The first argument for human superiority revolves around the story of Adam, particularly the divine command for the angels to prostrate before him. According to the Qurʾānic narrative, after creating Adam from clay, God commanded the angels to prostrate before him as a sign of respect and recognition of Adam’s unique status. This was not an act of worship directed toward Adam but rather a gesture of obedience to God’s command and acknowledgment of Adam’s elevated role in creation. All the angels complied except for Satan (Iblīs), who arrogantly refused. Satan’s defiance is recorded in several verses, including his statement: “You have honored him above me” (Qurʾān 17:62). Here, Satan expresses his envy and disdain for Adam, framing the prostration as an unjust elevation of a being he deems inferior. In another verse, Satan justifies his refusal by claiming superiority based on his origin: “You created me from fire, and him from clay” (Qurʾān 7:12), underscoring his belief that the nature of his creation made him superior.

Building on this narrative, proponents of human superiority over the angels develop their argument through four interconnected points. First, they interpret the angels’ prostration as a direct acknowledgment of Adam’s elevated status, not merely as a symbolic gesture. The Qurʾān’s account, particularly Satan’s protest in Qurʾān 17:62—“You have honored him above me”—is seen as evidence that the act signified Adam’s intrinsic superiority. Second, Adam’s designation as a khalīfa (vicegerent) on Earth further underscores his unique status. In this view, the role of a vicegerent, representing divine authority, naturally places Adam above the rest of creation. Third, the Qurʾānic affirmation of Adam’s divine selection in Qurʾān 3:33—“Indeed, God chose Adam, Noah, and the family of Abraham”—is presented as explicit proof of his privileged position. Finally, Adam’s capacity to learn and teach the names of all things, as described in Qurʾān 2:31, demonstrates a level of knowledge unparalleled by the angels. This unique intellectual ability is interpreted as a mark of Adam’s superiority, as Islamic theology often associates greater knowledge with higher rank. Together, these points affirm Adam’s superior status in the cosmic hierarchy.

Al-Rāzī critically addresses these interconnected points by offering alternative interpretations that challenge their underlying assumptions. First, he questions whether the command to prostrate to Adam included the celestial angels, who are traditionally considered closer to God in Islamic cosmology. Proponents of Adam’s superiority cite the general wording of the verse: “And when We said to the angels: Prostrate to Adam” (Qurʾān 2:34). However, al-Rāzī argues that this generality can be restricted by other Qurʾānic verses (takhṣīṣ ʿumūm al-Qurʾān bi naṣṣ al-Qurʾān), a principle widely accepted in Islamic hermeneutics.

To substantiate his argument, al-Rāzī references the verse: “Indeed, those who are near your Lord are not too proud to worship Him; they glorify Him, and to Him they prostrate” (Qurʾān 7:206). He focuses on the placement of the phrase “to Him” (lahu) before the verb “they prostrate” (yasjudūn), which indicates exclusivity in Arabic rhetoric. The forward placement of lahu emphasizes that the celestial angels direct their prostration solely to God. In classical Arabic, this kind of syntactical arrangement is often employed to limit or restrict the action to the specified subject (taqdīm wa taʾkhīr)—in this case, God alone. Therefore, al-Rāzī concludes that the celestial angels are excluded from the command to prostrate to Adam because their prostration is reserved exclusively for God (also see al-Rāzī 2012, 105).6

Building on this distinction, al-Rāzī proposes that the command to prostrate was instead directed at the terrestrial angels, who are assigned specific roles on Earth.7 These angels, whose ranks and responsibilities differ significantly from their celestial counterparts, would have been the intended recipients of this command. By narrowing the scope of the prostration, al-Rāzī reframes the act as one tied to terrestrial dynamics while maintaining the singular devotion of the celestial angels to God (al-Rāzī 2024, 621).

Second, al-Rāzī challenges the argument that Adam’s designation as a khalīfa (vicegerent) inherently implies superiority. Proponents equate this role with an elevated status, asserting that a vicegerent’s position surpasses that of other beings. Al-Rāzī counters by clarifying that Adam’s vicegerency is explicitly tied to Earth and does not extend to the heavens. He further notes that, according to the cosmological understanding of his time, the Earth is relatively insignificant compared to the vastness and grandeur of the heavens (al-Rāzī 2024, 621).8 This comparison undermines the assumption that an earthly vicegerency automatically elevates Adam above celestial beings, whose domain and proximity to God remain unparalleled.

