For several decades, the question of intrinsic value in nature has been at the forefront of environmental philosophy, even serving as the basis for a uniquely environmental ethic (Regan 1981, 23). There is a growing consensus that nature has intrinsic value, that is, value in itself. David G. Horrell (2010, 130) ties the concept of intrinsic value to biblical texts (though under the name “the goodness of all creation”). It has become commonplace to refer to the intrinsic value of the nonhuman parts of creation, as exemplified by numerous such occurrences in the recent Oxford Handbook of the Bible and Ecology (Bernstein 2022, 207; Braaten 2022, 155; Schifferdecker 2022, 188; Watson 2022, 332).

Environmental philosopher John Baird Callicott examined various arguments for intrinsic value in nature. Callicott (1986, 162–63) was most convinced by the bio-empathy theory of intrinsic value, claiming that this scientifically inspired axiology was coherent, defensible, and convincing. The runner-up was the biblical J-Theism theory, which Callicott claims is overall effective and defensible. Callicott thus firmly places the Bible in the scope of contemporary environmental philosophy, but he also narrows the biblical account of intrinsic value for nature to a portion of Genesis. As it stands, a comprehensive study analyzing the philosophical content on intrinsic value in the Bible is lacking, which this article will contribute towards.

Though theology of nature has sometimes incorporated the axiological concept of intrinsic value, the content of the concept remains unclear. To elucidate this, I will utilize philosophy and ethics to clarify the meaning of biblical intrinsic value. Specifically, this article asks: What kind of intrinsic value of nature can be discerned from the Bible?

The leading question breaks down into four main sections, each led by a question probing the concept of intrinsic value. First, is the concept of intrinsic value anthropocentric or theocentric? Second, is it ascribed by humans (subjective) or innately present in the entity (objective)? Third, is it hierarchical or egalitarian? Fourth, is it supervening on a property in the entity or is it a kind of final value?

Before delving into biblical intrinsic value, three concepts call for elucidation: intrinsic value, nature, and anthropocentrism. Intrinsic value is often defined over against instrumental value. These terms are commonly and most clearly defined in a Kantian fashion, which assigns instrumental value to something that serves as a means to an end, whereas something has intrinsic value if it is an end in itself (Afeissa 2009, 529; Francuz 2020, 57–58; Rolston 1988, 186). Intrinsic value is understood as something that is valuable without necessarily being useful for any purpose. It should be noted that instrumental and intrinsic value are not mutually exclusive. An entity can hold both instrumental and intrinsic value simultaneously; for example, a tree may have intrinsic value as part of nature while also providing instrumental value as a source of oxygen and shelter for animals. For a comprehensive overview of contemporary positions of intrinsic value in nature, see Benjamin Steyn (2024).

But what is nature? By nature, I refer to the nonhuman-processed parts of the Earth, encompassing both the biotic and abiotic world. This divides nature from culture with its human-made objects, following theologian Gordon Dester Kaufman (1972, 342), but does include that which is affected and modified by humans, such as crops, forests, and mountains. It should be specified that this definition goes against certain trends of including human-made objects in nature, in short, merging nature and culture (such as Santmire 1985, 12; see also Latour 2017). In my view, H. Paul Santmire’s broad definition has the weakness of including too much in nature, not being able to distinguish, for example, weapons from wilderness.

Finally, three aspects of anthropocentrism can be uncovered. Scholar Patrick Curry (2006, 43) describes anthropocentrism as the belief that “humanity is the principal or sole thing of value, and that the only appropriate or possible scale of value for humans is a scale of human values.” Implicit in this definition is an ascription of intrinsic value to humans and non-intrinsic value to nonhumans, for example, an economic value to certain minerals that are instrumentally valuable to humans. It also follows that only humans have moral standing and deserve ethical consideration for their own sake. Philosopher Allan Thompson (2017, 78) describes this type of anthropocentrism as ethical anthropocentrism, meaning that humans have moral superiority over the rest of the world. Ethical anthropocentrism is frequently coupled with ontological anthropocentrism, which holds that humans have a superior position in the world, being placed above everything else either by merit or divine decree (Thompson 2017, 78). A third type, coined conceptual anthropocentrism, claims that our human outlook on the world is the only one accessible to us, therefore, whatever position we deem plausible is necessarily of human origin (Thompson 2017, 79). I will return to conceptual anthropocentrism later.

