Resurrection—Theological and Scientific Assessments  . Edited by TedPeters, Robert JohnRussell, and MichaelWelker . Grand Rapids , Michigan : William B. Eerdmans , 2002 , XVII + 326 pages. $35.00 .

This book contains a collection of papers written by an international group of authors addressing the issue of intelligibility of the Christian belief in the resurrection in light of present‐day thinking. A number of the contributors have a long‐standing commitment to and expertise in the interdisciplinary discourse on science and religion: Ted Peters and Robert J. Russell from the Center of Theology and Natural Sciences, Berkeley, California; Michael Welker, director of the International Science Forum (Internationales Wissenschaftsforum) at Heidelberg; and the ordained Anglican minister‐physicist Sir John Polkinghorne. Six of the 18 authors come from universities in the United States, 10 from Germany (notably Heidelberg), and one each from Great Britain and South Africa. Twelve are theologians, with most of them Lutherans. We also have a computer scientist, a neurophysiologist, a biologist, a philosopher, a historian of religion, and a mathematician. They all want “to place Christian theological reflection into dialogue with the relevant Natural Sciences” (p. XII) in order to “provide critical appraisal … regarding the content of … eschatological hope” (p. XVII). They do so because they are convinced that “when science is at its best and theology is at its best, both are prosecuted by truth‐seeking communities open to reorientation by what they learn about reality in a process [of]‘hypothetical consonance’” (p. XIII).

As can be expected, the individual papers, too many to be reviewed here in detail, vary widely in scope, outlook, and approach. This makes for an interesting, stimulating, and thought‐provoking reading, albeit one that is occasionally redundant. The articles are grouped under four headings: I—Resurrection and Eschatological Credibility; II—Bodily Resurrection and Personal Identity; III—Resurrection and the Laws of Nature, and IV—Resurrection, New Creation, and Christian Hope.

R. J. Russell presents a very basic metatheoretical reflection about “Mutual Interaction of Christian Theology and Science” and provides a respective model taking bodily resurrection, eschatology and scientific cosmology as an example. Michael Welker addresses the topic of “Theological Realism and Eschatological Symbol Systems”, asking: “Does theology, indeed, give a fuller account of human reality [than common experience would admit], or does it reach out into areas of fiction and fantasy?” (33). After a brief yet concise scrutiny of relevant NT texts, he arrives at the answer: “The Spirit is the divine power by which the fullness of the divine and eternal life—revealed in the life of Christ—permeates human souls and bodies. … They [the members of Christ's body] incorporate God's message for God's creation, and they participate in the divine power and life that sustains, rescues, and ennobles the creation and will never perish” (42). John Polkinghorne, in his article “Eschatological Credibility: Emergent and Teleological Processes”, ponders the question “Is there … a purpose behind cosmic process?,” a question “relevant to eschatological thinking, since if past history were to lack meaning, there would be no reason to anticipate further fulfillment” (43) Such theological questioning, to which nearly every article in this volume is devoted, “arises from scientific insight” and “points beyond what can be the subject matter of science” because science “has to be honest enough to recognize that its success has been purchased by its self‐limited modesty in addressing only limited kinds of questions. … If a new natural theology contributes to this metascientific discussion, it does so as a complement to science and not in conflict with it. This contrasts with the old style of natural theology” (43–4). Having said that, Polkinghorne discusses a couple of issues of contemporary cutting‐edge scientific thinking like complexity, systems theory, autopoiesis and so forth, and concludes: “Eschatological thinking inevitably involves an element of speculation as to its details. Its scope is necessarily limited in terms of what can be comprehended within this life. Yet it is by no means an exercise in fantasy. Rather, it is an exploration of possibility … showing that its discourse is reasonable and its hopes well motivated” (55).