Third, al-Rāzī addresses the claim that Adam’s knowledge establishes his superiority. While he acknowledges Adam’s intellectual distinction, particularly his ability to learn and teach the names of all things as described in Qurʾān 2:31, al-Rāzī confines this distinction to Adam’s relationship with the terrestrial angels. He questions the extension of this claim to the celestial angels, for whom no evidence exists that Adam’s knowledge surpassed theirs. Al-Rāzī emphasizes that the breadth and depth of the celestial angels’ knowledge, derived from their proximity to the divine and their unique roles, cannot be easily compared to human capacities (more on this point in the next section). Without clear evidence, any assertion of Adam’s superiority in knowledge over the celestial angels remains speculative and unsubstantiated (al-Rāzī 2024, 621).

Finally, al-Rāzī critiques the argument based on divine selection in Qurʾān 3:33: “Indeed, Allah chose Adam and Noah and the family of Abraham and the family of ʿImrān over all the worlds.” Proponents interpret this verse as evidence of Adam’s universal superiority. Al-Rāzī (2024, 622), however, contextualizes the term “the worlds” (al-ʿālamīn) as referring specifically to the inhabitants of the earthly realm (ahl al-arḍ). By doing so, he limits the scope of Adam’s selection to his distinction within the earthly domain without extending it to celestial beings. In this way, al-Rāzī affirms Adam’s unique role and status on Earth while avoiding conclusions that would contradict his position on the greater rank of celestial beings.

The second argument for human superiority hinges on two related points. First, proponents emphasize the hardship of obedience, arguing that human worship is inherently more valuable because it is performed despite significant challenges. Unlike angels, who are free from desires and distractions, humans must overcome internal inclinations and external obstacles to remain obedient. This struggle, they argue, makes human devotion uniquely praiseworthy. This is supported by the Qurʾānic principle that striving for God entails divine guidance: “And those who strive for Us—We will surely guide them to Our ways. And indeed, Allah is with the doers of good” (Qurʾān 29:69).9

Second, proponents assert that equitable reward for hardship further underscores the superiority of human worship. They argue that the increased difficulty humans face in their acts of devotion must correspond to a proportionate increase in divine reward. This idea resonates with the Qurʾānic statement: “Indeed, the patient will be given their reward without account” (Qurʾān 39:10).10 Failing to account for such effort, proponents contend, would conflict with the wisdom and justice of God. This point strengthens the claim that human worship, marked by struggle and sacrifice, surpasses the pure but effortless worship of angels.

Al-Rāzī challenges the reasoning behind these claims by focusing on the limitations of hardship as a basis for superiority and the presumption of proportional reward for hardship. He offers two vivid analogies to make his point. First, he compares the situation to a baker or butcher who expends significant effort to secure basic necessities like food and clothing, while a ruler enjoys these without hardship due to their elevated status. Would anyone argue that the laborious efforts of the former make them superior to the ruler? Similarly, al-Rāzī argues, human struggles in worship, while admirable, cannot automatically place them above angels, whose uninterrupted and pure devotion demonstrates a higher quality of worship (al-Rāzī 2024, 622).

Building on this, al-Rāzī presents another analogy: consider a person prone to illness who expends great effort to maintain their health. Would such a person be deemed superior to someone who enjoys perfect health without such challenges? Common sense suggests otherwise, as the latter’s consistent state of health is inherently more desirable and reflects a greater excellence (al-Rāzī 2024, 622–23). For al-Rāzī, these analogies together demonstrate that hardship, even if rewarded, does not inherently confer superiority. Instead, he prioritizes the constancy and purity of angelic worship, which embodies a form of excellence that human challenges in worship cannot surpass.

The third argument for human superiority is rooted in the distinctive dual nature of humans. Unlike other beings, humans possess both intellect (al-ʿaql) and base desires (al-shahawāt), which places them in a unique position within creation. Animals are driven solely by desires and lack intellect, while angels are characterized by intellect but are devoid of desires. Humans, possessing both, are seen as capable of navigating between these extremes (see Table 1).

Proponents of human superiority put forth two related claims. The first is that when humans are ruled by their desires, they fall below the level of animals, as they fail to use their intellect to moderate their behavior. This is often supported by the Qurʾānic verse: “They are like cattle; rather, they are more astray” (Qurʾān 7:179), which is interpreted as evidence of this degradation. The second claim builds on the first, suggesting that if humans have the capacity to descend below animals, they must also possess the potential to ascend above angels when guided by reason and intellect. These two claims together frame humans as beings capable of both extreme vice and sublime virtue, depending on which of their faculties they cultivate.

