Notes

1. . Robert L, Heilbroner, An Inquiry into the Human Prospect (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., (1974).
2. . According to an interview by Nicholas Wade (“Robert I., Heilbroner: Portrait of a World without Science,” Science [August 16, (1974)], p. 599), Heilbroner says: “The things I see in the future are all personally abhorrent to me. I am against religion, for science, a liberal social democrat or whatever. I find myself very much like the king's messenger.”
3. . Heilbroner, p. 136.
4. . Ibid., p. 138.
5. . Ibid., pp. 140–41.
6. . Ibid., p. 140.
7. . Wade (n. 2 above).
8. . Heilbroner, chap. 4, esp. p. 122.
9. . Ibid., p. 115; original quote in italics.
10. . Interview with Wade (n. 2 above); Robert L. Heilbroner, “What Has Posterity Ever Done for Me?” New York Times Magazine (January 19, 1975), pp. 14–15. On the problem of motivating altruistic behavior see the quotation from an unpublished manuscript by Donald T. Campbell, in Ralph Wendell Burhoe, ed., Science and Human Values in the 21st Century (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1971], p. 144.
11. . Interview with Wade.
12. . Ibid.
13. . Heilbroner, Inquiry, p. 137.
14. . Ibid., p. 124; italics mine.
15. . Langdon Gilkey, “Robert L. Heilbroner's Vision of History,” this issue.
16. . Campbell (n. 10 above).
17. . See n. 10 above.
18. . Ibid., p. 15.
19. . Victor Ferkiss, “Christianity and the Fear of the Future,” this issue.
20. . Ibid.; italics mine.
21. . Edgar S. Dunn, Jr., “Heilbroner's Historicism versus Evolutionary Possibilities,” this issue.
22. . Hudson Hoagland, transcript of his commentaries at the Institute on Religion in an Age of Science symposium, “The Human Prospect: Heilbroner's Challenge to Religion and Science” (Washington, D.C., October 23–24, (1974).
23. . Gods‐as‐explanations‐of‐the‐unknown is a common hypothesis, hut the hypothesis is given a new illumination by recent hypotheses on necessary characteristics of the brain such as the “initial causal termini of strips of observed reality”discussed by Eugene G.D'Aquili and CharlesLaughlin, Jr., in “The Biopsychological Determinants of Religious Ritual BehaviorZygon  10 (1975): 32–58, esp. p. 55.
24. . The way in which the meaning of “nature” in modern physics has come to cover the domain denoted by the term “supernatural” in earlier times is given some elaboration in my “The Concepts of God and Soul in a Scientific View of Human PurposeZygon  8 (1973): 412–42, esp. pp. 423–24.
25. . For “initial casual termini” see d'Aquili and Laughlin (n. 23 above), esp. p. 47. The intertwined character of facts (what is actually perceived or observed) and hypotheses (or theoretical and conceptual systems) is widely recognized in the literature of and about the sciences (see Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions [Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962]). A clear source for nonscientists would be Henry Margenau, The Nature of Physical Reality (New York: McGraw‐Hill Book Co., 1950), or Richard von Mises, Positivism: A Study in Human Understanding (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1951), or Karl R. Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery (New York: Basic Books, 1959). Popper says: “We may distinguish within a theoretical system, statements belonging to various levels of universality. The statements on the highest level of universality are the axioms; statements on the lower levels can be deduced from them. Higher level empirical statements have always the character of hypotheses relative to the lower level statements deducible from them” (p. 75).
26. . In this account of brain functions I have perhaps gone beyond that given by Paul D.MacLean in his “The Brain's Generation Gap: Some Human ImplicationsZygon  8 (1973): 113–27. I draw on a number of other researchers and admit that all details for such a picture as I have presented here may not be in the literature as fully established yet, although I believe there are sufficient areas of evidence to make it quite probable. It is also necessarily an oversimplified and popularized picture.
27. .R. W.Sperry, “Science and the Problem of Values,” Zygon  9 (1974): 17.
28. . Ibid.
29. . Ibid., p. 9.
