Notes

  1. . John Rawls, Philosophical Review 72 (1963): 281–305.
  2. . Jean Piaget, The Moral Judgment of the Child (New York: Collier Books, 1962). Recent work by Lawrence Kohlberg has indicated that Piaget's account may require supplementation. See Kohlberg's “Development of Moral Character and Moral Ideology,” Review of Child Development Research 1 (1964): 383–432; and his “The Development of Children's Orientations toward a Moral Order,” Vita Humana 6 (1963): 11–33.
  3. . These first two laws embody roughly Piaget's two moralities of the child: the one founded on unilateral respect for authority, and the other founded on mutual respect and cooperation. See The Moral Judgment of the Child, pp. 194–96.
  4. . Rawls, “The Sense of Justice,” pp. 287. 289, 292.
  5. . Piaget, The Moral Judgment of the Child, pp. 103, 355, et passim.
  6. . A compatibilist might argue that, while these are deterministic laws, they do not conflict with freedom. I will not attempt to give a critique of compatibilism here. Rather I will assume that it is an unsatisfactory account of the facts, and therefore will assume that determinism is incompatible with freedom.
  7. . It is not clear that a child at this stage can even formulate a belief in determinism. If he cannot, there is no problem for my view with respect to belief. See Piaget, The Moral Judgment of the Child, pp. 188–89.
  8. . Rawls's principles are (a) that each person participating in the activity or affected by it has an equal right to the most extensive liberty compatible with a like liberty for all, and (b) that inequalities are arbitrary unless it is reasonable to expect that they will work out for everyone's advantage, and provided that the positions and offices to which they attach, or from which they may be gained, are open to all (“The Sense of Justice,” p. 283). It is not crucial for my purposes whether or not these are exactly right. All that matters is that the participants know in some intuitive sense that the activity is fair.
  9. . Rawls, “The Sense of Justice,” pp. 293–98.
  10. . See JohnRawls, “Justice as Fairness.Philosophical Review  67 (1958): 164–94.