“From Evolution to Eschatology” is the subject approached by the biologist Jeffrey P. Schloss, who currently is the director for Biological Programs of the Christian Environmental Association and professor at Westminster College. Schloss unfolds various aspects of the process of biological evolution, including the phenomenon of death. While “death is not necessary for life, the possibility of death is necessary—that is, life entails the continual overcoming of entropic forces that, if unresisted, will degrade the function and organization of the living system” (84, original emphasis). Evolutionary processes do not warrant eschatological hope. And while “recent approaches in the biosciences refuse to foreclose options” thus “persistently challeng[ing] reified conceptualizations of the real,” Christians “in recognizing that life admits itself in degrees … encounter warrant for eschatological hope” in that their own lives “will not just be continued but intensified in resurrection” (85).

The next three papers—Frank Crüsemann, “Scripture and Redemption”; Peter Lampe, “Paul's Concept of a Spiritual Body”; and H. J. Eckstein, “Bodily Resurrection in Luke—are exegetical in nature without adding something essentially new to the discussion.

The Egyptologist Jan Assmann presents how “Resurrection in Ancient Egypt” was perceived, carefully noting, “Resurrection is a Christian term and a Christian idea” (124). He concludes: “The decisive denominator of Christianity and ancient Egyptian religion is the idea of redemption from death, that beyond the realm of death there is an Elysian realm of eternal life in the presence of the divine” (135). Significant differences appear, however as this is unfolded.

Brian E. Daley surveys notions of early Church Fathers on resurrection in “A Hope for Worms: Early Christian Hope”. He notes the astonishing materiality of their respective reflections and the broad variety of their concepts. These range from “resurrection as completion of the human potential” (Justin, Tatian, Ireneus, 14ff) over “resurrection as reinterpretation” (Gnostics, 145ff), and “reconstitution” (Athenagoras, Tertullian, Augustin, 147ff) to “resurrection as transformation” (Origen, Methodius, Jerome, Gregory of Nyssa, 151ff). He boldly claims that for “all of these early theologians, the central issues in concerning a future resurrection were surely the same questions with which contemporary theology struggles” (161) and is convinced that in “the end … all Christian anthropology and all Christian hope must grow from wonder at the mystery of the incarnation of God” (164). Bernd Oberdorfer shows in “Schleiermacher on Eschatology and Resurrection” how untraditionally one of the outstanding Protestant theologians of the modern age answered these challenging questions in his very particular way.

The neuroscientist Detlef B. Linke authored the next article, “God Gives the Memory: Neuroscience and Resurrection”. While he does not give definite answers, he shares highly interesting insights from his field of research regarding the origin of the soul, the importance of speech (the Word!) for brain development and function, and even, though very briefly, regarding the “spiritual body.” Noreen Herzfeld, a computer scientist from St. John's University, Collegeville, Minnesota, explores “Cybernetic Immortality versus Christian Resurrection”: “Cybernetic immortality is based on the assumption that thoughts, memories, feelings, and action define the human person. These are products of consciousness, … informational patterns that arise and are stored in the neuronal structures of the brain” (194). And insofar as these patterns can be stored in a computer, the very individuality of people could be preserved—bodiless—and revived whenever desired. But Herzfeld, in taking recourse to Reinhold Niebuhr, is quick to show that the Christian hope in resurrection does not strive for an endless continuation of time or a trust in the power of human skill or machinery: “The Christian concept of the resurrection of the body … is a concept that transcends death, not by eluding it with part of our being, as cybernetic immortality does, but by passing through it with one's whole being” (201).