30. . MacLean, p. 115.
31. . George C. Williams, Adaptation and Natural Selection (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, (1966), p. 95.
32. . Ibid., p. 96.
33. . Ibid., p. 93.
34. . Ibid., pp. 93–95.
35. . Ibid., pp. 120–21; italics mine.
36. .TheodosiusDobzhansky, “Ethics and Values in Biological and Cultural Evolution,” Zygon  8 (1973): 261–81, esp. p. 276.
37. . Alfred E. Emerson, “Dynamic Homeostasis: A Unifying Principle in Organic, Social, and Ethical Evolution,” Scientific Monthly 78 1954: 67–85 (reprinted with some changes in Zygon 3 [1968]: 129–68). A committee of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences in 1960 brought together a few dozen pioneers to assess the relation of theories involved in biological, social, and personal development, some of whose papers were published in the Summer 1961 issue of Daedalus and in 1962 by the Columbia University Press as Evolution and Man's Progress, ed. Hudson Hoagland and Ralph Wendell Burhoe. Zygon contains numerous papers by many authors on this topic. Theodosius Dobzhansky in Mankind Evoking (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1962) provides a good summary in his first chapter on cultural arid biological evolution.
38. . Konrad Lorenz, On Aggression (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, (1966). The original title in German is a better characterization: Das sogenannte Böse, which might be translated “The So‐called Evil.”
39. . d'Aquili and Laughlin (n. 23 above).
40. . The phenotypic diversity of genetically homologous (identical) cells in an organism has to be accounted for by information supplied by the environment and is thus analogous to a primitive level of “culture.” Williams (n. 31 above), pp. 223–34, discusses cellular societies of possibly diverse genotypes where “cells that cooperated in the formation of these 'somatic structures sacrificed themselves.” But he indicates that either close genetic relationship or proportiona1 representation in the spores must be and probably is the explanation. Brian C. R. Bertram (“The Social System of Lions,” Scientific American [May 1975], pp. 54–65) describes a similar problem in the organization of prides of lions.
41. . I have long relied on the writings of Emerson (n. 37 above) and general biological texts for this area, but, as I write this, I am informed about a publication by E. O. Wilson, Sociobiology: The New Synthesis(Cambridge, Mass: Belknap Press, 1975), which I believe will be of central importance for this field. Williams (n. 31 above) deals with genetics in insect societies in his chap. 7.
42. . Williams, esp. on pp. 96–97, calls nongenic changes “biotic evolution.” In my descriptions of the non‐DNA mechanisms of changes in time I use “information” as a term to describe any set of forces or “boundary conditions” which shape or form and thus explain the interactions. The notion of “information” as a “boundary condition” is derived from recent physical analysis of information and is used by Michael Polanyi in “Do Life Processes Transcend Physics and Chemistry?” Zygon 3(1968): 445. More than Williams and other geneticists, a more general science like physics will be concerned to understand the outcome or selection in terms not only of the information in the DNA molecules but of the information or conditions in the total interacting system being studied. In Williams there is a hint of this in his reference to primitive man's interaction with other men in which the other men are the first man's “ecological environment.” My development of culture‐types also will be to show other men as embodying information in an ecological environment. But I would go further and deny Williams's denial that there is any biotic adaptation. I would agree with him that this information may not be collected by competition in a gene pool; but, if one looks at the total ecosystemic boundary conditions or sets of information, one may properly say that the total change (genic and biotic) is naturally selected or determined. As Polanyi points out in his writings, biologists have taken too restricted a view‐see his Personal Knowledge (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958), especially the last chapter, “The Rise of Man.”
43. . Lorenz (n. 38 above), p. 256.
44. . Ibid., p. 251.
45. . Anthony F. C. Wallace, Religion: An Anthropological View (New York: Random House, 1966), p. 102.
46. . Ibid., pp. 243–44.
47. . Ibid., p. 239.
48. . Anthony F. C. Wallace, “Religious Revitalization” (an occasional paper of the Institute on Religion in an Age of Science, 1961), p. 4.
