Basic Assumptions

It is well known that Teilhard’s thinking was considered problematic during his lifetime. One likely reason for this was his apparent disregard for the usual boundaries between various disciplines, most notably between science, philosophy, theology, and spirituality. This concern about his style is certainly understandable, but a careful reading of his works indicates there is often a subtle order in his method. He habitually starts with a purely empirical account of the phenomenon, continues with a study of the philosophical consequences of this account, and then deliberately and openly adds a theological layer of reflection, which he says is appreciable mainly by religious believers. The main philosophical starting points most relevant for our inquiry are as follows.

First, he is convinced that our knowledge must not be limited to analysis and must include synthesis. We should not assume we gain knowledge only by breaking down a given phenomenon into its parts. We need to recall that another kind of knowledge is available through the study of how the parts are joined together to constitute the whole. As regards biology, this insight means that, apart from the study of how evolution could have influenced singular lifeforms or ecosystems, we need to try to understand the entire evolutionary process considered as a whole. Secondly, we need to accept that there are two opposing forces in the material universe, not just one. Apart from the force of dissipation of energy, as explained by the second law of thermodynamics, there is also what he called a convergent force, most evident in living systems. This force represents a decrease in entropy, in other words, an increase in order and complexity. The third point at the basis of his approach concerns the distinction between three aspects of the planet. At the material level, we can talk about the geosphere. When considering life, we can talk about the biosphere, as a kind of organic cover of the Earth. Over this biosphere, we can identify what Teilhard calls the noosphere. This represents the Earth’s sphere of reason, as a kind of upper covering that is immaterial but supported by both the biosphere and the geosphere.

In Teilhard’s works, there are other points of considerable philosophical interest. But instead of listing them as separate principles, we can contrast his overall approach with that of his contemporary, Henri Bergson, who also sought to understand the deeper significance of the entire process of biological evolution taken as a whole. Consider, for instance, the most important characterization of evolution. Bergson was convinced that evolution, as a planetary or perhaps even cosmic phenomenon, is primarily characterized by divergence, dissociation, separation, and division. For him, the entire process is analogous to what happens when, say, we slowly pour milk onto the floor. The milk will hit the floor and start flowing in different directions, forming one puddle here, another there, and it keeps branching out in a random fashion until the milk stops flowing. In this simple analogy, the milk is analogous to what Bergson called the “élan vital.” The picture corresponds well to the customary picture of the tree of life, which shows the various species arranged according to the similarity between them and linked to one another with lines that branch out in all directions. One of Bergson’s (1922, 123) basic principles, therefore, is that “the evolution we are speaking of is never achieved by means of association, but by dissociation; it never tends toward convergence, but toward divergence of efforts.” For Teilhard, this is mistaken. For him, the exact opposite is true. The fact that evolution is characterized primarily by convergence is evident because of the undeniable empirical fact that there are two kinds of energy at work within the universe. There is tangential energy, which explains how an element tends to link itself to other elements at the same level of organization, and there is radial energy, which draws an element into structures of greater complexity.¹ The combined effect of these two kinds of energy results in the law of complexity-consciousness, which states that a more complex biological structure corresponds to a more developed consciousness. For Teilhard, these aspects of the phenomenon of life are undeniable evidence that the entire process is, as it were, seeking to establish increasingly effective levels of consciousness.

Teilhard’s thinking derives from some fundamental assumptions about matter. On this point, comparing him with Bergson will help. For Bergson, matter represents what in nature is inert. Because of this inertness, matter is in conflict with life and with self-consciousness. Even though life and full self-consciousness win in the end, matter remains the deadweight that needs to be overcome. Teilhard’s position is the direct opposite of this. No matter is inert. Within every fragment of it, even at the earliest stages of the evolving universe, there is a potentiality that corresponds to the primordial form of the self-consciousness that will emerge later. In line with this positive view of matter, Teilhard does not see matter and spirit as two opposing principles of the universe, as Bergson and others often assume. For Teilhard ([1955] 1979, 94), there is one long, evolving movement, a long process of cosmogenesis from beginning to end.²

