Abstract
This essay addresses three problems facing a physicalist (as opposed to dualist) account of the person. First, how can such an account fail to be reductive if mental events are neurological events and such events are governed by natural laws? Answering this question requires a reexamination of the concept of supervenience. Second, what is the epistemological status of nonreductive physicalism? Recent philosophy of science can be used to argue that there is reasonable scientific evidence for physicalism. Third, the soul has traditionally been seen as that which enables human beings to relate to God. What accounts for this capacity in a physicalist theory of the person? This essay argues that the same faculties that enable higher cognitive and emotional experience also account for the capacity for religious experience.
Keywords
reductionism, dualism, nonreductive physicalism, supervenience, religious experience
How to Cite
Murphy, N., (1999) “Physicalism Without Reductionism: Toward a Scientifically, Philosophically, and Theologically Sound Portrait of Human Nature”, Zygon: Journal of Religion and Science 34(4), 551–571. doi: https://doi.org/10.1111/0591-2385.00236