Al-Rāzī critically challenges both claims. He begins by addressing the first claim, that humans can fall below animals, and rejects its literal interpretation. According to al-Rāzī, the Qurʾānic verse 7:179, often cited to support this notion, is meant as a rhetorical warning or deterrent, not a definitive statement about an ontological hierarchy. By casting doubt on the scriptural basis of the first claim, al-Rāzī simultaneously weakens the second claim, that humans, by the same logic, can surpass angels. If the premise about humans being lower than animals lacks literal force, the symmetrical inference about humans ascending above angels cannot stand either (al-Rāzī 2024, 623).

Through his critiques of the arguments for human superiority, al-Rāzī systematically dismantles their foundational premises while rooting his objections in a broader theological framework. First, he challenges the interpretation that the prostration of angels before Adam signifies human superiority. He argues that the command to prostrate was limited to terrestrial angels and reflects Adam’s unique earthly role rather than an indication of universal human precedence over celestial beings. Second, he critiques the argument that the hardship of human worship confers superiority, contending that while human struggles in devotion are admirable, they do not surpass the excellence of angelic worship, which is uninterrupted and pure. Finally, he examines the claim that humans, having both intellect and desires, occupy a unique position that enables them to surpass angels. Al-Rāzī rejects this by challenging the analogy underpinning the argument. He contends that the Qurʾānic verse 7:179 cited as evidence for humans falling below animals is rhetorical rather than literal, undermining the symmetry needed to argue that humans can ascend above angels. Without a solid basis for the first claim, the second claim collapses as well.

These critiques expose the flawed anthropocentric assumptions underlying claims of human superiority. At the same time, they prepare the ground for al-Rāzī’s affirmative case for angelic superiority, which is developed in subsequent sections. The section “Scriptural Arguments Favoring Angelic Superiority” examines scriptural evidence supporting angelic excellence, while the section “Logical Arguments Favoring Angelic Superiority” presents rational arguments to reinforce this perspective.

The first cluster, based on the first and third arguments, emphasizes the angels’ continuous devotion and their precedence in creation as evidence of their superiority over humans (al-Rāzī 2024, 624–27; 629–33). This argument highlights how uninterrupted worship, combined with a higher degree of piety and awe of God, establishes the angels’ elevated rank in the cosmic hierarchy.

This claim is substantiated by several Qurʾānic verses. God says: “And those near Him are not too proud to worship Him; they glorify Him night and day, they do not slacken” (Qurʾān 21:19–20). This verse highlights the angels’ perpetual worship and servitude, marking them as beings entirely dedicated to the glorification of God without pause or distraction. In contrast, humans are constrained by their physical and temporal limitations, which prevent them from achieving this level of uninterrupted devotion.

The angels’ precedence in creation further underscores their rank. The verse “And the foremost are the foremost; they are the ones brought near” (Qurʾān 56:10–11) is interpreted to signify the angels’ spiritual proximity to God due to their earlier existence. Their precedence in the divine order is seen as an indication of their higher status, setting them apart from humans and prophets who came later.

Another dimension of this argument is the angels’ unwavering piety and fear of God. As God states, “They fear their Lord above them” (Qurʾān 16:50) and “[t]hey are apprehensive of Him out of awe” (Qurʾān 21:28). Unlike humans, whose piety can fluctuate due to external influences and internal struggles, the angels maintain a constant state of reverence and awe. This unwavering piety aligns with the Qurʾānic principle: “Indeed, the most noble of you in the sight of Allah is the most pious among you” (Qurʾān 49:13), reinforcing the notion that their superior piety elevates their rank above humanity.

The Prophet Muḥammad also acknowledged human fallibility, saying, “There is no one among us who has not sinned or contemplated sin, except Yaḥyā ibn Zakariyyā.” This contrasts with the sinless nature of angels, further highlighting their moral and spiritual superiority.

Together, these verses and traditions form a cohesive argument affirming the angels’ superior station. Their uninterrupted worship, precedence in creation, and unwavering piety distinguish them as beings of unparalleled dedication and proximity to God, solidifying their higher rank in the divine hierarchy.

This cluster, based on the second and fourth arguments, highlights the angels’ unique role as divine messengers and their elevated status compared to prophets (al-Rāzī 2024, 627–28; 633–36). Angels, as intermediaries between God and humanity, hold a privileged position due to their proximity to the divine and their role in transmitting His revelations.