49. . Wallace, Religion: An Anthropological View, pp. 29–30, 38.
50. . See n. 37 above. I would also suggest that my “Civilization of the Future” (Philosophy Forum 13 [1973]: 149–77) provides a useful review of some of the story.
51. . G. G. Simpson's commentary in a conference. It may have been published, but I have it only on tape.
52. .Burhoe, “Civilization of the Future  ,” p. 163–
53. . Julian Huxley, Evolution in Action (New York: Harper Bros., 1953), esp. p. 8.
54. . Williams (n. 31 above, chap. 5) reflects some of the marvel of origin of the genetic system. See also Francis Crick, Of Molecules and Men (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1966), pp. 63–71, on the necessary conjunction of amino and nucleic acids for the beginning of natural selection in biology.
55. . My “Civilization of the Future” (pp. 159–64) gives other details.
56. .Solomon H.Katz, “Evolutionary Perspectives on Purpose and Man,” Zygon  8 (1973): 325–40. Many of the other papers in the same Zygon issue (September‐December 1973) are also contributions to this same theme of the emergence of cultural evolution and man's sense of meaning arid purpose in the scheme of things. Dr. Abaya, Zygon's editorial assistant, in reading my manuscript commented that it appeared to be presenting the whole Zygon story.
57. . That scientific beliefs are a special case of “myths” is a matter that I and many other scholars have pointed out. The conference of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences that gave rise to the Daedalus, issue for Spring 1959 oil “Myth arid Mythmaking” was generated by a committee several of whom wanted to show the relation between scientific and other hypothetical structures (see the introduction, esp. pp. 218–19). My own efforts to translate religious beliefs into scientific language began when I was a preacher in 1935. Because of the lack of any audience ready to hear of such notions until I began to work with some first‐rate scientists on problems of science and human values in the American Academy after World War 11, I did little and published nothing until the mid 1950s. The first volume of the papers of the Institute on Religion in an Age of Science, Science Ponders Religion, ed. Harlow Shapley (New York: Appleton‐Century‐Crofts, 1961), contains my earlier paper on “Salvation in the Twentieth Century” seeking to integrate religion and science. In 1960, Hudson Hoagland arid I sought to evoke some new thinking on the relation of cultural to biological evolution which had been an academically taboo area for a half‐century. The American Academy held three symposia, some of the papers of which we published in Daedalus, and later these were issued as Evolution and Man's Progress (n. 37 above). These symposia were influential in a renaissance of thought and research concerning sociocultural evolution in relation to biological evolution and provided me with much critical information.
58. . Among significant developers of various stages in religious development are Erik Erikson, Lawrence Kohlberg, and Wallace. Two papers by Kohlberg are found in Zygon (“Indoctrination versus Relativity in Value Education,” Zygon 6 [1971]: 285–310; with Dwight Boyd, “The Is‐Ought Problem: A Developmental Perspective,” Zygon 8 [1973]: 358–72). Wallace treats of evolutionary stages of religion that are successive hierarchical levels (n. 45 above, esp. pp. 88, 256). It would seem significant that ontogenetic stages of development described by Erikson and Kohlberg roughly parallel the long‐term history or phylogeny of religion of the kind which Wallace presented or which I am presenting in this paper. In biology the notion that “ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny” was under severe criticism in the middle of this century. Alfred E. Emerson in his “Vestigial Characters, Regressive Evolution and Recapitulation among Termites” (in Termites in the Humid Tropics, Proceedings of the New Delhi Symposium [“Humid Tropics Research”], UNESCO, 1962) suggested quite properly, I think, that a good deal of the debate on this was semantic. Recent research on all kinds of systems suggests that the organization of complexity in adapting to ever wider ranges of an environment actually requires, whether in phylogeny or ontogeny, such hierarchical or pyramidal building of these systems or structures. In order to build the nth level there must be available entities of the (n ‐ 1) level and so on. An early and excellent paper on this is Herbert A. Simon's “The Architecture of Complexity,” first published in the Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society 106 (1962): 467–82, and later included as the final chapter in his The Sciences of the Artificial (Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press, 1969). In it Simon has a section specifically on “Ontogeny Recapitulates Phylogeny” (pp. 114–17). Another pioneer in this area is Paul A. Weiss, who wrote “The Basic Concept of Hierarchic Systems” as the introduction to his 1941 text, Principles of Development, and recently republished with other newer papers by several authors in Hierarchically Organized Systems in Theory and Practice, ed. Paul A. Weiss (New York: Hafner Publishing Co., 1971). The International Library of Systems Theory and Philosophy, ed. Ervin Laszlo, has published Hierarchy Theory: The Challenge of Complex Systems, ed. Howard H. Pattee (New York: George Braziller, Inc., 1973). Perhaps the matter is summed up by Simon in his paper, “The Organization of Complex Systems,” in Hierarchy Theory: “One can show on quite simple and general grounds that the time required for a complex system, containing k elementary components, say, to evolve by processes of natural selection from those components is very much shorter if the system is itself comprised of one or more layers of stable component subsystems than if its elementary parts are its only stable components…. Our whole discussion… underscores the crucial significance of hierarchic organization to the synthesis and survival of large, complex systems” (pp. 7, 23).
