself. Stent, Thompson would say, prefers to declare scientific exploration over rather than move to its new frontier.

Middle ground between a Thompson and a Stent is not easy to uncover. Each seems adequately to include the other. One may only note, as a kind of afterthought, a slender volume by Paul A. Weiss of the Rockefeller University, *The Science of Life: The Living System—a System for Living* (Mount Kisco, N.Y.: Futura Publishing Co., 1973). Weiss's book, labored in style and uncertain in outline, does make one point insistently and well. In the author's formulation, it is that the law of life is "order in the gross, freedom in the small." The small—the gene, the molecule, the subatomic particle—does not order the gross but is ordered by it. Thompson and Stent, not to speak of Heilbroner, may, despite their contradiction, conform to a larger order which only a later era—or a higher intelligence—will be privileged to see.

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Describing experts at a high-level, foundation-sponsored conference, a character in Arthur Koestler's *The Call Girls* complains: "Each of them possesses a small fragment of the Truth which he believes to be the Whole Truth, which he carries around in his pocket like a tarnished bubble gum, and blows up on solemn occasions to prove that it contains the ultimate mystery of the universe. . . . When the dialogue is supposed to start, each gets his own bubble gum out and blows it into the others' faces. Then they repair, satisfied, to the cocktail room" (*The Call Girls* [New York: Random House, 1973], p. 94. The call girls of the title are the experts themselves who at a call and for a price will give a speech). In *Generative Man*, Don S. Browning brings no bubble gum of his own to the conference. He is rather the delegate who skips cocktails and repairs instead to his room to make some private harmony of the public disharmony of the afternoon's proceedings.

The body of his *Generative Man* features four thinkers whom Browning terms "psychoanalytic ethicists." In their public disharmony, the relationship of science to religion has not been a central topic. It is to that topic, however, that Browning, in the privacy of an extended epilogue, finds himself most drawn; and it is the significance of that epilogue, in large part, that occasions this review.

The late Clyde Kluckhohn was of the opinion that the modern dichotomy between *Naturwissenschaften* and *Geisteswissenschaften* was not a theoretical necessity but only the unconscious aftermath of a practical compromise. During the nineteenth century, "organized religion still had a great power to block scientific teaching and research. In substance, the scientists were offered a compromise: 'You may investigate the non-human world of nature to
your heart's content so long as you admit that problems of morality, of ultimate values are, in principle, *ultra vires scientiae*" (Claude Kluckhohn, "The Scientific Study of Values and Contemporary Civilization," *Zygon* 1 [1966]: 236. Cf., more recently, R. W. Sperry, "Science and the Problem of Values," *Zygon* 9 [1974]: 7-21). This temporary line of demarcation was in effect erased by the rise of scientific psychology, of *Geisteswissenschaft* which was also, by aspiration, *Naturwissenschaft*. In practice, however, it lingered as an ethical diffidence in clinical no less than in experimental psychology. It should come as no surprise, then, that Browning, in "explicitating" the ethics of Philip Rieff, Norman Brown, Erich Fromm, and Erik Erikson, should find himself led, in his own way, to confront again the question which made the "explicitation" necessary. And in doing so it may be that he contributes to the psychotherapy of psychoanalysis; for if Kluckhohn was right and psychoanalysis has suffered (with science generally) from an inhibition which is the residual response to a situation now past, then Browning’s disregard of that inhibition from a position within *clinical* psychology may be seen as part of an enhanced self-appropriation on the part of psychoanalysis itself.

Can a psychoanalyst help an analysand “get better” without helping him to be good? Is an ethically neutral psychoanalysis possible? Oscar Wilde said that if nothing was serious, then nothing was funny. Browning's overriding position is that if nothing is good, then nothing is bad, and that in a world where nothing is either bad or good, where therefore no ideal can be entertained, mental health is impossible. The dichotomy between fact and value must be healed by a discovery that mental health—a factual condition, so to call it—requires ethical values, purposefully pursuable. Browning’s earlier work was directly concerned with the "implicit ultimate commitments . . . behind a particular system of psychology, psychotherapy, or socialization" (Generative Man, p. 15). In *Generative Man*, he stops short of a search for ultimate commitments and attends rather to the societal consequences of psychoanalytic answers to his programmatic question: What is the nature of the good man? One senses a tactical decision: The dialogue between psychoanalysis and religion must wait on a dialogue among psychoanalysts. Psychoanalysis must sharpen its awareness of its own implied ethical positions. Only at that point will it find that it has important matters to discuss with religion.

Browning's own role in this waiting period is that of facilitator in an intradisciplinary discussion. He contrives to make his “psychoanalytic ethicists” *address one another* rather than himself. To choose a random example among many, he writes: “It is tempting to put oneself in the shoes of Erich Fromm and imagine Fromm's response to Rieff's concept of the psychological man and Brown's concept of Dionysian man.” (p. 123). Browning yields often to such temptations and with good results. His undisguised personal persuasion is that Erikson’s is the paradigmatic achievement which will become the Kuhnian "normal science" of psychoanalysis; but in good T-group style he does not gloss over differences between Erikson and his peers but rather highlights them and laboriously talks them out. Ideally, he would unite Rieff, Brown, and Fromm in a new Eriksonian coalition, preserving, as he sees it, their strengths and correcting their weaknesses. Short of that, he can at least chart their differences and indeed does so in a literal chart.

