Notes

1. . In the words of William Blake: I was angry with my friend: I told my wrath, my wrath did end. I was angry with my foe: I told it not, my wrath did grow.
2. . See G. Homans, “Anxiety and Ritual: The Theories of Malinowski and Radcliffe—Brown,” in Reader in Comparative Religion, ed. W. Lessa and E. Vogt, 3rd ed. (London: Harper & Row, 1972), pp. 83–88.
3. . Konrad Lorenz, On Aggression (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1966); Robert Ardrey, The Territorial Imperative (New York: Atheneum, 1976).
4. . A. Bandura, Principles of Behavior Modification (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1969), p. 15. See also idem, Social Learning Theory (New York: Prentice Hall, 1977), p. vi.
5. . R. Hinde, “Energy Models of Motivation,” Symposia for the Society of Experimental Biology 14 (1960): 212; idem, “The Study of Aggression: Determinants, Consequences, Goals and Functions,” in Origins qf Aggression, ed. W. Hartup and J. de Wit (The Hague: Mouton, 1978), p. 8.
6. . I. Eibl—Eibesfeldt, “Phylogenetic Adaptation as Determinants of Aggressive Behavior in Man,” in Orig—Zns of Aggression, ed. W. Hartup and J. de Wit (The Hague: Mouton, 1978), p. 29.
7. . See, for example, E. Leach, “Don't say 'Boo' to a Goose,” New York Review vf Books (15 December 1966): 8–12.
8. . J. Flynn et al. find that “eating, sexual behaviour and attack can be controlled… even in cats.”“Anatomical Pathways for Attack Behavior in Cats,” in Human Ethology, ed. M. von Cranach et al. (Cambridge: University Press, 1979), p. 315. See also K. Moyer, The Physiology of Hostility (Chicago: Markham, 1971), pp. 21, 23.
9. . See L. Berkowitz, A Survey of Social Psychology (London: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1980), p. 346. And see below, p. 385.
10. . A. Bandura, “Psychological Mechanisms of Aggression,” in Human Ethology, ed. M. von Cranach et al. (Cambridge: University Press, 1979), p. 32.1
11. . A typical formulation including both extreme and strong claims is provided by R. Brown and R. Herrnstein in their discussion of drive theory: “exogenous stimuli (stimuli coming from the outside) throw off the central regulator and activate appetitive behaviour (aggression) that will continue until a consummatory response… restores the central state (the aggressive drive) to normal, allowing for a change of direction in behaviour,” Psychology (London: Methuen, 1975), p. 202.
12. . For further criticisms, in particular of innate deprivation theory, see Hinde.
13. . Moyer, p. 11.
14. . A. Bandura, “Vicarious Processes: A Case of No—trial Learning,” in Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, ed. L. Berkowitz (London: Academic Press, 1965),2: 1– 55
15. . Bandura, Principles (n. 4 above), p. 19. See also idem, “Vicarious Processes,” p. 18.
16. . Bandura, Social Learning Theory (n. 4 above), p. 13.
17. . J. Dollard et al., Frustration and Aggression (London: Yale University Press, 1969).
18. . Bandura, Principles (n. 4 above), p. 383. See also idem, “Psychological Mechanisms,” pp. 330–31.
19. . Bandura, “Vicarious Processes,” pp. 27–28.
20. . See, for example, R.Geenet al., “The Facilitation of Aggression by Aggression: Evidence Against the Catharsis Hypothesis,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology  31 (1975): 721–26.
21. . Moyer (n. 8 above), p. 124.
22. . F. Goodwin, see Report in Science News 113 (3 June 1978): 356. Cf., Berkowitz (n. 9 above), p. 363.
23. . For evidence from the fields of genetics, neurophysiology, human ethology, etc., see the bibliography provided by D. Sawin and L. Sawin, “Origins of Aggressive Behavior: A Selected Bibliography,” in Origins of Aggression, ed. W. Hartup and J. de Wit (The Hague: Mouton, 1978), pp. 305–54. Especially see J. Hokanson, “Psychophysiological Evaluation of the Catharsis Hypothesis,” in The Dynamics of Aggression, ed. E. Megargee and T. Hokanson (New York: Harper & Row, 1970). See also I. Eibl—Eisbesfeldt (n. 6 above), and idem, “Ritual and Ritualization from a Biological Perspective,” in Human Ethology, ed. M. von Cranach et al. (Cambridge: University Press, 1979), pp. 3–55.
24. . Berkowitz (n. 9 above), p. 344.
25. . Geen et al., p. 725.
26. . K.Bowers and P.Kelly, “Stress, Disease, Psychotherapy, and Hypnosis,” Journal of Abnormal Psychology  88 (1979): 490.