The Qurʾān underscores the closeness of angels to God, describing them as “those who are near” (Qurʾān 4:172). This verse situates angels within a distinct spiritual hierarchy, emphasizing their exalted station. Their nearness to God signifies an unparalleled alignment with divine will, setting them apart from prophets, who serve a different function in the divine plan. The Prophet Muḥammad himself, in Qurʾān 6:50, humbly acknowledges this distinction when he says: “I do not say to you that I have the treasures of God or that I know the unseen, nor do I say to you that I am an angel.” By distancing himself from attributes associated with angels, the Prophet indirectly affirms their unique qualities, such as access to divine knowledge and the unseen, which are beyond human capability.

Further highlighting this elevated status, Qurʾān 12:31 recounts the reaction of the women of Egypt upon seeing Prophet Yūsuf (Joseph). Struck by his beauty, they exclaimed: “This is no ordinary human; this is but a noble angel.” This description reflects how angels are perceived as beings of unparalleled nobility, transcending even the most extraordinary qualities found in humans.

Moreover, the hierarchical relationship between angels and prophets further reinforces this argument. Angels are entrusted with delivering God’s commands to prophets, who then convey these messages to humanity. This chain of communication positions angels at a higher level in the cosmic order, akin to a royal envoy who delivers the sovereign’s decree directly to his subjects. Their role as divine messengers emphasizes their spiritual priority and unique responsibilities in the divine scheme.

The third cluster highlights that the Qurʾān does not explicitly affirm human superiority over angels (al-Rāzī 2024, 636). This argument takes a negative approach, suggesting that the absence of a clear scriptural declaration of human supremacy supports the claim of angelic superiority.

The central verse for this cluster, “And We have certainly preferred them over much of what We have created” (Qurʾān 17:70), is one we encountered earlier in this article when discussing Muzaffar Iqbal’s perspective. While the verse acknowledges that humans are favored over much of creation, it stops short of declaring them the most superior of all beings. Proponents of angelic superiority argue that if humans were indeed superior to angels, the Qurʾān would have made this explicit. The absence of such a statement is interpreted as evidence that humans do not surpass angels in rank. The use of this verse by contemporary thinkers like Iqbal underscores its enduring relevance in theological discussions about the hierarchy of creation.

By focusing on what the Qurʾān does not state, this argument shifts the burden of proof to those who assert human superiority. Without unequivocal scriptural evidence, such claims remain speculative, reinforcing the position that angels hold a higher rank in the divine order. This approach underscores the importance of grounding assertions of human supremacy in explicit Qurʾānic evidence, which proponents of this argument contend is notably absent.

The fourth cluster of arguments highlights the role of angels as intercessors and stewards over humanity, further reinforcing their superiority (al-Rāzī 2024, 637–38). Two distinct aspects are emphasized: their unique role in seeking forgiveness for others and their responsibility for recording human deeds.

The sixth argument draws attention to the angels’ role as intercessors. Angels are depicted in the Qurʾān as beings who seek forgiveness for others but do not request it for themselves. For instance, Qurʾān 40:7 states: “Forgive those who have repented and followed Your way,” and Qurʾān 42:5 mentions their plea for the forgiveness of those on Earth. This selflessness contrasts with prophets, who are shown acknowledging their sins and seeking forgiveness for themselves and others, as seen in the prayers of Adam (Qurʾān 7:23), Noah (Qurʾān 71:28), and Abraham (Qurʾān 14:41). This contrast suggests a higher degree of spiritual purity and selflessness in angels, underscoring their elevated status.

The seventh argument focuses on the stewardship of angels, particularly their role in recording human deeds. Qurʾān 82:10–11 states: “And indeed, appointed over you are keepers, noble and recording.” This responsibility implies a hierarchical relationship where angels are positioned above humans, entrusted with observing and documenting their actions. Their role as divine recorders underscores their authority and reinforces their superior status.

Together, these arguments portray angels as morally impeccable beings who act selflessly in their intercessory roles and are entrusted with significant responsibilities in the divine order, further affirming their higher rank relative to humanity.

The fifth cluster argues for the superiority of angels based on their placement in the hierarchical order within Qurʾānic verses, highlighting their elevated rank over humans (al-Rāzī 2024, 639–641). This is supported by two arguments that interpret the sequence of entities mentioned in the verses as indicative of their respective statuses.

