Notes

1. . Alfred North Whitehead's major writings in this period include Science and the Modern World (1925; reprint ed., New York: New American Library, Mentor Books, 1964); Religion in the Making (1926; reprint ed., Cleveland, Ohio: World Publishing, Meridian Books, 1965); Symbolism: Its Meaning and Effect (1927; reprint ed., New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, Capricorn Books, 1959); The Function of Reason (1929; reprint ed., Boston, Mass.: Beacon Press, 1958); Process and Reality, corrected ed., ed. David Ray Griffin and Donald W. Sherburne (1929; corr. ed., New York: Free Press, 1978); Adventures of Ideas (1933; reprint ed., New York: New American Library, Mentor Books, 1967); and Modes of Thought (1938; reprint ed., New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, Capricorn Books, 1958).
2. . In the context of the American experience the conflicts have taken a different shape. Scientists working in most universities did not have to deal with a clergy establishment, for most of the major universities were public in the nineteenth century. The major private universities made the transition from substantial church relatedness to negligible or nonexistent church relatedness with relative felicity. Indeed, in the context of the American experience many church groups themselves appropriated many of the interpretations and findings of modern science. Political bodies, secondary schools, and some church related colleges bore the brunt of the controversy. The Scopes trial was the high water mark of the political impingement upon science in America, but some “creationist” advocates in the current epoch seem intent to raise similar issues. Some scientists and some church people entertain, in different ways, rather unbending viewpoints on creationist issues.
3. . See, for example, Ernst Mayr and William B. Provine, eds., The Evolutionary Synthesis: Perspectives on the Unification of Biology (Cambridge, Mass.; Harvard University Press, 1980). For a most interesting analysis of the evolutionary process emphasizing periods of rapid change associated with major evolutional transitions, see Steven M. Stanley, Macroevolution: Pattern and Process (San Francisco: W. H. Freeman, 1979). Although Stanley does not use the categories of process philosophy to interpret his data, the abruptness of the emergence of eternal objects in the conceptual phase of an actual occasion's becoming provides a basic explanation for the mutations and rapid emergence of novel creatures sometimes observed in nature. This issue is discussed subsequently in the section entitled “Emergent Evolution on this Planet.” Many biologists and social anthropologists reject the notion that nature has a purpose. See, for example, G. C. Simpson, The Meaning of Evolution, rev. ed. (New York: Bantam Books, 1971). In his Chance and Necessity (New York: Vintage Books, 1972) Jacques Monod holds that chance alone accounts for every creation in the biosphere. For him, chance is absolutely free but it is blind. On the other hand, Ralph W. Burhoe in his “The Human Prospect and the 'Lord of History,'” (Zygon 10 [September 19751: 299–375) discerns a deterministic pattern in the evolutionary process. For a most interesting interpretation of the evolutionary process having much in common with the constructive facets of this paper, see John F. Haught, Nature and Purpose (Lanham, Md.: University Press of America, 1980). He develops the notion that nature exhibits a “loose teleology,” somewhere between the randomness of Monod and the determinism of Burhoe.
4. . It is beyond the scope of this essay to elaborate the richness and complexity of the Augustinian formulations. The person reading this summary statement who has not read the Augustinian texts should be alerted to the breadth and the scope of his thought. It would be interesting to see what Augustine would have written if he had been living in an evolutionary epoch, for he ranks among the major intellects produced on this planet.
5. . One cannot fault the logicality and coherence of Augustine's formulations. His thinking cannot be challenged on the rational side. It must be challenged on the empirical side, for it does not seem to fit the facts. The evidence for the emergence of creatures on this planet with increasingly complex structures and with increasingly enhanced capacities for intensity of feeling and thinking and for greater capacities to respond to circumstances seems very persuasive indeed.
6. . Tillich affirms confessionally the revelatory power of Jesus as the Christ. It is beyond the scope of this essay to pursue this matter, but it is a central aspect of his theological system.
7. . For this reason an uninitiated person might think Barth was a biblical fundamentalist. There is a tantalizing relation between Barth and biblical fundamentalists, but he is definitely not a fundamentalist.
8. . See Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, The Phenomenon of Man (New York: Harper & Row, 1959).
9. . See, for example, Bernard Lee, The Becoming of the Church (New York: Paulist Press, 1974) and David Tracy, Blessed Rage for Order (New York: Seabury Press, 1975).
10. . See, for example, John B. Cobb, Jr. and David Ray Griffin, Process Theology: An Introductory Exposition (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1976). This volume contains an excellent annotated bibliography of works by persons informed by process thought. Those wanting bibliographical references for work done prior to 1976 are referred to this text. (For an exhaustive bibliography of writings relating to Whitehead prior to 1976, see Barry Woodbridge, Alfred North Whitehead: A Primary‐Secondary Bibliography [Bowling Green, Ohio: Philosophy Documentation Center, Bowling Green State University, 1971.) Cobb and Griffin also edited Mind in Nature: Essays on the Interface of Science and Philosophy (Lanham, Md.: University Press of America, 1977). This volume contains several essays of direct relevance to the topic of emergent evolution. For a rich and complex critique of process views of God, see Robert Neville, God and Creativity (New York: Seabury Press, 1980). For a collection of essays dealing with the implications of process thought for the human sciences, social ethics, and liberation theology, see John B. Cobb, Jr. and W. Widick Schroeder, Process Philosophy and Social Thought (Chicago: Center for the Scientific Study of Religion, 1981). Lewis Ford has incorporated evolutionary thinking in his work, The Lure of God (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1978).