59. . Wallace, Religion: An Anthropological View, p. 3. Among others dating religion back for more than 100,000 years is Theodosius Dobzhansky. See his The Biology of Ultimate Concern (New York: New American Library, 1967), esp. pp. 70–74.
60. . In biological evolution this is well known. In the history of civilizations much was made of it by Arnold Toynbee under the term “challenge and response.” It is perhaps an example of a basic law of physics, Newton's Third. Even the history of scientific advance in its revolutions is noted as a response to crisis‐“the scientist in crisis will constantly try to generate speculative theories that, if successful, may disclose the road to a new paradigm…” (Kuhn [n. 25 above], p. 87).
61. .Alfred E.Emerson, “Vestigial Characters of Termites and Processes of Regressive Evolution,” Evolution  15 (1961): 125–26:“Adaptive mechanisms of recombination certainly evolve. Whether mechanisms of mutation adaptively evolve is a more controversial question, but an affirmative answer is credible…. Genetic variability probably has different optimal values in different organisms under different conditions. Both mechanisms of change and mechanisms of stability are selected and evolve.”
62. . Karl Jaspers, The Origin and Goal of History (London: Routledge & K. Paul, 1953). The whole Spring 1975 issue of Daedalus was given over to an analytical review of the thesis of Jaspers's “axial age.”
63. . C. F. von Weizsäcker, The Relevance of Science (New York: Harper & Row, 1954).
64. . Arnold Toynbee, An Historian's Approach to Religion (London: Oxford University Press, 1956), see esp. chap. 13.
65. . Heilbroner, Inquiry, pp. 132, 136.
66. .Jay W.Forrester, “Churches at the Transition between Growth and World Equilibrium,” Zygon  7 (1972): 145–67. Heilbroner's views are given in n. 2 above and elsewhere in this issue.
67. .J.Bronowski, “New Concepts in the Evolution of Complexity: Stratified Stability and Unbounded Plans,” Zygon  5 (1970): 18–35.
68. . Ibid., pp. 32–34.
69. . Jacques Monod, Chance and Necessity, trans. Austryn Wainhouse (New York: Alfred Knopf, Inc., 1971).
70. . Bronowski (from the title of his paper).
71. . Jonathan Edwards, Freedom of the Will, ed. Paul Ramsey (1754; New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1957), p. 183.
72. . In spite of a number of more recent and excellent studies of the nature or philosophy of scientific statements and scientific inquiry, I find von Mises's Positivism: A Study in Human Understanding (n. 25 above) to be one of the clearest and best statements. The “causality statement” referred to is found on p. 161, but the whole book provides it with a sophisticated and sound context of understanding, showing its usefulness and limits.
73. . As quoted in Sydney E. Ahlstrom, Theology in America (Indianapolis: Bobbs‐Merrill Co., 1967), p. 168.
