Abstract
In Michael Ruse's recent publications, such as Taking Darwin Seriously (1998) and Evolutionary Naturalism (1995), he has advocated a certain sort of evolutionary epistemology and has argued that it implies a rejection of metaphysical realism (MR) in favor of a position that he calls “internal realism” (IR). Additionally, he has maintained that, insofar as his evolutionary epistemology implies a rejection of MR in favor of IR, it escapes the kind of argument against naturalism that Alvin Plantinga makes in his Warrant and Proper Function (1993). In this article I explain the relevant views and arguments of Ruse and Plantinga, and I critically engage with Ruse's views, arguing that (1) his case for rejecting MR has no essential connection to evolutionary considerations; (2) his case for rejecting MR depends upon internalist assumptions about the nature of knowledge that are in need of some kind of defense; and (3) given his implicit internalism and his commitment to IR, his argument for rejecting MR can be used against his IR.
Keywords
Michael Ruse, internal realism (IR), Alvin Plantinga, naturalism, evolution, metaphysical realism (MR), theism, epistemology, epistemically ideal conditions, truth
How to Cite
Lemos, J., (2002) “Theism, Evolutionary Epistemology, and Two Theories of Truth”, Zygon: Journal of Religion and Science 37(4), 789–801. doi: https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9744.00458
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© 2024 The Author(s).46
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