Abstract
This essay examines Nancey Murphy's commitment to downward causation and develops a critique of that notion based upon the distinction between the causal relevance of a higher‐level event and its causal efficacy. I suggest the following: (1) nonreductive physicalism lacks adequate resources upon which to base an assertion of real causal power at the emergent, supervenient level; (2) supervenience's nonreductive nature ought not obscure the fact that it affirms an ontological determination of higher‐level properties by those at the lower level; and (3) the notion of divine self‐renunciation, while consonant with Murphy's claim of supervenient, divine action, is nonetheless problematic. Throughout, I claim that the question of the causal efficacy of a level is logically independent from the assertion of its conceptual or nomological nonreducibility.
Keywords
nonreductive phsicalism, downward causation, reductionism, kenotic devine action, supervenience
How to Cite
Bielfeldt, D., (1999) “Nancey Murphy's Nonreductive Physicalism”, Zygon: Journal of Religion and Science 34(4), 619–628. doi: https://doi.org/10.1111/0591-2385.00240