74. . For living systems as open‐ended flow patterns of dissipative energy, see A.Katchalsky, “Thermodynamics of Flow and Biological OrganizationZygon  6 (1971): 99–125. I have given related pictures, involving the phenomena of culture and mind as well as basic biology in my “Control of Behavior: Human and EnvironmentalJournal of Environmental Health  35 (1972): 247–58 cf. esp. pp. 249–50, and in my “Civilization of the Future” (n. 50 above, esp. pp. 154–55). For the significance of “dynamic homeostasis” see n. 37 above.
75. . From pp. 20–29 of the transcript of the general discussion, in this symposium, following the presentation of the Ferkiss paper.
76. . For the weaknesses of psychotherapy as a religion see my “Bridging the Gap between Psychiatry and TheologyJournal of Religion und Health  7 (1968): 215–26. Various weaknesses of the Marxist ideology relative to long‐selected religions have been indicated in a number of my papers, but one of my prime resources for understanding this matter comes from the late Clyde Kluckhohn, an anthropologist who carefully studied Soviet society after World War 11. His “Scientific Study of Values and Contemporary Civilization,” Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society 102 (October 1958) (reprinted in Zygon 1 [1966]: 230–43), provides a critical analysis that is consonant with that of mine and others who more recently have come to understand how the selective processes of long‐evolved sociocultural systems produce a deep and essential wisdom that Marx arid his followers failed to include in their system. Various of my papers have also pointed out the fact that the Marxist program for salvation leaves out the sensitivities of individual human feelings, and the Freudian program leaves out the larger sociocultural system‐hence either of them is at hest a half religion.
77. . I have already, at the end of the previous section on “scientific theology” and the beginning of this section on freedom,” given grounds for understanding the expansion of the term “nature” in contemporary science to indicate what the older philosophers could mean by “being.” The Way Things Are is the title of a hook by a physicist, P. W. Bridgman (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 19.59), which I commend as one of the basic texts of the new “metaphysics” of the natural scientists. But the “conceptual systems” of Margenau (see his Nature of Physical Reality [n. 25 above]), or the “paradigms” of Kuhn (see his Structure of Scientific Revolutions [n. 25 above]), or the “systems of hypotheses or theories” of Popper (see his Logic of Scientific Discovery [n. 25 above]) are all indicative of the fact that the“TI by the sciences may readily be translated as equivalent to what philosophers and theologians have meant by ultimate being, so far as men can know anything about it.
78. . The “Kingdom of God” or the realm of ultimate being, I suggest, is essentially a symbol for the realm of reality that modern scientists call “nature.” This is the realm filled with a network 01 invisible forces and entities which actually produce the world that we perceive, along with its dynamic changes in history or evolution. Theologians, of course, have customarily used the term “nature” to refer to only the visible, tangible phenomena‐not the invisible network. What scientific literature lacks (and what religious and theological literature has possessed) is the meaning of what is going on in this invisible network for man or human destiny. What is to happen in the future, in the eschaton, in this hidden but real world is of the essence for proper human motivation and hope.
79. . For an analysis of the “higher and lower courts” in the selection process see my “Civilization of the Future” (n. 50 above), esp. p. 163; this is similar to the “first and second sources of selectivity” in Simon's “Architecture of Complexity,” in Sciences of the Artificial (n. 58 above), p. 97.
80. . Simon, Sciences of the Artificial, p. 25.
81. . The stages of ontogeny or development of the individual have been known in embryology and biological sciences for some time. Corresponding stages in psychological ontogeny have recently been pointed up by such students as Jean Piaget, Erikson, and Kohlberg. A significant view of the shaping of cognitive and emotive processes by the joint action of genetic and cultural information is present in Konrad Lorenz, “Knowledge, Belief, and Freedom,” in Hierarchically Organized Systems (n. 58 above), pp. 231–61.
82. . Williams (n. 31 above, p. 97) defines “biotic evolution” but in the course of the book correctly refuses to allow meaning to the term “biotic adaptation” on the grounds of genetic selection by elimination of less adapted individuals or groups in an ecosystem. However, he, as we, would recognize that there are natural circumstances or forces that do in Fact cause biotic evolution to take place and for persisting ecosystems to be formed.