To complete this brief overview of Teilhard’s position, I need to mention something about the deep consistency he sees between his empirical work, his philosophical proposal, and theology. His thought operates at three levels. The first level corresponds to an objective phenomenology of the situation. What can we empirically deduce about the nature of the biosphere? The second level corresponds to a kind of extrapolated physics that allows us to foresee what we are heading towards. He sees as very probable a point of arrival at planetary maturation, which he calls the Omega point, the point where we will have the full growth of the noosphere, the point where humanity will arrive at the full flourishing of a single collectivity of consciousness. For Teilhard ([1955] 1966, 257–63), the present evidence points to the fact that this Omega point will be personal in nature. Teilhard may here be accused of being naively optimistic, because the empirical traces we have of the emergence of human intelligence, symbolism, and language can be interpreted negatively as the beginning of planetary degradation, as the beginning of the eventually overwhelming contamination of the biosphere with human litter (Zwart 2022). His optimism, however, is not unfounded. He argues that we can foresee only two ways forward. We can have either a nature that is self-abortive, in which the evolutionary emergence of thought collapses and fails, or a nature that proceeds on the lines that it has already traced, eventually producing a super mind or soul, in which the evolutionary process achieves its goal. Teilhard is convinced of the latter, and his choice has not been confuted by successive evolutionary science. Admittedly, current evolutionary thinking holds that, strictly speaking, the entire evolutionary process, taken as a whole, could be goal-directed only if it were itself the product of some higher-order selective process. But this is not a confutation of Teilhard’s proposal. Since there is no empirical evidence of such a higher-order selective process, the correct attitude on the part of science is to say that the question of whether the biosphere is goal-directed or not is, up to now, undecidable on empirical grounds. But Teilhard favored the thesis of biospheric goal-directedness not on empirical grounds as such, like a typical scientific theory, but on the grounds that it maximizes the coherence of what we know. For him, the idea that self-consciousness, after being brought forth by the universe, is destined to wither and die out is inconsistent with the facts we already know. He writes, “We have seen and admitted that evolution is an ascent towards consciousness … Therefore it should culminate forwards in some sort of supreme consciousness” (Teilhard [1955] 1966, 258).

I move on now to Teilhard’s third level of reflection, where he enters the realm of theology. Addressing Christian believers, he argues that the Omega point corresponds to the figure of Christ. The consistency between science and religion becomes evident when we see how the Omega of evolution is identifiable with Christ, the prime mover of the entire movement of complexity-consciousness. In the face of opposition from some theologians, Teilhard insisted that the incarnation was more a work of unification of the universe than a work of redemption from sin. This unification is realized via the church, which Teilhard situates within the entire process of cosmogenesis as a special phylum within the human phylum. He uses the term Christogenesis to refer to the church’s destiny to carry human evolution towards the Christ-Omega, operating between the resurrection and the parousia. Christianity ensures that the two forces of human love and divine charity continue to realize the noospheric maturation. In such reasoning, Teilhard articulates a cosmological Christology in line with St. Paul’s teaching that the grace of Christ will transform, forgive, and heal this sinful and wounded world. One should add that Teilhard saw the mystery of the eucharist as embodying his view that the Omega of evolution is identifiable with Christ. The incarnation involves a kind of universal transubstantiation: “And then there appears to the dazzled eyes of the believer the eucharistic mystery itself extended infinitely into a veritable universal transubstantiation, in which the words of the Consecration are applied not only to the sacrificial bread and wine but, mark you, to the whole mass of joys and sufferings produced by the Convergence of the World as it progresses” (Teilhard [1955] 1966).³

This brief overview does not mention the genuine incompatibilities that can emerge between some of Teilhard’s proposals and standard theological understanding. This article, by using Teilhard as a point of reference for deeper reflection on the future of humanity, does not endorse all that he said.⁴ It nevertheless acknowledges the value of the insights mentioned and highlights the fact that, despite the richness of these insights, they leave work to be done, especially because Teilhard’s futurology focuses primarily on the human future. What are the implications for nonhuman creatures? To address this question, two key concepts need to be considered in greater depth.

Two Key Concepts

The first key concept is cephalization. This word refers to the evolutionary trend in which, over many generations, the mouth, sense organs, and nerve ganglia become concentrated at the front end of an animal, producing a head region. This concentration is associated with movement and bilateral symmetry, such that the animal has a definite head end in which a sophisticated brain is found. In current research, the notion of cephalization is associated with the notion of cognitive embodiment, which refers to the fact that an extended and complex organic body in space needs a center of control. To explain the original branching out of various lifeforms, one needs to consider the complexification of animal bodies and relate it to the complexification of perception, cognition, and behavior. A complex organism is possible only if it has a complex brain (Trestman 2013).

