Notes

  1. . Donald SzanthoHarrington, “Science and the Search for a Rational Religious Faith,” Zygon  1 (1966):97–107.
  2. . Ibid., p. 99.
  3. . Ibid.
  4. . Ibid.
  5. . Ibid., p. 106.
  6. . Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics: A Selection, trans, and ed. G. W. Bromiley, with an introduction by Helmut Gollwitzer (New York: Harper & Bros., 1962), p. 3.
  7. . Paul Tillich, Systematic Theology, 3 vols. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951–63), 1:6.
  8. . Charles W. Kegley and Robert W. Bretall. eds., The Theology of Paul Tillich (New York: Macmillan Co., 1956, p. 217.
  9. . Thomas J. J. Altizer and William Hamilton, Radical Theology and the Death of God (New York: Bobbs‐Merrill Co., 1966).
  10. . Revelation rests on the authority of reason, because to this faculty it submits its evidences of truth, and nothing but the approving sentence of reason binds us to receive and obey it.… Reason must prescribe the tests or standards to which a professed revelation from God should be referred; and among these none are more important than that moral law which belongs to the very essence and is the deepest conviction of the rational nature. Revelation, then, rests on reason, and in opposing it would act for its own destruction (William Ellery Channing, “Christianity a Rational Religion,” in The Works of William E. Channing, D.D., with an Introduction [Boston: American Unitarian Association, 1875], pp. 236‐37. Cf. Robert Leet Patterson, The Philosophy of William Ellery Channing [New York: Bookman Associates, 1952], chap. 6).
  11. . John Baillie, The Idea of Revelation in Recent Thought (New York: Columbia University Press, 1965), p. 28. His translation is from the article by Albrecht Oepke, who wrote: “Die Offenbarung wird auch in der Folgezeit nicht im Sinne der Mitteilung Übernatürlichen Wissens verstanden, sondern im Sinne des Aussichheraus‐tretens Gottes, als Enthüllung der jenseitigen, kommenden Welt” (Albrecht Oepke, “foreign language” Theologiiches Wörterbuch zum Neuen Testament, ed. Gerhard Kittel III [Stuttgart: Verlag von W. Kohlhammer, 1938], p. 586). Oepke's complete article is now available in English: Albrecht Oepke, “foreign language”, Theological Dictionary of the New Testament, trans, and ed. Geoffrey W. Bromiley, 6 vols. (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1964‐68), 3:582‐83. (Baillie's translation omits Oepke's eschatological element: the self‐disclosure of God is “the coming of God, as the disclosure of the world to come.”
  12. . Anthony F. C. Wallace, Religion: An Anthropological View (New York: Random House, 1966), pp. 30–39.
  13. . Richard von Mises, Positivism: A Study in Human Understanding (New York: George Braziller, Inc., 1956), p. 73.
  14. . Ibid., p. 96.
  15. . Tertullian, “The Prescriptions against Heretics,” in Early Latin Theology: Selections from Tertullian, Cyprian, Ambrose, and Jerome, trans, and ed. S. L. Green‐slade, Library of Christian Classics, 26 vols. (London: S.C.M. Press, 1956), 5:35‐36.
  16. . “Viderint qui Stoicum et Platonicum et dialecticum christianismum protulerunt” (“Q. S. Fl. Tertvlliani De Praescriptione Haereticorvm,” in Tertvlliani Opera, Pars I: Opera Catholica, Adversus Marcionem, ed. R. F. Refoulé, Corpus Christianorvm, Series Latina, 180 vols. [Turnholti: Typographi Brepols Editores Pontificii, 1954], 1:193).
  17. . “Away with all attempts to produce a mottled Christianity of Stoic, Platonic, and dialectic composition” (Tertullian, “The Prescription against Heretics,” in Latin Christianity: Its Founder, Tertullian, ed. A. Cleveland Coxe, The Ante‐Nicene Fathers: Translations of the Writings of the Fathers Down to A.D. 325, vol. 3 [Grand Rapids, Mich.: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1957], p. 246.)
