What do we aim for in religion and science (R&S) research? A dominant line of R&S research is to align religious concepts and beliefs with scientific concepts and theory, whether to promote the possibility of integration between religion and science, or of dialogue, or to show how religion and science are in conflict with one another. Bolger discusses cases in this alignment line of research and diagnoses them with religious scientism. Although he mentions how conflict thinkers like Richard Dawkins are guilty as charged, Bolger reserves his in‐depth analyses for prominent integration and dialogue thinkers. In a misguided attempt to legitimize religion with the help of science, researchers take concepts and the explanatory goal from the natural sciences and apply them to religious phenomena. This only leads to conceptual confusion, Bolger argues, and misrepresents both religion and science in the process. True to his own Wittgensteinian spirit and that of his late PhD supervisor, D. Z. Phillips, Bolger attempts to provide therapy by dissecting the conceptual confusions. In this vein, Bolger critiques Ian Barbour and his treatment of ‘models’ and ‘unobservables’; William Dembski's discussion of ‘intelligent design’ as an ‘explanatory theory’ of higher ‘probability’ than evolutionary theory; Philip Clayton's thought on ‘divine action’; and Arthur Peacocke's panentheistic use of ‘in’ when speaking of ‘the world in God’, among many others. Bolger's general charge is that researchers in these cases have “thought too much and looked too little” (p. 10) at the meaning concepts have in their scientific and religious contexts of use.

Bolger fleshes out his own position in the final chapter of the book. Simply put, it is independence: religion and science belong to very different conceptual realms. Religion is not about the facts in the world; it is a stance people take toward existence. Although sympathetic, this part of the book is less thoroughly supported with arguments than the middle chapters. Bolger occasionally seems to be guilty of the charge he held against others: he thinks a lot and looks relatively little. Surely, there are contexts in which religious concepts and beliefs are treated as propositional. In effect, Bolger develops a view of what religion can be, what it certainly is for some, and, most of all, what it in his opinion should be.

So, where does that leave religion and science research? Those who want to keep aligning religious and scientific concepts find a formidable challenge in Bolger's argumentation. Does the reinterpretation of concepts that is often necessary for alignment to be possible not obfuscate more than it clarifies? Especially when it comes to clarifying what religion is? Taking Bolger's careful critique seriously, researchers should restrict themselves to aspects of religion that truly are about propositional content; and prove that they are by looking at their use in the religious context. Alternatively, researchers would have to provide argumentation that even when concepts do not align completely, they align enough, for example, on relevant dimensions. However, if one accepts an independence position, as Bolger does, the alignment strand of R&S research is problematic overall. A substitute aim could be the one that Bolger set himself with this book: to show precisely in what respect religious phenomena and concepts are different from their seeming scientific counterparts. Naturally, other aims at home in the R&S field are untouched by Bolger's critique. The scientific study of religion can simply employ its scientific conceptual vocabulary and stick to its explanatory aim. Religious reflections on scientific (and technological) developments may use religious conceptual tools.

Robert Bolger's book is an absolute pleasure to read. It is much more carefully argued than its title may initially suggest. Above all, it is thought‐provoking. At 150 pages, this book is a great read for anyone involved or interested in attempts at analyzing religious phenomena in scientific terms.