Teilhard was aware of cephalization and considered it a planetary phenomenon. For him, it was important empirical evidence supporting the claim that, even though evolution involves random mutations and natural selection, it nevertheless shows traces of progress when considered as a planetary phenomenon. He writes:

While accepting the undeniable fact of the general evolution of Life in the course of time, many biologists still maintain that these changes take place without following any defined course, in any direction and at random. This contention, disastrous to any idea of progress, is refuted, in my view, by the tremendous fact of the continuing ‘cerebralisation’ of living creatures. Research shows that from the lowest to the highest level of the organic world there is a persistent and clearly defined thrust of animal forms towards species with more sensitive and elaborate nervous systems. A growing ‘innervation’ and ‘cephalisation’ of organisms: the working of this law is visible in every living group known to us, the smallest no less than the largest. We can follow it in insects as in vertebrates; and among the vertebrates we can follow it from class to class, from order to order, and from family to family. There is an amphibian phase of the brain, a reptilian phase, a mammalian phase. In mammals we see the brain grow as time passes and become more complex among the ungulates, the carnivores and above all the primates. (Teilhard 1964, 68)

Teilhard, however, does not stop there. When trying to figure out what our knowledge can tell us about the future outcome of evolution on the planet, he arrives at the following conclusion. Just as cephalization occurs within certain groups of animals as an evolutionary trend by which the animal’s front becomes a head, so within the entire biosphere, taken as a whole, can we observe the same evolutionary trend. We can observe a trend that is analogously making Homo sapiens, with its uniquely advanced capacities for reasoning and technological innovation, the head of life on the planet. The emergence and flourishing of Homo sapiens correspond to the cephalization of the biosphere. Here, the use of “cephalization” is metaphorical. It brings out the awareness that the direction of evolutionary development lies now in the hands of human beings, who represent, in a sense, the control center of life on the planet. Teilhard does not refrain from pointing out the resonance of this point with some fundamental theological ideas expressed most clearly by St. Paul. Teilhard ([1948] 1968, 167) writes, “[I]t is he [Christ] who gives its consistence to the entire edifice of matter and Spirit. In him too, ‘the head of Creation’, it follows, the fundamental cosmic process of cephalisation culminates and is completed, on a scale that is universal and with a depth that is supernatural, and yet in harmony with the whole of the past.”

Apart from cephalization, another key concept important for our consideration in this article is socialization. Again, we have here a concept Teilhard considers indispensable for extrapolating our present knowledge towards the future. The basic insight derives from the fact that, with the appearance of Homo sapiens, evolutionary life on the planet has taken the important step of giving birth to a species that floats freely. It floats freely in the sense that it changes and develops not according to random mutations and natural selection but primarily according to social and inter-relational transformation. When Teilhard (Teilhard [1948] 1968, 159) describes how future humanity, or super-humanity as it he calls it, will look, he writes: “It is not in the direction of anatomically super-cerebralised individuals that we must look if we are scientifically to discern the form assumed by Super-humanity, but in that of super-socialised aggregations.” He is convinced of this because each human being is becoming increasingly closer to others, and at the same time, each is becoming capable of extending interaction with others in an ever-increasing range of influence. Can we deduce something about the nature of this super-socialized future state? For Teilhard, the appearance of humans within the biosphere represents the crucial emergence of personality. This means that the socialization we find in nonhuman animals and the socialization we see in humans are different not only in degree but also in kind. He writes, “There is nothing new in the idea of comparing mankind, taken as one whole, to a ‘brain of brains’ or to an ant-colony; but, unless they are to lead us into gross misrepresentations, these attractive analogies can be pursued only if they respect the human particle’s quite unique property of constituting a reflective nucleus centred upon itself … Starting with man … there is a change in conditions. As a specific result of the phenomenon of ‘reflexion’, the living particle definitively closes in on itself. It begins to act and react as a centre of incommunicable value, a value therefore that cannot be transmitted. It lives for itself, as much as and at the same time as for others. It is personalised” (Teilhard [1948] 1968, 160).⁵ Teilhard here argues that once personalization has emerged at a certain point within the long sweep of evolutionary history, it is there to stay. It will not be sacrificed for any future development.