Now that intrinsic value, nature, and anthropocentrism are defined, the biblical methodology of ecotheological hermeneutics will be employed. Following the methodology, four main sections on intrinsic value will successively build the biblical value theory that this article argues for. Each section is led by a biblical excerpt, respectively: Genesis 1:28 and Genesis 9:8–11; Job 38:25–27, 41; Psalm 148:1–13; Romans 8:19–22; and finally, Genesis 1:31. All quotes from the Bible are from the New King James Version. Finally, this article concludes with an expanded biblical value theory—a theocentric, objective, egalitarian, final intrinsic value theory.

Ecotheological hermeneutics emerged at the turn of the millennium as a critical method for uncovering new ecological dimensions in scripture, spearheaded by Santmire’s (2000, 6–8) three interpretive approaches: reconstructive (see Habel 2000), apologetic (see Moo and Moo 2018), and revisionist—my preferred approach due to its scriptural authority (see Sittler 1962; Horrell, Hunt, and Southgate 2008).

The revisionists, writes Santmire (2000, 8), “have given the highest priority to biblical interpretation.” Unlike the reconstructionists, the revisionists respect the authority of the Bible but admit that it must be interpreted, both in light of and against the tradition of biblical interpretation. On account of this trait, they are also described as reformers (Santmire 2000, 8). I prefer the name “reformers” for this group instead of the ambiguous name “revisionists,” which can be understood as either revising the Bible or revising tradition (though the latter is meant). “Reformers” are rather looking at the Bible in a new time and using it as the norm to inspire new positions for contemporary problems. In relation to creation, one may say that the Bible does not need to be saved from being branded as fronting a harmful environmental position but that the Bible needs to reform our current stance on problems that have caused the environmental crisis. For the Bible to do this, it needs to be read with a careful sensitivity to its implications about contemporary environmental issues.

What may such a reformative approach constitute? The sober and critical account by David G. Horrell, Cherryl Hunt, and Christopher Southgate (2008, 233) paves the way for the development of what they call “an ecological hermeneutic.” There are two main points I will incorporate into my version of the reformative approach to reading the Bible: (1) promoting a circular hermeneutic, and 2) establishing the importance of an informed and interdisciplinary venture (Horrell, Hunt, and Southgate 2008, 233–37).

The first, promoting a circular—or reflexive—hermeneutic, is important. In a reformative approach, there exists a close relationship between what is sought to be reformed (our interpretation of the Bible) and the impulses from contemporary situations that inspire the demand for reformation. Horrell, Hunt, and Southgate (2008, 235) mention Martin Luther’s discovery of the lens of “justification by faith alone,” which was inspired by the religious climate of his time and then reformed how he read the entire Bible. Similarly for the present article, an ecotheological hermeneutic is employed on the Bible, which involves applying a lens of intrinsic value in creation to interpretation of scripture. While the inspiration for these lenses stems from contemporary issues, the hermeneutics would not be circular if they had no counterparts in the Bible itself. Both contemporary issues as well as the Bible work together to inspire lenses to interpret with, in order to reform tradition and our paradigmatic knowledge and beliefs. Theologian Peter Manley Scott (2010, 432) identifies this double hermeneutic as the “dialectic of engagement” through theological engagement with ecology and the “dialectic of repair” through repairing Christian tradition in light of interdisciplinary engagement. This follows Horrell’s (2010, 9) quest to develop and employ an ecological hermeneutic—a reorientation of reading the Bible with an ecological sensitivity called for by current environmental issues. It is my task, then, to discern the philosophical details of this lens of intrinsic value that is frequently employed in contemporary environmentally oriented theology. This approach, however, does not employ eisegesis by reading an intrinsic value of nature into the biblical texts; rather, it sheds light on texts that support the finding of such a concept in the Bible.

Second, theology has never been purely an a priori undertaking, and theology of nature is no different. The Bible and the contemporary situation ought to be in dialogue to secure a fruitful ecological hermeneutic (Horrell, Hunt, and Southgate 2008, 237; van den Brom 1997, 299). Theologian Jan-Olav Henriksen (2022, 3) claims that for the Christian tradition to be contemporarily relevant, interdisciplinary work is necessary. One particular strength of working across these two fields is that environmental philosophy is by nature interdisciplinary. Its focus lies on the empirical environment, which it shares with other hard sciences such as ecology. For the very same reasons, theology of nature benefits from working in an interdisciplinary manner with an informed view from the natural sciences as well as environmental philosophy and its expertise on axiology.