  18. . This passage has been repeatedly misunderstood. As Otto Heick has pointed out, Tertullian is not responsible for the phrase “Credo quia absurdum est.” What he did write was this: “And the Son of God died; it is by all means to be believed, because it is absurd. And He was buried, and rose again; the fact is certain, because it is impossible” (Tertullian, “On the Flesh of Christ,” ibid, p. 525 [“Prorsus credible est quia ineptum est… certum est quia impossible est”]). See also: “Dr. Moffatt has pointed out the curious affinity between Tertullian's famous paradox mentioned in De Carne Christ, 5, and a passage in Aristotle's ‘Rhetoric,' 23, 22. Tertullian deliberately exaggerates in order to call attention to the truth he wishes to emphasize” (C. De Lisle Shortt, The Influence of Philosophy on the Mind of Tertullian [London: Elliott Stock, n.d.], pp. 26‐27). Professor Shortt refers to James Moffatt's suggestive paragraphs on Aristotle and Tertullian (JamesMoffatt,” Aristotle and Tertullian,” Journal of Theological Studies  17 [1916]:170–171.)
  19. . In his useful book, The Influence of Philosophy on the Mind of Tertullian, Shortt has demonstrated at length how powerfully Tertullian was influenced by the philosophies he disparaged and how deeply he was indebted to them. Valentinus Morel, however, has argued that Tertullian depended more on unchanging oral tradition than on Scripture as such, to which, of course, any influence from philosophy would be inferior. Professor Morel places tradition above Scripture: “Tertullianus gaat door als een roemrijk verdediger van de overlevering. Hij is het ook in feite. Geen schrijver uit de Oudheid heeft met meer onverbiddelijke logica en met meer grootschheid van beschouwingen aangetoond dat de mondelinge overlevering boven dc H. Schrift staat en dat zij, wat den geloofsregel betreft, onverandcrlijk is naar haar beteekenis. Van dit beginsel is hij nooit afgeweken, ook niet nadat hij montanist was geworden” (Valentinus Morel, De Ontwikkeling van de Christelijke Overlevering Volgens Tertullianus [Brussels: De Kinkhoren, 1946], p. 195. I have added the italics). Such a one‐sided view should be corrected by more balanced interpretations, such as that of Richard Baepler, who acknowledges that “Jerusalem has always needed Athens.” He continues: “It is inexact to conclude from some of Tertullian's statements that he believes scripture to be incomplete and requiring an oral tradition superior to it in order to understand it.… The modern distinction or opposition between scripture and tradition is unknown to Tertullian; there is mutual coherence, rather in the uniting apostolic content. This is one leading idea in On the Prescription against Heretics” (Richard Paul Baepler, “The Biblical Interpretation of Tertullian” [Ph.D. diss., University of Chicago, 1964], pp. 17, 140–41).
  20. . Isma'il R. al Färüqi has emphasized that because for Islamic modernism the empirical methods of science and revelation “both pertain to the same reality, they are, in final analysis, subject to the same laws of intelligibility and, hence, equally critical and rational” (Isma'ilR. al Faruqi, “Science and Traditional Values in Islamic Society,” Zygon  2 [1967]:239).
  21. . Kenneth Cauthen, Science, Secularization, and God: Toward a Theology of the Future (Nashville, Tenn.: Abingdon Press, 1969), p. 140.
  22. . Reinhold Bendix, “Max Weber,” International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, 17 vols. (New York: Macmillan Co., and Free Press, 1968), 16:495. Cf. Edward Shils and H. A. Finch, eds., Max Weber on the Methodology of the Social Sciences (Glencoe, III.: Free Press, 1949), p. 93, where Weber describes an ideal type as a conceptual construct which “has the significance of a purely ideal limiting concept with which the real situation or action is compared and surveyed for the explication of certain of its significant components.”
  23. . JohnC. Godbey, “Brief Remarks on the Need for a Scientific Theology,” Zygon  4 (1969):125–26.
  24. . H. StanleyBennett, “The Scope and Limitations of Science,” Zygon  3 (1968):343.
  25. . Ibid., p. 353.
  26. . Vincent of Lérins, “The Commonitory,” in Early Medieval Theology, trans, and ed. George E. McCracken in collaboration with Albert Cabaniss, Library of Christian Classics, 9:38.