Could this emphasis on socialization tell us something about the best way forward regarding politics? Teilhard was dealing with these questions at a time when the world was undergoing traumatic political turmoil. The major political systems of communism, democracy, and fascism confronted each other not only ideologically but also physically during the Second World War. For Teilhard, the evolutionary basis of life and the emergence of the noosphere offer undeniable evidence for the claim that the genuine flourishing of socialization is one that secures the infinite value of the person. Hence, one cannot simply construct a political future on the model of an organism in which each cell loses its early pluripotentiality and eventually becomes specialized in total subservience to the organism. Nor should one use the model of social insects, in which a high level of socialization results from different instincts that literally transform individual members of the colony and make of them instruments for the efficient functioning of the whole.⁶ In political terms, therefore, one should not conceive of human super-collectivity in a way that requires the total subordination of the individual under the will of the state. Teilhard ([1948] 1968, 160) writes, “In the case of man, therefore, collectivisation, super-socialisation, can only mean super-personalisation; in other words, it ultimately means (since only the forces of love have the property of personalising by uniting) sympathy and unanimity.”

Open Questions

As is well known, Teilhard’s work left various open questions that were the cause of discussion and consternation for many generations of scholars and scientists after him. One of the less discussed questions concerns the relation between cephalization and socialization. As mentioned, Teilhard sees cephalization as also occurring at the planetary level, in the sense that Homo sapiens is the head of the biosphere. The idea of a “head” of the planet implies, of course, coordination and responsibility, just like the head of an animal with respect to the entire body. This aspect of the notion of cephalization however has remained unexplored by both Teilhard and his commentators. If we acknowledge that humans are the head of the biosphere, how are we to conceive of their care for the entire body and not just for themselves? A similar question arises as regards socialization. Teilhard considers this notion in terms of relations between individual humans. In fact, he uses the term noosphere to refer to the interpersonal nature of intelligence that emerged with the appearance of Homo sapiens. One could ask, however, whether the ultimate planetary maturation, corresponding to the Omega point, is exclusively noospheric. On this point, Teilhard’s thinking seems to pull in two opposite directions. On the one hand, he emphasizes the crucial and unavoidable importance of personalization and sees the super-socialization of the future as the flowering of human potentiality at the end of a long process of cosmogenesis. The implication here is that as regards the Omega point, all nonhuman reality fades in importance. It is as though the biosphere with all its lifeforms served only as a kind of chrysalis out of which the butterfly of the super-personalization of the Omega point emerges. The chrysalis, of course, remains like a crust that falls away when its work is over.⁷ Hence, the Omega point is exclusively noospheric. On the other hand, however, Teilhard often repeats, especially in his more theological works, that what he is trying to articulate is an evolutionary version of the cosmic Christology we find in St. Paul and the prologue of St. John’s gospel. He is thus engaged in articulating the idea that the redemption of Christ is not limited to humans but also in some way the entire creation, presumably including animals and plants. This line of reflection, therefore, seems to indicate that for Teilhard, the Omega point is not exclusively noospheric.

These open questions and divergent interpretative possibilities invite us to explore this area further and see whether it is possible to articulate an idea of future togetherness that goes beyond human togetherness. What we are looking for is an account that includes not only the idea of the biosphere having a head, and the idea that the future lies in the direction of socialized personalization, but also the imperative for a broader kind of socialization that includes all lifeforms. Is this possible?

Charting New Territory

The most plausible way forward is to carefully revise what we mean by planetary maturation. Is it possible to see planetary maturation as involving a kind of flourishing of humans that includes the flourishing of other animals? Teilhard’s proposals have thrown invaluable light on the idea of cosmogenesis, anthropogenesis, and Christogenesis, but much more needs to be said about nonhuman animals. If we launch our investigation from where Teilhard left off, the question therefore becomes: How can we bring animals on board?⁸ To proceed correctly, we need to avoid the simplistic idea that all animals go to heaven. This proposal would certainly ensure that planetary maturation both in terms of the flourishing of the noosphere and in terms of a theology of Christogenesis will include animals. It nevertheless remains unacceptable in so far as it does not properly reflect the obvious differences between human and nonhuman animals, especially as regards cognitive and semantic capacities. The challenge therefore is to articulate an idea of planetary maturation that is not merely inclusive of nonhuman animals but inclusive in the right way.

