Notes

1. . B. F. Skinner, Walden II (New York: Macmillan Co., 1948). “Much of the argument goes beyond the established facts. I am concerned with interpretation rather than prediction and control…. Speculation is necessary, in fact, to devise methods which will bring a subject matter under better control” (B. I;. Skinner, About Behaviorism [New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1974], p. 19).
2. . B. F. Skinner, Beyond Freedom and Dignity (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1971); Verbal Behavior (New York: Appleton‐Century‐Crofts, 1957).
3. . For an examination of the “framework of operant behaviorist psychology,” see B. F. Skinner, Science and Human Behavior (New York: Macmillan Co., 1953), and James G. Holland and B. F. Skinner, The Analysis of Behavior: A Program for Self‐Instruction (New York: McGraw‐Hill Book Co., 1961).
4. . See his “Introduction  ”. 3–8.
5. . Noam Chomsky, “The Case against H. F. Skinner,” New York Review of Boob 17, no. 5 (1971): 18–24. Skinner has remarked in response to Chomsky that “he doesn”t know what I am talking about and for some reason is unable to understand it” (B. F. Skinner, “I Have Been Misunderstood…,” Center Magaziner [March‐April 1972], p.63). Kenneth MacCorkquodale examined Chomsky's earlier analysis of Skinner's Verbal Behavior and concluded that his methodological criticisms were based on ignorance of “much that is central to an understanding, application, and assessment of Skinner's position” (Kenneth MacCorkquodale, “On Chomsky's Review of Skinner's Verbal Behavior,” Journal for the Experimental Analysis of Behavior 13 (1970): 98; furthermore, “Chomsky did not grasp the differences between Skinnerian and Watsonian‐Hullian behaviorism, and his criticisms, although stylistically effective, were mostly irrelevant to Verbal Behavior” (Kenneth MacCorkquodale, “B. F. Skinner's Verbal Behavior: A Retrospective Appreciation,” Journal and the Experimental Analysis of Behavior 12 [1969]: 841). In his review of Beyond Freedom and Dignity Chomsky appears to have overcome for the most part the effects of confusing Watsonian with Skinrierian behaviorism. Yet he distorts Skinner's use of “reinforcement” (see pp. 22–23). A major difference between Watsonianism and Skinnerianism is that Watson conceived of all behavior as fitting within the “S‐R” framework. All behaviors were held to he reflexlike in that each behavior constitutes a response (R) elicited by a prior determinative stimulus (S). Iowa ever, this paradigm is applicable only to a limited class of reflex behaviors–largely autonomic and internal in nature. Skinner believes that most significant behaviors fall in a class called “voluntary,”“purposive,” or “operant.””The consequences of a behavior are the determining element rather than a prior eliciting stimulus. In ordinary language, the “reason” or “cause” for any behavior is not to be found in a prior stimulus situation but in its consequences.
6. . Richard Rubenstein, “Books,” Psychology Today (September 1971), p. 96.
7. . Among these 1 include Brewster Smith's review, even though he clearly objects to Skinner's “limited concept of cause” (“The Scientists” Bookshelf,” American Scientist [January‐February 1972], pp. 80–81).
8. . Arnold Toynbee, “Beyond Freedom und Dignity:”An Uneasy Feeling of Unreality,”“Center Magazine (March‐April 1972), p. GO.
9. . This obstacle to understanding may also be the major reason why the more familiar Freudian and humanistic psychologists have been found to be less problematical for intensive examination by those concerned with religious issues.
10. . B. F. Skinner, Contingence's of Reinforcement (New York: Appleton‐Century‐Crofts, 1969), p. 48.
11. . “The disastrous results of common sense in the management of human behavior are evident in every walk of life, from international affairs to the care of a baby, and we shall continue to he inept in all these fields until a scientific analysis clarifies advantages of a more effective technology” (Skinner, About Behaviorism, p. 234).
12. . Skinner says that he does not intend to argue for a “metaphysical” or “philosophical” resolution to this or other problems raised by a science of behavior. Lie believes that such discussion fails to engage the practical issues in which he is most interested: “You can criticize the adequacy of my behavioral analysis if you like, but you cannot challenge it on the ground of faulty metaphysics because it is not metaphysical analysis…. I am not concerned about those who think that I am being amateurish a5 a metaphysician, because I am not engaging in metaphysics. I am looking for a behavior analysis” (Skinner, “I Have Been Misunderstood,” p. 64).
13. . Who is to do the controlling? is the question immediately asked. As Skinner indicates in Walden II, he appears to believe that society could be controlled by an elite of experts. Skinner says that control already exists in the hands of an elite–the politicians, the priests, and the psychotherapists–who are not necessarily experts in human behavior.
