Based on a conference held May 17–19, 2010, as part of the “Science and Religious Conflict” project at Oxford University and organized by the volume's three editors, all of whom are current or former members of the Faculty of Philosophy there, this book contains 13 original papers by 24 authors. Ten of these contributions are based on presentations given at the said conference but have been “significantly revised” (p. xi). The others have been specially prepared for the edited volume. The goal of the publication is clearly stated in its subtitle, namely to provide a scientific and conceptual investigation of religion, intolerance, and conflict, which the editors want to be “of the highest quality” (p. xi).

A Preface, the Table of Contents, and Biographical Notes on Contributors (pp. v–xviii) precede the opening chapter by Powell and Clarke entitled “Views from across the Disciplines” (pp. 1–35). This piece with its comprehensive bibliography serves as general orientation to the current discussion in the disciplines represented at the said conference, that is, evolutionary anthropology, experimental psychology, and analytic philosophy. Presentations by evolutionary anthropologists come first (chapters 2–4, pp. 36–87), followed by contributions from experimental psychologists (chapters 5–7, pp. 88–145), and, finally, the bulk of the book, six chapters by analytic philosophers (chapters 8–13, pp. 146–252), each one with notes and references. Two “Commentaries” in smaller typeface (pp. 253–272), followed by indices of names and subjects (pp. 272–282) conclude the volume. Space here allows for some general observations only, not for discussing the many topics dealt with by the authors.

As is to be expected with multiauthor publications, the content, style, and quality of chapters vary considerably. However, studying this book, even if one is somewhat experienced in the dialogue with so‐called “New Atheists” and their derision of anything religious—after all, Richard Dawkins was one of the brains behind this conference (see p. xi; p. 234)—leaves one not a little surprised when encountering certain highly questionable, even disgusting phrases; the gravest of such the reviewer noticed in chapter 13 (I. Persson/J. Savulescu, “The Limits of Religious Tolerance”), where the authors repeatedly refer to circumcision and sacrifice as “torture or mutilation of innocent children for fun” (pp. 246–248; six times!). Such language certainly cannot claim to be of “the highest quality” of scholarship nor of philosophical reflection either. It shows exactly the opposite, that is, it shows disdain for responsible, serious reflection. No doubt, rigorous and unrestrained inquiry is the staple of genuine science; yet, rigorous scientific inquiry without intellectual integrity is anything but serious scholarship.

The editors, in their attempt to present a somewhat balanced view, also included a paper by the philosopher of religion Roger Trigg (“Freedom, Toleration, and the Naturalness of Religion,” pp. 163–178) and a “Critical Commentary” by the two Oxford theologians John Perry and Nigel Biggar (pp. 253–265). Trigg emphasizes that “theology and atheism, epistemology and scientific theorizing … have to talk to each other, and can only do so in an atmosphere of freedom” for “it is only in this way that harmful and benign aspects of religion can be distinguished and the former controlled” (pp. 176–177). Perry and Biggar frankly articulate their criticism of much of what is said in the book. They especially bemoan the lack of shared concepts of the core terms “religion,” “tolerance,” and “intolerance” by those involved in the project. Noticing that the “confidence of … assertions about religion” made by various contributors “so often outstrips the carefulness of their argumentation” they ask: “What explains the overreach?” and conclude: “Since the answer cannot be reason, it must be prejudice” (p. 260).

There are other serious limitations as well, as for instance the almost total loss of the historical dimension when authors discuss mental concepts, social forms, and cultural habits. Such amnesia renders their findings somewhat suspicious; these tend to be nothing more than the product of the ingenuity of individual theorists. Further, no attempt is made to sufficiently differentiate between various kinds of religion (theistic, nontheistic, animistic, spiritualistic, etc.), between lived and institutionalized religion, between personal piety and general religious concepts, between faith and dogma. Such differentiation would have had a serious impact on the conceptualization of the questionnaires collecting empirical data. Also—and much more disturbing—there is a complete absence of any reference to the host of classic studies in the field by scholars of religion and theology. Even though these disciplines do not qualify as scientific, the material collected, screened, and processed over centuries in these disciplines deserves adequate scrutiny by anyone claiming to do serious study in matters religious. Conscious, intentional ignorance of this material in scholarly pursuits on religion cannot pose as methodological prerequisite to avoid bias; rather, it is a serious omission, substantially impacting, even distorting the findings. It, actually, is also an expression of bias itself.

In their somewhat redundant concluding remarks, “Practical Implications for Social Policy” (pp. 266–272), Clarke, Powell, and Savulescu repeat what they already stated in the preface (p. v), “that religion promotes social cohesion and heightened tolerance within social groups but also … intolerance and hostility between social groups” (p. 271). While this does not come as a surprise, the final statement does. The editors, who all teach practical ethics, point out that “awareness of the tendency of religions, under certain conditions, to generate out‐group intolerance, hostility, and prejudice leaves us better prepared to anticipate and ameliorate these tendencies where they arise, and perhaps even prevent them from arising in the first place” (p. 272). This remark not only corresponds to the opening sentence of the whole collection which makes reference to the “events of 9/11” (p. v); this comment also reveals the underlying agenda of the entire project while—at least for now—implicitly admitting its failure in succeeding to identify precisely the particular conditions under which religions generate intolerance and hostility. This failure might very well have to do with the inadequacy of the approach and the methods of inquiry used.