1. . For a short and clear exposition of how the current problematic of science arose, see Peter Alexander, “The Philosophy of Science: 1850–1910,” in A Critical History of Wettern Philosophy, ed. D. J. O'Connor (New York: Free Press, 1964), pp. 402–25.
  2. . For a recent work on this subject, see Gerard Radnitzky, Contemporary Schools of Metascience, 2 vols. (New York: Humanities Press, 1969); see also Sylvain Bromberger, “A Theory about the Theory of Theory and about the Theory of Theories,” in Philosophy of Science, The Delaware Seminar, vol. 2, ed. Bernard Baumrin (New York: Interscience Publishers, 1963), pp. 79–105.
  3. . The prefix “meta‐” was originally applied to mathematics by David Hilbert; he used the term metamathematics to designate a branch of mathematics which would take mathematical theories and their structural properties as objects of study (see David Hilbert, The Foundations of Geometry, trans. E. J. Townsend [La Salle, Ill.: Open Court, 1938], pp. 126–32 [“Conclusion”).
  4. . This proposal is presented well in James Collins, The Emergence of Philosophy of Religion (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1968).
  5. . An excellent statement of how scientists and theologians are “grounded” within the cultural order can be found in Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckman, The Social Contruction of Reality (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Co., 1967), passim.
  6. . The peculiar convergence of linguistic philosophy and phenomenology in “grounding” theologians and scientists within the social order is well explicated by Dallas M. High, Language, Per‐sons, and Belief Studies in Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations and Religious Uses of Language (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967), chap. 3 (“Language Games”), pp. 70–98.
  7. . It is assumed, above, that the theologian qua theologian is operating within a “universe of meaning” within which he has “bracketed out” the realm of ordinary discourse. For a further explanation of this view, see Alfred Schutz, “The Structure of the Social World,” in The Phenomenology of the Social World, trans. G. Walsh and F. Lehnert (Evanston, 111.: Northwestern University Press, 1967), pp. 139 ff.; or see Part I (“Pure Theory”) of the same author's Collected Papers 11: Studies in Social Theory, ed. Arvid Brodersen (The Hague: M. Nijhoff, 1964), pp. 3–90.
  8. . An explanation of the hypothetico‐deductive analysis of science can be found in a variety of places; see, for example, Norman R. Campbell, Foundations of Science (New York: Dover, 1957), chap. 6 (“Theories”), pp. 119‐58; Ernest Nagel, The Structure of Science: Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1961), chap. 3 (“The Deductive Pattern of Explanation”), pp. 29–46.
  9. . The term “theology” is often used in a broad sense so as to include any writings about religion. Once one acknowledges this fact, and is willing to adopt the view of the theologian as a man operating within a dimension of reality that (though the theologian remains grounded as a human being in the everyday world) is open to his insight and discourse alone, he may be willing to consent to the view that “God” in theology is both the subject and the target for theory and speculation.
  10. . Both of these terms point to two salient facts. First, the proposals of theologians are subject to the “intersubjective” critique of other theologians; second, a theological theory can be more readily “falsified' than “verified” in the consequences it may have within the broader context of religious life. For an explanation of “verifiability” and “falsifiability” see Karl R. Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery (London: Hutschinson, 1959), chap. 6 (“Falsifiability”), pp. 78–92.
  11. . The discussion concerning the “old” and the “new” logic, of course, still continues; a good introductory essay to this subject is Karl Menger, “The New Logic,” Philosophy of' Science 4 (1937): 299–336; most introductory textbooks in logic direct themselves to some discussion of this issue.
  12. . See the variety of “logics” employed by theologians as outlined in Fredrick Ferre, Language, Logic and God (New York: Harper & Row, 1961), chaps. 5–9 especially.
  13. . There is a wide variety of expressions for a dictionary of reference (the term originally used by Campbell [n. 8 above], pp. 122–58): correspondence rules, operational definitions, coordinating definitions, rules of interpretation, and epistemic correlations.
  14. . Some theologians would object, of course, to the expression “metareligion,” arguing (with some validity, of course) that scholarly interest in religion does not qualify one to be a theologian.
  15. . Sir Edmund Whittaker once remarked that he knew of no set of theological principles which, if followed, would justify one in being a pure mathematician.