While the hard facts of the environment are helpful in order to do environmental philosophy, they are not exhaustive. To quote Holmes Rolston III (1996, 20): “There really is no scientific guidance of life.” When it comes to discussing the value of nature, environmental ethics may benefit from working with theology, which has dealt with the status of nature and the world since its genesis. Likewise, theology of nature can benefit from tapping into environmental ethics to better map the content of the popularized concept of intrinsic value.

Traditionally, the story of humanity has been at the fore of history, while the story of nonhuman creation has largely been ignored (Habel 2001, 24). This led to an anthropocentric outlook, that is, holding humanity as the sole or highest value within creation (Curry 2006, 43). Anthropocentrism has recently been challenged by theocentrism, where God is the warden of value. In short, a theocentric value theory holds God as the creator and granter of intrinsic value. The origin of intrinsic value affects its ontological character and thus serves as a vital component of any value theory. This article deals with the subject of biblical dominion before considering arguments for anthropocentrism and its favored model, stewardship, and then finally exploring a path to theocentrism through a key covenantal biblical text.

Beyond the topic of theocentrism, there remains a question regarding the origin of intrinsic value: Is value subjective (there for us) or objective (really there)? Callicott (1986) argues for a subjective position that holds nature (humans included) to be originally devoid of intrinsic value, but humans can attribute intrinsic value to the world. This position is called anthropogenic rather than anthropocentric, based on Callicott’s (1986, 142) claim that “the source of all value is human consciousness, but it by no means follows that the locus of all value is consciousness itself.” Although it is not ontological nor ethical anthropocentrism, I identify it as a conceptual anthropocentrism as outlined earlier, following Thompson (2017, 79). The subjectivists (in addition to Callicott, see Curry 2006, 41–42, drawing on Wiggins 2000, 8, and for a Christian stewardship account, see Valera 2025, 138) argue that all theories of intrinsic value are subjective, due to our inevitable human outlook. I will show that this need not apply to a biblical, theocentric theory of intrinsic value, drawing on Psalm 148:1–13:

The psalmist calls all and everything to praise the Lord. From the heavens with its angels to the sun and moon, even the stars, from the Earth and all its inhabitants to the sea and its depths, even the elements of fire, air, earth, and wind; all that is alive, both animals and humans of all kinds, should give praise to the Lord. The psalmist implores creation with the use of the verb “praise” as imperative. The commands to praise, it should be noted, are not merely directed to the living creatures but also to the abiotic world. That creation is called to praise the Lord is not unique to the Psalms, nor even unique to the Old Testament (for the book of Revelation, see Bauckham 2011, 164; for the Gospel of Luke, see Horrell and Coad 2011). What is the significance of nature, not just humanity, being an agent of praise? The integral character of nature surfaces in Psalm 148, and in the following, I shall examine its importance to a subjective or objective understanding of intrinsic value.

Recognizing that all parts of creation “raise their voices” in praise of God is instrumental to challenging the anthropocentric status quo. Scientist–theologian Mark Harris, through an analysis of Psalm 19, considers the anthropomorphic language of creation’s praise in the Psalms. Harris argues that the text ought not to be read anthropocentrically by interpreting nature as a poetic model for human praise. Rather, Harris (2018, 294) understands nature’s praise as real and merely portrayed in anthropomorphic language for it to make sense for a human understanding. We do not know what it is like to be a bat, much less a tree or a mountain, necessarily leading us to employ the language familiar to the human sphere. This hermeneutical move allows us to dig deeper into the text’s meaning beyond its poetic form.

Theologian Richard Bauckham uses Psalm 148 to turn anthropocentrism on its head. Bauckham (2011, 154) notes that in the order of praises, humans are the last ones to join the choir, hence “it is much more obvious that other creatures can help us to worship God than that we can help other creatures to.” Perhaps mirroring the order of their creation from Genesis 1, the abiotic world precedes the biotic world. This may have a very practical reason; it is hard to imagine life without ground to stand on or water to drink or live in. The abiotic world necessarily precedes the biotic world, both according to evolutionary theory and the biblical account. Thus, the abiotic world also precedes the biotic world in offering praise to their Creator. This aligns with Old Testament scholar Iain Provan’s (2021) comparative analysis of anthropocentrism in Genesis and the Psalms, finding no basis for an anthropocentric religion in either book. Provan (2021, 108) further notes the precursor to the call of praise in Psalm 148, namely, that God intimately cares for creation in Psalm 147, mirroring the excerpt from Job 38 considered earlier. As the Psalms are identified to discourage an anthropocentric position, the question remains whether Psalm 148 supports a subjective or an objective value theory.