  27. . Clyde Leonard Manschreck, Melanchthon, the Quiet Reformer (New York and Nashville, Tenn.: Abingdon Press, 1958), pp. 82–89; Melanchthon on Christian Doctrine: Loci Communes 1555, trans, and ed. Clyde L. Manschreck with an introduction by Hans Engelland, A Library of Protestant Thought (New York: Oxford University Press, 1965).
  28. . Otto W. Heick, A History of Christian Thought, 2 vols. (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1965–66), 2:48 ft.
  29. . Eldred C. Vanderlaan, Protestant Modernism in Holland (London: Humphrey Milford, Oxford University Press, 1924), pp. 29–32. Vanderlaan used the first edition (1848, 1850) of Scholten's work. In his fourth edition (1861, 1862), Scholten reduced the material principle to God's absolute sovereignty in the natural and moral world: “Het materiéle grondbeginsel van de leer der Hervormde Kerk bestaat in de belijdenis van Gods volstrekte opperheerschappij in de natuurlijke en zedelijke wereld.” In a footnote: “De woorden ‘inzonderheid van zijne vrije genade als den eenigen grond der zaligheid' zijn hier weggelaten. Dat Gods genade de eenige grond der zaligheid is, volgt uit zijne Souvereiniteit van zelf, en zal bij de verdere ontwikkeling van het gereformeerde leerstelsel nader blijken” (J[an] H[endrik] Scholten, De Léer der Hervormde Kerk in hare Grondbeginselen uit de Bronnen voorgesteld en Beoordeeld, 4th enlarged ed., 2 vols. [Leiden: Akademische Boekhandels van P. Engels, 1861‐62], 2:1).
  30. . Vanderlaan, pp. 49–58. For more details, cf. H. Van ‘t Veer, Mr. C. W. Opzoomer als Wijsgeer (Assen: Van Gorcum & Co., 1961).
  31. . Henry Nelson Wieman, The Source of Human Good (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1946); Robert W. Bretall, ed., The Empirical Theology of Henry Nelson Wieman, Library of Living Theology, vol. 4 (New York: Macmillan Co., 1963).
  32. . Reinhold Seeberg, Text‐Book of the History of Doctrines, trans. Charles E. Hay, 2 vols. (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Baker Book House, 1954), 1:46.
  33. . O. W. Heick and J. L. Neve, A History of Christian Thought, 2 vols. (Philadelphia: Muhlenberg Press, 1946), 1:83.
  34. . Ibid., 1:114.
  35. . Henry Chadwick, Early Christian Thought and the Classical Tradition: Studies in Justin, Clement, and Origen (New York: Oxford University Press, 1966), p. 111.
  36. . Ibid., p. 122.
  37. . Jean Daniélou, Origen, trans. Walter Mitchell (New York: Sheed & Ward, 1955), p. 99.
  38. . Chadwick, p. 103.
  39. . In opposition to the interpretation of E. Gilson, Van der Laan emphasizes the importance of the studies of F. Van Steenberghen, who insisted on the importance of Aristotelianism in Bonaventura's thought: “In dit opzicht zijn de onderzoekingen van Van Steenberghen van grote betekenis. Hij komt tot een bepaalde konceptie van Bonaventura's denken, dat hij typeert als eklektisch en neoplatoniserend aristotelisme ten dienste van de augustijnse theologie.… Bovendien is dit aristotelisme in de illu‐minatieleer neoplatoniserend” (Hendrikus Van der Laan, De Wijsgerige Grondslag van Bonaventura's Theologie [Amsterdam: Buijten & Schipperheijn, 1968], pp. 135–36).
  40. . Sydney Herbert Mellone, Western Christian Thought in the Middle Ages (Edinburgh and London: William Blackwood & Sons, 1935), p. 153. Van der Laan notes that Bonaventura's doctrine of illumination was not clearly stated: “Een mens kan niet zonder meer kennis verwerven. Hij moet verlicht worden.… Zonder God is er geen verlichting en zonder verlichting is er geen kennis. Wat dit lumen is wordt door Bonaventura niet duidelijk gezegd. Hij noemt het lumen cognitionis, dat tot een bepaalde vorm van kennis aangaande het kenbare leidt” (Van der Laan, De Wijsgerige Grondslag van Bonaventura's Theologie, pp. 135–36).