The eighth argument draws from Qurʾān 2:285: “The Messenger has believed in what was revealed to him from his Lord, and so have the believers. All of them have believed in God and His angels and His books and His messengers.” Here, angels are mentioned immediately after God and before His books and messengers. This sequence is understood as reflecting a deliberate ranking, with angels positioned above humans, including God’s prophets. The order underscores the angels’ spiritual and ontological significance, directly following God in importance.

The ninth argument is based on Qurʾān 3:18: “God bears witness that there is no deity except Him, and [so do] the angels and those of knowledge, maintaining His creation in justice.” In this verse, the angels are explicitly mentioned before the people of knowledge, affirming their superior rank. Given the high regard for scholars in Islamic tradition, the precedence of angels highlights their unique role and elevated status in the divine order.

By examining the order in which entities are mentioned, these arguments suggest the superiority of angels through their proximity to God in the divine schema.

The sixth and final cluster addresses the specific case of archangel Gabriel’s superiority over the Prophet Muḥammad, based on the former’s attributes and his role as an intermediary of divine revelation (al-Rāzī 2024, 641–47).

The tenth argument draws on Q. 81:19–22, where God says: “Indeed, it is a noble messenger’s word, [delivered by] one of mighty power, [and] held in honor by the Owner of the Throne, obeyed and trustworthy. And your companion is not [at all] mad.” In this context, the “noble messenger” refers to Gabriel, who is described as possessing immense strength, honor, and reliability, and as being held in high esteem by God Himself. In contrast, the Prophet Muḥammad is referred to as “your companion,” with the verse affirming only that he is free from madness. The elevated language used to describe Gabriel emphasizes his exceptional qualities of power and trustworthiness, which surpass the attributes explicitly ascribed to the Prophet in this passage. This disparity in description suggests a hierarchy in which Gabriel occupies a higher rank than Muḥammad.

The eleventh argument expands on Gabriel’s superior knowledge and proximity to divine matters, asserting that his extensive understanding of both foundational and secondary realms of knowledge solidifies his elevated status. Gabriel’s unique position as the first recipient of divine revelation grants him unparalleled access to the mysteries of the heavens and the divine order. As stated in Qurʾān 53:5: “He was taught by one mighty in power,” Gabriel served as the teacher to Muḥammad, highlighting the hierarchical relationship between teacher and student (al-Rāzī 2024, 645).

Al-Rāzī elaborates on this epistemic hierarchy by dividing religious knowledge into two broad categories: foundational (ʿilm al-uṣūl) and secondary (ʿilm al-furūʿ). Foundational knowledge itself consists of two aspects. The first is the knowledge of God’s oneness and attributes, which al-Rāzī argues is necessarily perfect for both Gabriel and Muḥammad, as any deficiency in this domain would imply ignorance of God—a theological impossibility. The second aspect, however, pertains to the details of creation, where Gabriel’s superiority becomes evident. As a celestial being, Gabriel has directly witnessed the Throne (al-ʿArsh), the Footstool (al-Kursī), the Preserved Tablet (al-Lawḥ al-maḥfūẓ), the Pen (al-Qalam), Paradise (al-Jannah), Hell (al-Nār), and the layers of the heavens.12 Additionally, his knowledge extends to the intricacies of earthly creation, including the elements, minerals, plants, and animals. Gabriel’s role as a leader among celestial beings and his command over the angels entrusted with these domains further highlight his unparalleled comprehension of these realms (al-Rāzī 2024, 645–46).

In the domain of secondary knowledge (ʿilm al-furūʿ), which concerns the specifics of the jurisprudential laws and prophetic missions, Gabriel’s superiority remains evident. Al-Rāzī explains that Prophet Muḥammad’s understanding of his jurisprudential framework (sharīʿa) was confined to the laws of his own mission, and he did not have knowledge of the divine laws governing (sharāʾiʿ) the previous prophets. Furthermore, Prophet Muḥammad was unaware of the divine laws governing celestial realms, whereas Gabriel possessed comprehensive knowledge of these domains. Since this secondary knowledge was acquired exclusively through Gabriel, the teacher–student relationship further underscores Gabriel’s epistemic primacy. Gabriel’s unique position as the mediator of revelation makes him indispensable for the transmission of this knowledge (al-Rāzī 2024, 646).

This hierarchy of knowledge is encapsulated in the Qurʾānic verse: “Are those who know equal to those who do not know?” (Qurʾān 39:9). Gabriel’s direct witnessing of creation’s mysteries and his comprehensive knowledge of both foundational and secondary matters firmly establish his superiority within the epistemic order.