The founding father of environmental philosophy, Holmes Rolston III, challenges Callicott’s subjective position. The major difference between Rolston and Callicott’s objective and subjective theories of value, respectively, is that Rolston argues that humans discover value already present in nature, while Callicott asserts that humans generate value in nature. Callicott’s anthropogenic view elevates humanity to a higher status than Psalm 148 does. The closest connection might be Fretheim’s (1987, 29) observation that Psalm 148 implies a human worship leader calling to praise, making praise occur within a human context. However, as Fretheim (1987, 26) acknowledges, God directly calls on nonhuman creation on several occasions without the need for human intermediaries. The fact that God directly relates to nonhuman creation, and that the mountains and fire can praise God regardless of whether humans hear it or not, aligns with Rolston’s objective theory of intrinsic value.

Fretheim (1987, 26) takes for granted that God observes intrinsic value in all creatures, indeed, independent of humans. This view is consistent with the independence of creatures like Leviathan and the desolate ground God waters for its own sake, as seen in Job 38. There is value in creation that is theoretically not reliant on intra-creation relationships—even though in practice these relationships are unavoidable. In other words, it is not an instrumental kind of value. This intrinsic value is an objective kind, hence why God saw that his creation was good (Genesis 1).

However, is value realism of this kind philosophically plausible? Lutheran theologian Christoph Schwöbel (2018, 58) recognizes this blur of ontological and ethical lines, commenting that God’s observation of creation being very good “connects fact and value in such a way that questions of ethics cannot be a matter to be considered after the facts have been established.” Is this connection of fact and value not a blatant transgression of David Hume’s famous is–ought problem?

Rolston dispels the is–ought problem for environmental philosophy as what is recognized to be a category mistake. One may say that in traditional interhuman ethics, the worldview one holds (i.e., how the world is) does not necessarily translate to a definite plan of how the world ought to be (Rolston 1988, 230). However, this is not so for environmental ethics according to Rolston. Rolston (1988, 230) claims that in environmental ethics, “[o]ur model of reality implies a model of conduct.” Rolston’s model is an evolutionary type, where nature itself generates values through life-flourishing natural processes. In other words, value is part of what an entity is, and value carries with it a certain ought, though granted, admits Rolston (1988, 231), with the basic premise that values ought to be protected. This premise is held as fundamental, to the same extent as the premise to promote the good. Rolston (1988, 231) places this observation of values being generated and demanding an ethical response as part of metaecology, which is largely a consequence of his value realism. While Rolston operates within environmental ethics and the natural sciences, Hume was largely focused on human-to-human ethics, hence why Rolston dispels the charge of the is–ought problem as a category mistake. These fields have different premises, especially Rolston’s interdisciplinary approach to environmental ethics.

The question remains whether Rolston’s escape from the is–ought problem is unique to his evolutionary theory of environmental ethics or whether the solution has a broader applicability for a biblical value theory. Recall that Rolston holds the premise that values ought to be protected on par with the premise that the good ought to be pursued. I identify a similar premise in Genesis 1:31, wherein God sees that creation is very good, which I will return to later. There is an important distinction between God considering, evaluating, and regarding it as good and, as in fact the text reads, God seeing that it is good, because God created it good. God’s seeing the goodness implies a value realism; the value is there to be discovered, not generated, by humans. The fact that God sees this goodness and takes care to protect it (Job 38) demands an ought from what is (it is good, therefore it is to be treated accordingly), akin to Rolston’s argument. This shows that Rolston’s circumvention of the is–ought problem is dependent on his value realism. Because values are real, and values are to be protected, one derives an ought from an is, or more specifically, they are discovered together (Rolston 1988, 231). Thus, value realism is as valid for an ecocentric position as it is for a theocentric view of intrinsic value that sees an ontological goodness in creation deserving of consideration. Through both nature’s praise of God in Psalm 148 and God’s acknowledgment of intrinsic goodness in creation in Genesis 1, we find a value not projected nor generated by humanity but rather sustained objectively by God.