Nancey Murphy, professor of Christian philosophy at Fuller Theological Seminary, and Andreas Schuele, professor of Old Testament at Heidelberg, comment on issues of loss and preservation of personal identity in death and resurrection. In her article “The Resurrection Body and Personal Identity: Possibilities and Limits of Eschatological Knowledge,” Murphy suggests that while “the laws of nature of this aeon are God's creatures … the completion of Christ's work must include” their “radical transformation” permitting “the fullness of human life that God intends” to come about (217). She is, however, certain “that the science‐theology dialogue … must reach a point of silence when [it turns] to certain matters of eschatology” (218). Schuele's far‐ranging reflections in “Transformed into the Image of Christ: Identity, Personality, and Resurrection”, which dwell upon modernity's loss of death awareness, as well as on contemporary psychological and philosophical conceptions of immortality, culminate in the statement: “Resurrection as becoming conformed to the image of Christ … is … the key symbol to the Christian understanding of what it means to be a person” (235). Eschatology mirrors anthropology, and vice versa.

“Memory in the Flow of Time and the Concept of Resurrection” is the topic addressed by Dirk Evers, who unfolds the eschatological quest over against physicalistic perceptions of resurrection as proposed by F. Dyson or F. Tipler. To Evers it is the “complex interdependence between individual, social, and canonic memory … embedded in the overall realm of God's being mindful of us and his creation,” which “is the foundation of eternal life” (252). It also is “through God's judgment that our lived life is invested with its ultimate integrity and through which it finds its fulfillment” (252). Günter Thomas, a systematic theologian like Evers, approaches the eschatological issues from a pneumatological perspective in “Resurrection to New Life: Pneumatological Implications of the Eschatological Transition”. Being convinced that the “work of the Holy Spirit is the key to any sound and realistic understanding of the Christian symbol of the final resurrection that resists the lure of groundless speculation” (255) and showing that this Spirit is the “nexus between Christ's resurrection and the future resurrection” (267). Thomas concludes: “Through resurrection in the power of the Spirit, the life of the Resurrected One did not come to an end but experienced a new beginning as perfected eternal life, a life filled by the Spirit and marked by time, relationality, sociality, activity, and dynamic and eventually unendangered openness” (276).

The South African theologian Ernst M. Conradie meditates upon “Resurrection, Finitude, and Ecology”. In referring to P. Tillich, he frequently emphasizes that Christian eschatology is not “a form of escapism.” Instead, “it may suggest a more profound affirmation of the significance of this earth, this life, this particular body. The hope for the resurrection of the body may help us to put this life into the wider perspective of eternal life. Paradoxically, a vision of the resurrection of the body may in this way empower and encourage a commitment toward this life and toward this earth” (296).

The final paper, written by Ted Peters, who is also one of the editors of this volume, deals with “Resurrection: The Conceptual Challenge”. It corresponds in its principal design like a closing bracket to the opening chapter of his colleague Russell. Peters shows that any serious eschatological reflection leads into dilemmas of various kinds, which cannot be resolved easily, if they can be resolved at all. But this does not lead him to resignation. He instead identifies the “doctrine of God”—and thus the genuine theo‐logical topic or locus—as being at the very center of eschatology. “The question is: Will God act? Resurrection, if it is to take place at all, must be a divine act. As a part of that act … God will provide what is necessary to maintain continuity of our identity while transforming us into the new creation” (321). The appropriation of this hinges on unconditional trust and genuine faith in what God is going to do once humans cease being able to respond to His call anymore.

In short, of these very compact papers should not be read in one sitting but one or two at a time in order to digest them properly. One will notice, however, that none of the authors reflects the semiotics of language‐based communications, which play a significant role, especially when talking about eschatology and resurrection of the dead. Such considerations would have safeguarded this well‐intended dialogue from running the risk of being positivistically misconceived as not addressing the real matter, which could have been avoided if the interface of the different language games of theology and science could have been shown and interacted upon. So, in the end one is somewhat at a loss as to what is actually new here. And one further wonders why those who deal with the question of personal identity beyond death do not consider the several biblical references to the individual's name being “written in the book of life” (see Revelations 3:5; 13:8; 17:8; and also Luke 10:20; Philippians 4:3). As mentioned already, this book makes for a thought‐provoking and interesting reading, challenging all ardent students of its pages to come to terms with the vital subject matter of resurrection for themselves.