To preempt counterarguments based on Qurʾān 2:31—where Adam is taught the names of all things while the angels appear unaware—al-Rāzī interprets the verse in line with the argument discussed in the first section (under “The Argument from Adam’s Prostration and Vicegerency”). He suggests that the ignorance attributed to the angels in this instance pertains specifically to the terrestrial angels and not to Gabriel or the higher celestial beings. This approach reconciles the verse with the broader theological framework that positions Gabriel above all human prophets, including Prophet Muḥammad (al-Rāzī 2024, 646–47).

This cluster emphasizes Gabriel’s pivotal role in the transmission of revelation, his unparalleled access to divine knowledge, and the extraordinary qualities attributed to him in scripture. Together, these arguments establish Gabriel as a figure of supreme status within the hierarchy of creation, surpassing even the greatest of human prophets, i.e., Prophet Muḥammad.13

Al-Rāzī’s scriptural arguments construct a comprehensive case for the superiority of angels over humans, addressing their roles, attributes, and proximity to God. First, the constancy of their worship, their precedence in creation, and their unwavering piety establish their elevated spiritual rank, contrasting with human fallibility. Second, angels’ unique role as intermediaries between God and humanity, rooted in their proximity to the divine and their responsibility for transmitting His revelations, underscores their privileged position and spiritual priority over humans. Third, the Qurʾān’s silence on human superiority shifts the burden of proof to proponents of human primacy, while, fourth, the angels’ selfless intercession and stewardship over humanity highlight their moral and functional excellence. Fifth, their precedence in divine hierarchies, as evidenced by their mention in scripture before prophets and other creations, further affirms their divine preference and elevated rank. Finally, the case culminates with Gabriel, whose unparalleled knowledge of divine and created realms, his mediatory role, and his status as a teacher to prophets solidify his rank above all human beings, including the Prophet Muḥammad. Together, these clusters provide a forceful scriptural basis for angelic superiority and set the stage for al-Rāzī’s rational arguments, where the philosophical dimensions of this hierarchy will be further explored.

The first argument centers on the fundamental ontological distinction between angels and humans. Angels are purely spiritual beings, free from the constraints of physicality, such as time, space, and matter. This lack of physical dependency elevates them above humans, who are composite beings made of both body and soul. Humans are inherently tied to their physical nature, which subjects them to decay and imperfection. This reality is starkly captured in the description: “Its origin is a vile drop of fluid, its end a decaying corpse, and, in between these two states, it carries filth” (al-Khūnajī 2021, 494; al-Rāzī 2024, 649). Such a state highlights the transient and impure aspects of human existence.

In contrast, angels are exempt from these deficiencies. Their spiritual essence makes them independent of physical needs, such as food, clothing, or reproduction. This resemblance to God—who is free from physical dependencies—further underscores their superiority. While not equating angels with God, this argument highlights how their transcendence over physicality aligns them more closely with the divine attributes of independence and purity than with human limitations (al-Rāzī 2024, 648–50).

The second argument focuses on the unparalleled knowledge of angels. Unlike human knowledge, which is prone to error, forgetfulness, and contradiction, angelic knowledge is free from such flaws. Angels possess an innate understanding that is both accurate and comprehensive. Additionally, their access to the Preserved Tablet grants them insight into the unseen, including the divine decree and cosmic order. This access provides them a breadth of knowledge far beyond human capacity, which is limited to sensory perception, reason, and conjecture.

Additionally, angels’ knowledge is actualized rather than developed through learning or reasoning. Their innate understanding is unerring, free from the processes of trial and error, and unaffected by forgetfulness, emotional biases, or conflicting desires. Humans, in contrast, are often hindered by these limitations, which distort their intellectual pursuits. Angels, by virtue of their spiritual essence, grasp divine truths with unparalleled clarity and precision, establishing them as beings of superior intellect and insight (al-Rāzī 2024, 651–52).

The third argument highlights the unmatched power of angels in their worship and servitude to God. Angels are described as beings who tirelessly glorify and remember God, their sustenance being His praise, their drink His exaltation, and their solace His remembrance. This unbroken devotion is made possible by their exemption from the limitations of fatigue, slumber, or exhaustion. Unlike humans, who are bound by physical needs and distracted by desires and anger, angels remain wholly focused on their divine duties.