One source of inspiration on how to do this is found in the works of Jakub von Uexküll, a biologist and philosopher who was a contemporary of Teilhard’s. Uexküll draws out valuable implications from the simple fact that animals have different ways of perceiving. What an organism can perceive determines that organism’s world. Hence, to each animal there is a corresponding world, which Uexküll calls the animal’s Umwelt. Normally, the German word Umwelt means environment, but here, we have an important nuance. The word “environment” connotes whatever surrounds, conditions, or influences a given organism, while Umwelt in Uexküll’s sense connotes a subsection of this. It connotes what organism can perceive, even in the most rudimentary sense of a mere response to stimuli. Sectors of the environment not perceivable by an organism are not part of that organism’s Umwelt. When seen from this perspective, all organisms appear as subjects in the sense that each has its way of registering its surroundings and thereby constituting its world. What it perceives, often from different senses, is brought together into a single project, the project of surviving. In this sense, organisms are well tuned to their Umwelt. A simple organism is well tuned to its simple Umwelt, a complex organism is well tuned to its complex Umwelt. “Subject and object are interconnected with each other and form an orderly whole … All animal subjects, from the simplest to the most complex, are inserted into their environments to the same degree of perfection” (Uexküll [1934] 2010, 49–50; see also Uexküll [1937] 2001). We notice therefore that, on this view, subjectivity is not an exclusively human attribute. The major novelty in this approach is that subjectivity is a matter of degree. It is not that organisms are tuned to their surroundings to different degrees but that organisms are subjects like us to different degrees. Simple organisms have a modest range of perception and hence modest combinatorial use of perceptual information. Complex organisms have a wide range of perception and hence a rich combinatorial use of perceptual information (Kawade 2009). This point about degrees of subjectivity corresponds to some extent to what Teilhard writes about personalization. Of course, we need to recall that for Teilhard, the appearance of personalization within the evolutionary process constitutes what he calls a critical point; in other words, it constitutes a kind of ontological leap. Personal organisms are intrinsically different from nonpersonal ones. Nevertheless, for Teilhard, there is the law of complexity-consciousness according to which a higher degree of organic complexity corresponds to a higher degree of consciousness. Hence, although he does not mention degrees of personality, he does accept degrees of consciousness. In this sense, therefore, we can safely say that in the works of both Uexküll and Teilhard we find significant hints on how to correctly situate nonhuman animals within the general push towards the genuine flourishing of the planet.

Our basic conceptual tool is the idea that subjectivity can come in degrees. This means we attribute subjectivity to others by extending what we experience ourselves as subjects. I experience myself as an individual. What happens when I encounter an individual other than me, in other words, when I encounter a foreign individual, a foreign entity? I extend the concept of being a subject, and I attenuate it, if needed, in line with my knowledge of the nature of that foreign individual. I am assuming here that my primordial experience, which constitutes the dawning of my rationality as an individual, is not a two-stage process. It is not the case that I first learn about myself and then learn about my surroundings. It is rather that experience grows as I am situated within my surroundings. It grows within my relationality with my surroundings. My individuality is disclosed to me in the very process of encountering foreign individuals, which are of various kinds. Some are animate, others inanimate. Thus, I slowly learn how to correctly situate foreign individuals with respect to each other and with respect to me. These simple phenomenological reflections indicate that, although we attribute subjectivity to other persons spontaneously, thus considering them humans like us whom we can understand and with whom we can empathize, this attribution can sometimes become dubious. Admittedly, such cases are rare, but with the advance of robotics, the issue can cause concern. For instance, older people in retirement homes where humanoid robotic assistants are being introduced can become confused. In other words, there can be cases in which we are not sure whether the foreign individual we encounter really has the full subjectivity we enjoy ourselves.