Though all creatures—biotic and abiotic—praise God and are imbued with intrinsic value, we may ask whether this value gives rise to a hierarchy or portions of value. Philosopher Sigurd Hverven (2023, 347–49) follows Rolston’s critique of Callicott’s subjective value theory. Hverven (2023, 350) recognizes the uniqueness of Rolston’s theory, specifically its emphasis on the dynamics of nature; real value stems from independent activity, creativity, and autonomy in natural phenomena. While I agree with several points by Rolston and Hverven, I will challenge the idea that the origin of value stems from activities or projects in nature, which leads to a hierarchy of intrinsic value. This will be the first of two parts challenging these two philosophers, as the next section will deal with the specific type of intrinsic value Rolston and Hverven articulate.

In regard to identifying whether our value theory ought to be hierarchical or egalitarian, a central biblical excerpt portraying creation will guide us, namely, Romans 8:19–22:

In Romans, we find the promise of creation’s delivery from the “bondage of corruption.” The curse from the Fall shall be lifted, and creation will share the gift of liberty given to the children of God. It is underscored that creation was not subjected to futility by its own will, but being subjected to this state, it was branded with hope of restoration, with the hope of salvation. Both humanity and the rest of creation await freedom from the corruption of sin through salvation in Christ. In this sense, creation is not divided along biotic and abiotic lines, nor by any other hierarchy for that matter.

Contrary to Romans 8, Rolston has a preference for life. When pushed by his critic Katie McShane on what makes something ethically valuable, his one word answer is simply “life” (Rolston 2007, 257). Though Rolston’s value theory is more complex than this, he insists that ecosystems play a vital role in bringing value into being. In fact, Rolston (1994, 24) claims that “[t]he ecosystem is the depth source of individual and species alike.” Without ecosystems, no individuals, and certainly no species, would ever be brought into existence. It is in the ecosystem that value is made. An ecosystem is defined as a unit containing both abiotic and biotic parts and as the place where these two parts intertwine (Jax 2009, 251). Biotic parts do not necessarily mean human parts. Humans are just a part of some ecosystems, even being a “late product of the system” (Rolston 1994, 25). Rolston’s insistence on the ecosystem as the locus of value raises the question of whether anything outside the ecosystem can also be considered valuable.

Rolston entertains the thought of what may come of something outside of an ecosystem, specifically, dirt. Dirt is not sentient, and as such, it cannot value itself, nor does it strive towards its own good. Though Rolston (1994, 26) acknowledges the role of dirt in ecosystems, being part of a process that fosters life; however, dirt conceived of outside of an ecosystem is devoid of value: “An isolated clod defends no intrinsic value.” While it may be hard to sympathize with a clod (a piece of dirt), how far may one stretch Rolston’s logic without betraying it? Instead of a piece of dirt, could the same be said of a small rock? If so, then a whole mountain might be introduced, as presumably the quantity of valueless non-ecosystemic entities makes no difference. Holding life at a distance, may we let a waterfall flow down the mountain while maintaining that no value is present? Stretching it even further, if all life—animal as well as plant—were gone from this world, and as such, all ecosystems, would intrinsic value be gone too? Put another way, if ecosystems are the sources of value, and ecosystems require life, does life hold the sine qua non of value for Rolston?

It seems to be so. Without ecosystems, without life, ecosystemic value theories struggle to value abiotic nature. This is not just a thought experiment; Rolston considers the case of Antarctica, the seventh continent, which is largely devoid of life. Rolston (2002, 115) admits that his own ecocentric theory is not fit for such a place, claiming that “[a]n appropriate ethics for the seventh continent differs radically from that for the other six.” An ethical system that places the generation of value and life fundamentally together is not fit to defend a lifeless world. Rolston (2002, 129) attempts to muster respect for such places as the top of Mount Everest—not an ecosystem but still demanding something from a human onlooker. This respect, whatever it may be, cannot easily be connected to the value generated from ecosystems. As I doubt Rolston would admit that the lifeless Antarctica or the top of Mount Everest is felt as valueless, why does he rob dirt of such value? As philosopher Keekok Lee (2007, 18) notes, Rolston has not paid much attention to the abiotic world on its own terms, as it usually plays a supplementary role in his value theory. Hverven and Lee continue the work of defending the value of the abiotic world through an argument of telos as the criterion of intrinsic value, thus paving the way for a hierarchy of intrinsic value.