27. . S. Freud, Civilization and Its Discontents (London: Hogarth Press, 1975), p. 15.
28. . M. Rosaldo, Knowledge and Passion (Cambridge: University Press, 1980), p. 19.
29. . S. Schachter, Emotion, Obesity, and Crime (London: Academic Press, 1971). The recent endogenous emphasis in the psychological study of emotions casts further doubt on Bandura's argument that arousal only persists because of appropriate cognitive control. See H. Leventhal, “Towards a Comprehensive Theory of Emotion,” in Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, ed. L. Berkowitz (London: Academic Press, 1980), 13:140–94; Berkowitz (n. 9 above).
30. . Bandura (n. 14 above), pp. 34–37.
31. . L. Berkowitz, Aggression: A Social Psychological Analysis (London: McGraw—Hill, 1962), p. 214.
32. . V.Konecni and E.Ebbesen, “Disinhibition Versus the Cathartic Effect: Artifact and Substance,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology  34 (1976): 363.
33. . Geen et al. (n. 20 above), p. 721; A.Doob and I.Wood, “Catharsis and Aggression,” in Journal of Personality and Social Psychology  22 (1972): 156–62.
34. . Geen et al. (n. 20 above), p. 722.
35. . Ibid., p. 725. The fourth option, that aggressive behavior increases after aggressive display and attributing this to increased arousal, is not discussed here because it involves rather different experimental designs–not simply decreasing or increasing inhibitions, but positively encouraging arousal.
36. . Ibid., p. 722.
37. . R.Kaplan and R.Singer, “Television Violence and Viewer Aggression: A Reexamination of the Evidence,” Journal of Social issue  32 (1976): 48. See also Konezni and Ebbesen, p. 363.
38. . Kaplan and Singer, pp. 52–56.
39. . Bandura (11. loabove), provides a useful summary of social learning theory and evidence supporting it. For more information on the extent to which aggression is bound up with exogenous processes and culture, see M. Billing, Social Psychology and Intergroup Relations (London: Academic Press, 1976); Berkowitz (n. 9 above); and T. Wills, “Downward Comparison Principles in Social Psychology,” in Psychological Bulletin 90 (1981): 245–71.
40. . Bandura, “Social Learning Theory” (n. 4 above), p. 63.
41. . Berkowitz (n. 31 above) and Geen et al. (n. 20 above), p. 725.
42. . Bandura (n. 10 above), p. 323.
43. . Konečni and Ebbesen, p. 364. See also Geen et al. (n. 20 above) and Berkowitz (n. 31 above), p. 214.
44. . Berkowitz (n. 9 above), p. 361.
45. . Ibid., p. 360.
46. . A. Bandura and R. Walters, Social Learning and Personality Development (New York: Holt, 1963); Bandura (n. 14 above), p. 37.
47. . R.Sipes, “War, Sports and Aggression: An Empirical Test of Two Rival Theories,” in American Anthropologist  75 (1973): 65.
48. . Ibid., p. 80.
49. . Bandura (n. 10 above), p. 331.
50. . It is true that both parties would have to ponder in that the former would have to consider the possibility that aggression is increased (games being frustrating), the latter that aggression is decreased (the games teaching that aggression is bad). But these possibilities are not likely.
51. . A. MacIntrye helps us see why the continuity—discontinuity criterion is important in deciding between psychodynamic explanations and those involving cognitive and learning processes. He writes that “the explanation of rational belief terminates with an account of the appropriate norms and procedures; the explanation of irrational belief must be in terms of causal generalizations which connect antecedent conditions specified in terms of social structures or psychological states‐or both–with the genesis of beliefs” (Against the Self—Images of the Age [London: Duckworth, 19711, p. 247). Does one act for a reason or does one act to produce catharsis? The latter is suggested by discontinuity by virtue of the fact that one cannot explain irrational activities by making appeal to the workings of reason or norms extended through teaching processes.
52. . For a more general discussion of what is involved in extending laboratory findings to other, more natural, situations, see L. Berkowitz and E. Donnerstein, “External Validity is More Than Skin Deep,” American Psychologist 37 (March 1982): 245–57.
53. . P. Marsh, Aggro: The Illusion of Violence (London: Dent, 1978).
54. . See P. Heelas, “Anthropology, Violence and Catharsis,” in Aggrenion and Violence, ed. P. Marsh (Oxford: B. Blackwell, 1982), pp. 48–61.
55. . See R. Bolton, “Aggression and Hypoglycemia Among the Qolla: A Study in Psychobiological Anthropology,” in Physiology of Aggression and Implications for Control: An Anthology of Readings, ed. K. Moyer (New York: Raven Press, 1976), pp. 189–217; and J. Loudon, “Psychogenic Disorder and Social Conflict Among the Zulu,” in Culture and Mental Health, ed. M. Opler (New York: Macmillan, 1959), pp. 351–69.