The situation described so far has great relevance for the question about our relation to nonhuman animals. We all know how small children tend to be very generous with attributing subjectivity and even personality to nonhuman animals. This trend is supported by literary and cinematographic works showing animals talking and behaving like humans. As children grow up, however, they learn how to attenuate the subjectivity they attribute to animals. They learn how to attribute the right degree of subjectivity to an animal in line with that animal’s nature. For instance, they learn that it is correct to empathize, to some extent, with their pet dog but quite silly to empathize with the worm just picked up by the bird in the garden. Attributing full subjectivity to all nonhuman animals, considering them just like persons, is one extreme to be avoided. The opposite extreme needs to be avoided as well. So, children eventually become aware that, although they should refrain from seeing all animals as persons, they should refrain just as much from seeing them as mere machines without feelings. In other words, children learn that nonhuman animals enjoy some degree of subjectivity, each type of animal according to its nature.

In my view, these observations are universally recognized, despite cultural differences (Caruana 2020). The important step now is to see how they can help us address the general question in this article. The task set was to articulate an idea of future togetherness that goes beyond human togetherness, an idea that involves a broader kind of socialization to include all lifeforms.

We humans enjoy the dynamism of planetary maturation at the level of the noosphere. If we accept the imperative of bringing animals on board, we need a way of including them within this noospheric dynamism. In other words, we are envisaging a future in which there is feedback from the noosphere back into the biosphere and even to the geosphere. Maturation is not a one-way process. Researchers in environmental studies sometimes talk about anthropization, an idea that refers to the way the environment is transformed by human activity. Anthropization corresponds to some extent with the proposal being defended here. But the kind of anthropization I want to highlight is not selfish but generous. It is not the carving out of our comfortable niche but a kind of sharing of human rationality. Of course, this kind of anthropization, which corresponds with “bringing animals on board,” does not mean changing their genome to make them rational like us. It means helping them share in the benefits of the order that is possible for us to establish via our rationality. Each species is to share in this order according to its nature and possibilities. It should be clear therefore that this imperative of reaching out beyond the habitual frontiers of the noosphere requires us to make correct judgements concerning each organism’s degree of subjectivity. We certainly need to avoid the two extremes already mentioned. It will distort our outreach if we take all animals to be persons, and it will distort our outreach just as much if we take all animals to be nonsubjective entities, like stones or machines.

At this point, those familiar with ancient philosophy will recognize that my reasoning in terms of two opposing extremes is reminiscent of Aristotle’s famous account of the nature of virtue, a virtue as a point between a deficiency and an excess of a trait. For example, as regards courage, Aristotle said that courage is the right point between being rash and being cowardly. In general, a virtue is a kind of excellence at being human, a kind of excellence that is either moral or intellectual. Various religions and philosophical traditions have produced lists of virtues, but there is no guarantee that the excellence at being human has been fully determined. If the reasoning in this article is correct, we are now encountering the features of a specific virtue that has not yet been properly named. We are dealing with a kind of human excellence situated at a point between the deficiency of acting on the assumption that all nonhuman entities are nonsubjects and the excess of acting on the assumption that all of them are fully personal subjects. This virtue corresponds to the kind of excellence in being able to infer correctly how things look from another individual’s perspective or in being able to empathize to the right extent, in the right way, with another individual. Notice that we engage in this kind of inference and empathy quite often in the run of our daily lives, especially as regards other human beings. At times we do it correctly, at times incorrectly. What I am highlighting here is the need to extend this kind of inference and empathy beyond interpersonal relations and apply it with respect to nonhuman individuals. The challenge, of course, is to do it correctly, neither personalizing the other individual too much nor too little. The basic point of this article is therefore that we need this virtue to realize a future in which planetary maturation is not just a human affair but a planetary one.

If we want to examine this virtue further, we may try to give it an appropriate name, which, in my view, can be derived from the idea of seeing the world from different perspectives. What does the world look like from your dog’s viewpoint? How do the polar bears feel with the decreasing sea ice? This is not equivalent to merely picturing the world from different standpoints. It is rather a kind of seeing and feeling the world from different degrees of subjectivity. The envisaged displacement is not in visual space but in subjectivity space. The exercise is harder. Resorting to classical philosophical terminology, we can use the term psyche for subject, and the different degrees of subjectivity would then correspond to the different kinds of psyche or soul. In Greek, the prefix “apo-” indicates “away from,” “distant,” or “separate.” Hence, apopsychic means “drawn away from the soul.” We can therefore define an apopsychic person as one who excels in determining how the world looks or feels from a perspective other than their own. The virtue we are interested in can therefore be called apopsychitude.⁹