Both Lee (2007, 21) and Hverven (2023, 376) follow Rolston in holding telos as the criterion for a thing to have intrinsic value. In the Aristotelian sense, telos means to have an end goal or purpose (Hverven 2023, 376). Thus it follows that abiotic entities have no intrinsic value, as they have no adequate telos, according to Hverven’s (2023, 378) reading of Rolston. This leads both Lee and Hverven to explore other values fit for the abiotic world(s), abandoning the hope of intrinsic value for this category. The strength of theocentrism is that it can take the unorthodox route of admitting to a telos for all of creation, not just for the traditional organisms.

Lee strives to disconnect telos from anthropocentrism. Towards this end, she employs three distinctions of teleology that warrant clarification. These brief definitions will be useful before continuing: “[T]eleomatic systems are classified as end-resulting, teleonomic systems are classified as end-directed, and teleological systems are end-seeking” (Christensen 1996, 305; emphasis added). Humans are assumed to be end-seeking, thus being full-fledged teleological creatures. Lee (2007, 22) admits that nonhumans (hogs, lions) have a telos, and even that organisms without consciousness such as oaks have telos, because “its life history and its associated activities could be understood as one of being goal-oriented or ‘teleonomic.’” Lee (2007, 23) ties these goals to evolutionary concepts such as survival and reproduction. Because these creatures are end-directed—they are acting towards their end—they are qualified as teleonomic entities.

Finally, Lee (2007, 23) writes that “[u]nlike the biotic, the abiotic is ‘teleomatic,’ as it lacks not only consciousness (like the oak), but also because its behaviour is not goal-oriented (unlike the oak).” The abiotic entities are classified as end-resulting, because while they have an end, it is something that simply happens to them. In this strain of ecocentrism, intrinsic value—through having telos of the upper two kinds (teleological and teleonomic)—is reserved for living entities such as humans, hogs, and oaks. But is this biotic bias necessary in the theocentric worldview this article argues for?

To consider whether a biotic bias is necessary in a theocentric worldview, the foremost question is what makes something valuable in a theocentric theory. Theologian Ronald A. Simkins (2014, 400) is right in his straightforward claim on the matter: “God imputes the creation—humans, animals, the land—with value, and God the Creator is the measure of all that is good and right in the world. The biblical worldview is first and foremost theocentric.” God imputes—attributes, assigns, ascribes—value on all of creation, which makes for both a theogenic and a theocentric value theory. It is God that creates value, and creation is valuable insofar as it relates back to its Creator. It is in this sense that the biblical worldview is theocentric.

How do these criteria of intrinsic value fit in the biblical theocentric worldview? Is the abiotic world according to the biblical view thus far explored either end-directed or end-seeking? Recall the biblical passage of Romans 8:19–22, where creation—abiotic world included—eagerly waits for revelation. Indeed, “[f]or we know that the whole creation groans and labors with birth pangs together until now” (Romans 8:22). With verbs like “groans” and “labors,” a simple end-resulting passivity is not an adequate description. While this language may contain elements of metaphor, as with Isaiah’s trees clapping their hands (Harris 2018), abiotic creation having “inclinations” is not unheard of (Wynn 2010, 158). Creation is here at the very least end-directed, by looking forward to and yearning after a specific end: salvation. Further, in Psalm 148, the abiotic parts of creation are specifically called to praise the Lord. If salvation is creation’s end goal, praising the Lord is its closest form of end-seeking possible. In attaining salvation, all but God are passive, humans as well as hail. The abiotic parts of creation cannot attain their own salvation any more than humanity can, thus their closest action to end-seeking is to praise and give thanks to the Lord for leading them to their goal. Although this worldview differs radically from Lee’s and Hverven’s, it aligns with their criteria for intrinsic value, affirming both biotic and abiotic intrinsic value in the biblical theocentric view.

Note that this discussion is not building an argument for the topic of dominion considered earlier. Where the dominion debate argues for a hierarchy of power/responsibility as in a stewardship model, the current debate with Lee and Hverven deals with the value status of all subjects, regardless of steward or that which is stewarded. Intrinsic value is prior to social models, akin to human rights being prior to the status of king or peasant, parent or child. Intrinsic value does not presuppose a certain type of power hierarchy, but it does presuppose a basic moral consideration for those possessing it.