The chart, though useful, is less than a complete summary of *Generative Man*, for it omits the key fourth chapter, “The Ego, Play, and Individuation,” with its revealing judgment that
neither Rieff nor Brown has any respect for the advances that have been made by psychoanalytic ego psychology. . . Neither of them seems to be aware of the clinical usefulness of the contributions of Heinz Hartmann, Ernst Kris, David Rapaport, Robert White, and Erik Erikson. Hence, their respective efforts to set forth the moral meaning of psychoanalysis stop short of saying anything at all positive about this aspect of the psychoanalytic tradition which is for all practical purposes now considered to be normative in clinical psychoanalytic circles. [Pp. 83–84]

Generative Man in good part, then, is a clinician's reaction to psychoanalytically derived cultural analysis. Thus, to cite one example among dozens, Browning questions Philip Rieff's skepticism that the instinctual can collaborate with the rational by reference to clinical observation of children who "spontaneously stop eating their favorite snack in willing exchange for another food containing vitamins or minerals which they lack" (p. 52). The issue is not thereby settled, but the mode of Browning's criticism is clear: it is clinically validated ego psychology which must stand in judgment on even the most articulate psychocultural analysis, and within ego psychology it is Erik Erikson who offers the brightest promise of carrying that criticism to a constructive conclusion: "Erikson and men like him have successfully worked on the border line between the image of the past and the emerging cultural disciplines of the present to help form a grand new world image which will bridge our march from the present toward a more inclusive and universal future" (p. 217). It is by applying the insights of a progressively refined clinical psychology to the pathology of culture that Browning, it would seem, hopes to resolve the Naturwissenschaft-Geisteswissenschaft dichotomy spoken of by Kluckhohn.

In light of this, one might be tempted to say of that estrangement itself: Solvatur ambulando. The reintroduction of undisguised ethical and cultural concerns into the context of clinical psychology might make psychotherapy as adequate a religion surrogate as modern man can expect. In fact, the matter is more complex. The Eriksonian vision includes more than self-understanding plus ethical concern. Browning notes that "Erikson defines identity as the 'accrued confidence that one's ability to maintain inner sameness and continuity . . . is matched by the sameness and continuity of one's meaning for others.' . . . 'The growing child must derive a vitalizing sense of reality from the awareness that his individual way of mastering experience . . . is a successful variant of a group identity and is in accord with its space-time and life plan' " (p. 166). Erikson's emphasis on "match" and "accord" is in striking continuity with Clifford Geertz's well-known definition of religion as "the conviction that the values one holds are grounded in the inherent structure of reality, that between the way one ought to live and the way things really are there is an unbreakable inner connection" (Islam Observed [New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1968], p. 97). Where, for Erikson, the child must believe that his individual way of mastering experience is in accord with the space-time and life plan of a community, for Geertz the community itself must believe that its space-time and life plan are in accord with the inherent structure of reality. Conversely, if the community cannot believe that its life plan is in accord with the inherent structure of reality, then it cannot be "there" as the necessary context for the identity formation of a growing child. A helpful fiction, once recognized as such by its user, becomes unhelpful. A society consciously relying for its moral direction on a set of helpful fictions is helpless in itself and morally useless to a child growing up within it.

The "grand new world image" of which Browning speaks must therefore
offer more than the merely social environment of consensus. Ian Barbour writes of models in physics: “The ‘as if’ reflects both a partial resemblance and a tentative commitment. . . . Leonard Nash puts it thus: ‘To the hypothetical entities sketched by our theories we must venture at least provisional grants of ontologic status. Major discoveries are made when invisible atoms, electrons, nuclei, viruses, vitamins, hormones, and genes are regarded as existing’” (Myths, Models and Paradigms [New York: Harper & Row, 1974], p. 38). So it must be for the child. His major self-discoveries are made when the invisible values, canons, and goals of his culture are regarded as true.

The faith of a scientist in the truth of his model and the faith of a believer in the final adequacy of his dogma have not ordinarily been the same. It may be, however, that the future of religion will reveal a progressive approximation of the latter to the former. Religion may discover, in other words, under the impact of natural science, a new way to regard its dogmata both as more than helpful fictions and as less than truth beyond revision.

Apropos this prospect, it is significant that Browning closes his work with a brief discussion of Erikson's affinities with Whitehead, Dobzhansky, and Teilhard and affirms that “the most exciting current developments in psychoanalytic theory are those which are striving to align psychoanalysis more systematically with current developments in evolutionary theory” (p. 220). Readers of Generative Man may well look forward with pleasure to Browning's further reflections on this new alignment.

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