56. . R. Ness, “The Impact of Indigenous Healing Activity: An Empirical Study of Two Fundamentalist Churches,” Social Health and Medicine 14B (1981): 167–80.
57. . See R. Needham, Primordial Characters (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1978), pp. 28–29.
58. . For other ways in which ethnographic material can be used to support psychological theorizing, see Bandura (n. 10 above), pp. 323, 328; Eibl—Eibesfeldt (n. 23 above): and A. Montagu, Learning Non—Aggression (Oxford: University Press, 1978). I do not think, however, that there is adequate evidence for the catharsis hypothesis, for example, to be supported by correlations, such as between frustration and witchcraft accusations. There is not space to discuss the many difficulties facing those who attempt to use correlatory evidence to support or reject psychological theories, such as Sipes (n. 47 above).
59. . F. Hsu, Under the Ancestor's Shadow (Stanford, Calif.: University Press, 1971), p. 248. See also V. Turner, The Forest of Symbols (London: Cornell University Press, 1970), pp. 55–57.
60. . J. Briggs, Never in Anger (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1970), p. 4. p. 181. p. 329. p. 47.
61. . Ibid.
62. . Ibid., p. 4
63. . Ibid., p. 181.
64. . Ibid., p. 329.
65. . Ibid., p. 47.
66. . The exogenous theorist might simply argue that dog—beating is due to rational considerations, that dog—beating is instrumental aggression. It is indeed likely that some violence is called for if Utku dogs are to be kept under control. But it is a strange sort of discipline when economically valuable dogs are injured and when dog—beaters so obviously enjoy beating exercises. Peace—loving Utku can have no good reasons for maltreating, not merely disciplining, dogs. It is hard to imagine that they could not have devised less aggressive ways of managing their dogs if it were not for the fact that they require some way of managing their emotions.
67. . K. Lorenz discusses Polar expeditions and other isolated groups, claiming they are frequently torn apart by quarrels because members experience an unfortunate damming up of aggression. The wise individual, he writes, “finds an outlet by creeping out of the barracks (tent, igloo) and smashing a not too expensive object with as resounding a crash as the occasion merits.” Lorenz (n. 3 above), pp. 55–56. But it must be said that Utku dog—beating is not entirely informed by endogenous processes: Utku learn that dogs can be beaten, and it is likely that inhibitory processes (for example, due to feeling guilty on returning from a dog—beating session) help explain the decline in aggressive behavior.
68. . See R. Dentan, The Semai (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1968) and C. Robarchek, “Frustration, Aggression and the Nonviolent Semai,” American Ethnologist (1978), pp. 762–79.
69. . Robarchek, p. 767.
70. . Ibid., p. 769.
71. . C.Geertz, “Deep Play: Notes on the Balinese Cockfight,” Daedalus  (1972): 1–37.
72. . Ibid., p. 9.
73. . Ibid., p. 25.
74. . Ibid.
75. . See p. 387 earlier in this article.
76. . Geertz, p. 18.
77. . Ibid., p. 6.
78. . Ibid., p. 25.
79. . Ibid., o. 18.
80. . Ibid., p. 21.
81. . Ibid., p. 28
82. . Ibid., p. 23.
83. . Ibid., p. 27.
84. . Berkowitz (n. 31 above), p. 227.
85. . Since writing this paper, I have arrived at a rather different explanation of Semai punishment models, attaching more importance to endogenous emotional arousal but not radically diverging from the position given here. See P. Heelas, “Indigenous Representations of the Emotions: The Chewong, “Journal of the Anthropological Society of Oxford 14 (1983): 87–103.
86. . See, e.g., M. Gluckman, Order and Rebellion in Tribal Africa (London: Cohen and West, 1963), pp. 126–27; Turner (n. 59 above), pp. 48–58.
87. . See, e.g., T. Beidelman, “Swazi Royal Ritual,” Africa 36 (1966): 373–405; M. Gluckman, Order and Rebellion; idem, “Psychological, Sociological and Anthropological Explanations of Witchcraft and Gossip: A Clarification, “Man 3 (1968): 20–34; and J. Kennedy, ”Psychological and Social Explanations of Witchcraft, “Man 2 (1967): 216–25.
88. . R. Fox, “The Inherent Rules of Violence,” in Social Rules and Social Behaviour, ed. P. Collett (Oxford: B. Blackwell, 1977), p. 136.
89. . See Eibl—Eibesfeldt (n. 23 above) and Marsh (n. 53 above).
90. . R. Fox, Encounter with Anthropology (Harmondsworth, England: Penguin, 1975), p. 139.