Neither Romans 8 nor Psalm 148 show signs of a value hierarchy, whether in relation to salvation or a philosophical telos model. While Rolston’s, Hverven’s, and Lee’s ecocentrism differentiates levels of value, the nonhuman world’s longing and praise are taking place side by side as an interconnected creation. The egalitarian concept of value surfaces in all of creation’s presence and expression in the earlier excerpts, which rather than following trajectories of difference, underscore unity and creaturely (broadly understood) brotherhood. Even the mandate of dominion, when interpreted with Genesis 2:15 in mind, ensures a mutual respect for creation’s value.

However, ecocentric critique of egalitarian intrinsic value looms: Rolston (1988, 119) argues that “Schweitzer’s dilemma,” based on Albert Schweitzer’s reverence-for-life ethics that has reverence for all life, is fine in theory, yet in practice it leads to moral paralysis. Rolston’s solution is a hierarchy of intrinsic value. Visualized as a curve, Rolston (1988, 119) argues that “the intrinsic value of sentient animals would be lower than that of humans, that of insects still less. The value of plants would be practically nil, a barely useable idea in ethics.” With this hierarchy, it becomes possible to make moral judgements, say, in favor of chopping down a tree that is at risk of falling on a house and endangering human lives, or mining minerals essential to green technology. In this hierarchy of value, more sentience and self-awareness means more value, hence why it culminates with humanity on the top (Rolston 1988, 223). Callicott (1999, 225; who coined Rolston’s “hierarchy”) connects the variations of value in organisms to their defense of their own kind as a good kind. Because sentient animals “feel the good that they defend,” they receive a value bonus, and because animals are self-aware of this defense, they receive an even greater value bonus, in Callicott’s (1999, 226) words. It is unclear to me exactly what Rolston’s criteria are for a value bonus. It is up to Rolston or other ecocentrists to specify the criteria for a value bonus and how it relates to biotic and abiotic entities. However, whether it is sentience, self-awareness, life, or something else, the point is that there is something regulating the degree of intrinsic value in Rolston’s theory that is not found in the biblical material analyzed in this article. The consequences of a biblical value theory as argued for here will be, with the critique of moral paralysis in mind, considered in the concluding section.

Returning to Genesis (1:31a), the final verse of the Bible’s first chapter culminates with God observing that which he has created and seeing goodness therein: “Then God saw everything that He had made, and indeed it was very good.” The type of intrinsic value inferred from this key verse will function as the final piece of the puzzle that is biblical intrinsic value. Further, an analysis of two kinds of intrinsic values will elucidate my divergence from Rolston and provide conceptual clarity to the something regulating Rolston’s value theory.

Philosopher Anna Deplazes-Zemp (2024, 169) identifies a distinction between several kinds of intrinsic values, two of which are relevant here: intrinsic final value (FIN) and intrinsic supervening value (SUP). Intrinsic FIN mirrors the basic definition presented earlier: “X is valuable and thus considerable for its own sake, as an end in itself” (Deplazes-Zemp 2024, 169). In addition to the Kantian definition, considerability is added, in accordance with the ethical demand of value realism. Intrinsic FIN, then, suffices at the very least for being a moral addressee. Moving over to the second kind of value, intrinsic SUP, “an entity X has intrinsic SUP value when X bears a value that supervenes on internal properties of X” (Deplazes-Zemp 2024, 169). Intrinsic SUP relies on—supervenes on—a certain property of an entity being present to which intrinsic value is attached. What this property is varies between philosophers, one example being biocentrist Paul Taylor’s property of “having a good of its own,” which living beings have (Deplazes-Zemp 2024, 169).

Rolston is not mentioned by Deplazes-Zemp, but it seems to me that Rolston’s insistence that the property of life must be present in order for intrinsic value to be admitted places his value theory in the intrinsic SUP category. This differs from my own specification that intrinsic value is present because God made it present in creation. “Being made by God” is not a property, it is an explanation of a fact, unlike life. Therefore, the kind of intrinsic value found in the Bible is intrinsic FIN rather than intrinsic SUP. Deplazes-Zemp recognizes intrinsic SUP as a subclass to intrinsic FIN, and I will now explore the consequences of locating intrinsic value in supervening on a property rather than as a final value.