14. . Skinner believes that the major behavioral problems in culture relate to food, sex, and aggression. These behaviors are proving to be troublesome rather than adaptive for cultural survival. Our singular capacities for food reinforcement lead to overeating and emphasis on sweet foods. Our capacity to he strongly reinforced by aggressive behaviors gets us into continuous trouble, and sexual capacities have led to threats of overpopulation. A leisure‐time culture must ensure that these three aspects are effect timely dealt with, or they may come to dominate leisure‐time activities along with other “inconsequential reinforcers.” Damaging behaviors can he controlled through programming and breaking down into small steps sequences of behaviors that lead to final reinforcing consequences. We must ensure that aggressive behavior will no longer he reinforced in our culture and that the desired reinforcers of normally aggressive actions are made contingent on socially desired ones such as cooperative or “loving” behavior.
15. . This paradigm for behavior change is used in “operant” behavior modification programs.
16. . See Skinner, Contingencies of Reinforcement (n. 10 above).
17. . “Token economy” experiments have demonstrated that when reinforcers are provided “noncontingently” or “freely” upon demand, productive behaviors break down, evidences of reversions to former “illnesses” appear, and dissatisfactions are expressed. The psychiatric ward in which an experiment of this type was carried out returned to “normalcy.” However, with the reinstitution of the “token system,” in which reinforcers had to he earned, productive behaviors returned and greater interest and satisfaction in work were reported. This seemingly supports Skinner's opinion that people need to be creatively productive in order to be happy. See Teodoro Ayllon and Nathan Azrin, The Token Economy (New York: Appleton‐Century‐Crofts, 1968), chap. 8 (“Evaluation of the Overall Reinforcement Procedures”), pp. 186–99.
18. . “Behavioral repertoire” refers to all the potential actions at one's disposal. Experiments with “extinction procedures” demonstrate that behaviors which are consistently nonreinforced gradually disappear from the “behavioral repertoire.”
19. . For example, a person chooses to sit down at the dinner table not because he has “made a choice” hut because in the past such a choice, indicated by the behavior of approaching the dinner table and seating oneself, has been followed by the reinforcing consequence of eating.
20. . Skinner alleges that the nature of cultural evolution in having brought us to this “intentional” level of existence demands that we take active responsibility for the future evolution of humanity.
21. . The letter of Robert Frost to Skinner can be found in the Selected Letters of Rohert Frost, ed. Lawrance Thompson (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1964), pp. 326–27.
22. . R. F. Skinner, “B. F. Skinner… An Autobiography,” in Festschrift, for B. F. Skinner, ed. P. B. Dews (New York: Appleton‐Century‐Crofts, 1970), p. 7.
23. . Skinner describes Walden II as a “venture in self‐therapy, in which I was struggling to reconcile two aspects of my own behavior represented by Burris and Frazier” (“An Autobiography,” p. 13).
24. . “The expression of that interest in the world which is science in the deepest sense… may he a casual interest in current affairs or in literature or the controlled and creative efforts of the laboratory–in any case it represents the unnecessary and pleasurable selective exploration of nature” (Skinner, Walden II, p. 160).
25. . Skinner, “An Autobiography,” p. 19.
26. . Fred S. Keller, a colleague of Skinner, is currently connected with the psychology department of Georgetown University. Skinner dedicated his Science and Human Behavior to Keller. The information on Keller comes from his essay, “Psychology at Harvard (1926–1931): A Reminiscence,” in Festchrift, p. 33. Other affinities listed by Keller are: protestations of compulsory “physical education,” being out of step with fellow students, and being mildly “un‐American.”
27. . Skinner, “An Autobiography,” pp. 3–4, 16–18.
28. . Skinner, Science and Human Behavior (n. 3 above), p. 352.
29. . Ibid., p. 358.
30. . Ibid., pp. 85455.
31. . B. F. Skinner, B. F. Skinner; The Man and His Ideas, ed. Richard I. Evans (New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., 1968), p. 32.
32. . Skinner, Walden 11, p. 199.
33. . “No ritual, no dalliance with the supernatural. Just an enjoyable experience, in part aesthetic, in part intellectual. Now what else does organized religion provide?” (ibid., p. 200).
34. . Skinner, Verbal Behavior (n. 2 above), p. 99.
35. . Skinner, Beyond Freedom and Dignity (n. 2 above), p. 213.
36. . Skinner, Verbal Behavior, pp. 396–97.
37. . Paul Ricoeur believes that with certain provisos religious language may be understood as a variety of poetic expression. As such, religious language in its disclosure of existence is originative, imaginative, or figurative rather than conceptual. This in formation on Ricoeur comes from Kicoeur's lecture, “The Specificity of Religious Language” (mimeographed [University of” Chicago, 1973]), used in a seminar on hermeneutics.
38. . Skinner, Contingencies of Reinforcement (n. 10 above), p. 40.
39. . Skinner has admitted that “cultural survival is a very weak value” (“I Have Been Misunderstood” [n. 5 above], pp. 64–65).
40. . Skinner, Walden, II, p. 159.
41. . Skinner, Beyond Freedom and Dignity, pp. 112–13.