This superior power is not limited to devotion but extends to their roles as divine agents. Angels execute God’s will with precision and strength, from governing celestial bodies to guiding and protecting humanity. Their capacity to act without hesitation or error, free from the physical and emotional hindrances that constrain humans, makes them unparalleled in their ability to fulfil divine mandates. By embodying perfect obedience and unrelenting strength, angels demonstrate their exalted status within the cosmic hierarchy (al-Rāzī 2024, 652–55).

Al-Rāzī’s logical arguments are deeply informed by his engagement with the Muslim Peripatetic tradition (falsafa), within which angels are conceptualized as pure intellects (ʿuqūl mujarrada), immaterial beings free from physical constraints and perpetually immersed in divine contemplation (Davidson 1992; Avicenna 2005, 358–69). In this framework, angels function as metaphysical principles (mabādiʾ) or causal agents (ʿilal) for human souls. Since causes are inherently more complete (akmal) and superior to their effects (maʿlūlāt), this relationship places angels higher in the cosmic hierarchy. Unlike humans, whose intellects are bound to the constraints of physical bodies (ajsām), angels, as pure intellects, possess complete independence from sensory and material faculties. This independence allows them to maintain an unbroken connection to the divine. By contrast, human intellects are hindered by physical needs and emotional distractions, which obstruct their ability to attain the same degree of perfection (kamāl) (al-Rāzī 2024, 655–57).

To further illustrate the disparity, al-Rāzī (2024, 659) identifies nineteen opposing forces (qiwā muʿāriḍa)14 that obstruct human intellect from achieving its full potential. These forces fall into three categories: external senses, internal senses, and vegetative faculties, alongside desires and anger. Together, they highlight the numerous distractions that compromise human intellectual and spiritual clarity. These are summarized in Table 3 for clarity.

Al-Rāzī emphasizes that while these forces are necessary for human survival and sensory engagement, they act as barriers to intellectual perfection. Angels, free from such distractions, operate with uninterrupted focus and clarity, underscoring their superior intellect and spirituality. This distinction reinforces their elevated status in the divine hierarchy and affirms the argument for their inherent superiority over humans.

Al-Rāzī’s logical arguments firmly establish the superiority of angels over humans by analyzing their essence, knowledge, and power. Drawing from the Muslim Peripatetic tradition, angels, as pure intellects, are unburdened by the physical and sensory limitations constraining humans, allowing them to maintain an unbroken connection to the divine. Furthermore, angels, as causal foundations of humans, inherently surpass them. Reflecting the initial comment—“Whoever believes that humans are superior to angels does not truly understand the nature of angels but rather imagines them to be birds flying in the sky”—the final statement concludes: “Thus, the notion of equivalence between humans and angels is untenable. God knows best the true realities of His creation” (al-Khūnajī 2021, 495).

A foundational implication of al-Rāzī’s theological framework is the possibility of a metaphysical gradient within creation, a spectrum of beings possessing varying degrees of excellence in intellect, spirituality, and proximity to the divine. Rather than presenting a binary between angels and humans, al-Rāzī outlines a hierarchy that is open-ended, structured not by species membership but by qualitative attributes such as knowledge, constancy in worship, freedom from corporeal limitations, and nearness to God.

This gradient, central to al-Rāzī’s argument for angelic superiority, subtly shifts the theological conversation away from rigid species-based hierarchies toward an evaluation based on traits. Crucially, al-Rāzī himself distinguishes between celestial and terrestrial angels, acknowledging a hierarchy even within the angelic class. Celestial angels, by virtue of their uninterrupted proximity to God and unceasing worship, occupy a higher rank than terrestrial angels, whose roles are more functional and tied to the earthly realm. This internal differentiation suggests that superiority is not reducible to belonging to a particular ontological kind, i.e., being an “angel” simpliciter, but instead hinges on the manifestation of specific traits such as epistemic clarity, spiritual constancy, and freedom from material limitation. On this model, metaphysical excellence is graded by degree, not by kind. Accordingly, if ETIs were to exhibit these high-ranking traits, even if they were not of the same "kind" as angels, they could, at least in principle, be located above humans within the same gradient.

While al-Rāzī does not speak of ETIs, his metaphysical framework creates conceptual room for their possibility. If such beings exist and embody traits aligned with the higher end of this gradient, such as greater epistemic clarity, uninterrupted devotion, or freedom from bodily impediments, then one could tentatively suggest that they may occupy ranks above humanity. Of course, such claims must remain speculative and cannot be doctrinally asserted. But what al-Rāzī’s arguments decisively do is open a theological space: a space in which it is not only possible, but potentially coherent within the tradition, to imagine ETIs whose excellence surpasses that of human beings.

