Where the Conflict Really Lies: Science, Religion, and Naturalism  . By AlvinPlantinga . New York : Oxford University Press , 2011 . xvi + 369 pages. Hardcover $27.95 .

This book has been a long time coming. Plantinga has addressed the perceived conflict(s) between science and Christianity for decades, and with this book he brings all of his reflections and intellectual powers to bear on the topic. It showcases one of the greatest living philosophers at the top of his game addressing one of the most controversial (hence, interesting) topics.

He begins with biological evolution, going over the attempts by Richard Dawkins, Daniel Dennett, and others to demonstrate an incompatibility between current biology and Christianity. These authors suggest that the randomness involved in evolution means that God had no hand in it, but Plantinga points out that “random” merely refers to the absence of physical mechanisms which foresee and cause beneficial mutations. Nonphysical nonmechanistic forces are not ruled out by this. Indeed, attempts to concoct a conflict between evolution and theism are precisely what fuels skepticism about evolution in western culture. Plantinga next asks whether the possibility of miracles is incompatible with science. He argues that neither Newtonian nor quantum physics conflicts with the possibility of miracles since they both address closed systems. He mentions the Divine Action Project, which seeks a noninterventionist theory of God's action, and although Plantinga rejects this approach, he offers a solution to their quest as a byproduct of his musings—as if a time‐traveler explained to Kepler how to make his Platonic solid‐based celestial physics work before informing him that it is, nevertheless, wrong.

This constitutes the first part of Plantinga's book: alleged conflicts between science and religion. Part 2 deals with genuine but superficial conflicts. His targets here are evolutionary psychology and historical biblical criticism, the conflicts arising by employing either a strong or weak methodological naturalism. The strong form presupposes the falsity of certain theistic tenets, such as miracles, while the weak merely brackets them for the purpose of the study. The former will obviously produce conflicts with theism as it supplements the scientific evidence with anti‐theistic claims. In this case, however, it is obviously the supplements that conflict with religion, not the science. “Suppose I propose as a theory the conjunction of Newton's laws and atheism: have I succeeded in producing a scientific theory inconsistent with theism? Hardly” (142). The weak form may produce a conflict because it is working from a truncated evidence base, one which does not include the existence of God and the tenets of theism. In the same way, if I limit my evidence base to introspective knowledge, beliefs gleaned via perception may become improbable, thus producing a conflict between these two sources of information. But so what? This does not give us a reason to doubt the general reliability of perception. Similarly, neither the strong nor weak form of methodological naturalism gives the theist a defeater for—a reason to withhold belief in—theism, a concept about which Plantinga has written much.

As is his wont, Plantinga reverses popular conceptions. Part 3 deals with the claim that science actually offers support for religion, a first reversal. A second reversal is seen in how Plantinga finds the popular design arguments about cosmic fine‐tuning to offer only mild support for theism, but considers the much more suspect biological design arguments—suspect in light of evolution—to be stronger. Plantinga, however, does not see the strength of these examples as arguments; he sees them as perceptions. It is not a matter of inferring that biological structures were designed, we just immediately form beliefs that they were designed upon being presented with them. He sees the arguments of William Paley and Michael Ruse as pointing to how this process works rather than as actual arguments. This is of a piece with Plantinga's naturalized epistemology, where we are designed to form beliefs about various things in response to certain experiences. Beliefs formed in this way are properly basic and do not need to be defended by reference to other beliefs or experiences. This does not mean that they are infallible, they are just innocent until proven guilty—by one of those elusive defeaters mentioned in the previous section.

In the next chapter, Plantinga makes a third reversal, looking at the “deep concord” between science and Christianity that is found in the origins of modern science in Christian theism, a point that has been exaggerated in the past, and so is often treated as a historical curiosity. Plantinga argues instead that the notion that we are created in God's image provides a reason for thinking our cognitive faculties are reliable, and that they are attuned to the universe. Science presupposes the veracity and applicability of mathematics; that nature behaves in a consistent and law‐like fashion; that simplicity is a guide to truth; and that we are capable of apprehending all of this. Explaining these phenomena in naturalistic terms is much more difficult than many are willing to think, but they make perfect sense given Christian theism.

We have moved from alleged conflict to superficial conflict, and then to concord and deep concord. Plantinga concludes by pointing to a deep conflict between science and religion, but the “quasi‐religion” in question is naturalism, which serves “one of the main functions of a religion: it offers a master narrative, it answers deep and important human questions. … Naturalism is therefore in competition with the great theistic religions: even if it is not itself a religion, it plays one of the main roles of a religion” (311).

The conflict is Plantinga's Evolutionary Argument against Naturalism, and here he presents its “official and final version (I hope)” (310 n. 4). The focus is on two types of representations: indicative and depictive. The latter depict the world as being a certain way and so has content and can be true or false. Indicators, however, indicate something about the world without being true or false. If what they indicate about the world is not the way the world actually is, we do not say that they are false, merely inaccurate. Beliefs are depictive, but evolution could only see and select indicators. Therefore there is no reason to think the (depictive) belief that associates with an indicator would even be about the same set of circumstances. From this, the rest of the argument follows: this scenario produces a defeater for accepting any particular belief, including belief in naturalism and evolution. So if naturalism is true, we have a defeater for evolution and even naturalism itself. There is indeed a conflict between science and religion, but we have mistaken where the conflict really lies.