Dworkin approaches the study of the relation between science and religion as a philosopher asking whether religion can be atheistic. He does not really doubt that religion can be conceived without a need for a supernatural being, whether this be called God or not. There is much in the history of philosophical reflection on religion that lends support to Dworkin's quest. The result is something like what Ursula Goodenough calls naturalistic religion. Religion in this sense then represents something like an orientation to values. The question really becomes whether this orientation can be grounded in a way that does not require a personal Deity. If so, then the relation between religion and science might be significantly reconfigured.

Certainly Dworkin not only has an agenda that involves thinking about religion without God, but he also is interested in characterizing science in a particular way. The model he suggests is probably widely held. He claims that most physicists are “working realists” (p. 57), which means that they are likely to look for what Dworkin calls explanations that assume a mind‐independent universe. He argues that beauty cannot be evidence of truth. This is a model that emphasizes the experimental nature of science, assuming that theoretical explanations are tested, with the results of the testing forming the basis for judging whether some hypothesis is accepted. He claims that this process can lead toward a form of beauty (even increasing beauty), but that it is a by‐product of rigorous experimentation.

This view of science may, indeed, represent a broadly held perspective in the scientific community, but runs into basic difficulties when dealing with the actual work of scientists. It is not clear that scientific research is always “testing based in terms of judgments.” These days we are more likely to accept the commonly held view that science proceeds from research programmes. The fact that these grow from complex theoretical structures, often based on which broad view is more aesthetically pleasing, may suggest that beauty is more than a product of this work. Even his use of Stephen Hawking's work already implies that some of this latter picture of work is involved, as Hawking accepts that more than one explanation can clearly be given for a variety of scientific questions.

Debating the nature of science may seem somewhat esoteric, but the end result is quite significant in judging the larger project of this book. It may be worthwhile to pursue a form of naturalistic religion as an alternative in the science and religion discussions. There are plenty of voices ready to take that up as a project. Even so, it is not so clear that issue centrally has to do with the incompatibility of revealed religion with science. At least much of the science and religion conversation already has been involved in taking on the position that revealed religion is far more compatible than might be assumed with contemporary science. The project of a religion without God is fine, but skews the nature of the conversation as if this were a distinction between nature and supernature. I would argue that the latter picture of the conversation is basically misleading.

Still, when Ronald Dworkin writes, it is worth paying attention to his work. The book is a careful development of a broadly held position. We expect such from Dworkin. The book may not produce strikingly new contributions to the science and religion conversation, but it does summarize the sort of position that Dworkin has taken through the years. In this way, it is an important voice in the wider conversation. The reader must have some sophistication in understanding the fields of study within this discussion, but Dworkin writes in a way that even the novice (probably one at an advanced level of work) may find it helpful as a clear introduction to a whole range of questions.