In brief, therefore, the foregoing reasoning has advanced Teilhard’s notions of cephalization and socialization in two ways. It shows how the idea of humanity being the head of the biosphere strongly supports the proposal that humans are obliged to coordinate and be responsible for all living things, being a kind of hub of planetary intelligence and responsibility. It also shows that there is no valid reason to conceive of socialization as a phenomenon constrained within the limits of the human realm. Socialization in fact is better seen as the realization of community that involves the entire biosphere. Hence, planetary maturation is not just human collectivity becoming better on its own but human collectivity becoming better by extending itself to embrace all creatures. To achieve this correctly, the virtue of apopsychitude is essential.

At this point, some may be worried because apopsychitude as described earlier seems an unrealizable ideal. When we recall how hard it is to figure out how things look from another person’s point of view, how could we even think of the possibility of accomplishing this with regard to other lifeforms? The difficulty highlighted here is real, but the point of recognizing and determining the main features of this virtue was not that we can aspire to become capable of grasping the fullness of perspectival knowledge of all subjects, whatever their level of subjectivity. In other words, it was not that we can acquire the attribute of omnisubjectivity, which is discussed by some philosophers as one of the divine attributes (Zagzebski 2008). The point is much more modest. By highlighting the importance of apopsychitude, we are claiming that a genuine effort to appreciate another subject’s point of view, whatever the level of the subjectivity involved, is not only helpful but essential for planetary maturation, even if this appreciation is achieved incompletely. With the excellence associated with this virtue, the person comes to enjoy to a modest extent something of God’s omnisubjectivity. To say it using the Platonic notion of participation, just as the human knower participates in God’s omniscience, the human apopsychic person participates in God’s omnisubjectivity. By enlarging the horizon of planetary flourishing to include all creatures, the proposal therefore draws new light on the way human beings can participate in God’s providential care for all creation.

Another worry that may trouble the reader is that the proposal highlights the need for people to be apopsychic, but it says very little about how to deal with concrete cases. Should we attribute legal rights to chimpanzees? Is it correct to have religious burial rites for dogs? What is wrong with exterminating the entire species of the screwworm fly? Should we really feel sorry for polar bears, or should we rather let their innate resourcefulness and Gaia take care of the situation? The objection puts a finger on a genuine weakness in the overall proposal because what the paper offers is a set of very general guidelines, the primary one being that we conceive of future togetherness in terms of a collectivity of all kinds of subjects. To achieve this, we need to correctly judge the degree of subjectivity of the various organisms that constitute the biosphere in line with our best empirical knowledge regarding their nature. But what does this mean for concrete cases? There is still a lot of work to be done. A good start would be to recall the extensive literature on how a person can grow in virtue; how a person can form a morally good habit, retaining it until it becomes second nature to that person; and how virtuous mentors can be useful in such teaching of virtue. This literature can certainly be a good source of inspiration for further exploration of how to become an apopsychic person, but this work must be left for a sequel to this article.

For now, we can be content with the modest results achieved so far. The article has reviewed Teilhard’s position on the future of humanity, especially his way of emphasizing cephalization and socialization. It has extended this view by proposing an inclusive account of planetary maturation that is not limited to the noosphere. For this to be possible, we need to become good at correctly figuring out what the world looks like and how it feels from another subject’s viewpoint. We need to acquire the virtue I called apopsychitude. The main point of the article does not really depend on whether we can name the required virtue or not. The main point is that for future togetherness to be inclusive, we need to be good at recognizing the correct degree of subjectivity of all members of the biosphere, and that to do this we cannot let our emotions run away with us. We must resort to all that science can teach us about the nature of each species and the nature of each ecosystem. The challenge is considerable, but it cannot be ignored.

Acknowledgments

For providing helpful comments on earlier drafts of this article, I thank the participants of the workshop of the Philosophy Faculty research group of the Gregorian University held at the Vatican Observatory premises, Rome, Italy, in May 2023, the participants of the Science Religion Forum conference held at Cambridge, UK, in August 2023, and anonymous referees for Zygon: Journal of Religion and Science.