83. . See 11, 10 above.
84. .Alfred E.Emerson and Ralph WendellBurhoe, “Evolutionary Aspects of Freedom, Death, and Dignity,” Zygon  9 (1974): 156–82. I am also indebted to a paper, “The Origin of Death,” by George Wald, at a Star Island conference of the Institute on Religion in an Age of Science, following his earlier paper, “The Origin of Life.” The latter was published in scientific American (August 1954). I do not know if the former was published.
85. . Ibid.
86. . Many anthropologists and evolutionists have noted the origin of burial ceremonies in archaeological sites more than a hundred thousand years old and have concluded from this as well as from the context of other facts about human brains and psyches the religious rituals and myths were already evolving then to protect the human psyche against the increasing knowledge of death of the hotly. See, for instance, Theodosius Dobzhansky, “An Essay on Religion, Death, and Evolutionary AdaptationZygon  1 (1966): 517–31.
87. . I give further detail on this in “Concepts of God arid Soul” (n. 24 above).
88. . Wallace (n. 45 above), p. 52.
89. . Ibid., p. 107.
90. . As quoted in Robert N. Bellah, Beyond Belief (New York: Harper & Row, 1970), p. 12.
91. .Wallace(n. 45 above), pp. 264–65.
92. . In looking now at the position of life and human life beyond biological conditions and in the framework of the totality of nature, the evolving universe‐most of whose realities are as yet and probably forever will be unknown to us‐I am drawing our attention to such recent formulations as those mentioned earlier by Broilowski (n. 67 above) and Katchalsky (n. 74 above), which provide important insights for this purpose.
93. . I have defended on scientific grounds the necessity for and genuineness of religion in my “The Phenomenon of Religion Seen Scientifically,” in Changing Perspectives in the Scientific Study of Religion, ed. Allan W. Eister (New York: Wiley‐ Interscience, 1974), pp. 15–39. This also contains further details that supplement my efforts here to show how the biophysical as well as the psychosocial sciences are essential for a scientific understanding of religion.
94. . “Civil Religion iii America,” Daedalus (Winter 1967), pp. 1–21, was Robert N. Bellah's first paper on this theme.
95. . Sydney E. Ahlstrom, A Religious History of the American People (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1972).
96. . Any of the writers on the philosophy of science to which I have already referred bear this out. See, for instance, the writers listed in n. 25 above. Not only does the scientific community recognize the finiteness of its knowledge, in Gödel's theorem it has proved the impossibility of ultimate knowledge even at the level of the internal or logical consistency of‐ arithmetic.
97. . See, for instance, B. F. Skinner, Beyond Freedom and Dignity (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1971). In many of my papers I have used certain of Skinner's hypotheses arid data to support my efforts at scientific theology. I was interested to see “B. F. Skinner and Religious Education” in Religious Education 69 (1974): 558–67 by John L. Elias, who also sees the importance of Skinners “insights into the nature of religious behavior and… institutions.” Skinner, however, has not faced up with what I have called the higher courts of nature's selections and has rested largely within the lower courts of human preferences, which, like all humanistic self‐worship anti pride, could be lethal in natural selection's last judgment.
98. . By the “preferred configurations” of our universe, I mean those stable or metastable states described in such papers as those by Bronowski and Katchalsky quoted earlier and cited in nn. 67 and 74.
99. .Ralph WendellBurhoe, “Natural Selection and God,” Zygon  7 (1972):30–63;“Concepts of God and Soul” (n. 24 above); “What Specifies the Values of the Man‐Made Man?,” Zygon  6 (1971): 224–46; and many others.
100. . My development of the “cosmotype” as the primary and inclusive set of boundary conditions of the soul has not been published, although presented in a number of papers beginning with one to the Society for the Scientific Study of Religion in 1951.
101. . See, for instance, Mircea Eliade's The Sacred and the Profane (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1959).
102. . Bronowski (n. 67 above), p. 34.