11. . As noted in the opening paragraphs of this essay, the specialized scientist will inevitably incorporate some presuppositions in his analysis not directly derived from work in his specialized field of endeavor. These more general notions will effect the shape and tone of his interpretation. If the scientist is informed by reductionist views, he is apt to seek to “explain” the activity of the human organism on the basis of some underlying elements internal and/or external to the organism. Some evolutionary theory is of this type. E. O. Wilson's Sociobiology (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1975) is informed by such views. In this essay, the informing evolutionary theory is “emergent evolution. “In this view the causal past conditions the present, but it does not determine the present. The more complex and high grade the organism, the greater its capacity for novelty in response to circumstances. Life is fittingly interpreted as a claim for freedom from the bonds of the causal past.
12. . The unity of the self constitutes a major problem in process modes of thought. Process philosophy entertains an atomic view of reality, for the ultimately real are drops of experience. Varying in richness and complexity, the occasions constituting the world are, nonetheless, all on the same level of actuality. This view does justice to the experience of diversity, but it does not adequately deal with the unity of human experience. The notion of a formless form is advanced here to account for the unity of the human person. God contributes to the experience of the unity of the self, for there is a peculiar mutual immanence between God and the soul, due to the significance of the mental phase in occasions constituting the soul and the richness of the human subjective aim.
13. . In the case of the Divine entity, the mental pole of Its becoming is prior to Its physical pole. This exception has far‐reaching consequences for an interpretation of the Divine life. The implications of this exception are not explored systematically in this essay, but some of the consequences are considered in the latter part of the essay.
14. . Some subhuman animal societies have some transphysical feelings and meanings. Dolphins and primates probably have the richest subhuman cultures. In the future humans may devise better ways to communicate with such creatures and may be able to empathize more sensitively with their symbolic worlds.
15. . The order of nature manifest in our cosmic epoch is partially objectified in the regnant ultimate percipient occasion through sense reception in the mode of casual efficacy. This version of philosophic realism is central to process modes of thought.19
16. . Telepathy and other psychic phenomena–insofar as they are authentic–also involve the hybrid prehension of the mental pole of another creature or creatures.
17. . The interrelatedness of nature and the intimate relations existing between the organizing center and the rest of the body underscore the importance of a congenial sustaining environment to support human life. The ecological concerns emerging in our time are grounded on this interrelatedness. For a discussion of ecology by a process theologian see John B. Cobb, Jr., Is It Too Late? A Theology Ecology (Beverly Hills, Cal.: Bruce. 1972).
18. . For a rich discussion and elaboration of the order of nature and the properties of the extensive continuum, see Whitehead, Process and Reality, corrected ed. (n. 1 above), pp. 61‐129, 283‐333. An extended discussion of the extensive continuum and the geometrical implications of it are beyond the scope of this essay. The discussion here is designed to set the human organism within its broader environment and to illumine the form of emergent evolution which is envisaged in the framework of process philosophy. For helpful discussions of these issues, see Elizabeth Kraus, The Metaphysics of Experience (New York: Fordham University Press, 1979) and Robert M. Palter, Whitehead's Philosophy of Science (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960).
19. . Of course, the human consequences of developments in scientific theory and application are important for human life. High technology has helped transform many human societies, and the scientific mind set has greatly influenced modern culture. Because such work is inevitably informed by some implicit or explicit metaphysical assumptions, the human impact of such work may be substantial. These factors need to be considered in the human sciences, but it is not necessary to understand the most recent specialized work in the natural or biological sciences to elaborate a human social theory or social ethic. Because so many scientists formally eschew metaphysics. the communication problems between scientists and others are increased.
20. . In this way a double understanding of human freedom emerges. In one sense, freedom is doing what one wants to do. In a second sense, authentic human freedom consists in doing what one ought to do. The “is/ought” contrast deeply embedded in human experience is ultimately grounded in the intense human awareness of the Divine subjective aim. Its once‐and‐for‐all envisagement and harmonization of the forms of definiteness provide the basis for the “ought” aspect of human experience. Finitude, ignorance, sloth, lethargy and inordinate self‐interest provide the basis for the “is” aspect of human experience.
21. . For an illustration of alternative approaches to a process social ethic, see Cobb and Schroeder (n. 10 above).
22. . It is beyond the scope of this essay to elaborate these notions in detail. For extended discussion, see W. Widick Schroeder, “Religious Institutions and Human Societies: A Normative Inquiry into the Appropriate Contribution of Religious Institutions to Human Life and to the Divine Life” in Belonging and Alienation: Religious Foundations for the Human Future, ed. Philip Hefner and W. Widick Schroeder (Chicago: Center for the Scientific Study of Religion, 1976), pp. 181–218 and W. Widick Schroeder, “Toward Belief A Process Perspective on the Social Sciences and Social Ethics” in Belief and Ethics: Essays in Ethics, the Human Sciences, and Ministry in Honor of W. Alvin Pitcher, ed. W. Widick Schroeder and Gibson Winter (Chicago: Center for the Scientific Study of Religion, 1978), pp. 237–54.
23. . It is beyond the scope of this essay to examine alternative interpretations of religious phenomena. For a typological discussion of alternative perspectives, see W. Widick Schroeder, Cognitive Structures and Religious Research (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1970), pp. 145–80.
24. . Because so few contemporary workers in the sciences–natural or human–are informed by views rooted in the Platonic or Aristotelian traditions, most scientists entertain either skeptical, phenomenological, or reductionistic views of a Divine reality. Because most Western theologians entertain “one‐way” God‐world relations, their views of the Divine reality contrast substantially with process views. Process theists suggest that a “two‐way” God‐world relation exists. God is immanent in and transcends the world, and the world is immanent in and transcends God. From the point of view of most contemporary scientists, many process thinkers are willing to say more about a Divine reality that is, in some senses, sui generis than they are. From the point of view of most Western theologians, process thinkers limit the Divine in ways they do not.