The aforementioned something that regulates Rolston’s intrinsic value of organisms is what qualifies his concept of intrinsic value as intrinsic SUP. Because intrinsic value supervenes on a property (life, sentience, self-awareness), that property varies in degrees, as then does its intrinsic value. Hverven (2023, 363) defends Rolston’s value hierarchy by claiming that it cannot be decided once and for all which organisms have what kind of value and by what criteria such value supervenes on. Perhaps that is why it is hard to locate Rolston’s exact criteria for evaluation, because it changes based on our knowledge of the world. If Rolston’s theory was thought of before self-awareness was discovered, or before animals were thought to be sentient, it would be an incomplete theory. But who is to say that we have now discovered all criteria for intrinsic value? What if we discover a new concept that fits perfectly in next to life, sentience, and self-awareness? Perhaps more importantly, who decides what the properties that intrinsic value supervenes on are? Hverven (2023, 364) recognizes this problem and wants to maintain the possibility of letting nature have values that humans may not ever be able to recognize.

Intrinsic value as a final value accords with the value statement in Genesis 1:31. God does not specify a common property in creation that the intrinsic value supervenes on. God does not add a “because” after stating that creation is good. God created, and then he saw that what he created, all he created, was good. It was not good for anything, but it simply and intrinsically was good. That is why all of creation is awaiting the same salvation, that is why covenants are entered with all of creation, that is why God cares for each part of creation, and creation thanks him back with praise. All these excerpts from the Bible point to the same phenomenon of there being intrinsic value in all of creation. A theocentric, value realism, nonhierarchical, intrinsic FIN type of value, at that. This kind of value is biblically grounded and philosophically coherent, providing a solid fundament for the value of creation.

This article has argued that a biblical view of value affirms that all of creation is imbued with intrinsic value of a theocentric, objective, egalitarian, and final kind. Intrinsic value is frequently recognized as being in accordance with the Bible, however, a deeper analysis of the biblical value concept was missing. Further, through analyses of various biblical texts, it has been demonstrated that reading the Bible with an ecotheological lens challenges the status quo of anthropocentrism. Ecocentrism and its philosophical defense functioned as a fruitful interlocutor through elucidating theocentrism, its alternative, and providing fundamental concepts for an independent, biblical value theory.

In this article, I have primarily focused on the ontological aspects of intrinsic value, but owing to its value realism, certain metaethical aspects proved relevant. I have not dealt with specific moral issues by looking at right and wrong actions. The specific ethical consequences of the value theory proposed here warrant further exploration in future research. However, this article will end with some thoughts on the way forward.

It should be noted that I am not arguing for some type of enlightened stewardship. Admitting to seeing intrinsic final value in creation/nature does not grant human instrumental values (be they monetary, aesthetical, recreational, or otherwise) priority over the flourishing of intrinsically valuable beings and entities. The practical consequences of incorporating the biblical worldview argued for here would imply a monumental lifestyle change in diet, consumption, and everyday life, but it would be ethical, possible, and beneficial in light of the contemporary crises of climate change and natural degradation. This does not mean that plants cannot be eaten for sustenance, but it is hard to see how industries of unnecessary animal violence and slaughter can survive the criticism of egalitarian intrinsic value. That is not to say that this biblical view of value in creation is categorically against infringing upon entities with intrinsic value; sometimes it is unavoidable and right to act against other valuable entities (see Plumwood 2002, 145). That a human tills and harvests from the Earth, thus sustaining life, is part of respecting human life as created by God. As such, we may build our abodes, but not without careful consideration of the consequences of our actions. Recognizing that the Earth is intrinsically valuable gives rise to an ethical demand to treat it responsibly. This ethical point is as valid for philosophy as it is for theology. In this trajectory, theologian James M. Gustafson’s (1981, 1984) double volume on Ethics from a Theocentric Perspective and theologian Michael S. Hogue’s (2008) later expansion may prove competent guides.

It has been beyond this article’s scope to explore ethics for the whole universe, life-less planets included. However, the further human technological advances go, the closer these planets are to us, and the more they demand our attention. Future research should explore the trajectories of galactic ethics, and it seems to me that theocentrism is better equipped to defend the value of other planets than that of life-oriented axiological theories. It has been argued that intrinsic value is integral to protecting nature (Samuelsson 2022). This article’s biblically grounded theocentric and objective intrinsic value theory challenges secular environmental philosophy to expand its moral horizons regarding intrinsic value in nature, extending the frontier beyond the human and beyond life itself.