In this light, al-Rāzī’s thought challenges static and anthropocentric hierarchies. By foregrounding the metrics that make angels superior, he invites a more expansive vision of creation—one in which metaphysical excellence is distributed across a spectrum that may well include beings beyond our world.

As reviewed in this article, one of the central claims for human superiority in Islamic thought is based on humanity’s designation as vicegerent on Earth, as mentioned in the Qurʾān (2:30). Proponents argue that this role signifies humanity’s preeminence in the cosmic order. Al-Rāzī, however, challenges this interpretation by framing vicegerency as a functional, localized responsibility rather than evidence of universal superiority.

Al-Rāzī argues that the vicegerency pertains specifically to humanity’s earthly domain and does not extend beyond it. This is reflected in his critique of the prostration narrative (Qurʾān 2:34), where he contends that the angels commanded to prostrate before Adam were terrestrial, not celestial. For al-Rāzī, the celestial angels occupy a higher metaphysical rank, remaining in uninterrupted proximity to God. In contrast, terrestrial angels serve more localized roles akin to humanity’s own responsibilities on Earth.

If humanity’s vicegerency is tied to Earth alone, this localization raises thoughtful questions about our responsibilities and boundaries. Does this exclusivity imply that human efforts to colonize other planets, such as Mars, overstep the divinely assigned limits of our stewardship? If vicegerency is tied to Earth, any expansion beyond it might reflect human hubris rather than a divine mandate. Furthermore, ETI might hold analogous or superior roles in their own domains, with responsibilities potentially more aligned with their cosmic environments. This could reframe humanity’s theological understanding of stewardship as not universal but rather one piece of a larger, interconnected mosaic of divine representation across the cosmos.

In al-Rāzī’s cosmological framework, the Earth is portrayed as a minuscule entity within the vast expanse of creation. While his perspective reflects the cosmology of his time, it resonates with modern understandings of the universe’s immense scale, where Earth is one among billions of planets in countless galaxies. For al-Rāzī, humanity’s dominion over this “speck of dust” does not imply cosmic superiority; instead, it highlights the localized and contingent nature of human authority. This perspective challenges anthropocentric assumptions by emphasizing the Earth’s relative insignificance in the divine schema.15

The recognition of Earth’s relative insignificance in the vast cosmos amplifies the possibility of intelligent beings inhabiting realms far grander in scale or significance. If humanity’s dominion is confined to a tiny speck in the universe, could beings dwelling in larger, more complex regions possess superior authority or closer proximity to the divine? Moreover, this realization invites reflection on human aspirations to project dominance beyond Earth. Might the theological lesson be one of humility rather than conquest, encouraging exploration as a means of wonder and understanding rather than as an extension of human sovereignty? Al-Rāzī’s perspective encourages a shift from anthropocentrism to a recognition that humanity may hold a small, albeit meaningful, role in a much grander cosmic drama.

Al-Rāzī contrasts the spiritual and intellectual purity of angels with the physical and biological constraints of humans. Angels, as purely immaterial beings, are free from the needs and distractions imposed by material existence. Humans, by contrast, are tethered to their corporeal nature, which al-Rāzī views as a source of imperfection. He vividly describes humanity’s physical state as one marked by dependency, frailty, and impurity, characteristics that limit their spiritual potential.

This critique extends to the cognitive realm. Human intellect, while remarkable, is bound by sensory limitations, emotional biases, and the constant demands of biological survival. These constraints hinder humans from attaining the unbroken clarity and devotion exhibited by angels. For al-Rāzī, these limitations underscore humanity’s contingent and imperfect nature within the broader cosmic order.

If human biology is a limitation rather than an advantage, it provokes fascinating possibilities for ETI. Could such beings exist without the physical constraints of hunger, fatigue, or mortality, enabling uninterrupted worship or greater alignment with divine will? This would challenge humanity’s assumed superiority and introduce new paradigms of existence that transcend the physical and intellectual struggles intrinsic to human life. Such beings might serve as living examples of the potential for perfection beyond human imagination. Additionally, this prompts ethical questions: Should humanity strive to augment its own biological limitations through technology, genetic engineering, or AI, seeking to emulate these superior forms of being? Or should humanity instead embrace its unique struggles as an intended design of divine wisdom? These possibilities urge a reconsideration of how we view both our limitations and our aspirations in light of divine creativity.