  41. . Paul Vignaux, Philosophy in the Middle Ages, trans. E. C. Hall (New York: Meridian Books, 1959), pp. 105–6.
  42. . “At first he [Saint Thomas] even paid tribute to the Platonic‐Augustinian theory of illumination only to reverse himself completely later on when the full force of Aristotelian principles drove his logical mind in another direction” (Hans Meyer, The Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas [Saint Louis: B. Herder Book Co., 1944], p. 30).
  43. . McNeill describes the coming of Aristotelian thought: “In the twelfth century, Ibn Rushd (Averroes) and Maimonides had revivified Aristotle's philosophy. The doctors of Islam, who cherished their own well‐tried patterns of thought and honored other sources of authority, paid no attention; but in the Latin West, where men were only beginning to explore the subtleties and complexities of intellectual life, the logical method and systematic reasonableness of Aristotelian philosophy had all the force of fresh revelation. Aristotle offered a world‐view that rivaled the traditional Christian (for the Latin West, basically Augustinian) outlook; a pagan philosophy, to be sure, yet one so impressive, so fascinating, and so appealing to the powers of reason that it could not casually be neglected” (William H. McNeill, The Rise of the West: A History of the Human Community [Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963], p. 550).
  44. . “In a large sense, therefore, the SCG is part of the Christian intellectual reaction against Arabian intellectual culture, and especially against Arabian Aristotelianism” (Anton C. Pegis, “General Introduction,” Saint Thomas Aquinas. On the Truth of the Catholic faith: “Summa Contra Gentiles.” Book One: God [Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Co., Image Books, 1955], p. 21).
  45. . Kenneth Scott Latourette, A History of Christianity (London: Eyre & Spottis‐woode, n.d.), p. 510.
  46. . Josef Pieper, Scholasticism: Personalities and Problems of Medieval Philosophy (New York: Pantheon Books, 1960), pp. 122–23.
  47. . Harry Emerson Fosdick, The Living of These Days (New York: Harper & Bros., 1956), p. vii, quoted in Kenneth Cauthen, The Impact of American Religious Liberalism (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), p. 27.
  48. . Pieper, p. 8.
  49. . Ibid., pp. 119–20.
  50. . Hebrews 12:1.
  51. . “Das ‘schlechthinige Abhängigkeitsgefühl' ist eine spekulativphilosophische Konstruktion, wir dürfen es nicht mil einer empirischpsychologischen Tatsache ver‐wechseln. Die Glaubenslehre nennt es selber ausdrücklich nur ein ‘postuliertes Selbstbewusstsein,' das an und für sich als wirkliches Bewusstsein nicht vorkommt” (Felix Flückiger, Philosophic und Theologie bei Schleiermacher [Zollikon‐Zürich: Evangelischer Verlag AG., 1947], p. 39).
  52. . Heick (n. 28 above), 2:180.
  53. . Heick calls Schleiermacher's theology “a religious psychology” (ibid.).
  54. . Tillich, Systematic Theology (n. 7 above), 1:60.
  55. . Mircea Eliade, “Paul Tillich and the History of Religions,” in Paul Tillich, The Future of Religions, ed. Jerald C. Brauer (New York: Harper & Row, 1966), p. 35.
  56. . Henry Nelson Wieman, The Wrestle of Religion with Truth (New York: Mac‐millan Co., 1927).
  57. . Robert Bruce Lindsay, The Role of Science in Civilization (New York: Harper & Row, 1963), p. 7.
  58. . Ibid., p. 197.
  59. . Friedrich Schleiermacher, On Religion: Speeches to its Cultured Despisers, trans. John Oman, with an introduction by Rudolf Otto (New York: Harper & Bros., 1958), p.1.
  60. . Francis Ellingwood Abbot, Scientific Theism, 3d ed. (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1888), p. 60.
  61. . Kenneth Cauthen, n. 47 above.
  62. . Abbot is quoting Ralph Waldo Emerson.
  63. . Abbot, pp. 217‐18.
  64. . Cf. Stow Persons, Free Religion: An American Faith (Boston: Beacon Press, 1947), pp. 52‐53, 151‐52.
  65. . Editorial, Zygon 1 (1966):1.